UANI and its work

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)is a nonprofit and non-partisan policy organization formed to combat the threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. UANI educates the public, policymakers, and businesses about the danger posed by the Iranian regime and designs programs to ensure the regime’s economic and diplomatic isolation until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights violations. UANI is an issue-based coalition in which each coalition member has its own interests as well as the collective goal of advancing an Iran free of nuclear weapons. UANI’s distinguished Advisory Board is comprised of outstanding national figures representing all sectors of our country.

What is so bad about a nuclear Iran?

The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to American security interests, regional stability, and a danger to world peace. For decades, the United States and the international community have worked to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, believing that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian regime would directly threaten America’s allies in the Middle East, destabilize the region and present a security risk to the U.S., Europe, and other allies.

Furthermore, Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, through its financial and operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and others. The possibility that Iran could share its nuclear technology with extremist groups hostile to the United States and others should concern every American and be unacceptable to the community of nations.

Isn't Iran's nuclear program for peaceful purposes?

The Iranian regime has long insisted its nuclear activities, such as enriching uranium, are only for energy and not weapons. However, this is false and disingenuous. For 18 years, Iran’s nuclear program was kept secret, and in 2002, Iran’s covert program was exposed. Since then, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said it cannot consider Iran’s nuclear program as entirely civilian. In September 2009, Iran revealed to the IAEA the existence of a secret uranium enrichment facility (the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant) located near the city of Qom. Evidence indicates that construction began in 2006 and is capable of running approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Three thousand centrifuges are sufficient for producing quantities of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran’s refusal of several years to disclose this information to the IAEA casts significant doubt on the regime’s true motivation for its nuclear program. As early as 2008, Iran’s stockpile of 320 tons of uranium hexafluoride was enough fuel to make as many as 100 bombs.

In January 2010, Iran agreed to a fuel swap deal that would have required Iran to send the majority of its uranium stockpile abroad for enrichment. This would have deprived Iran of the amount of uranium necessary to build a nuclear weapon, but Iran reneged on the agreement. In June 2010, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, confirmed: “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the IAEA to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful activities.”

The international community correctly identified that if Iran truly wanted a peaceful nuclear program, outsourcing enrichment would make the process easier, as the Iranian government would be provided with a set supply of enriched uranium, eliminating the need for a difficult and expensive domestic enrichment program. By rejecting this deal, Iran sought to delay action by the international community and demonstrated its true intentions.

In April 2017, Chinese and Iranian ambassadors agreed to a cooperation deal to reconstruct the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor. Arak is especially concerning since the spent fuel from a heavy-water reactor is better suited for nuclear weapons than the plutonium produced by light water reactors like the one the Iranians are building at Bushehr. Iran says it will not separate the plutonium from the spent fuel and that the reactor will be used for the civilian purpose of producing medical isotopes. Still, Iran already has a research reactor with unused capacity that is capable of producing medical isotopes. Experts have pointed out that the Arak facility is much larger than necessary for that purpose.

In January 2018, Israel’s Mossad intelligence service seized over 50,000 pages of documents from a warehouse in Tehran that contained Iran’s clandestine nuclear archive. According to The New York Times, the documents confirmed what inspectors from the IAEA had suspected, “Despite Iranian instance that its program was for peaceful purposes, the country had worked in the past to systematically assemble everything it needed to produce atomic weapons.”

When will Iran have a nuclear weapon?

The JCPOA preserved the fundamental elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and placed only limited, temporary, and reversible constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. By simply waiting for certain constraints to expire under the terms of the JCPOA, Tehran can emerge as a threshold nuclear weapons state. As a result of the sunset provisions, the JCPOA provided Iran with patient but inevitable pathways to nuclear weapons capability.

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the U.S. would withdraw from the JCPOA. Following U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iranian officials have abandoned Iran’s commitments and resumed nuclear activities that exceed the JCPOA limits.  Since June 2019, Iran has increased the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile and has ignored restrictions on advanced centrifuge research and development. Iran has also restarted enrichment operations at the Fordow facility. In January 2021, Iran announced it had begun enriching uranium at 20% purity, and in April 2021, Iran said it has begun enriching uranium at 60% purity for the first time. Some experts suggest, if the total is enriched to weapons-grade – 90% purity – Iran would have enough material for three weapons.

What we do

  1. Heighten awareness nationally and internationally about the grave threat that a nuclear-armed Iran poses to the region and the world;
  2. Educate the public, policymakers, and businesses about the nature of the Iranian regime, including its desire and intent to possess nuclear weapons, as well as Iran’s role as the leading state sponsor of global terrorism and a major violator of human rights at home and abroad;
  3. Design programs to ensure the regime’s economic and diplomatic isolation until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights violations;
  4. Through a vast private correspondence operation, targeted public campaigns, and deep original research, UANI counsels, cautions, and compels all existing and would-be commercial partners, highlighting the myriad severe legal, financial and reputational risks of Iran business;
  5. Mobilize public support, utilize media outreach, and call upon elected leaders to voice a united American opposition to a nuclear Iran;
  6. Lay the groundwork for effective U.S. policies in coordination with European and other allies;
  7. Promote efforts that focus on vigorous national and international, social, economic, political, and diplomatic measures.

How can I donate to UANI?

You can make a donation online or contact UANI for additional information.

How do I contact UANI?

You can call UANI at 212-922-0063, fax to 212-682-1238 or send an email to
[email protected]