

THE THARALLAH (SARALLAH) HEADQUARTERS UNVEILED

THE HIDDEN
INFRASTRUCTURE
BLOCKING REGIME
CHANGE IN IRAN.

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REPORT BY:
SAEID GOLKAR
AND KASRA AARABI

ABOUT UANI

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a nonprofit and non-partisan policy organization formed to combat the threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

OUR MISSION

UANI educates the public, policymakers, and businesses about the danger posed by the Iranian regime and designs programs to ensure the regime's economic and diplomatic isolation until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights violations.

AUTHOR BIOS

Saeid Golkar is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and serves as the UC Foundation Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Tehran University, obtained in 2008, and moved to the United States in 2010. Golkar has held research and teaching positions at prestigious institutions such as Stanford University and Northwestern University. His expertise lies in international and comparative politics with a focus on authoritarian regimes, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. He is also recognized as an expert on the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His book, *Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Post-revolutionary Iran* (Columbia University Press, 2015), received the Silver Medal Prize from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has extensive media experience in broadcast, print and online including BBC, CNN, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal.

Follow him @SaeidGolkar

Kasra Aarabi is the Director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). He is a specialist on Iran's military security, and intelligence apparatus, as well as Shi'a extremism. Previously, he served as the Iran Program Lead at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and as an advisor on Iran to the Executive Chairman, former British Prime Minister Sir Tony Blair. He was also a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. Kasra is regularly sought after for counsel by governments, policymakers, military officials, and non-governmental organizations. He has testified on Iran before multiple parliaments and is a frequent contributor to international media. Kasra is a native Persian (Farsi) speaker and holds an MA (with Distinction) in International Relations and a BA (First Class) in International Politics, both from King's College London. He is currently pursuing a PhD at the University of St Andrews, where his research focuses on the IRGC.

Follow him @KasraAarabi

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01

INTRODUCTION

The protests unfolding in Iran in the winter of 2025–26 must be understood within the longer cycle of contention and repression that has shaped state–society relations over the past decade. The demonstrations take place against the backdrop of heightened regional tensions with Israel and U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s warning that America would intervene if the regime kills protesters. The Islamic Republic has used this context to frame domestic dissent as a security threat rather than the expression of social or political grievances. This external environment has allowed the state to securitize protest more quickly and to justify extraordinary coercive measures using the language of national defense and resistance.

These demonstrations also follow a familiar pattern established during earlier waves of unrest in 2017, 2019, and 2022. Each of those episodes resulted from different immediate triggers—ranging from economic grievances to moral and social outrage—yet all were ultimately met with overwhelming repression. The regime did not rely solely on ad hoc violence. Instead, it activated a well-developed system of surveillance, coordination, and coercion that allowed it to fragment protest networks, deter sustained popular mobilization, and reassert control over public spaces. The repeated suppression of these movements has produced a protest cycle marked by resilience at the societal level and by institutional learning at the regime level.

To assess whether the current protests may succeed or fail, and to understand how the Islamic Republic is likely to respond, one must examine the central pillar of the regime's internal security architecture: the Tharallah Headquarters. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) primary command structure for security in Tehran and, by extension, for crisis management nationwide, the Tharallah Headquarters functions as the regime's operational brain during moments of unrest. It coordinates intelligence, policing, Basij militia, IRGC units, and psychological operations, ensuring that repression is not improvised but calibrated. Any analysis that ignores this institution risks misreading both the limits of protest and the durability of authoritarian control.

Ultimately, the fate of the current protest wave will not be determined solely by public anger or international pressure. It will depend on how effectively the regime activates its coercive machinery and how successfully that machinery contains fragmentation within the security elite itself. Understanding the Tharallah Headquarters' role is therefore essential not only for evaluating the present moment but also for explaining why previous uprisings failed to produce systemic change and why the Islamic Republic continues to survive despite recurring crises.

Despite the Tharallah Headquarters' function as the most critical cog in the IRGC's security and suppressive apparatus, there is virtually no insight or intelligence on how it operates, not least during times of unrest.

This is precisely the research gap this United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) report intends to fill.

Using primary Farsi-language material and intelligence obtained from inside Iran—including internal documentation from within the Tharallah Headquarters and its sub-headquarters—this paper will, for the first time, reveal the ecosystem of the most critical and life-preserving organ in the regime's security and suppressive apparatus.

In doing so, this paper will identify and expose:

- Key infrastructure and assets—from mapping its operational headquarters sub-branches, and vast apparatus spanning Tehran's regional zones, municipality districts, and neighborhood districts, to exposing its key suppression units and how the Tharallah Headquarters divides Tehran's municipality districts.
- Internal structures—from identifying key personnel and directorates to shedding light on how these structures practically function and coordinate.
- Operational units, capabilities, and distribution of units.
- Strategic calculus and operations—from its strategic rationale to suppression strategies and tactics during different security levels and on-the-ground unit arrangements during unrest.
- Tactical on-the-ground deployment.

THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: FROM INCEPTION TO TODAY

The strategic importance of Tehran to the regime's survival, particularly during times of protest, has long influenced the IRGC's security approach. Iran's protest history shows that regime change has always been city-led. The IRGC's conclusion: control over Tehran is existential. This logic underpinned the creation of the Tharallah Headquarters, the regime's key national security body. As Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor to the supreme leader and the first commander of the Tharallah Headquarters, has stated: "The security of Tehran is, in fact, the security of Iran." ¹

KHAMENEI'S LEADERSHIP AND EARLY UNREST

Established in 1995, the Tharallah Headquarters emerged following unrest in Tehran and a 1992 drill that revealed the capital could fall in just two hours.² Compared to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's reign as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's leadership faced broader unrest, spurred by his lack of charisma and a population worn out by war and economic hardship. He has increasingly relied on the IRGC to maintain his power.

THE URBAN-POOR RIOTS, 1991-1995

Economic liberalization under President Hashemi Rafsanjani led to inflation, triggering urban riots. Violent unrest in Mashhad (1991) and Qazvin (1994) saw deadly force used by ill-equipped IRGC units.³ However, the final straw came after the 1995 Eslamshahr riots, sparked by soaring inflation, which prompted the complete recalibration of security policies in Tehran.

FORMATION AND ROLE OF THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS

In response, the IRGC created the Tharallah Headquarters to hold full security authority over Tehran during times of crisis, which the IRGC defines as “threats against the regime or the interests of the Islamic Revolution.”⁴ In such times, the interior ministry's National Security Council (SHAK) mandates that the Tharallah Headquarters to assume full authority over Tehran Province and all security entities in that province—including the police, Basij, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the IRGC—and their resources are brought under its command and control. Its formation was designed to professionalize and centralize suppression.

1999 STUDENT PROTESTS

The Tharallah Headquarters' first test would take place under the presidency of the so-called “reformist” President Mohammad Khatami, following student protests in July 1999 after the closure of the *Salaam* newspaper. With police unable to neutralize the unrest, on July 14, SHAK mandated that the Tharallah Headquarters take control of Tehran's security. This would result in IRGC divisions mobilizing throughout 20 nights to crush the protests. While authority was given for the Tharallah Headquarters to intervene on July 14, its intelligence operatives had been on the ground monitoring the protests from the outset. In 2004, when reformist members of Iran's Sixth Parliament protested the Guardian Council's widespread disqualification of reformist candidates for the 2004 parliamentary elections, the IRGC ground forces commander instructed Tharallah Headquarters to suppress the peaceful sit-in by the reformist members of Parliament.⁵

2009 GREEN MOVEMENT

The outbreak of major nationwide protests following the rigged 2009 presidential elections saw SHAK hand over Tehran to the Tharallah Headquarters. The Headquarters used all available assets and resources to suppress the demonstrations, including obtaining the facilities of Iran's notorious Evin Prison. The IRGC's satisfactory performance in quelling the unrest led Khamenei to reward it with greater powers: its Intelligence Directorate was upgraded to full organization status. The aftermath of the protests also led to the creation of the IRGC security units, comprising the IRGC and Basij forces. In 2010, the Tharallah Headquarters' geographical boundaries expanded beyond Tehran to encompass the province of Alborz. The Tharallah Headquarters also established four sub-headquarters—Nadr, Qods, Fath, and Ghadr—throughout Tehran to streamline the coordination of its forces.

2017–18 DEY PROTESTS

Starting in Mashhad, the “Dey Protests” marked the first major unrest driven by Iran's working class across smaller cities. Although the disturbance in Tehran was limited and police managed it, the Tharallah Headquarters monitored the protests but did not intervene. Afterwards, it began focusing on “slum dwellers” as a rising threat. Consequently, the IRGC launched projects to address widespread economic grievances.

2019 BLODDY NOVEMBER

A gas hike in November 2019 led to nationwide protests, with demonstrators explicitly calling for regime collapse. The Tharallah Headquarters, led by IRGC Commander Esmail Kowsari, seized control of Tehran and its suburbs just three days after the unrest was sparked. It would order a complete internet shutdown, and its forces killed at least 1,500 protesters. The protests led to more professionalization, with IRGC security units gaining distinct ranks. Until 2019, all IRGC security units in Tehran shared the same rank insignia of the Guards' Intelligence Organization. However, after the 2019 protests, the IRGC's security units obtained their own rank insignia, indicating the further professionalization and organization of these units as a distinct force within the Guards' security-intelligence apparatus. In 2020, Hossein Nejat took command of the Tharallah Headquarters and identified poor urban populations and cyberspace threats as among the most pressing concerns.


2022 WOMAN, LIFE, FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Despite the regime's focus on shantytowns, protests erupted in September 2022 after Mahsa Amini died in the custody of the morality police. The movement spread to over 100 municipalities, including major unrest in Tehran. The Tharallah Headquarters, again under Nejat, assumed complete control. It deployed new strategies and tactics, detailed later in this paper, based on original IRGC internal materials.

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS COMMANDERS FROM PAST TO PRESENT



Yahya Rahim-Safavi
1995–1997




Ali Fazli
1997–1999



Mohammad Ali Jafari
1999–2005



Mohammad Reza Zahedi
2000–2006



Mohammad Ali Hejazi
2007–June 2009



Hossein Hamedani
June 2009–August 2009



Mehdi Rabbani
September 2009–2012



Mohsen Kazemini
2012–2017



General Esmaeil Kowsari
2017–2019




General Hossein Nejat
2019–present

IRGC THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

The Tharallah Headquarters, like the 10 other security-military headquarters, falls within the structure of the IRGC Ground Forces. Tharallah operates as the Guards' primary security headquarters.⁶

IRGC STRUCTURE



IRGC PROVINCIAL GUARD AND SECURITY HEADQUARTERS ⁷

Province	IRGC Provincial Guard	Operational Headquarters
Kurdistan	Sepah-e Beit al-Muqaddas	Hamze-ye Sayyed al-Shohada
West Azerbaijan	Sepah-e Shohada	
Ardabil	Sepah-e Hazrat-e Abbas	Ashura
East Azerbaijan	Sepah-e Ashura	
Zanjan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Mahdi	
Hamedan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Hossein	Najaf-e Ashraf
Ilam	Sepah-e Amir al-Momenin	
Kermanshah	Sepah-e Nabi Akram	
Markazi	Sepah-e Ruhollah	Saheb al-Zaman
Qazvin	Sepah-e Saheb al-Amr	
Qom	Sepah-e Ali bin Abu Taleb	
Semnan	Sepah-e Ghaem al-Muhammad	
Gilan	Sepah-e Qods	Ghadir
Golestan	Sepah-e Neynavā	
Mazandaran	Sepah-e Karbala	
Khuzestan	Sepah-e Vali-ye Asr	Karbala
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad	Sepah-e Fath	
Lorestan	Sepah-e Abolfazl	
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	Sepah-e Ghambar Bani Hashem	Sayyed al-Shohada
Isfahan	Sepah-e Saheb al-Zaman	
Yazd	Sepah-e al-Ghadir	
Razavi Khorasan	Sepah-e Imam Reza	Samen al-Aeme
North Khorasan	Sepah-e Javad al-Aeme	
South Khorasan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Reza	
Bushehr	Sepah-e Imam Sadeq	Madineh-ye al-Munavareh
Fars	Sepah-e Fajr	
Hormozgan	Sepah-e Imam Sajjad	
Kerman	Sepah-e Sarallah	Qods
Sistan and Baluchestan	Sepah-e Salman	
Alborz	Sepah-e Imam Hassan Mojtaba	Tharallah
Tehran province	Sepah-e Sayyed al-Shohada	
Tehran city	Sepah-e Muhammad Rasoul Allah	

THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS' INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

Since 2007, the IRGC has decentralized through the establishment of its Provincial Guards, which operate under the control of the 11 IRGC security-military headquarters. These Provincial Guards serve as military commanders for their respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij bases within their areas. The Tharallah Headquarters oversees three Provincial Guards for Tehran and Alborz Province. These include the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran City, the IRGC Seyyed Ol Shuhada Corps in other cities within Tehran Province, and the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps in Alborz Province.

THE IRGC'S MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH CORPS

Among these three Provincial Guards, the IRGC's Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran is the most critical and Tehran's main IRGC force. Created in 2007, it is responsible for maintaining the political order in Tehran city from hard threats (either external or civil conflict), semi-hard threats (domestic protests and uprisings), and soft threats (such as cultural and societal ones).

The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps operates a main staff base on Niayesh Highway in the north of Tehran. It has also established 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases (*nahiyeh*), each located in one of Tehran's 22 municipality regions. The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps also operates two regional bases across Tehran's first municipality region. These regional bases are responsible for preserving order and security in their respective municipality regions from hard, semi-hard, and soft threats.



Map of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah 23 Basij Regional Bases (*nahiyah*)⁸

THE IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH 23 BASIJ REGIONAL BASES (NAHIYAH)

- 1st Tehran municipality region: Jamaran Basij Resistance Regional Base
 - Mahalati Township: Amir al-Momenin Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 2nd Tehran municipality region: Bahoner Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 3rd Tehran municipality region: Muftah Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 4th Tehran municipality region: Karbala Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 5th Tehran municipality region: Quds Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 6th Tehran municipality region: Valiasr Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 7th Tehran municipality region: Motahari Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 8th Tehran municipality region: Beheshti Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 9th Tehran municipality region: Hamzah Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 10th Tehran municipality region: Moqdad Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 11th Tehran municipality region: Salman Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 12th Tehran municipality region: Khomeini Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 13th Tehran municipality region: Kamil Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 14th Tehran municipality region: Mahalati Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 15th Tehran municipality region: Malik Ashtar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 16th Tehran municipality region: Rajaei Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 17th Tehran municipality region: Habib Ibn Mazher Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 18th Tehran municipality region: Muslim Ibn Aqeel Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 19th Tehran municipality region: Abu Dhar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- The 20th Tehran municipality region is outside of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's jurisdiction
- 21st Tehran municipality region: Maysam Tamar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 22nd Tehran municipality region: Amariasar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- Lavasanat and Rudbar Qasran: Al-Ghadir Basij Resistance Regional Base – This regional base is in the northeast of Tehran city but falls under the jurisdiction of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah.

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH'S BASIJ DISTRICT BASES (HOWZEH)

In the vertical command structure, beneath the regional base level, lies the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's 300 Basij District Bases (*howzeh*). These are spread across Tehran city's 123 municipality districts.

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH'S BASIJ'S NEIGHBORHOOD BASES (MAHALAAT)

The final layer in the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's vertical structure is the Basij's Neighborhood Bases (*mahalaat*). In total, 3000 Basij Neighborhood Bases exist across Tehran's 375 neighborhoods.

CASE STUDY 1ST TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY REGION: JAMARAN BASIJ RESISTANCE REGIONAL BASE

For example, Tehran's 1st municipality region, under the Jamaran Basij regional base, has eight Basij District Bases (*howzehs*). This municipality region has a total of 32 Basij resistance bases (*mahalaat*) spread throughout the area.



Basij District Base Zones in District 1 Tehran controlled by the
Basij Jamaran Regional Base

DISTRICT 1 IS CONTROLLED BY JAMARAN REGIONAL BASE (NAYIHEH). SOME OF THESE DISTRICTS INCLUDE:


1. Basij District Base 131: Basij Jundullah Base / Martyr Chamran Base / Martyr Valenjak / Martyr Modares
2. Basij District Base 132 Tayybin (only for women): Masjid al-Nabi / Kotsar / Shahid Bakri Basij base
3. Basij District Base 133 Tariq al-Quds: Bases of Azam / Sahib al-Zaman / Defenders of the Province / Wali Asr / Sayed Al-Shahda / Velayat Faqih / Ammar / Tharullah
4. Basij District Base 134 of Sabrin (only for women): Wilayat / Zahra/ Seyd al-Shohda bases
5. Basij 136 Base Mansurin area (only for women): Ansar / Alawi (Hazrat Zahra) / Qaim bases
6. Basij District Base 137 of Ramadan: Martyrs' bases of Jamaran / Imam Khomeini / Wahdat / Shahid Timuri / Shahid Bahnar / Imam Hassan Mojtabi / Walfajr

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH OPERATIONAL WINGS

IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah has two operational wings: an infantry branch and a security branch.

MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH INFANTRY BRANCH

The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps’ infantry branch is the 27th Division (or Lashkar-e 27 in Farsi), comprising five IRGC infantry battalions of full-time IRGC members. It also has an additional 22 Basij Imam Hussain Infantry Units. These units are composed of active Basij members who are paid IRGC employees. Theoretically, each IRGC-Basij Resistance Regional Base (*nahiyah*), such as the Jamaran Regional Base, has at least one Imam Hussein Infantry Unit.



While these forces are primarily composed of infantry units focused on external rather than domestic threats, they are integrated into the security and suppression apparatus during times of protest or domestic crises.

In addition to the Basij Imam Hussein Infantry Battalions, the 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Brigade also commands the Fateheen Basij Unit (*yegan-e fateheen-e basij*), which operates as the Basij’s special infantry force—the most critical Basij infantry force. According to reports, there are at least four Basij Fateheen special unit battalions in Tehran.⁹

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH SECURITY BRANCH

The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Security branch is the main operational security force for Greater Tehran. It has established two key security brigades: the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade, located in the northeast of Tehran, and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade, located in Tehran District 11.¹⁰

In addition to these security brigades, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Security Branch also has five security units (bigger than battalions, but smaller than brigades):

1. Imam Hadi Unit.
2. Imam Sajjad Unit
3. Imam Hussain-Mojtaba Unit
4. Imam Reza Unit
5. Saheb al-Zaman Unit.

These five security units have three teams apiece, each with ten motorbikes manned by two recruits. In other words, each security unit has 60 motorbike riders (see case study). Each security force combines both IRGC and Basij members. For example, the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade each have five IRGC battalions comprised of full-time IRGC special security forces with distinct security insignia. They command several Imam Ali Basij Security units, comprising 70 to 150 recruits.

Founded after the 2009 Green Movement protests, the primary mission of these units is to address security threats, making them the most prominent Basij unit for handling anti-riot operations. Each IRGC-Basij Resistance Regional Base (*nahyiheh*) is required to have at least one Imam Ali Unit, which receives orders from the Guards' security branches. These security units specialize in suppressing urban protests and are equipped primarily with anti-riot gear, including shields, batons, paintball guns, shotguns, pepper spray, and casket hats.

The Imam Ali Units comprise active Basij members between the ages of 15 and 30 who have received training from the IRGC's security brigades for neighborhood-suppression operations. Regarding logistics and training, they are all under the control of the Imam Ali Central Headquarters, which oversees all the Imam Ali Units nationwide. According to some reports, the Imam Ali Units have also recruited criminals and thugs who often act with greater brutality, spreading fear and discouraging dissent.

Each Imam Ali Unit has a motorcycle division that has been utilized for psychological intimidation through irregular violence. Similar to the Basij special infantry unit, the Fatheen (located at the Resistance Village in East Tehran; [click here for location](#)), a new Basij special security force, the Navab Unit, has also been established in recent years. The Navab Unit comprises the most highly trained and skilled active Basij members specializing in protest-suppression methods.


Every unit within the Mohammad Rasulullah Security branch consists of several teams, including: barrier teams, responsible for blocking and/or separating protesters from the rest of the people; motorized assault teams, tasked with attacking protesters at the right time, when the barrier and separation work have been done well; pursuit teams, whose job is pursuing and arresting individuals identified as protest leaders; documentation teams, in charge of filming protests and identifying their leaders; intelligence teams that specialize in infiltrating protests, intelligence gathering, and identifying the protest leaders; and interrogation teams, in charge of conducting initial and street interrogations as well as separating important detainees from unimportant ones.

MOTORBIKE UNIT CASE STUDY

Primary documents from the Imam Ali Security Central Headquarters reveal key details on the deployment, formation, and tactics used by the motorbike units within the battalion. The motorbike units within the Imam Ali Security Battalions are fast-moving, two-person teams designed for suppressing protests. One person drives, while the other rides with a baton, a taser, pellet guns, or even launchers. They are part of the Basij's security frontline response when unrest breaks out, especially in big cities like Tehran, Shiraz, or Mashhad.



These teams are trained for speed, intimidation, psychological operations, and crowd disruption. Their main job is to scatter crowds before they grow. By weaving through alleys, flanking protest groups, and circling demonstrators, they aim to cause panic and confusion. The internal manuals from the Imam Ali Security Battalion Headquarters outline the deployment formation of these motorcycle units. According to these internal documents, “the best formation during the motorcycle parade to display the number of riders is a two-column formation.” It also states that “the speed of the column should be low so that the column remains exposed to public view for a longer time.”



The presence of the motorbike units is loud, aggressive, and meant to show control. To wage what it calls “psychological warfare” against protestors, the Imam Ali Security Battalion internal manuals call on motorbike units to “deliberately create loud noise and sounds [from their motorbikes] to create psychological warfare.”

(۱۱) ایجاد سرو صدا توسط موتورسیکلت: یکی از عواملی که می توان توسط موتورسیکلت برای ایجاد جنگ روانی انجام داد ایجاد سرو صدا توسط موتورسیکلت می باشد:

Likewise, the motorbike units are instructed to “turn on motorcycle headlights to inflict psychological warfare against rioters” during their deployment suppressive parades.

(۵) روشن نمودن چراغ ها در هنگام حرکت: یکی از روش هایی که در بالا بردن اقتدار گردان در هنگام رژه موتوری نقش دارد، روشن کردن چراغ های موتورسیکلت ها بوده که ایجاد جنگ روانی در بین اغتشاش گران می کند.

Motorbike units were heavily used during the November 2019 protests, when the regime responded with brutal force. They have also been deployed in their numbers during the ongoing winter 2026 protests. Videos from that time show swarms of bikes chasing down protesters, even running them off roads. They are often deployed first, ahead of riot police or heavier security units such as the Imam Hossein Battalions.

Command for these units comes from the local IRGC and the Tharallah Headquarters. They are often called up in what is known as a “yellow” security alert during the early phases of unrest.

Despite receiving criticism and condemnations from human rights groups and the broader Iranian population, the Imam Ali Battalion’s—not least its lethal motorcycle units—have been expanding and intensifying their repression, which is visible in the ongoing winter 2026 protests in Iran. In short, motorbike units are the Basij’s hit-and-run tool for fast, cheap, and brutal repression and intimidation, aimed at keeping people off the streets.



THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS, OPERATIONS AND SITUATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

To control Tehran and manage its security forces, the Tharallah Headquarters has established four operational sub-headquarters, dividing Tehran into four sections: Quds (northwest Tehran), Nasr (northeast Tehran), Fath (southwest Tehran), and Ghadr (southeast and central Tehran).

Each sub-headquarters oversees several districts within the Tehran Municipality and coordinates with various IRGC security units and brigades in those districts. Each sub-headquarters coordinates between IRGC and Basij forces across the districts that fall within its remit.


Crucially, the sub-headquarters operate as the key command and coordinating link to the main Tharallah Headquarters.

Quds Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising North and Northwest Tehran, specifically covering the municipality districts of 2, 5, 21, and 22. Its central operational units are the Imam Hadi and Imam Sajjad Security Units.

Fath Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Southwest Tehran, specifically covering the municipality districts 9, 10, 17, and 18. Its central operational unit is the Imam Reza Security Unit.

Nasr Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Northeast Tehran, specifically covering municipality districts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. Its central operational units are the Ale-e Mohammad Security Brigade and Saehb-e Alzaman Security Unit.

Ghadr Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Southeast Tehran, specifically covering districts 10, 11, 12, 16, 19, and 20. Its central operational units are the Al Zahra Security Brigade and Imam Hasan Security Unit.



Tehran's Tharallah zoning, showing operational command areas ¹¹

THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: OPERATIONS & SITUATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

According to official security documentation, the Islamic Republic has four national-security situational threat levels, codenamed:

White (*vaziat-e sefid*), Yellow (*vaziat-e zard*), Orange (*vaziat-e narenji*), and Red (*vaziat-e ghermez*).¹²

1. **White (normal):** No incidents, intelligence, or evidence indicate disruption of public order or threats to the internal security of the regime. During this situation, “enemies of the Islamic Revolution” and their affiliated elements are not carrying out open and public activities—except “propaganda measures”—against the security of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic’s security doctrine describes the White level as a “normal situation or situation that is under control... [where] the possibility of threats from enemies is weak or very weak.”
2. **Yellow (abnormal):** There are signs of public disorder, and small, localized groups may initiate uncoordinated anti-security activities. According to official documentation, Yellow status is characterized by a perceived threat level ranging from low to medium, with the situation still considered controllable. The anticipated consequences are expected to remain manageable. Examples of potential unrest include labor strikes at factories and other workplaces.
3. **Orange (extraordinary):** A phase of large-scale, coordinated anti-regime actions, both armed and unarmed, that have become organized and disruptive. The actions of “gathering elements” escalate from a calm state into protests, riots, and acts such as road blockades and attacks on government, military, or other sensitive sites. In response, the IRGC’s Provincial Guards become active, deploying Basij units—including the Imam Hussein, Imam Ali, Bayt al-Muqaddas, and local Basij neighborhood forces—across provinces to restore control.
4. **Red (critical):** A shift to a revolutionary phase, where opposition forces have expanded in both organization and geographic scope. Armed resistance, including the use of firearms or improvised explosive devices—such as Molotov cocktails—emerges, and protesters actively work to undermine the regime. Attacks may target high-value or symbolic locations, including government offices, military facilities, and state-owned media outlets (e.g., national television networks). The unrest moves beyond protest into a systemic threat, prompting full-scale security responses. This is the point at which the IRGC’s 11 security headquarters—including the Tharallah Headquarters—assume full provincial authority.

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE WHITE SITUATION

During the White situation, when there are no threats to the regime's survival, the central role of the Tharallah Headquarters is to research, train, and plan. The bulk of the Tharallah Headquarters' attention during this period is dedicated to territorial use planning (*amayesh-e sarzamini*) and scenario planning. Additionally, the Tharallah Headquarters will assess situations at both national and local levels that could potentially pose security threats in Tehran and establish policies to mitigate these threats. *Amayesh Sarzamini*, a.k.a. Spatial Planning, is a strategic framework focusing on efficiently distributing security resources across regions to meet security and defense objectives. It refers to the deliberate and systematic planning of geographic space to enhance national security, territorial integrity, and regime stability. It aids in identifying and preparing for potential threats in urban and national defense planning.

For instance, the Tharallah Headquarters utilizes *Amayesh Sarzamini* to determine the optimal locations for military and security installations, such as IRGC and Basij bases—particularly in vulnerable areas like central Tehran. The framework also helps identify protest hotspots, enabling the strategic deployment of resources to maintain control during unrest. Vital infrastructure, including power plants and transportation hubs, is protected through the targeted placement of security and surveillance.

Amayesh Sarzamini extends to digital security by restricting sensitive data to secure government-controlled areas, thus minimizing cyber vulnerabilities.¹³ Additionally, resource allocation prioritizes high-risk regions, enhancing emergency preparedness against potential adversarial exploitation during crises. For border provinces, the framework supports measures against smuggling and illegal immigration by allocating border security forces based on geographic vulnerability.

The Tharallah Headquarters applies these principles by assessing and securing critical locations in Tehran, while coordinating aerial surveillance and local security efforts to ensure operational readiness.

OPERATIONAL READINESS AND MONITORING

Throughout periods of stability, the Tharallah Headquarters continuously monitors the capabilities and readiness of operational security forces in Tehran, the Greater Tehran area, and the Alborz region. This includes routine inspections and visits to various sub-branch headquarters to evaluate the preparedness and training of the IRGC and Basij security brigades for suppression operations. In one instance, a smuggled 2016 video reveals joint exercises involving Iran's Law Enforcement Force, the IRGC, and the Basij, all operating under the supervision of the Tharallah Quds Operational Headquarters. The footage highlights coordinated drills designed to improve synergy between police and paramilitary units, ensuring their ability to respond effectively to potential protests.¹⁴


DRONE REGULATIONS AND SECURITY

A recent security assessment identified private drones and quadcopters with cameras as potential security risks. Consequently, under orders from Alireza Rabiei, deputy for operations at the Tharallah Headquarters, drones and quadcopters equipped with cameras have been restricted over security-sensitive areas and residential neighborhoods in Tehran. Permits are now mandatory for operating quadcopters, with Tharallah Headquarters overseeing the issuance of all flight licenses in Tehran.¹⁵

According to Rabiei, aerial vehicles with cameras are banned from flying over sensitive and residential areas to ensure safety and privacy. Many drones imported by various organizations have been used without authorization, leading to their confiscation. To address security and community concerns, a recent directive restricts the use of private drones and quadcopters, particularly in areas where they could be used to monitor homes or critical sites, thereby raising privacy concerns. Permits are now required for flying drones, including helicopters and quadcopters. However, these permits are not issued directly to individuals.

THARALLAH TRAINING AND WORKSHOPS

During the White situation, another mission of the Tharallah Headquarters is to coordinate and organize seminars and workshops for various organizations to improve security and increase preparedness for encountering threats. One example is the educational seminar on cybersecurity aimed at managers of state organizations. This seminar focuses on identifying the latest vulnerabilities and enhancing collaboration among information technology managers from national and military agencies. It includes the fourth conference of cybersecurity managers, which took place following the Israeli cyberattacks (see below).



Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on Cybersecurity for State Organizations

تاریخ: ۱۱ - ۱۳۹۷/۳/۳
 تاریخ: ۱۳۹۷/۳/۳
 ساعت: ۱۰
 مکان: تهران



- حداقل ۱۰ سال از خدمت قانونی سازمانی فرد باقی مانده باشد.
- دارای صلاحیت علمی، شخصی، فنی و امنیتی باشد.
- امکان حضور بدون غیبت در کلاسها را داشته باشد.

۲. زمان دوره:

دوره مذکور (۳۳۳) تا تاریخ ۱۳۹۷/۳/۳۰ لغایت ۱۳۹۷/۳/۳۰ و فقط روزهای چهارشنبه در پنجشنبه به مدت ۵ جلسه (۳۳ و ۳۴ جلسه) از ساعت ۸:۰۰ الی ۱۲:۰۰ برگزار خواهد گردید.

۳. عناوین دوره آموزشی:

عناوین دوره آموزشی

ردیف	عنوان
۱	تدابیرات امنیتی و ضرورت آشنایی و مدیریت امنیت اطلاعات
۲	راهبردهای مدیریت امنیت اطلاعات
۳	عوامل امنیت داده و شبکه
۴	عوامل امنیت سیستم‌های متصل
۵	عوامل امنیت پایگاه داده
۶	عوامل امنیت برنامه‌های کاربردی وب

۴. مکان برگزاری کلاسها:

- تهران آزادی - دانشگاه صنعتی شریف - سالن همایش دانشکده فیزیک

۵. ملاحظات:

۱. سازمانها تا تاریخ ۱۳۹۷/۳/۲۲ (چهارشنبه) لیست اسامی و امتیازات (طبق جدول ضمیمه آخر) را طی نامه ای به شماره ۲۲۶۶۶۱۸۱ اعلام نموده و فایل تکمیل آن را به security@tharallah.ir ارسال نمایند.
۲. با توجه به محدودیت فضای آموزشی، سازمانهایی که لیست آنها پس از تکمیل ظرفیت اتمت شود و یا افرادی که دیرتر حاضر گردند در دوره بعدی سازماندهی خواهند گردید.

آدرس: تهران، بزرگراه نیاوران - پست قریب، پلاک ۱۸۱، تهران، تهران، تهران
 تلفن: ۲۲۶۶۶۱۸۱ - فکس: ۲۲۶۶۶۱۸۱

Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on
 Cybersecurity for State Organizations

شماره:
تاریخ:
موضوع:
از:

بسم تعالی
جمهوری اسلامی ایران



گيرندگان:

- رئیس محترم مرکز فناوری اطلاعات، ارتباطات و امنیت ریاست جمهوری
- رئیس محترم مرکز برنامه ریزی و فناوری اطلاعات مجلس شورای اسلامی
- معاون محترم فناوری اطلاعات مرکز امور فناوری اطلاعات و فضای مجازی
- رئیس محترم مرکز فناوری فضای مجازی صدا و سیما
- مدیرعامل محترم سازمان فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات شهرداری تهران
- رئیس محترم مرکز توسعه دولت الکترونیک، فناوری اطلاعات و امور وزارت کشور
- مدیرکل محترم اداره کل مدیریت ذاتی وزارت خارجه
- رئیس محترم دفتر مدیریت امور و فناوری اطلاعات وزارت بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی
- مدیرکل محترم سیاست فرهنگی و امنیت سیستم های ارتباطی شرکت ارتباطات زیرساخت وزارت فناوری اطلاعات
- سرپرست محترم فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات شرکت ملی نفت ایران وزارت ورزش و جوانان
- رئیس محترم مرکز نوآوری و تحول فناوری وزارت صنعت، معدن و تجارت
- رئیس محترم مرکز فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات مرکز آمار ایران
- رئیس محترم مرکز حرفه ای وزارت آموزش و پرورش
- مدیرکل محترم دفتر فناوری آمار و اطلاعات کشور جمهوری اسلامی ایران
- مدیرکل محترم دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات سازمان هواشناسی کشور
- مدیرعامل و فرستاده ارشد محترم IJSE بنیاد خبری و مدیریت بحران منطقه ویژه اقتصادی پارسین
- رئیس محترم مرکز فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات وزارت جهاد کشاورزی
- معاون محترم مدیرکل دفتر فناوری اطلاعات وزارت نیرو
- مدیرکل محترم دفتر تحول انرژی و فناوری اطلاعات وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری اطلاعات
- مشاور محترم وزیر و رئیس مرکز فناوری اطلاعات ارتباطات و تحول انرژی - وزارت تعاون، کار و رفاه اجتماعی
- رئیس محترم مرکز توسعه سیستم ها و فناوری اطلاعات سازمان برنامه و بودجه کشور
- بنیاد شهید انقلاب اسلامی
- سازمان تبلیغات اسلامی
- مدیرکل محترم پشتیبانی، فنی، بهداشتی و فناوری اطلاعات سازمان محیط زیست
- سازمان میراث فرهنگی، صنایع دستی و گردشگری
- سازمان ملی استاندارد ایران
- مدیر محترم خراست سازمان نقشه برداری کشور
- پایک مرکزی
- مدیرکل محترم دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و بررسی های انرژی سازمان هواپیمایی کشوری
- مدیرکل محترم دفتر فناوری ارتباطات و اطلاعات شرکت رت آون ج ۱۱
- رئیس محترم مرکز فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات سازمان امور مالیاتی کشور

آدرس: تهران - بزرگراه نیا - پست غرب - بعد از پلگاه انقلاب - قرارگاه کد رهگیری: ۲۳۶۶۱۹۴۱
تلفن: ۲۳۳۷۶۱۸۱

Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on Cybersecurity for State Organizations

Primary documents reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters, as part of its activities to monitor the security capabilities of state institutions, has ordered all state- and regime-affiliated organizations to store sensitive information in two separate locations to ensure backup, given the rising threat of cyber and phishing attacks.

ACADEMIC COLLABORATIONS AND RESEARCH INITIATIVES

As part of its operations during the White situation, the Tharallah Headquarters collaborates with universities in Tehran to enhance its research capabilities and operational effectiveness. The Tharallah Headquarters collaborates with universities to conduct research that aligns with its security objectives. This collaboration often involves joint projects, seminars, and workshops addressing emerging security challenges. To cultivate expertise in critical areas, the Tharallah Headquarters provides full PhD scholarships to students pursuing research relevant to national security. These scholarships are designed to attract talent into fields that directly support the IRGC's strategic interests.

Additionally, the Tharallah Headquarters emphasizes documenting and disseminating its operational experiences and research findings. This is achieved by publishing books and reports serving as resources for academic and military communities. These publications aim to share insights from past operations and research endeavors, contributing to the broader knowledge base within Iran's security apparatus. Through these collaborative efforts—for example, with Imam Sadegh University—the Tharallah Headquarters leverages academic resources to enhance its strategic capabilities, ensuring that research and education are closely integrated with national security objectives.

The Tharallah Headquarters takes the lead in handling a wide range of cases, even when there is no imminent threat to the regime, including those involving groups the Islamic Republic considers “deviant religious and spiritual organizations,” such as the Taheri group. Mohammad Ali Taheri, an Iranian faith healer, founded the Circles of Mysticism nearly a decade ago, advocating a mystical understanding of the universe and faith healing. Initially, the regime tolerated his activities. However, documents released by this group reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters' intelligence deputy was responsible for arresting and interrogating Taheri and dismantling the organization.¹⁶ This group posed a dual threat to the regime: it offered an alternative to Islamic spiritualism and successfully recruited and organized a significant number of Iranians.

In some cases, the intelligence deputy also targeted student activists. For instance, the student newspaper *Mowj* was shut down for allegedly mocking the Hidden Imam and Islam, and in May 2008, Majid Tavakoli, a prominent student leader, was arrested by the Tharallah Headquarters.¹⁷

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE YELLOW SITUATION

During the Yellow situation, the initial response in the capital involves deployment of the police force (FARAJA), including units trained for crowd control and suppression. When the yellow alert is triggered in the capital, the Tehran police command (*Farmandehi-e Entezami Tehran-e Bozorg*, or FATEB) takes responsibility for the city's security. In these situations, the Police Intelligence Organization of Tehran is the first group deployed to gather information about the source of the problem or threat and the parties involved. Immediately following disturbances, public security police are deployed to contain and control the situation. These officers and operational forces, which are primarily made up of conscript soldiers, are sent to the affected areas. Tehran has 85 police stations throughout the city and, if protests spread, these stations can request the deployment of operational support units, known as the Emdaad Operational Support Brigades. These units are mobilized quickly to assist during emergencies, public disturbances, or natural disasters, providing rapid backup where needed.¹⁸ Support operational units located in East Tehran are responsible for maintaining order and security in the capital.

If the situation escalates and the support command is unable to restore order, FARAJA's last resort is to deploy its Special Unit (Police Vijzeh). Unlike the other police forces, the Special Police are managed by the Headquarters of FARAJA's special units. The Special Police are elite law enforcement units trained for high-risk operations, including crowd control, counterterrorism, and crisis response. Among them, the Special Units (Yegan Vije) focus on managing riots and large-scale public unrest when regular police forces are overwhelmed. The most prominent of these is NOPO, a tactical unit comparable to SWAT or special forces in other countries.

If the situation in Tehran escalates and the regular police cannot restore order, the Tehran Police Command will request the deployment of Special Police units (*police-e viezeh*), which comprise three brigades, to maintain order in the capital.

While FATEB is responsible for restoring order during this phase, it informs the Tharallah Headquarters of potential developments by directly sharing intelligence. The antennas at the Tharallah Headquarters also became operational, collecting information and receiving updates on the unfolding situation. The Tharallah Headquarters will deploy its intelligence assets on the ground during this process.

The Tharallah Headquarters' primary responsibilities during this situation include scenario planning and preparations, threat monitoring and mitigation activities, and intelligence operations. An example of such mitigation interventions occurred under the administration of President Hassan Rouhani, when public discontent began to emerge over unfinished state-subsidized social housing projects (*maskan-e mehr*) in the Paradis neighborhood in Greater Tehran. The dissent stemmed from the preceding Ahmadinejad government's decision to sell social housing to residents without finishing the project and building critical infrastructure in the neighborhood, such as schools, hospitals, and police stations. Subsequently, Rouhani and his minister of roads and urban development, Abbas Akhoundi, abandoned the completion of the social housing projects. Having assessed the potential risk of escalation, the Tharallah Headquarters intervened by directly ordering the Ministry for Roads and Urban Development to complete all necessary infrastructure projects in the Paradis neighborhood as a matter of urgency.

FORMATION OF COMMITTEES

As part of its response to emerging or ongoing threats, the Tharallah Headquarters often forms ad hoc committees to bring relevant stakeholders and forces together to command and coordinate. When these committees are formed, a Tharallah Headquarters' deputy assumes commanding authority over the actions of all parties involved in the committee, issuing and delegating their responsibilities. The formation of such committees, which will meet regularly on the headquarters premises, occurs across Yellow *and above* threat levels.

For example, during the Yellow situation, the Tharallah Headquarters formed a Cyber Committee to implement its "Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran" (*tahr-e amn-sazi-e tablohay-e electronic-e shahri*).

The plan sought to implement new security protocols and procedures for all public LED billboards and TVs across Tehran after several were hacked during domestic protests and began circulating anti-regime messages. The specifics of the new plan reveal the extent to which the Tharallah Headquarters micromanages every aspect of security in Tehran. Under its plan, all public LED billboards and TVs must have three locks and be connected to a local Basij base, which would have a two-factor authentication system in place to prevent unauthorized access to the billboards and TVs.

شماره تاریخ ۵/۱/۸۲۰۰ ۱۴۰۰/۰۹/۲۳ عادی عادی	بسمه تعالی  جمهوری اسلامی ایران	 مأموریت شری	سال تولید، پشتیبانی ها و مانع زدایی ها
به : گیرندگان محترم زیر از : دبیر کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران موضوع : دعوتنامه به جلسه			
سلام علیکم اَللّٰهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلٰی مُحَمَّدٍ وَ عَلٰی مُحَمَّدٍ با احترام - پیرو صورتنامه آن به شماره ۱/۷۲۴۵/ت مورخ ۱۴۰۰/۸/۲۲ جهت پیگیری آخرین اقدامات صورت گرفته و انجام هماهنگیهای لازم جلسه ذیل برگزار می گردد: (۱۱۳/۲۳۳۲۶۱۵۱)			
دستور جلسه : ۱- ارایه گزارش اقدامات در راستای امنیت تابلوهای شهری از جلسه گذشته تاکنون ۲- ارایه و تصویب طرح امن سازی تابلوهای شهری ۳- تعیین دارندگان تابلوی شهری و نحوه نظارت بر آنها			
مورخه : ۱۴۰۰/۹/۳۰ روز : سه شنبه ساعت : ۱۰-۱۲ اداره کننده : سرهنگ پاسدار شاهرخ دزفولی محل برگزاری جلسه : سالن جلسات شهدای امنیت قرارگاه ثارالله تهران			
شرکت کنندگان مسئول محترم امنیت تابلوهای شهری مسئول محترم امنیت تابلوهای شهری مسئول محترم امنیت تابلوهای شهری		گیرندگان محترم سازمان فناوری اطلاعات شهرداری تهران شرکت کنترل ترافیک شهرداری تهران شهرداری کرج	
 سرهنگ پاسدار شاهرخ دزفولی دبیر کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران		 انستیتوس شید سازمان شهرداری تهران شهرداری تهران شماره ۴۵۸۹۳۲ تاریخ ۱۴۰۰/۹/۲۷	
رونوشت : ریاست محترم کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران جهت استحضار و در صورت صلاحدید مدیریت جلسه دفتر معاونت فاوا جهت هماهنگی			

Tharallah Headquarters Cyber Committee "Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran" Document Page 1 of 3

تألیف کننده : آقای مهندس واحدی قر – معاونت محترم شبکه و امنیت

امضاء کننده : آقای دکتر فرجود – مدیر عامل محترم سازمان فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات شهرداری تهران

عنوان : جناب آقای سرکوب غلامحسینی – مسئول کمیته سایبری قرارگاه تارالله تهران

رونوشت : جناب آقای سرهنگ مزقولی - دبیر محترم کمیته سایبری قرارگاه تارالله تهران

جذاب آقای سرکوب غلامحسینی

مسئول محترم کمیته سایبری قرارگاه تارالله تهران

ستم علیکم

پاراگراف به نامه شماره 1/7245/ت مورخ 1400/08/22 و جلسه کمیته سایبری قرارگاه تارالله با موضوع تابلوهای اطلاع رسان شهری ، مشخصات تابلو و اطلاعات پیمانکاران به شرح ذیل حضوریات ارسال می گردد.

سیستم حفاظتی و امنیتی تلویزیون های شهری تحت اختیار سازمان زیباسازی شامل موارد زیر می باشد.

1. استفاده از 3 عدد قفل کابلی صنعتی با کلید های غیر قابل گشایی (دو عدد جهت دربان و یک عدد جهت درب ورودی تلویزیون)
2. استفاده از سیستم حفاظتی پارانوکس دارای سیستم تلفن کننده. قبل از باز کردن درب ورودی نمایشگر توسط ریموت کنترل باید درنگی نصب شده غیر فعال شود تا امکان ورود به تابلو وجود داشته باشد. (مشخصات پیوست)
3. در صورت غیرفعال کردن آژیر قبل از ورود به تابلو، آژیر نصب شده بیرون از نمایشگر شروع به آژیر زدن کرده و SMS برای کاربر تعریف شده می رود.
4. در صورت فعال شدن آژیر و به صدا درآمدن آژیر، این امکان وجود دارد که کاربر تعریف شده روی سیستم تلفن کننده توسط SMS مشخص، اقدام به خاموش کردن تلویزیون نماید.
5. جهت حفظ امنیت بیشتر، تلویزیون فوق به صورت OFF line کنترل شده و باید ابراتور مراحل ذیل را جهت دسترسی به PC به منظور پخش تیزر طی نماید:

1. حضور پای تلویزیون و غیر فعال نمودن سیستم امنیتی به وسیله ریموت کنترل یا پل ک امنیتی
2. در صورت عدم غیر فعال نمودن سیستم امنیتی و به محض باز شدن درب ورودی نمایشگر ها (بعد از باز کردن 3 عدد قفل کابلی زد بزش) مگنت درب فعال شده و سیستم حفاظتی شروع به صدای آژیر بلند می نماید و در لحظه برای افراد تعریف شده SMS ورود غیر مجاز ارسال می گردد در این صورت کاربر می تواند با ارسال کلمه OFF به سر شماره تعریف شده نمایشگر را خاموش نماید. شایان ذکر است در صورت عدم قطع آژیر و همچنین عدم ارسال SMS توسط کاربر ،نمایشگر پس از یک دقیقه به صورت اتومات خاموش می گردد.
3. تمامی USB های سیستم کامپیوتر غیر فعال می باشد. غیر فعال نمودن USB ها جهت عدم امکان استفاده از موس و کیبرد برای کار با سیستم نرم افزار تلویزیون توسط افراد غیر می باشد.
4. برای کار با نرم افزار نیاز به پسورد می باشد که در صورت اشتباه وارد کردن کد مربوطه نرم افزار باز نمی شود.
5. دوربین نصب شده با ارتباط موبیوتورینگ جهت نمایش صفحه اکران بوده و قابلیت ذخیره تصاویر و ارسال تصاویر را ندارد.(نمایشگر فرهنگی)

Tharallah Headquarters Cyber Committee “Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran” Document Page 2 of 3

همچنین اطلاعات بیمه‌گذاران به شرح زیر می باشد:

6. دستگاه نمایشگر تجاری: (لیست پیوست)

شرکت بهره بردار: طرح باران سما

نشانی: خیابان شهید کندی خیابان این بمن بیش کوچه ششم شماره 16 طبقه پنجم تلفن شرکت: 88526430

مدیر عامل: آقای محمد قیامتی یزدی 09121468022

تمایندة شرکت طرح باران و تلفن ضروری آقای زرغیر: 09125809023

7. دستگاه نمایشگر فرهنگی: (لیست پیوست)

بهره بردار: مدیریت ارتباطات و امور بین الملل سازمان زیلسازی

بیمه‌گذار و شرکت نگهداری نمایشگر: شرکت مشاوره و پشتیبانی صنعت نمایشگرهای شفق

مدیر عامل: خاتم طاهره ابراهیمی 09126148837

نشانی شرکت: کرج کارمندان شمالی خیابان شهید موسوی (ششم شرقی) پلاک 23 ساختمان بهشت طبقه 4 واحد 8-

تلفن 02634211431

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Under the command of Brigadier General Hossein Namdari, the Information Communication Technologies deputy of the Tharallah Headquarters, the Cyber Committee, and its secretary, Guardsman Shahrokh Dezfully, ordered all relevant organizations, including Tehran and Karaj Municipalities and their sub-branches, to implement this plan as a matter of urgency. Similarly, in another order, the Tharallah Headquarters' Cyber Committee demanded that state bureaucracy organizations across both the conventional and the unconventional regime apparatus, such as the Centre of Statistics, the Martyrs Foundation, and the Tax Office, upgrade their cybersecurity software and undergo cybersecurity training in collaboration with Sharif University in Tehran.

Another example of such ad hoc committees being formed at the Tharallah Headquarters relates to the deliberations by the administration of former President Ebrahim Raisi regarding the removal of the state-subsidized price for the dollar shortly after Raisi became president in the summer of 2021. Identifying this policy as potentially catalyzing economic instability and provoking a backlash, on November 23, 2021, the Tharallah Headquarters formed the "Working Group for the Prevention of Security Crisis from Worsening Livelihoods" to assess various crisis scenarios should this policy be implemented. The working group, chaired by the intelligence deputy at Tharallah Headquarters, convened a diverse group of stakeholders for weekly meetings at the headquarters to identify potential problems and develop solutions. These stakeholders included the Deputy for Intelligence of the IRGC's Mohammad Rasulollah; the Tehran MOIS; the Tehran chief prosecutor; the Police Intelligence deputy; and representatives from the Guild Basij (*Basij-e Asnaf*), Industrial Basij, and Agricultural Basij.

شماره ۲۹۸۱ - در شماره

تاریخ ۱۳۰۰/۰۸/۳۰

پرست

دریافت

فهرست

بسم تعالی



جمهوری اسلامی ایران

سال تولید، پخش و توزیع



تذکره امور

به: گیرندگان محترم زیر

از: فرماندهی قرارگاه ثارالله (ت) تهران

موضوع: مصوبات جلسه

مهم

بسم تعالی: این نامه جهت اطلاع و پیگیری به برگزاری بیست و هشتمین جلسه کارگروه پیشگیری از بحران‌های امنیتی معیشت پایه در مورخ ۱۳۰۰/۰۸/۳۰ بدینوسیله اهم موارد مطرح شده و مصوبات آن جهت بهره‌برداری و اقدام حضورتان ارسال می‌گردد.

موضوع جلسه: بیان اخبار و اطلاعات، گزارش کمیته های ذیل کارگروه و بررسی مصوبات جلسه ۲۷

زمان جلسه: روز: یکشنبه تاریخ: ۱۳۰۰/۰۸/۳۰ ساعت: ۰۷:۱۵

اداره کننده: سردار نجات

حاضرین: سرداران و همکاران (دادستانی تهران، شهرداری سازمان اطلاعات تهران، کلانتری (ساوا قانس)، دینی (مع قس و پشتیبانی ثارالله)، مهدوی (سپاه حضرت مهدی (عج)، یگسی، آرام، بابایی (مع امه ثارالله)، جوزایی (سپاه حضرت رسول (ص)، معنی (پهلو ناچا)، حسن پور (سپاه استوار کشور) احمدی و محراب (مع اقتصادی سازمان امه سپاه)، عیداللهی (مع اجتماعی سازمان امه سپاه)، قلی پور (مع امه سازمان بسیج) رضایی پور (مع فرهنگی، اجتماعی ثارالله)، کلاوند (سپاه استوار و بازویران تهران) و کلاسم (دعایی (دفتر فرماندهی قرارگاه)

شایعین: فرجی (سپاه وزارت جهاد کشاورزی)، چرغی (سپاه صحت) سردار حسن زاده (سپاه حضرت رسول (ص)، سردار فولادگر (سپاه سیدالشهدا (عج))

اهم موارد مطرح شده در جلسه:
سردار یگسی (معاون اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله (ت) تهران):
 جدول تغییر قیمت ۱۰۰ قلم کالای اساسی (پانزدهم تا سی ام آبانماه ۱۴۰۰)

زمان	افزایشی	کاهشی	تثبیت
نیمه دوم آبانماه	۵۵ قلم	۴۵ قلم	۰ قلم
نیمه اول آبان	۶۰ قلم	۳۹ قلم	۱ قلم



- آب و فاضلاب. از سال ۹۶ شرکت آب و فاضلاب جنوب تهران به دنبال راه اندازی ایستگاه تسویه آب در جنوب تهران (شهرری) می باشد که با مخالفت آستان مقدس حضرت امام خمینی (ره) روبرو شده است، لذا شعاع ۵۰ کیلومتری را برای حریم در نظر می گیرند

ارائه گزارش در خصوص دستور کار جلسه (تبعات حذف آرز ترجیحی)

کمیته اقتصادی (۱) تاجادی (مسئول اقتصادی سازمان اطلاعات سپاه)

در حال حاضر بسیاری از مشکلات در جامعه ایجاد شده است و دولت فعلی در جریان روندهای ساخته شده قرار گرفته است و این روندها مردودی را مدیریت خواهد کرد و انجام اقدامات موثر در بسیاری از زمینه ها از قبیل بیکاری، افزایش قیمت ها، تورم، اشتغال و... با فرصت کم نمی توان مدیریت کرد، این موضوعات با دو ماه و سه ماه قابل حل نخواهد بود. بسیاری از زیر ساخت ها در دولت قبل از بین رفته است تبعات آن در جامعه در حال نمودار شدن است و از اساس ریشه ها را زدند پهران آفرین شدند. موضوع نیکتر هفت تپه که سالها نظام با آن درگیر شده بود با یک تصمیم انقلابی حل شده است.

این دولت با ایجاد امید در جامعه ترمز ناامیدی را کشیده است و بسیاری از مردم به آینده امیدوار شدند حدود سه ماه از این موضوع گذشته است و کارآمدی دولت در سه ماه آینده برای مردم ادراک سازی خواهد شد اینکه دولت کارآمد است یا نه و قابلیت اداره کشور را دارد یا نه با اینکه دولت تمرکز لازم برای حل مشکلات را دارد یا نه کم کم دولت در حال خارج شدن از تمرکز است و کافی است در این حالت یک جرقه خورده شود که نتواند مدیریت کنند. مدتی است گزارشات مکتوب دادیم و دیدار حضوری رفتیم ولی علیرغم این موضوعات تصمیم خودشان را می گیرند. در موضوع کاهش قیمت خودرو اگر رئیس جمهور ورود نمی کردند این موضوع کشور را به پهران می کشاند. در این دولت از این موضوعات کم نداریم. علیرغم اینکه دولت اعلام کرد که آقای مخبر فرماده تیم اقتصادی است، در حال حاضر در دولت تمرکز واحد در فرماندهی نداریم این موضوع ادراک سازی نشده است و گاهی با تصمیمات متفاوت در حوزه اقتصادی مواجه هستیم. با این وضعیت دنبال اجرای طرح حذف آرز ترجیحی رفته اند، طرحی که دولت روحانی می تواند آنرا را اجرایی نماید و اگر اجرایی می نمود در شرایط الان بودند. در حال حاضر فاصله بین دهک های بالا و پایین در حال افزایش است و دو دهک پایین با کمک های مومنان گذران زندگی می کنند. دولت در ابتدای سال ۸ میلیارد برای این امور کنار گذاشته بود. که در شش ماه اول سال به اتمام رسید. لذا دولت دو بار طی نامه هایی از رهبری درخواست آرز ترجیحی کردند که رهبری نامه دوم را برای تعیین تکلیف به مجلس فرستاد و این موضوع متأسفانه به صورت علنی در مجلس مورد بررسی قرار گرفت که با توجه به مذاکرات برجام و در شرایط امنیتی آبان قرار داشتیم و بازار داخل منتظر اقدام دولت است. و با این شرایط به سمت احتکار کالا رفته است. بازار احتکار روند افزایش یافته است. در حاضر آدم های ناکارآمد دولت قبل هنوز در عرصه کار هستند و وزیر دنبال این است که با برنامه با این افراد اتمام حجت کند. برخی وزرا با شرایط فعلی هماهنگ نیستند و نمی دانند چه شرایطی را تحویل گرفتند. در حال حاضر این شرایط آذنان مردم را درگیر کرده است. احتکار و گرانی های زیادی رخ داده و شاورها یار را تخلیه نمی نمایند (حدود ۴۴ کشتی) روند تخلیه بار بنادر به کندی صورت می گیرد. اما دپوی اقلام اساسی روند کاهشی گرفته است. روند فروش نفت و درآمدهای ارزی در سال جاری به حدود ۴۴ میلیارد دلار خواهد رسید و نسبت به سال گذشته حدود ۲۰ میلیارد دلار افزایش خواهد یافت.

در خصوص آرز ۴۲۰۰ تومانی تمرکز واحد در دولت وجود ندارد. محرمانگی تصمیمات در نظام رعایت نشده و پیوست عملیات روانی و پیوست امنیتی برای آن لحاظ نشده است. فرمانده اجرای طرح مشخص نیست و بهره مردم از این وضعیت، گرانی و آشفتگی بوده است.

شهبازی : سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران (در خصوص آرز ۴۲۰۰)

- تا کنون باید آرز ترجیحی داده شود، تورم بیشتر مربوط به کالاهای اساسی است که آرز ترجیحی به آنها تعلق می گیرد. نظام ناچار به روی آوردن به آرز تک ترخی می باشد و بیشتر منافع آن به جیب دلالان و واسطه ها می رود لذا به شترین فساد در حوزه

In a Yellow threat level, the Tharallah Headquarters continues to monitor the ongoing security situations and provides recommendations to other organizations in order to enhance their security. For example, primary leaked Persian-language documents from the Khamenei-run Bonyad Mostazafan (or Foundation of the Underprivileged of the Islamic Revolution) reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters requested the installation of their internal telecommunications network equipment ("Cellular Novin") on the roof of the foundation's headquarters and Plasco buildings. This enables the Tharallah Headquarters to safely communicate with IRGC and Basij brigades, units, and personnel by positioning mobile phone lines and by sending voice signals, text messages, web pages, and audio-visual smartphone files. According to the document, one of this service's security applications is the positioning of security forces and assets, as well as complete monitoring of the operational area.

تاریخ: ۱۳۰۱/۲۱/۷
شماره: ۴۴۶۴
پیوست: ۱
شماره ملی بنیاد: ۱۰۱۰۰۱۷۱۹۲۰

بنیاد

محرم

بنیاد مستضعفان انقلاب اسلامی
مرکز حراست

مورد استفاده دارای ارتفاع ۴۰ متر است که البته در صورت عدم امکان اجرا آن می‌توان از تجهیزات شبکه در فضای حداقل ۹ متر مربع با دکل ۴ متری استفاده نمود.

ملاحظات

- ۱- استقرار سامانه در محل‌های مورد نظر به لحاظ فنی منوط به تأمین فضای کافی و جریان برق می‌باشد.
- ۲- هم‌اکنون تجهیزات بسی بسی اس (شبکه همسراه اول و ایرانسل) پس از انجام توافق در ساختمان مرکزی بنیاد نصب گردیده است.

نکته:

(الف) در خصوص استقرار سامانه در ساختمان مرکزی بنیاد:

- با عنایت به وسعت ساختمان‌های بنیاد و با در نظر گرفتن تمام جهات، استقرار سامانه مذکور در ساختمان مرکزی بنیاد (با رعایت ملاحظات حفاظتی و امنیتی) مشکل خاصی ایجاد نمی‌نماید.
- (ب) در خصوص استقرار سامانه در ساختمان پلاسکو:
- نظر به تجهیز ساختمان پلاسکو به هلی‌پد از یکسو و از سوی دیگر، احتمال واگذاری حق مالکیت بنیاد در این ساختمان به مالکان (صاحبان سرقفلی) در آینده، بروز مشکلات امنیتی و حقوقی با توجه به واگذاری و انجام امور حفاظت فیزیکی توسط صاحبان سرقفلی، متصور است.
- منوط به اوامر عالی است.

سید علی نبوی
رئیس

محرم

بزرگراه شهید سلیمانی (رسالت) فرسیده به بلوار فریاد، ساختمان مرکزی بنیاد مستضعفان انقلاب اسلامی، کد پستی: ۱۵۱۹۶ - ۱۲۳۴۰

Bonyad Mostazafan Document on Request From Tharallah Headquarters
for Installation of "Cellular Novin" Page 1 of 2



Bonyad Mostazafan Document on Request From Tharallah Headquarters for Installation of "Cellular Novin" Page 2 of 2

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE ORANGE SITUATION

If conditions worsen and FATEB fails to neutralize the threat, the Orange situation is activated. As per protocol, this is the point at which the IRGC's provincial guard is brought in. The Mohammed Rasulullah Corps assumes responsibility for controlling Tehran city, the Seyyed ol Shuhada Brigade gains control over other cities in Tehran province, and the Imam Hassan Mojtaba Brigade takes over Alborz province and Karaj city. All these forces operate under the management of the Tharallah Headquarters.


If the anti-riot police cannot control the situation, the 23 IRGC Basij Regional Bases in Tehran will become operationalized. During the Orange situation, the first forces deployed are Basij members from various units, including the Basij-e Bayt ol Moghadas and Kowsar units (the lowest organized forces in each Basij zone), as well as the Imam Ali Battalions (Basij security forces) and the Imam Hussain Battalions (Basij infantry units). All these are operational, trained Basij units under the IRGC's control. The deployment of Basij units is coordinated through the Mohammad Rasulullah Corps, which controls all Basij forces in Tehran and some IRGC ground forces.

DEPLOYMENT OF BASIJ UNITS

As per protocol, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps deploys a series of tactical formations when the Orange situation is triggered. According to Brigadier General Hassanzadeh, the commander of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah, the Tharallah Headquarters' patrols, comprising IRGC and Basij members, are now active and deployed throughout the city.

For example, according to an IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps document, the IRGC Jamaran Regional Base will maintain order in the Tajrish neighborhood. In the Tehran Pars and Hafteh-e Hoz neighborhoods located east of Tehran, the Al Mohmmad Security Brigade will oversee crowd control and manage anti-riot efforts. In the northwestern part of Tehran, in the Saadat Abad neighborhood, Basij Fathein units would maintain order. In the south of Tehran, in the Javaideh neighborhood, Alzahra Security Brigade will be in charge.


At this point, IRGC and Basij battalions are deployed in various city zones and are prepared for operations.



A map of Tehran showing neighborhood names and main roads ²⁰


One of the leading brigade and unit formations measures that the IRGC’s Mohammad Rasulullah Brigade adopts during the Orange situation is the creation of security rings (*halgheh-hayeh amniatee*) across key locations and neighborhoods in Tehran, such as Enghelab Square.

These security rings consist of several layers: an inner ring covering the most sensitive area, a middle ring encompassing the secondary region, and an outer ring surrounding a broader area. The IRGC’s security brigades and units are positioned within the inner ring—the most sensitive geographical location. Covering the middle ring are the Basij’s security brigades and units, namely Imam Ali and Imam Hussain. Finally, all other Basij units, such as Bayt-ol Moghadas units, Tehran Municipality Basij, the Basij-e Edarat, and Women’s Basij, are deployed across the geographical boundaries of the outer ring.



- 1. Inner Ring:** IRGC security personnel
- 2. Middle Ring:** Imam Ali, Imam Hussain
- 3. Outer Ring:** Bayt ol Moghaddas and Basij of the municipality

For example, during the Mahsa Amini protests, the IRGC deployed the three layers of its security rings to shield Friday Prayers at Tehran University, which is led and attended by senior regime officials. The inner ring was deployed in the main prayer hall and garden of Tehran University; the middle ring covered the area outside Tehran University—from 16 Azar Street, Pour Sina, Quds Street and Enghlab Street; and the outer ring was deployed across Kargar, Keshavarz, Vali Asr, and Jomohri Avenue. For the formation and territories covered by the security rings, please see below.



Map of territories covered by the security rings

Beyond operational units, the IRGC Mohammad Rasollullah will also issue orders to deploy additional human resources on the streets and across Tehran. For example, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah will make a mandatory call on all Basij organizations, such as Basij-e Edarat (the state bureaucracy Basij), especially the Tehran Municipality Basij, to deploy on the streets.



The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Document Instructing Deployment of the Basij—including State Bureaucracy Basij Page 2 of 2


فهرست فرماندهان

فهرست نام‌های عملیاتی سپاه حضرت محمد رسول الله...

ردیف	نام حضور	نام فرمانده	رتبه	توضیحات
۱	تیموری	سید محمد کوشایی	ناحیه چهارم	
۲	پارک وی	خسروی	ناحیه امیر المومنین	
۳	تهران پارس	پار محمدی	نپ آل محمد	
۴	هفت حوض	قاسم	نپ آل محمد	
۵	بازار	سردار بنایی	لشکر عملیاتی	
۶	نازی آباد	عابدی	نپ حضرت زهرا	
۷	سعادت آباد	سید محمد هاشمی	فاتحین	
۸	انویان باغری	سید محسن موسوی	فرزگاه نصر	
۹	شور زما	سردار خراسانی	معاون دفاع امنیتی	
۱۰	نهر نصر	فرخنده‌ای	ناحیه عظیم	
۱۱	جوادیه	مفتوی	نپ حضرت زهرا	
۱۲	پونک	گل محمدی	ستاد سپاه	
۱۳	ستار خان	سجادی	بگال امام سجاده	

List of Names of Operational Commanders for IRGC
Mohammad Rasulullah

Primary documentation reveals that in November 2022, the Labor and State Employee Basij Organizations, each with its own Baytol Moghadas Battalions of 100 members, were transferred to the Tehran Municipality Basij for one day. IRGC families and retirees are also expected to be ready for mobilization. Primary documents reveal that 400 IRGC families, including retired veterans, were mobilized and placed at the disposal of Tehran Municipality Basij, as were the Women's Basij. (Pirhadi is the commander of Basij Municipality.)



The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Document Quota for Distribution of Different IRGC and Basij Forces—including 400 IRGC families.

THE THARALLAH INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY: THE INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES AND SUPREME JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

While under the Orange situation, the IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps takes operational command, controlling and deploying the forces. At this security level, the Tharallah Headquarters is responsible for intelligence coordination and command. Practically speaking, in this situation, the deputy for intelligence assumes overall command responsibility at Tharallah Headquarters, coordinating among the Police Intelligence organization, the IRGC Intelligence organization, the Basij Intelligence units, and the Tehran MOIS Intelligence Bureau.

For example, according to a document obtained from Tharallah Headquarters, during the October 23, 2022, labor protests, the Intelligence Deputy at Tharallah Headquarters assigned both the IRGC Intelligence Organization and MOIS to suppress the unrest. Specifically, the IRGC IPO was responsible for suppressing the Kafsheh Shima Factory. At the same time, the Tehran MOIS office was tasked with confronting, crushing, and controlling workers in the communications industry.

۱-	کارخانه کفش شیمای	معاونت اطلاعات سپاه پاسداران (ع)	رسیدگی به مشکلات شرکت و پیگیری حل آن از مراجع مربوطه	تا جلسه بعدی
۲-	شرکت واگن سازی شهری	معاونت اطلاعات سپاه پاسداران (ع)	رسیدگی به مشکلات شرکت و پیگیری حل آن از مراجع مربوطه یا از طریق قرارگاه ثارالله	تا جلسه بعدی
۳-	خرابکاری در زیرساخت های مخابراتی	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران - فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله تهران - سازمان اطلاعات سپاه	اشراف اطلاعاتی جهت جلوگیری از اقدامات خرابکارانه - توجیه کامل حراست ها	در اسرع وقت
۴-	ایستگاههای گاز و پست های برق	فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - کمیته فنی قرارگاه ثارالله تهران	افزایش هوشیاری و مراقبت از ایستگاهها	در اسرع وقت
۵	محیط های کارگری	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران - فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله تهران	افزایش اشراف اطلاعاتی بر محیط های کارگری در فضای حقیقی و مجازی با هدف جلوگیری از ایجاد تحریک و اعتراض و اعتصاب در ماههای پایانی سال	در دستور
۶	ایجاد تصفیه خانه آب در جنوب تهران	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران	به دنبال تعارض منافع آستان حضرت امام (ره) با وزارت نیرو در خصوص ساخت تصفیه خانه در جنوب تهران، سازمان اطلاعات تهران گزارشی در این خصوص تهیه و به فرماندهی قرارگاه ارسال فرمایند	تا جلسه بعدی
۷	حذف ارز ترجیحی	کلیه اعضاء و دستگاههای اطلاعاتی	برگزاری جلسه مرتبط سازمان اطلاعات تهران و مشارکت اطلاعات ناجا و ثارالله با سندیکاهای اصناف جهت بررسی پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۲۰۰ و تدابیر دولت در این رابطه - در یافت نظرات دولت و سازمان بر نامه در مورد پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۲۰۰ و تدابیر دولت در این رابطه - ارزیابی کلیه اعضاء از پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۲۰۰	در اسرع وقت
۸	برگزاری جلسه فوق العاده	قرارگاه ثارالله	بررسی پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۲۰۰	هفته آینده

Document on Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence Deputy Orders on the Division of Labor Between Security Forces

In this situation, Tharallah Headquarters not only coordinates between different intelligence organizations but also monitors the developments and advises other bodies on how to neutralize threats.

Perhaps more importantly, the Tharallah Headquarters also plays a key role in arresting protesters as well as interrogating detainees during the Orange situation and above. It effectively works as a bailiff unit, arresting and interrogating Iranian civilians alongside the MOIS and the IRGC Intelligence Organization.²¹ In addition to arrests and interrogations, the Tharallah Headquarters also operates several independent detention centers, none of which are under the control of the Organization of Prisons, Security, and Corrective Measures of the Country, which is under the Judiciary and responsible for overseeing all prisons and detention centers in Iran. One of the most recent facilities is *Detention Center Alef-1*, located in eastern Tehran.²² This prison has recently been used as a new holding place for detainees. Reports indicate that the use of beatings and other methods to obtain forced confessions at this facility is unprecedented.

This prison came to public attention only after some students detained here identified it. After the November 2019 protests, during which the regime brutally killed 1500 people in less than a week, the Tharallah Headquarters arrested a group of students who were mourning the victims of a Ukrainian passenger plane that was shot down. The Tharallah Headquarters is so powerful that even when the Judiciary offers clemency to the detained, it has the power to override such decisions, as seen in the case of Soheil Arabi, an Iranian activist accused of posting “blasphemous” content on Facebook.²⁰ The power of the Tharallah Headquarters extends to the authority to determine the length of sentences imposed by the Judiciary. Many detainees have reported that their investigators told them the investigators decide their sentences. Judges simply sign and confirm the verdicts of the Tharallah Headquarters.

OPERATIONAL COMMITTEES DURING TIMES OF UNREST

During the Orange situation, the Tharallah Headquarters assumes authority to neutralize threats from revolutionary actors at their source. For example, during the initial phase of the 2022-23 “Woman Life Freedom” protests, the Tharallah Headquarters focused extensively on universities and students, key drivers of political unrest in Iran. To tighten its grip, it established special committees, including the Security Intelligence Committee for Universities and the Knowledge Committee (“Komite Dansh”), to control academic institutions.

شماره: ۴۲۲۰
تاریخ: ۱۳۰۱/۹/۲۸
رشته: ...
پایه: ...
موضوع: ...

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری
فرماندهی قرارگاه ثارالله تهران

سال ۱۴۰۱؛ توبیخ دانش‌نشینان؛ استیصال آفرین

بده گیرندگان زیر
از: فرماندهی قرارگاه ثارالله تهران
موضوع: اولین جلسه مشترک کمیته دانش و کمیته اطلاعاتی امنیتی دانشگاه ها

سلام علیکم
اللهم صل علی محمد و آل محمد و عجل فرجه؛
با احترام، پیرو دعوتنامه شماره ۴۱۶۹-ت/ث ۲۰۲۳ در تاریخ ۱۴۰۱/۹/۲۲ در خصوص اولین جلسه مشترک کمیته دانش و کمیته اطلاعاتی - امنیتی دانشگاههای سطح استان تهران، بدینوسیله مصوبات این جلسه به شرح زیر جهت اطلاع و هرگونه اقدام لازم ابلاغ می‌گردد.

دستورات جلسه:
۱- وضعیت تشکیل کلاس ها بر مبنای صورتجلسات پایانی ترم
۲- بررسی آخرین وضعیت دانشگاهها (فضای فیزی و فرهنگی و دانشجویان و اساتید و سیاست های پیشنهادی)
۳- آخرین وضعیت دانشجویان بازداشت
۴- آخرین وضعیت برگزاری کمیسیون های انضباطی و هیات انضباطی اساتید در دانشگاهها و میزان احکام صادره
۵- پیگیری مصوبات جلسه قبل

زمان جلسه: روز چهارشنبه مورخ: ۱۴۰۱/۹/۲۳ ساعت: ۱۲:۰۰ اداره کننده: سردار نجابت

حاضرین: برادران بهرامی (سازمان اطلاعات و ایمنی)، پناهی (سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران)، حیدری (سازمان اطلاعات سپاه)، میرزاده، مکر (سازمان بسیج دانشجویی)، ابن الدین (سازمان بسیج اساتید)، ظروفی (حراست وزارت علوم و تحقیقات)، فرهنگ (حراست دانشگاه آزاد)، عباسی مهر (تهاد نمایندگی)، سردار بیگی و برادر پورهادی (اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله) و حنیف (دفتر فرماندهی قرارگاه ثارالله)

الف) خلاصه جلسه:
جلسه با تلاوت آیات نورانی قرآن کریم آغاز، سپس جانشین فرماندهی قرارگاه ثارالله ضمن خیر مقدم، دستورات جلسه را مرور نموده و در ادامه هر یک از اعضای کمیته دانش و کمیته اطلاعاتی امنیتی دانشگاهها، علاوه بر ارائه آخرین اخبار و رویدادهای رخ داده، گزارش آخرین وضعیت دانشگاهها، دانشجویان بازداشتی و کمیسیون های انضباطی برگزار شده را بر اساس دستور جلسه ارائه نمودند و در نهایت توسط جانشین فرماندهی قرارگاه جمع بندی صورت گرفت. همچنین موضوع درخواست مسئولین دانشگاه امیرکبیر مبنی بر عدم ممنوع الخواصیاتی و عدم بستن پورتال دانشجویی دانشجویان ممنوع الورد نیز مطرح شد که تمامی اعضای حاضر در جلسه به اتفاق آراء مخالف این درخواست بوده و بر اجرای کامل مصوبات شورای امنیت کشور تأکید نمودند.

ب) جمع بندی و مصوبات:
۱- جلسات کمیته زین پس هفته ای یک مرتبه روزهای چهارشنبه ساعت ۱۲ برگزار خواهد شد.
۲- معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه با همکاری اعضای کمیته اطلاعاتی امنیتی دانشگاهها، نسبت به تکمیل اطلاعات لیست دانشجویان بازداشت شده در صحنه اغتشاشات بیرون از محیط دانشگاه (تهیه شده توسط سازمان اطلاعات قراچا) اقدام و ضمن مقایسه با لیست دانشجویان ممنوع الورد، اسامی دانشجویانی که مشترک می باشد را احصاء و در جلسه بعدی کمیته ارائه تا در خصوص معرفی به دانشگاه و برخورد با ساز و کار کمیته انضباطی دانشگاه تصمیم گیری شود.

۴۳۰

حنی محمد سرماز

۵۴۸۷۳۸۵-۱۰۰۸۶۶۶

These committees wield considerable influence over university affairs. For example, a leaked document from February 5, 2023, reveals that one committee requested that the Judiciary consult the Tharallah Headquarters before granting amnesty, reducing sentences, or suspending student punishments. Decisions were made explicitly in coordination with the IRGC officer assigned to each case.

Another confidential document shows that university committees opposed SHAK’s decision to allow protesting students to access dormitories. Further records indicate that the IRGC disapproves of optional head coverings for female students and seeks control over their registration processes. Moreover, the Deputy of Intelligence at Tharallah Headquarters compiled a list of professors who resisted attempts to suppress student protests and submitted it to the Ministry of Science, demanding their punishment, including transfer to other educational centers in less developed cities.

Tharallah Headquarters Security Intelligence Committee for Universities and the Knowledge Committee (“Komite Dansh”) Document

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE RED SITUATION

The Red situation is declared when the demonstrations have spread throughout the country, and the survival of the regime is under imminent threat. If the Red situation is announced in Tehran, it means the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps has failed to neutralize the threat, and protests have spread in scope and scale. During these circumstances, the Tharallah Headquarters takes complete control of all operational decisions. In a Red situation, SHAK, the Interior Ministry’s Security Council, gives the Tharallah Headquarters complete control over Tehran. In doing so, all policymaking bodies (such as the Tehran municipality and city council), organizations (including banks), and operational units—including the police, Basij, IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps, intelligence bodies, such as the Office of Tehran Intelligence, Herasat networks, and even some religious associations—fall under its authority.



In a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters assumes total control of the capital’s security infrastructure and immediately activates a range of crisis-response mechanisms. At the onset of the situation, a high-level coordination meeting is convened and chaired by the senior commander of the Tharallah Headquarters. Participants typically include the IRGC commander-in-chief and his deputies, commanders of the Mohammad Rasulullah and Seyyed ol-Shohada Corps, Tehran’s police chief, Tehran’s chief prosecutor, the MOIS Tehran bureau head, and the Tehran governor. In this emergency war room setting, commanders assess the scope and scale of unrest, identify the most volatile districts, and allocate security forces accordingly. At this level of alert, the Tharallah Headquarters becomes the unified military command for Tehran, functioning as both an operational command post and an intelligence fusion center.

As the military command, the Tharallah Headquarters oversees security in Tehran during a crisis to restore order and neutralize threats. It plays a critical role in assessing the situation, gathering intelligence regarding the nature, scope, and origin of the crisis, and clarifying roles and responsibilities among the various security forces.


Ensuring robust communication systems amongst all subordinate units is also essential. To maintain control, Tharallah Headquarters establishes a series of ad hoc committees focused on intelligence, operations, universities, and labor unrest. These committees serve to harmonize the activities of various suppressive institutions, including the IRGC, Basij, MOIS, Herasat, and the regular police. A Tharallah Headquarters deputy typically chairs each committee and includes representatives from multiple security agencies as well as political organizations aligned with the Supreme Leader’s office. These bodies coordinate suppression strategies, conduct intelligence assessments, and implement scenario-based planning and response.

In a Red situation, all security units operate under the direct orders of the Tharallah Headquarters. It is at this point that the Tharallah Headquarters assumes operational command of all forces, controlling their deployment and operationalization. In practice, this results in a transfer of command-and-control authority from the IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps to the Tharallah Headquarters. Similarly, in a Red situation, the deputy for operations assumes overall command responsibility at the Tharallah Headquarters from the deputy of intelligence.

TACTICAL FORMATIONS: ACTIVATION OF ALL SECURITY LAYERS UNDER THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS

Upon receiving a mandate for total control over Tehran, the Tharallah Headquarters activates all the security layers under its command structure across Tehran, Greater Tehran, and Alborz Province. While the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps will already have activated this network to a limited extent during the Orange situation, the Red situation sees the Tharallah Headquarters deploy all security layers in a fully-fledged, expansive manner. This results in the immediate installation of security checkpoints and mobile guards at the municipality's regional zones and districts.²⁴ These checkpoints, which are usually controlled by members of the Basij Bayt ol Moghadas Units, are designed to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians to identify dissidents, anyone possessing "sensitive" dual-use items—such as weapons, drones, or communication systems—that could undermine the security forces, or

anti-regime material, either on their phones or in physical form. Roadblocks and guard installations manned by Basij operational units armed with batons are also set up along all major highways and squares within the municipality's regions and districts by the IRGC-Basij Regional Base and Basij District Base. At the neighborhood level, the Basij Neighborhood Base deploys its Ashura and Al-Zahra groups to conduct street patrols across Iranian neighborhoods – a tactical deployment aimed at identifying and countering dissent, as well as intimidating the local population. Primary documents obtained from the IRGC's Imam Ali Battalion Headquarters also reveal that in protest hotspots and sensitive locations, the Imam Ali Battalions even deploy "snipers to target [protest] leaders" across rooftops close to rioting areas.



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of Snipers on Rooftops to Target Protest Leaders

The Tharallah Headquarters framework centralizes crisis control by dividing responsibilities among Basij, IRGC, and police units. In red-level emergencies, it escalates the response through drone surveillance and direct deployment of IRGC ground forces. The use of Imam Hossein Battalions during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests demonstrates how this structure functions as a mechanism for rapid internal mobilization, intimidation, and suppression. Perimeter control—particularly through checkpoints and control of entry and exit routes—is a core element designed to isolate unrest and limit protester mobility.

Much of this tactical deployment was operationalized during and after the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025. As soon as Israel’s strikes began, checkpoints were formed throughout Tehran to enable stop-and-search operations against Iranian pedestrians and vehicles. Such measures involved the confiscation of civilian phones without warrants to search for any anti-regime or pro-Israel content, including any material mocking the regime. Vehicles were also searched for drones and any communication equipment.²⁵ Likewise, as reports began to circulate of Iranians taking to their rooftops to chant anti-regime slogans—such as “Death to the Dictator”²⁶—the Basij Neighborhood Bases deployed their Ashura and Al-Zahra units to identify the apartment blocks carrying out such activity.²⁷

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES ACROSS PROTEST HOTSPOTS

Having activated all the security layers under its command, the Tharallah Headquarters allocates the IRGC infantry and security battalions and units to its four sub-headquarters. Subsequently, each day it identifies protest hotspots and unrest-prone areas, then distributes its security forces to those locations under an assigned commanding officer. Primary documents from the Tharallah Headquarters reveal how this was operationalized during the 2022 anti-regime protests.

<p>بسمه تعالی</p> <p>طرح استقرار عملیاتی روز ۲ آبان ۱۴۰۱</p>			
فرارگاه	محور ها	فرمانده محور	توضیحات
<p>فرارگاه فتح</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> مقداد (۲ گردان) حمزه سیدالشهدا ع (۵ گردان) مسلم بن نقیل (۸ گردان) ابوذر (۵ گردان) حبیب بن مظاهر (۶ گردان) یگان امام رضا ع (۲ گردان کادر و ۱۰ گردان امام علی ع) تیپ احتیاط ستادی دال شهید مطهری یگان فاتحین (۲ گردان) 	محور حیدران آزادی		توسط فرارگاه اعلام شود
	شهرک واقع در (عج)	برادر صفری	محدوده: حد ناسیل جاده ساوه تا احمد حسینی- سامان تا بهرامی یک گردان از یگان امام رضا (ع) غرب ح شهید احمد حسینی گردان امام علی (ع) ناحیه گردان بیت المقدس
	اکباتان	برادر طاهری	یک گردان از یگان امام رضا (ع)
<p>سایر نقاط طبق اولیایات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های امنیتی نواحی و کلون ها و معابر و میادین اصلی با تیپ ها و یگان های امنیتی) پوشش داده شود با تأکید بر (نقاط توافق شده با فاتب) بازار صلی یافت آباد، چهار راه یافت آباد، فلاح لیویر</p>			

فرارگاه	محور ها	فرمانده محور	توضیحات
<p>فرارگاه قدر</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> مسلمان فارسی (۳ گردان) امام خمینی (۶ گردان) کمیل (۵ گردان) مجاهدین (۶ گردان) سایک اشتر (۱۰ گردان) رجایی (۵ گردان) تیپ حضرت زهرا (س) (۵ گردان کادر و ۱۲ گردان امام علی ع) یگان امام حسن ع (۲ گردان کادر و ۹ گردان امام علی ع) لشکر ۲۷ (گردانهای کادر) کد ۳ ستاد سپاه (۲ گردان) 	محور حیدران امام خمینی (تأسیسات)	سردار بنایی	۵ گردان پاسدار محور لشکر ۲۷
	محور پیروزی شامل: - حیدران امام خمینی (۲ گردان) - حیدران امام رضا (۲ گردان) - حیدران بهارسان - باغ سیه سالار - کپتان - مفت	برادر علانینی	یگان امام حسن (ع) یا ۲ گردان کفیل
	محور پیروزی شامل: - پیروزی - چهار راه فرارگاه - پنج دهقان - انتهای پیروزی	برادر معنوی	تقاطع های تازگر، فلسطین و ولی عصر - گردانهای تیپ حضرت زهرا (س) (حفاظت ۳ گردان)
	نازی آباد	برادر غلبهینی	دو گردان تیپ (اصبح) ، دو گردان تیپ (بعد از ظهر) یک گردان بسیج شهرداری یک گردان کارگری یگان جنگ یونین گردان امام علی ناحیه رجایی ۱۰۰ نفر استقرار از گردان ۶۹ حضرت عباس (ع)
<p>سایر نقاط طبق اولیایات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های امنیتی نواحی و کلون ها و معابر و میادین اصلی با تیپ ها و یگان های امنیتی) پوشش داده شود با تأکید بر (نقاط توافق شده با فاتب) میدان ۱۵ مرداد، ناصر خسرو، جمهوری، سعدی، لیسر کبیر، سعدی ح (اکباتان) ، سعدی موجزهری، سعدی جمهوری، چهار راه سیرس، سه راه نمین، حقور، فردوسی، نوبل، لوشاد، بهارستان، شهر ۷۷، جمهوری ولی عصر</p>			


Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests

rasuyab2

فرارگاه	محور ها	فرمانده محور	توضیحات
فرارگاه نصر <ul style="list-style-type: none"> نیپا آل محمد (۵ گردان کادر و ۹۲ گردان امام علی ع) یگان صاحب الزمان (۲ گردان کادر و ۹ گردان امام علی ع) ناحیه جماران (۶ گردان) مفتح (۲ گردان) کویلا (۹ گردان) ولی عصر (۵ گردان) مظفری (۶ گردان) بهشتی (۶ گردان) امیر (۵ گردان) سپح شهرداری (۲ گردان) کد ۲ ستاد سپاه (۳ گردان) سپح افشارت (۵ گردان) 	تهران یارس	برادر یار محمدی	با ۳ گردان کامل
	۷ حوض و شمعان ۲۰۰ متری	برادر قسام	لنکه اول و دوم و سوم و شمعان ۲۰۰ متری
	۷ تیر		حدفاصل ۱ گردان
	تقریش شافیل - میدان تجریش ۱۰۰	برادر سهیل	یک گردان شهرداری - یک گردان امام
	فردوس تا پمپستون تجریش	گوشاسی	علی (ع) ناحیه - یک گردان بیت المقدس ناحیه
	پارک وی شامل - از پارک وی تا پمپ	برادر اکبری	یک گردان از ناحیه امیر
	بزرگ تجریش		حدفاصل ۳ گردان
			توسط فرارگاه اعلام شود
	حیابان آزادی از قریب - خیابان زاهد - ۱۶	برادر میگوئی	۶ گردان پارتیستان
	آذر - قدس - وصال - فلسطین		
	میدان المذیر	برادر لطفعلی جانی	یک گردان شهرداری - یک گردان امام علی (ع) ناحیه - یک گردان بیت المقدس
	شورعی بیچال		توسط فرارگاه اعلام شود
سایر نقاط طبق اطلاعات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های امنیتی توانی و کانون ها و معابر و مبادین اصلی با تیب ها و یگان های امنیتی) پوشش داده شود با تأکید بر (نقاط توافق شده با فاتب) میدان فردوسی و فتنه اول تهران یارس			

فرارگاه	محور ها	فرمانده محور	توضیحات
فرارگاه قدس <ul style="list-style-type: none"> باغتر (۶ گردان) قدس (۵ گردان) عمار یاسر (۳ گردان) میشتم تمار (۳ گردان) یگان امام هادی ع (۲ گردان کادر و گردان امام علی ع) یگان امام سجاده ع (۲ گردان کادر و ۹ گردان امام علی ع) تیب احتیاط ستادی نیروی هوافضا سپح کارگرو (۱ گردان) 	ستارخان	سردار خراسانی	یگان امام سجاده (ع) با ۶ گردان امام علی (ع)
	صادقیه تا پونک		توسط فرارگاه اعلام شود
	تهرانسر	برادر فرخ شاهی	یک گردان از یگان امام هادی (ع)
			یک گردان امام علی (ع) ناحیه ای
			یک گردان بیت المقدس
			یک گردان کارگرو
	سایر نقاط طبق اطلاعات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های امنیتی توانی و کانون ها و معابر و مبادین اصلی با تیب ها و یگان های امنیتی) پوشش داده شود با تأکید بر (نقاط توافق شده با فاتب) تیرازه لشرقی اصفهان، ستاری کوروش		

Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests



Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests

شماره: ۵۸۱/۱۶/۳
تاریخ: ۱۳۰۴/۴/۲۶
پوسته: ...
اربعیت: آنی
فهرست: علی محرماته

۲۶۰۲

برستان
جمهوری اسلامی ایران

خلی مجتهدانه

بازرس: محمد رسول الله

سال توليد، دانش بنیان، اشتغال آفرين

به: **میرندگان زیر**
از: **فرمانده سپاه حضرت محمد رسول الله (ص) تهران بزرگ**
موضوع: **ابلاغ ماموریت روز ۴ آبان ماه**
سلام علیکم

اللهم صل علی محمد و آل محمد (ص)

و با احترام به منظور تنبیه وضعیت امنیتی شهر تهران و پیشگیری از وقوع ناآرامی های احتمالی ضروری است نسبت به اجرای دستورات زیر در تاریخ ۱۴۰۱/۱۰/۰۴ اقدام نمایند.

۱- قرارگاه های عملیاتی با تاکید بر محورهای تعیین شده برابر جدول پیوستی، سازمان رزم خود را از ساعت ۰۹۰۰ در نقاط تعیین شده مستقر نمایند. ضروری است کلیه قرارگاه های عملیاتی نسبت به ارسال طرح استقرار گردان ها به فرماندهی سپاه تهران اقدام نمایند.

۲- هر یک از یگانهای امنیتی، دو گردان ۳۰ موتوره، هر یک از تیپهای امنیتی ۵ گردان ۲۰ موتوره و لشکر عملیاتی نیز ۵ گردان ۳۰ موتوره از ساعت ۰۹۰۰ فراخوان و در نقاط تعیین شده مستقر نمایند.

۳- ستاد سپاه ۵ گردان کد ۲ ستادی را با مسئولیت برانگیختن از ساعت ۰۹۰۰ فراخوان و تیپهای امنیتی را در میدان انقلاب مستقر نماید و ۲ گردان را به قرارگاه قدر جهت تقویت امنیت تهران و آماده امر و انضام نماید.

۴- هر یک از نواحی از ساعت ۰۹۰۰ یک گردان با استعداد حداقل ۱۵ موتور (۲۰ نفر) فراخوان نموده و اقدام به اجرای نمایش اقتدار کانون به کانون در میداين و معابر اصلی محدوده سرزمینی خود نمایند.

۵- کلیه گردانهای امام علی (ع)، امام حسین (ع)، فاطمین و بیت المقدس از ساعت ۱۴۰۰ با استعداد ۱۰۰ درصد نیروی اصلی فراخوان و ضمن استقرار نیروها در نقاط مشخص شده توسط قرارگاه های عملیاتی از ساعت ۱۴۳۰ نسبت به اجرای نمایش اقتدار کانون به کانون توسط تیم های موتوری (۲۵ موتوره) اقدام نمایند.

۶- گردانهای سازمان موقت شهید سلیمانی (عملیات)، سید حکیم (کهنل)، شهید خلیلی (عربستانی)، شهید بروجردي (میراحمدی)، شهید ابراهیمی (قدرتی زاده)، شهید کریمی (برادر جمفری) از ساعت ۱۵۰۰ فراخوان و آماده اجرای ماموریت باشند.

۷- قرارگاه های عملیاتی نسبت به نظارت بر ماموریت تیپ ها، یگان ها و نواحی مقاومت بسیج اقدام نمایند و با دقت نظر نسبت به چينش و استقرار گردانهای بیت المقدس و امام علی (ع) نواحی مقاومت، یگانها و تیپهای امنیتی از ساعت ۱۴۳۰ در کانونهای احتمال درگیری اقدام نمایند.


۸- نسبت به فعال سازی پاستگاه فرماندهی خود از ساعت ۰۸۰۰ اقدام نمایند.

۹- سازمان بسیج شهرداری، نسبت به فراخوان ۵ گردان بیت المقدس استقرار آن ها در میدان قدس، نازی آباد، ربر پل گانج، میدان الغدیر، تقاطع آزادی حیچون اقدام نمایند.

Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests

PLAINCLOTHES FORCES

The operationalization of plainclothes units under the orders of Tharallah Headquarters is another primary tactic that is activated under the red situation. Primary documents obtained by UANI reveal that plainclothes intelligence patrol teams are deployed amongst protestors to carry out covert intelligence operations across Tehran's unrest hotspots. According to the primary documents acquired from the Imam Ali Security Battalions, these intelligence patrols "blend in with a suitable appearance and clothing so as not to be identified by the rioters, and through operating among them, they were able to identify the protest leaders." Having identified the "ringleaders," once the protest ends, these intelligence teams "track them down, identify their home locations and report them, and then an operational team is dispatched to that location to arrest the leader." Alternatively, as stated in the IRGC documents, if the "conditions are right and/or regime forces attack protestors, they [covert intelligence teams] will quickly detain the leaders and transfer them towards regime forces."




Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on
Deployment of Plainclothes Units

THE ACTIVATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL ASSETS

In addition to deploying security forces, in a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters also acquires the authority to mobilize all pro-regime or quasi-regime organizations and individuals for additional staffing to help manage the situation.

DEPLOYING RELIGIOUS AND MOURNING ASSOCIATIONS: THE HEYAT NETWORK


A critical component of this is the deployment of the regime's extensive network of radical religious and mourning associations (*heyat haye azadari*) to suppress protests. Internal documents from a security battalion headquarters reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters deploys this network across Tehran for suppression operations. The documentation states that the network's power and capacity are activated "during crises that last longer than one week." During the 2009 Green Movement uprising, General Hossein Hamedani is on record stating that he ordered the deployment of the network to crack down on civilians.²⁸



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of Heyats

SECURITY GUARD (HERASAT) NETWORK AND STATE EMPLOYEE BASIJ MEMBERS


The internal material also reveals how the Tharallah Headquarters gains authority over the Herasat (MOIS security units) and state employee Basij members to obtain additional manpower. During the Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters will deploy Herasat and Basij members, including state employees, to protect critical infrastructure.²⁹ These individuals are automatically considered part of the reserve forces and can be deployed to defend critical infrastructure and sensitive sites during times of unrest. Almost all of these sensitive locations have their own security personnel, who are expected to erect “fixed guard, mobile guards and inspection points” and protect facilities from protesting forces. For example, the document reveals that Iran’s state TV, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has its “own herasat, as well as a defense command and Vali-e Asr unit, along with the presence of members from Ashura and Imam Ali Battalions, to provide security at IRIB.”



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of Herasat Units

DEPLOYMENT OF PRO-REGIME STUDENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS


In a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters also gains full authority and access to deploy pro-regime students and student organizations for various operations, not least psychological operations against the protestors. For example—as per official IRGC documentation acquired by the authors—on November 4, 2009, “more than 1500 individuals from among students of the Imam Hussain University were placed, with a specific plan, under the control of the Al-e Mohammad Headquarters.” According to the documents, these plainclothes students were ordered to stage counter-protests as Basij forces neutralized the “rioters” to show strength in numbers and land a psychological blow to the anti-regime protestors.




Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of 1,500 Students

COVERT MOVEMENT OF IRGC UNITS VIA CIVILIAN VEHICLES


It has long been suspected and reported by human rights organizations and Iranian protestors that the IRGC uses civilian vehicles to covertly move and position its units against protestors, including the use of ambulances. Primary IRGC documents acquired by the authors confirm this. The documents make it clear that the IRGC uses the cover of civilian vehicles to pass through areas of unrest and covertly deploy its forces. One example even cites how the IRGC used the cover of “trucks for transporting chickens” to pass through protest hotspots and deliver amenities to IRGC and Basij forces.



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Covert Movement of IRGC Units via Civilian Vehicles



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Covert Movement of IRGC Units via Civilian Vehicles



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of 1,500 Students

The committee also issues explicit orders for its members to carry out. For example, during the Mahsa Amini protests, academics and scholars had signed a petition against the suppression of students, not least after the repressive apparatus turned its attention to universities. This mild form of dissent, however, was considered a step too far by the Tharallah Headquarters. As soon as the petition was published, the Tharallah Headquarters committee instructed the MOIS Tehran intelligence deputy to summon the academics, intimidate them into withdrawing their signatures, and secure pledges from them not to speak out again.

پیرامون آخرین وضعیت دانشگاه ها ، گزارشانی در زمینه دستورات جلسه و مصوبات جلسات قبل ارائه نمودند و در نهایت توسط جانشین فرماندهی فرارگاه ناواه جمع بندی صورت پذیرفت.

(ب) جمع بندی و مصوبات

۱. با توجه به گزارش حراست وزارت علوم و تحقیقات در مورد عدم کارآمدی و نتیجه بخش بودن سازو کارهای درون دانشگاه و وزارت علوم در برخورد با برخی از اساتید کنش گر و فعال در اغتشاشات اخیر و لزوم برخورد قضایی با این افراد، مقرر گردید توسط سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران، سازمان اطلاعات سپاه، معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله و حراست وزارت علوم لیستی از اساتید تند و مساله دار تهیه و جهت تصمیم گیری و اتخاذ شیوه برخورد با این افراد در جلسه آینده ارائه شود.
۲. با توجه به هک شدن سایت دانشگاه امام صادق و تکرار مواردی از این دست در دانشگاه های دیگر، مقرر گردید بررسی فنی سایت های دانشگاه ها از نظر امنیت شبکه و جلوگیری از سرقت اطلاعات و ... توسط حراست وزارت علوم پیگیری شود.
۳. مقرر گردید جهت بررسی آخرین وضعیت برخوردهای صورت گرفته با اساتید متخلف و مساله دار از آقای حسینی مدیرکل دفتر هماهنگی حیات های رسیدگی به تخلفات اداری و انتظامی وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فن آوری جهت حضور در جلسه بعدی دعوت به عمل آید.
۴. در این جلسه تاکید شد حذف تسهیلات و پرتال آموزشی دانشجویان متضرر ورود از مصوبات شایک بوده و اجازه حضور دانشجویان متضرر ورود در امتحانات پایان ترم تخطف محسوب می شود و لازم است کلیه رؤسای دانشگاه ها نسبت به اجرای این مصوبه اقدام و امتحانات این افراد نیز حذف و ملغی گردد. در همین زمینه معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله نامه ای خطاب به وزیر علوم تهیه و ضمن اعتراض به اقدام برخی روسای دانشگاه ها در نقض مصوبه شایک، بر اجرای مصوبه مذکور تاکید نمایند.
۵. اعضا برای جلسه آینده گزارشی در مورد وضعیت حجاب و عفاف در دانشگاه ها و اقدامات صورت گرفته و ... ارائه نمایند. ضرورت دارد ضمن مشخص شدن میزان اجرای مصوبات گذشته در این زمینه، این موضوع در ثبت نام از دانشجویان برای ترم آینده نیز در دستور کار قرار گیرد.
۶. سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران، سازمان اطلاعات سپاه پاسداران، معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله و سازمان اطلاعات فراجا لیست دانشجویان بازداشت شده اعم از کسانی که حکم دریافت نمودند یا کسانی که با

۲. با توجه به هک شدن سایت دانشگاه امام صادق و تکرار مواردی از این دست در دانشگاه های دیگر، مقدر گردید بررسی فنی سایت های دانشگاه ها از نظر امنیت شبکه و جلوگیری از سرقت اطلاعات و ... توسط حرمت وزارت علوم پیگیری شود.

۳. مقرر گردید جهت بررسی آخرین وضعیت برخورد های صورت گرفته با اسانید متخلف و مساله دار آقای حسینی مدیرکل دفتر هماهنگی هیات های رسیدگی به تخلفات اداری در انتظامی وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فن آوری جهت حضور در جلسه بدوی دعوت به عمل آید.

۴. در این جلسه تأکید شد حذف تسهیلات و پرتال آموزشی دانشجویان ممنوع ورود از مسوئلتی شایک بوده و اجازه حضور دانشجویان ممنوع ورود در امتحانات پایان ترم تخلف محسوب می شود و لازم است کلیه روسای دانشگاه ها نسبت به اجرای این مصوبه اقدام و امتحانات این افراد نیز حذف و ملغی گردد. در همین زمینه معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثاربه نامه ای خطاب به وزیر علوم تهیه و ضمن اعتراض به اقدام برخی روسای دانشگاه ها در نقض مصوبه شایک، بر اجرای مصوبه مذکور تأکید نمایند.

۵. اعضا برای جلسه آینده گزارشی در مورد وضعیت حجاب و عفاف در دانشگاه ها و اقدامات صورت گرفته و ... ارائه نمایند. ضرورت دارد ضمن مشخص شدن میزان اجرای مصوبات گذشته در این زمینه، این موضوع در ثبت نام از دانشجویان برای ترم آینده نیز در دستور کار قرار گیرد.

۶. سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران، سازمان اطلاعات سپاه پاسداران، معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله و سازمان اطلاعات فراجا لیست دانشجویان بازداشت شده اعم از کسانی که حکم دریافت نمودند و یا کسانی که با



The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities' Document to Universities on How to Handle Student Protests

Another instance of how the Tharallah Headquarters Intelligence-Security Committee for Universities micromanages universities in times of unrest occurred during the Mahsa Amini protests, when it overturned a request by the head of Amir Kabir University to allow protesting students to reside in dormitories and use university facilities. SHAK issued an order prohibiting universities from allowing students who participated in protests to live in dormitories or use university facilities, and from taking exams. But when the head of Amir Kabir University sought to challenge this order, the Tharallah Headquarters committee intervened, rejecting it and instructing the university head to take a clear stance on the issue. Additionally, the committee directed the Ministry of Science and the Universities to dissolve any dissident student associations.

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پارشت

۱۳/۱/۱۴۰۱

آمن
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ارکیت
فهرندی



ب) جمع بندی و مصوبات

۱. بر اساس گزارش های ارائه شده مشخص گردید روند برگزاری کمیته های انضباطی در دانشگاهها مطلوب نمی باشد لذا تاکید می شود تا پایان ترم جاری تمامی دانشجویانی که به کمیته های انضباطی معرفی شده اند به خصوص دانشجویان ممنوع ورود باید توسط این کمیته ها تعیین تکلیف شوند. لذا حراست های محترم این موضوع را به روسای دانشگاه ها ابلاغ نمایند.
۲. در حوزه حجاب و عفاف در تعدادی از دانشگاه ها به خصوص واحد های دانشگاه آزاد و دانشگاه شهید بهشتی وضعیت خوب نیست، لذا بر اساس مصوبات شاک باید علاوه بر تذکر، ارشاد و تعهد، نهایتاً از ثبت نام دانشجویان دختری که کشف حجاب کرده اند معافیت بعمل آید؛ شرط ثبت نام از این افراد حضور به همراه والدین و سپردن تعهد می باشد.
۳. برابر گزارشات دریافتی علیرغم مشخص بودن اسامی اساتید خاطی، هیات های انتظامی اساتید در دانشگاه ها تشکیل نشده است. لذا ضرورت دارد ضمن تشکیل هیات های انتظامی اساتید در دانشگاه ها، نسبت به رسیدگی گزارشات در مورد تخلف اساتید اقدام شود. لازم به ذکر است اعضا ضمن نامناسب بودن پیگیری قضایی تخلفات اساتید، بر فعال سازی سازوکار های درون دانشگاهی و بهره برداری از روشهای جایگزین از جمله محدود سازی قراردادهای خارج از دانشگاه، مزایای پژوهشی، سفرهای خارجی، فرصت های مطالعاتی و تاثیر تخلفات آنان در ارتقاء رتبه و ... تاکید نمودند.
۴. معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله تهران طی نامه ای خیلی محرمانه اسامی اساتید خاطی که باید با آنها برخورد انضباطی صورت بگیرد را برای وزیر علوم ارسال و درخواست کند ضمن معرفی این افراد به هیات های انتظامی، نسبت به تعیین تکلیف این افراد (تذکر و تعهد، توبیخ کتبی، تعلیق ارتقاء، تعلیق همکاری، قطع همکاری با اساتید قراردادی، بازنشسته کردن برخی اساتید با سابقه بالا و ...) و در نظر گرفتن محدودیت در فعالیت آنها اقدام نماید.
۵. معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله تهران لیست روسای دانشکده ها و گروه هایی که بر اساس گزارشات دستگاه های امنیتی و نظارتی بایستی جابجا شوند را به صورت خیلی محرمانه برای وزیر علوم ارسال و از ایشان پیگیری نماید. همچنین نسخه ای از لیست به تفکیک دانشگاه ها به صورت غیر رسمی برای روسای دانشگاه ها ارسال شود.

The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities
Ordering University Disciplinary Committees How to Punish Dissenting
Student Protests

۴۹۴۷ - امریه

۱۳۸۱/۱۱/۱۳

آئی
خیلی محرمانه

نماد
تاریخ
پرست
انگشت
فرهنگی



۶. سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران، سازمان اطلاعات سپاه، معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله، حراست وزارت علوم، حراست وزارت بهداشت و حراست دانشگاه آزاد، لیست شوراهای صنفی اساتید و دانشجویان که بر خلاف اساستنامه اقدام به صدور مواضع و بیانیه سیاسی و دعوت به اغتشاش، تحریک دانشجویان و ... کردند را تهیه و ضمن تشکیل پرونده برای آنها، در جلسات آئی برای بررسی و اخذ تصمیمات لازم طرح نمایند.
۷. مقرر گردید حراست وزارت علوم تا جلسه آینده آمار دقیق اقدامات صورت گرفته در زمینه تشکیل کمیته های انضباطی و میزان تذکرات ارائه شده در مورد کشف حجاب را به تفکیک دانشگاه ها ارائه نماید.
۸. با توجه به گزارش سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران در مورد عملکرد انجمن اسلامی دانشگاه شریف که حاوی اقدامات تند و رادیکال، هدایت و نقش آفرینی در اغتشاشات اخیر و دیگر اقدامات بر علیه نظام بوده است، مقرر گردید طی نامه ای از سوی معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله به هیات نظارت دانشگاه شریف درخواست شود با توجه فعالیت های مجرمانه و خلاف آئین نامه فعالیت شکل های دانشجویی، در مورد ادامه فعالیت این شکل تجدید نظر صورت بگیرد.
۹. از اقدامات شایسته حراست وزارت بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی در پیگیری مصوبات و برگزاری کمیته های انضباطی و هیات های انتظامی تشکر و قدردانی به عمل می آید.

سرلشکر پاسدار حسین سلامی

فرمانده قرارگاه ثارالله تهران

با تسنن سرپرست پاسدار مبین نبات

گیرندگان:

نهاد نمایندگی مقام معظم رهبری در دانشگاه ها
رئاست محترم سازمان اطلاعات سپاه - معاونت فرهنگی
معاونت محترم فرهنگی وزارت اطلاعات

The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities
Ordering University Disciplinary Committees How to Punish Dissenting
Student Protests


In addition to the measures above, during a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters will also order university Herasat representatives to install new security gates to monitor students' entry and exit and prevent graffiti bearing protest slogans. On 21 January 2023, the committee requested a list of problematic or dissident students from University Herasat and the representative of the supreme leader.



Tharallah Headquarters Document Requesting a List of Problematic or Dissident Students

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE PATROLS AND AMBUSHES

According to a confidential IRGC document analyzed and verified by UANI, the Tharallah Headquarters also deploys intelligence patrols and ambushes to target protestors, not least near sensitive locations. The document reveals that the deputy commander of Tharallah Headquarters emphasized the need to deploy targeted intelligence patrols and ambushes around potential protest centers to confront protestors. The document emphasizes the importance of identifying classified locations, including military, government, and judicial sectors, that are vulnerable to “harmful” actions, as well as parks and open spaces within the security perimeter. The aim is to conduct intelligence patrols in a coordinated, targeted, and planned manner, and to initiate ambushes in the security and protection zones surrounding these key areas.



Tharallah Headquarters Document on Intelligence Patrols and Ambushes

Technology also plays an increasingly important role in the Tharallah Headquarters' red-alert operations. During such times, the Tharallah Headquarters issues orders requiring all government agencies and universities to enhance security personnel and install technological equipment, such as facial recognition systems and CCTV, in all state-run buildings. It also requests that all data considered "sensitive" be stored in multiple locations with backups to prevent loss from the source. The Tharallah Headquarters will also install facial recognition technology in state-run buildings.³⁰

شماره : ۵۰۹۴ - ارشاد
تاریخ : ۱۳۰۱/۱۷/۲۵
پوست :
ارجحیت :
طبقه بندی :

خیلی محرمانه



تولید دانش بنیان، اشتغال آفرین

حضور محترم برادر ارجمند محمد بنجر

معاون اول رئیس جمهور

موضوع : وضعیت مطالبات مالی شرکت بهره برداری مترو از دولت

سلام علیکم

اللهم صل علی محمد و آل محمد

با احترام، همانطور که مستحضرید، مترو تهران با ۷ خط، ۱۴۴ ایستگاه و پایانه و ۱۲۱ رام قطار وظیفه خدمات رسانی به صدها مسافر را در طول روز بر عهده دارد که سهم قابل توجهی از حمل و نقل عمومی تهران را شامل می شود. از طرفی مترو یکی از نقاط شگفتی ساز و آشنای حوادث در شرایط امنیتی مختلف به خصوص آشوب و اغتشاشات، به دلیل شرایط ویژه همچون تراکم جمعیتی بالا، محیط بسته و حالات آشفته روانی و خستگی مسافران از کار روزانه می باشد. از همین رو یکی از محورهای نارضایتی شهروندان که منجر به وقایعی همچون شعاردهی در ایستگاه ها و تخریب واگن مترو در سال های اخیر بوده ناشی از فرسودگی ناوگان مترو می باشد که منجر به نقص های فنی متعدد و حوادث در مترو شده است. از طرف دیگر فرسودگی و کیفیت پایین سیستم مانیتورینگ و دوربین های مدار بسته مترو نیز موجب کاهش بهره برداری از آن ها در اغتشاشات اخیر پایتخت گردید که قابل توجه می باشد. توجه به مترو به عنوان شهر زیرزمینی و یکی از نقاط حساس، آسیب پذیر و آسیب زا در تمامی وضعیت های امنیتی نشان از نیاز به اهتمام جدی دولت در راستای رفع نیازهای مالی و پرداخت دیون مالی آن جهت بازسازی ناوگان و تأسیسات آن دارد. لذا در زیر جدول مطالبات مالی مترو تهران از دولت تا پایان سال ۱۴۰۰ و برآورد مالی بروزرسانی و نوسازی سیستم دوربین های مدار بسته مترو تهران ارسال می گردد و خواهشمند است به جهت لزوم توجه جدی به مجموعه مترو تهران و جلوگیری از هرگونه وقایع ضد امنیتی دستور فرمایید موضوع بررسی و تدابیر لازم در این خصوص اتخاذ گردد:

Tharallah Headquarters Document Orders for CCTV Cameras in Tehran Metro

شماره: ۵۰۹۴
تاریخ: ۱۳۸۵/۱۱/۲۵
پروست:
ارجحیت:
طبقه بندی:

بررسی

جمهوری اسلامی ایران

ستاد مرکزی

برآورد مالی به روزرسانی و نوسازی دوربین های مدار بسته ایستگاه های مترو تهران

شرح	قیمت هر ایستگاه (تومان)	تعداد	قیمت کل در هر ایستگاه
دوربین چهره زن	۵۰۰۰۰۰۰	۱۰	۵۰۰۰۰۰۰
تجهیزات سیستم انتقال	۱۰۰۰۰۰۰۰	۱	۱۰۰۰۰۰۰۰
ساخت استرکچر نصب دوربین	۱۰۰۰۰۰۰۰	۱	۱۰۰۰۰۰۰۰
نصب و راه اندازی	۴۰۰۰۰۰۰	۱	۴۰۰۰۰۰۰
مجموع در هر ایستگاه			۱۵۵۰۰۰۰۰

سر لشکر پاسدار حسین سلامی

فرمانده قرارگاه ثارالله (ع) تهران

باشین سرپاسدار مین نجات

رونوشت:

- جناب آقای دکتر وحیدی وزیر محترم کشور جهت استحضار
- جناب آقای فخاری ریاست محترم شورای تأمین و استاندار تهران جهت آگاهی
- جناب آقای زاکانی شهردار تهران جهت اطلاع و پیگیری لازم

مدیریت دیوارخانه و سری

۴۲۴۹۸

تعداد: ۱۳۸۵/۱۱/۲۵

تاریخ: ۱۳۸۵/۱۱/۲۵

پرونده:

Tharallah Headquarters Document Orders for CCTV Cameras in Tehran Metro

In sum, a Red situation effectively transforms Tehran into a militarized zone under the centralized authority of the Tharallah Headquarters. Its vertical control over intelligence, operations, education, and labor—not to mention civilian life—makes it the single most powerful institution in Iran’s internal security apparatus. Without disrupting Tharallah’s command structure and shutting down its surveillance infrastructure, any regime change effort relying on mass protests is unlikely to succeed.

CONCLUSION

Current discussions on whether the ongoing protests or another direct war between the Islamic Republic and Israel could lead to regime change in Iran largely ignore the vast suppressive machinery built by the IRGC. Nowhere is this apparatus more entrenched than in Tehran, where, for the first time, this paper reveals a multilayered security infrastructure extending from district zones down to neighborhood networks.

That being said, the current protests in Iran are not a flash-in-the-pan moment. They are a continuation of a new wave of unrest that began in 2017, reoccurred in 2019, and again in 2022–23. This protest movement is explicitly anti-regime in nature. The pattern of unrest in Iran reveals that protests are increasing in size, scale, and frequency. In turn, the regime is resorting to more violence to reassert control. The cycle of demonstrations and suppression will likely continue until the balance of power shifts between the Iranian people and the vast suppressive apparatus under the IRGC's Tharallah Headquarters. This apparatus is the biggest barrier to regime change in Iran.

Without dismantling this security web, regime change through domestic protest alone is highly unlikely. The Tharallah Headquarters has consistently crushed all unrest in the capital due to its deep and preemptive reach. Even during the 12-day war, amid Israeli strikes and the absence of protests in Iran, the Tharallah Headquarters deployed forces across Tehran to prevent any small-scale gatherings.

As the current protests gain momentum and Israel's objectives evolve toward creating conditions to empower the Iranian people, dismantling the IRGC's internal security infrastructure, especially the Tharallah Headquarters, becomes critical. Simply put, regime change through popular protest can succeed only if external actors target the IRGC's repressive structure at every level.

Drawing on internal IRGC documents obtained from the Tharallah Headquarters and affiliated units, UANI's research presents the first-ever comprehensive assessment of the Tharallah Headquarters' infrastructure, assets, and operational strategies. The findings illuminate how the IRGC maintains control over Iranian society, particularly in major urban centers.

This research provides critical insights for military officials, policymakers, human rights advocates, and scholars. It details the Tharallah Headquarters' coordination with intelligence, military, and paramilitary forces to repress dissent rapidly. Mapping command structures and threat-response tactics reveals how the regime adapts to varying levels of unrest.

The Tharallah Headquarters operates a tiered threat-response model, with colors ranging from white to red, allowing for scalable mobilization from local police to full IRGC deployment. Understanding this system is crucial for predicting the regime's behavior and developing effective strategic countermeasures.

Specialized units, such as the Imam Ali and Fateheen Basij, are central to this rapid-response strategy. Their deployment reflects the IRGC's focus on speed and force to neutralize organized opposition. Undermining these units will be critical to empowering the Iranian people.

The Tharallah Headquarters also utilizes advanced surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, internet shutdowns, and cyber-monitoring, underscoring the urgent need for secure communications among activists and journalists. This technology enables the regime to dominate public discourse and prevent mobilization.

The IRGC has embedded operatives across civilian institutions, universities, municipalities, and workplaces, allowing for constant surveillance and social control. Identifying these embedded agents may help expose vulnerabilities in the regime's oversight network.

Lastly, the Tharallah Headquarters targets economically marginalized areas, recognizing their potential for unrest. Addressing socioeconomic grievances could reduce regime control and open space for resistance, weakening the Islamic Republic's grip on vulnerable communities.

Any meaningful effort to enable regime change in Iran must begin with a strategic dismantling of the IRGC's deeply entrenched internal security infrastructure, especially the Tharallah Headquarters, without which popular protest movements are unlikely to succeed. ■

07

NOTES

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