Israel Struck Syria’s T-4 Base to Reinforce its Red Lines, and Hezbollah Unlikely to Launch a War

On April 9, at 3:25 AM, four Israel Air Force (IAF) jets entered Lebanese airspace from the Mediterranean, over the coastal town of Jounieh and headed eastwards toward Baalbek, near the Syrian-Lebanese border. Apparently, two of the jets broke off and returned to Israel around 3:35 AM. However, Russian Defense Ministry sources said that, while still in Lebanese airspace, the two other Israeli jets – F-15s – fired eight missiles at the Syrian regime’s T-4 Airbase in the Homs Governorate, just west of Palmyra. Russia claims Syrian air defenses intercepted five of the missiles. However, three missiles hit their targets in the western part of the base, killing 14 people, four to seven of them Iranians, and the remainder Syrians.

The Israeli strike came less than two days after the Syrian regime carried out a suspected chemical weapons attack on the city of Douma, in the north of Eastern Ghouta. The attack, which likely used nerve agents mixed with either pesticides or chlorine, killed at least 42 people, and 500 others – mostly women and children – were treated for exposure to chemical agents.

What Was Israel Thinking?

Israel stepped into the fray in the midst of rising international tensions over the suspected chemical attack in Douma, and likely heightened them by remaining silent regarding its responsibility for the April 9 strike on T-4. In fact, the Syrians initially thought the United States had carried out the strike, in a repeat of last April’s retaliatory U.S. bombing of Al-Shayrat airbase in the wake of the regime’s chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheikhoun.

But Israel’s timing was no coincidence, coming days after President Trump began calling for an imminent U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria. As the Israelis saw it, a rapid U.S. withdrawal would have strengthened the regime and Iran’s hand in Syria, and when the Douma attack happened, it confirmed their fears.

Jerusalem likely believed that the news of an imminent U.S. withdrawal emboldened Assad to carry out the chemical attack, and feared what could come next, especially since its own deterrence had been dented back in February when the Syrian regime’s air defenses shot down one of its F-16 jets. Israel therefore stepped into the fray on April 9 to reinforce its long-held “red lines” in Syria. It struck the T-4 base – where Iran is allegedly setting up an air force compound under its exclusive control –  to send the message that neither Assad nor any of his allies, particularly Iran and Hezbollah, should exploit the vacuum from the U.S. withdrawal to threaten the Jewish state.

What Will Iran Do?

Iran is now threatening to retaliate against Israel, having lost several of its nationals in the IAF’s strike on T-4. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian Supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s top adviser, vowed that “Israel’s crime…will not go unpunished.” Now, some observers are predicting that Iran may exploit the anticipated U.S. strike on Syria to unleash its proxy Hezbollah against Israel.

However, that is not likely to occur. First, it is worth considering that this is not the first time Iran has threatened furious retaliation against Israel. In the wake of the January 18, 2015 Israeli strike that killed the IRGC’s Brig. Gen. and Quds Force commander Mohammad Ali Allahdadi, alongside several Hezbollah commanders, including Jihad Mughniyeh and Mohamamd Issa, the IRGC’s commander Mohammad Ali Jafari threatened Israel with “devastating thunderbolts” in retaliation. Instead of the promised grand retaliation, 10 days later Hezbollah attacked an Israeli border patrol, killing two Israeli soldiers, and quickly sent the Israelis calming messages via intermediaries saying it did not want an escalation and that the matter was closed.

The pattern repeated itself when Hezbollah’s military commander Mustafa Badreddine was killed in an explosion in Syria. Iran and Hezbollah blamed Israel, and again threatened overwhelming retaliation. Days later, however, they opted to blame Sunni militants for his death, obviating the need for a strike against the Israelis.

Will Tehran and its star proxy again shy away from a large-scale confrontation with Israel? In short, it depends on the magnitude of the U.S. strike, if it happens at all. At the moment, Iran and Hezbollah are apprehensive about the impending potential U.S. strike and, along with Assad's army, have begun redeploying their forces in Syria out of harm’s way. Hezbollah, which has generally avoided its usual bellicose rhetoric over the past few days, is even rumored to have transferred many of its commanders to Lebanon, to protect them from a potential strike. Those don’t seem like the actions of a group that is preparing to launch a war against the Israelis.

Right now, Hezbollah and Iran are busy slowly laying the groundwork for a larger project in both Syria and Lebanon. As Nasrallah recently said in a leaked interview by pro-Iranian regime Farda News, his group is not fighting in Syria to protect Assad, but for the sake of Iran’s brand of Shiism and its regional project. They will not risk its hindrance or destruction over a one-off strike by the U.S. against the Assad regime. The likeliest scenario is that Iran will task Hezbollah to retaliate against the Israelis, but in a manner that is restrained and limited, to avoid leading to an escalation. The ball will then be in Israel’s court. It can either choose to accept the blow, as it did in January 2015, and consider the matter closed, or respond disproportionately and risk an escalation.

However, Iran’s calculus could change if the United States carries out a wide-scale attack on Iranian and Hezbollah assets in Syria, or if U.S. strikes on the Assad regime’s assets are devastating enough to threaten Tehran’s interests in the country. In that case, where the Islamic Republic’s back is pushed against the wall, it will have little to lose by ordering Hezbollah to open up a front against Israel, particularly if it can leverage such an action to pressure the U.S. and its allies to halt any attack on Syria.

David Daoud is a Research Analyst on Hezbollah and Lebanon at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).