UANI Report Provides Iranian Protesters with Key Intelligence on Regime Suppressive Apparatus

• Leaked Iranian Intelligence Reveals IRGC’s Playbook for Suppressing Demonstrations in Iran
• UANI Report Exposes Hidden Command Structures, Bases, Operational Units and Their Capabilities to Iranian People
• UANI Unveils Key IRGC Suppressive Tactics, Methods and Deployment on the Streets of Iran    

Using primary Farsi-language material obtained from inside Iran—including internal documentation from within the IRGC’s Tharallah Headquarters and its sub-headquarters—UANI’s paper provides Iranians on the streets with critical intelligence on the regime’s hidden repressive architecture. It reveals, for the first time, the ecosystem of the most critical and life-preserving organ in the regime’s security and suppressive apparatus.

(New York, NY) – As protests continue across Iran—prompting President Trump’s historic warning of U.S. intervention if the regime kills protesters—a new report by United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) provides the first comprehensive assessment of the Islamic Republic’s primary internal security apparatus: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Tharallah Headquarters – the nerve center of the regime’s repression in Tehran and across Iran.

Authored by Saeid Golkar and Kasra Aarabi, The Tharallah Headquarters Unveiled: The Hidden Infrastructure Blocking Regime Change in Iran, for the first time, reveals the extensive nature and capabilities of the IRGC’s suppressive apparatus right down to the granular level—and how it operates. This includes:

• The operations of Tharallah Headquarters;
• The locations of its extensive suppressive apparatus right down to the neighborhood level;
• Command structures;
• Key suppressive battalions, their capabilities and how they operate;
• Tactical and on-the-ground deployment during times of unrest.

All of the data is based on primary material acquired from inside Tharallah Headquarters and its sub-headquarters. ‎

The report finds that the fate of the current protests will depend not solely on the scale of the unrest or international pressure, but on how effectively the regime activates its coercive machinery—and how successfully that machinery contains fragmentation within the security elite itself. At the center of that machinery is the Tharallah Headquarters.

THE THARALLAH HQ’S INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

Since 2007, the IRGC has decentralized its organizational structure through the establishment of its Provincial Guards, which operate under the control of the 11 IRGC security-military headquarters. These Provincial Guards serve as military commanders for their respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij bases within their areas. The Tharallah Headquarters oversees three Provincial Guards for Tehran and Alborz Province. UANI’s report reveals among these three Provincial Guards, the IRGC’s Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran is the most critical and Tehran’s main IRGC force.

The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps operates a main staff base on Niayesh Highway in the north of Tehran. The UANI report identifies 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases, each located in one of Tehran’s 22 municipality regions, operating under its command. These 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases—the locations of which are in UANI’s report—have been at the forefront of the brutal massacre on the Iranian streets.

The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah’s 300 Basij District Bases spread across Tehran city’s 123 municipality districts. The report also exposes 3000 Basij Neighborhood Bases which exist across Tehran’s 375 neighborhoods.

THE BATTALIONS, UNITS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES

With the goal of supporting the Iranian protesters, UANI’s report unveils the key battalions and units suppressing the demonstrations, as well as their capabilities.

This includes the two key security brigades spearheading the bloodshed on the streets: the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade, located in the northeast of Tehran, and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade, located in Tehran District 11 (southeast Tehran).

In addition to these security brigades, UANI identifies five key security units and their capabilities: the Imam Hadi Unit; the Imam Sajjad Unit; the Imam Hussain-Mojtaba Unit; the Imam Reza Unit; and the Saheb al-Zaman Unit.

UANI’s report informs Iranian protesters that these five security units have three teams apiece, each with ten motorbikes manned by two recruits. In other words, each security unit has 60 motorbike riders (see case study in full report).

Each security force combines both IRGC and Basij members. For example, the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade each have five IRGC battalions comprised of full-time IRGC special security forces with distinct security insignia. They command several Imam Ali Basij Security units, comprising 70 to 150 recruits.

THARALLAH HQ: OPERATIONS AND SITUATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

The report reveals how the regime manages unrest and deploys its assets through a national-security framework built around four situational threat levels: White (normal), Yellow (abnormal), Orange (extraordinary), and Red (critical).

This tiered model governs the escalation of repression—from routine monitoring and police-led responses to mass Basij mobilization and, in Red situations, the transfer of full security authority to the Tharallah Headquarters. Under a Red (critical) threat level, Tehran is effectively transformed into a militarized zone, with the Tharallah Headquarters exercising complete control over Tehran. In doing so, all policymaking bodies (such as the Tehran municipality and city council), organizations (including banks), and operational units—including the police, Basij, IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps, intelligence bodies, such as the Office of Tehran Intelligence, Herasat networks, and even some religious associations—fall under its authority.

Using internal IRGC documentation, the report also exposes how the Tharallah Headquarters suppresses unrest in practice, including by:

• Activation of motorbike units early in moments of unrest, using fast-moving, two-person teams to disrupt and disperse gatherings before they can grow. This approach is described in the report as a “hit-and-run tool for fast, cheap, and brutal repression and intimidation.”
• Deploying snipers across rooftops close to rioting areas. Primary documents obtained from the IRGC, and included in the report, reveal that Imam Ali Battalions deploy “snipers to target [protest] leaders” across rooftops close to rioting areas.
• Using criminal elements alongside Basij units to carry out irregular violence and intimidation against protesters. The report cites Imam Ali Units as recruiting “criminals and thugs who often act with greater brutality, spreading fear and discouraging dissent.”
• Dispatching plainclothes intelligence patrols to identify protest ringleaders for arrest during or after protests. The report also finds that “ambushes in security and protection zones” will be initiated in key areas, including locations associated with military and government facilities.
• The activation of unconventional assets: From covert movement of IRGC units via civilian vehicles to deploying religious and mourning associations (the Heyat network) to bolster suppressive apparatus manpower on the streets. 
• Running detention and interrogation processes in parallel, including those outside the formal prison system, where detainees are subjected to coercive interrogations and forced confessions. The report exposes Detention Center Alef-1, a facility located in eastern Tehran, where “the use of beatings and other methods to obtain forced confessions…is unprecedented.”

To view a copy of the report, please click HERE.

UANI CEO Ambassador Mark D. Wallace said:

“UANI stands with the people of Iran as they fight to reclaim their country. They are mounting a historic uprising against the Ayatollah and his forces of tyranny. This report aims to support the Iranian people with information gleaned from leaked documents revealing aspects of the IRGC’s apparatus of oppression.”

Kasra Aarabi, Research Director IRGC, UANI said:

“Our goal through publishing this report, which exposes the hidden suppressive infrastructure of the IRGC, is to support the heroic Iranian people on the streets. The intelligence made public today aims to positively contribute to their ambitions to topple the Ayatollah regime and minimize the civilian casualties by revealing the key suppressive headquarters, units, their capabilities and how they operate. Through the release of this sensitive data, we hope it will undermine the regime’s brutal killing machine’s ability to spill blood on the streets of Iran.” 

Dr Saeid Golkar, Senior Advisor, UANI and co-author of the report said:

“This research provides critical insights to the brave men and women in Iran who are fighting for freedom against the Ayatollah’s Islamist dictatorship. It details the Tharallah Headquarters’ coordination with intelligence, military, and paramilitary forces to repress dissent rapidly. Through mapping command structures and threat-response tactics, it reveals how the regime adapts to varying levels of unrest. Our goal through releasing this data is to support the Iranian people to counter the IRGC’s suppressive apparatus.”

About United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and countering the malign activities of the Islamic Republic.

About the Authors

Dr. Saeid Golkar is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and serves as the UC Foundation Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Tehran University, obtained in 2008, and moved to the United States in 2010. Golkar has held research and teaching positions at prestigious institutions such as Stanford University and Northwestern University.

Kasra Aarabi is the Director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). He is a specialist on Iran’s military, security and intelligence apparatus, as well as Shi’a extremism. Previously, he served as the Iran Program Lead at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and as an advisor on Iran to the Executive Chairman, former British Prime Minister Sir Tony Blair. He was also a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.