Khatib detailed his top four priorities as Minister of Intelligence in a briefing to the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. He pledged to “intelligently confront” the “main partners and movements of economic, social, culture, etc. corruption,” to make “maximum use of revolutionary forces in the minister with priority of revolutionary and hezbollahi [phrase for Islamic Republic supporters],” to “strengthen and activate hidden diplomacy for effective intelligence exchange, increase the system’s strategic depth and influence with allied countries inside and outside the region, and support Islamic movements, Hezbollah, and cooperate with the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Qods Force to strengthen the Resistance Front.” He also vowed to confront “the infiltrating movement in the government especially the country’s sensitive and vital centers and sites.”
In his speech in the Parliament, Khatib called for “transformation in the hidden intelligence formations” for the ministry to “produce intelligence and oversight in providing security and awareness issues in monitoring all aspects of complex and various security layers at the national, regional and global levels.”
Khatib’s tenure comes amid questions swirling significant intelligence failures in recent years, namely the assassination of military commander and nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and sabotages against nuclear facilities, acts carried out by Israel, which led to a blame game between MOIS and the IRGC.
Furthermore, in recent years, the ministry has been weakened compared to the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO). Overlapping responsibilities between MOIS and IRGC-IO have led to clashes that have spilled into the public. For example, MOIS disagreed with IRGC-IO when it arrested several environmentalists on espionage charges.
Khatib has cultivated deeper trust in Khamenei and his office, which have a symbiotic relationship with the IRGC. It remains unclear how Khatib would navigate the power struggle between the Islamic Republic’s competing intelligence organizations, but it would be hard to imagine the IRGC-IO losing ground anytime soon. In theory, Khatib could try to reduce friction between MOIS and IRGC-IO to increase efficiency in the face of external and internal threats, but overlapping responsibility inevitably leads to some fighting.
A significant difference between Khatib and his predecessor Mahmoud Alavi is that Khatib has actual experience in the ministry. Alavi admitted that he had no intelligence experience when former President Rouhani sought to appoint him. The intelligence ministry post is a negotiation, at best, between the Presidency and the Office of the Supreme Leader. Compared to all past intelligence ministers, Khatib comes in with the most hands-on experience.