

THE THARALLAH (SARALLAH) HEADQUARTERS UNVEILED

THE HIDDEN
INFRASTRUCTURE
BLOCKING REGIME
CHANGE IN IRAN.

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REPORT BY:
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ABOUT UANI

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a nonprofit and non-partisan policy organization formed to combat the threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

OUR MISSION

UANI educates the public, policymakers, and businesses about the danger posed by the Iranian regime and designs programs to ensure the regime's economic and diplomatic isolation until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, regional destabilization, and human rights violations.

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CONTENTS

01 Introduction	1-3
02 The Tharallah Headquarters: From Inception to Today	4-5
Khamenei's Leadership and Early Unrest	5
The Urban-Poor Riots, 1991-1995	5
Formation and Role of Tharallah Headquarters	5
1999 Student Protests	6
2009 Green Movement	6
2017-18 Dey Protests	6
2019 Bloody November	6
2022 Woman, Life, Freedom Movement	6
Tharallah Headquarters Commanders From 1995-Present	7
03 IRGC Tharallah Headquarters Structure	8-9
04 The Tharallah Headquarters' Infrastructure and Assets	10
The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah 23 Basij Regional Bases (<i>nahiyah</i>)	11
IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's Basij District Bases (<i>howzeh</i>)	12
IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's Basij District Bases (<i>mahalaat</i>)	12
Case Study 1st Tehran Municipality Region: Jamaran Basij Resistance Regional Base	13
IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Operational Wings	14
Mohammad Rasulullah Infantry Branch	14
IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Security Branch	14-15
Motorbike Unit Case Study	16-18
05 Tharallah Headquarters: Distribution of Units, Operations and Situational Interventions	19-20
The Tharallah Headquarters: Operations & Situational Interventions	21
Tharallah Headquarters Operations During the White Situation	22-27
Tharallah Headquarters Operations During the Yellow Situation	28-37
Tharallah Headquarters Operations During the Orange Situation	37-49
Tharallah Headquarters Operations During the Red Situation	50-71
06 Conclusion	72-73
07 Notes	74-76

01

INTRODUCTION

The protests unfolding in Iran in the winter of 2025–26 must be understood within the longer cycle of contention and repression that has shaped state-society relations over the past decade. The demonstrations take place against the backdrop of heightened regional tensions with Israel and U.S. President Donald J. Trump's warning that America would intervene if the regime kills protesters. The Islamic Republic has used this context to frame domestic dissent as a security threat rather than the expression of social or political grievances. This external environment has allowed the state to securitize protest more quickly and to justify extraordinary coercive measures using the language of national defense and resistance.

These demonstrations also follow a familiar pattern established during earlier waves of unrest in 2017, 2019, and 2022. Each of those episodes resulted from different immediate triggers—ranging from economic grievances to moral and social outrage—yet all were ultimately met with overwhelming repression. The regime did not rely solely on ad hoc violence. Instead, it activated a well-developed system of surveillance, coordination, and coercion that allowed it to fragment protest networks, deter sustained popular mobilization, and reassert control over public spaces. The repeated suppression of these movements has produced a protest cycle marked by resilience at the societal level and by institutional learning at the regime level.

To assess whether the current protests may succeed or fail, and to understand how the Islamic Republic is likely to respond, one must examine the central pillar of the regime's internal security architecture: the Tharallah Headquarters. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) primary command structure for security in Tehran and, by extension, for crisis management nationwide, the Tharallah Headquarters functions as the regime's operational brain during moments of unrest. It coordinates intelligence, policing, Basij militia, IRGC units, and psychological operations, ensuring that repression is not improvised but calibrated. Any analysis that ignores this institution risks misreading both the limits of protest and the durability of authoritarian control.

Ultimately, the fate of the current protest wave will not be determined solely by public anger or international pressure. It will depend on how effectively the regime activates its coercive machinery and how successfully that machinery contains fragmentation within the security elite itself. Understanding the Tharallah Headquarters' role is therefore essential not only for evaluating the present moment but also for explaining why previous uprisings failed to produce systemic change and why the Islamic Republic continues to survive despite recurring crises.

Despite the Tharallah Headquarters' function as the most critical cog in the IRGC's security and suppressive apparatus, there is virtually no insight or intelligence on how it operates, not least during times of unrest.

This is precisely the research gap this United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) report intends to fill.

Using primary Farsi-language material and intelligence obtained from inside Iran—including internal documentation from within the Tharallah Headquarters and its sub-headquarters—this paper will, for the first time, reveal the ecosystem of the most critical and life-preserving organ in the regime's security and suppressive apparatus.

In doing so, this paper will identify and expose:

- Key infrastructure and assets—from mapping its operational headquarters sub-branches, and vast apparatus spanning Tehran's regional zones, municipality districts, and neighborhood districts, to exposing its key suppression units and how the Tharallah Headquarters divides Tehran's municipality districts.
- Internal structures—from identifying key personnel and directorates to shedding light on how these structures practically function and coordinate.
- Operational units, capabilities, and distribution of units.
- Strategic calculus and operations—from its strategic rationale to suppression strategies and tactics during different security levels and on-the-ground unit arrangements during unrest.
- Tactical on-the-ground deployment.



THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: FROM INCEPTION TO TODAY

The strategic importance of Tehran to the regime's survival, particularly during times of protest, has long influenced the IRGC's security approach. Iran's protest history shows that regime change has always been city-led. The IRGC's conclusion: control over Tehran is existential. This logic underpinned the creation of the Tharallah Headquarters, the regime's key national security body. As Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor to the supreme leader and the first commander of the Tharallah Headquarters, has stated: "The security of Tehran is, in fact, the security of Iran." ¹

KHAMENEI'S LEADERSHIP AND EARLY UNREST

Established in 1995, the Tharallah Headquarters emerged following unrest in Tehran and a 1992 drill that revealed the capital could fall in just two hours.² Compared to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's reign as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's leadership faced broader unrest, spurred by his lack of charisma and a population worn out by war and economic hardship. He has increasingly relied on the IRGC to maintain his power.

THE URBAN-POOR RIOTS, 1991-1995

Economic liberalization under President Hashemi Rafsanjani led to inflation, triggering urban riots. Violent unrest in Mashhad (1991) and Qazvin (1994) saw deadly force used by ill-equipped IRGC units.³ However, the final straw came after the 1995 Eslamshahr riots, sparked by soaring inflation, which prompted the complete recalibration of security policies in Tehran.

FORMATION AND ROLE OF THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS

In response, the IRGC created the Tharallah Headquarters to hold full security authority over Tehran during times of crisis, which the IRGC defines as “threats against the regime or the interests of the Islamic Revolution.”⁴ In such times, the interior ministry’s National Security Council (SHAK) mandates that the Tharallah Headquarters to assume full authority over Tehran Province and all security entities in that province—including the police, Basij, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the IRGC—and their resources are brought under its command and control. Its formation was designed to professionalize and centralize suppression.

1999 STUDENT PROTESTS

The Tharallah Headquarters’ first test would take place under the presidency of the so-called “reformist” President Mohammad Khatami, following student protests in July 1999 after the closure of the *Salaam* newspaper. With police unable to neutralize the unrest, on July 14, SHAK mandated that the Tharallah Headquarters take control of Tehran’s security. This would result in IRGC divisions mobilizing throughout 20 nights to crush the protests. While authority was given for the Tharallah Headquarters to intervene on July 14, its intelligence operatives had been on the ground monitoring the protests from the outset. In 2004, when reformist members of Iran’s Sixth Parliament protested the Guardian Council’s widespread disqualification of reformist candidates for the 2004 parliamentary elections, the IRGC ground forces commander instructed Tharallah Headquarters to suppress the peaceful sit-in by the reformist members of Parliament.⁵

2009 GREEN MOVEMENT

The outbreak of major nationwide protests following the rigged 2009 presidential elections saw SHAK hand over Tehran to the Tharallah Headquarters. The Headquarters used all available assets and resources to suppress the demonstrations, including obtaining the facilities of Iran's notorious Evin Prison. The IRGC's satisfactory performance in quelling the unrest led Khamenei to reward it with greater powers: its Intelligence Directorate was upgraded to full organization status. The aftermath of the protests also led to the creation of the IRGC security units, comprising the IRGC and Basij forces. In 2010, the Tharallah Headquarters' geographical boundaries expanded beyond Tehran to encompass the province of Alborz. The Tharallah Headquarters also established four sub-headquarters—Nadr, Qods, Fath, and Ghadr—throughout Tehran to streamline the coordination of its forces.

2017–18 DEY PROTESTS

Starting in Mashhad, the “Dey Protests” marked the first major unrest driven by Iran’s working class across smaller cities. Although the disturbance in Tehran was limited and police managed it, the Tharallah Headquarters monitored the protests but did not intervene. Afterwards, it began focusing on “slum dwellers” as a rising threat. Consequently, the IRGC launched projects to address widespread economic grievances.

2019 BLOODY NOVEMBER

A gas hike in November 2019 led to nationwide protests, with demonstrators explicitly calling for regime collapse. The Tharallah Headquarters, led by IRGC Commander Esmail Kowsari, seized control of Tehran and its suburbs just three days after the unrest was sparked. It would order a complete internet shutdown, and its forces killed at least 1,500 protesters. The protests led to more professionalization, with IRGC security units gaining distinct ranks. Until 2019, all IRGC security units in Tehran shared the same rank insignia of the Guards’ Intelligence Organization. However, after the 2019 protests, the IRGC’s security units obtained their own rank insignia, indicating the further professionalization and organization of these units as a distinct force within the Guards’ security-intelligence apparatus. In 2020, Hossein Nejat took command of the Tharallah Headquarters and identified poor urban populations and cyberspace threats as among the most pressing concerns.

2022 WOMAN, LIFE, FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Despite the regime’s focus on shantytowns, protests erupted in September 2022 after Mahsa Amini died in the custody of the morality police. The movement spread to over 100 municipalities, including major unrest in Tehran. The Tharallah Headquarters, again under Nejat, assumed complete control. It deployed new strategies and tactics, detailed later in this paper, based on original IRGC internal materials.

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS COMMANDERS FROM PAST TO PRESENT



Yahya Rahim-Safavi
1995–1997



Ali Fazli
1997–1999



Mohammad Ali Jafari
1999–2005



Mohammad Reza Zahedi
2000–2006



Mohammad Ali Hejazi
2007–June 2009



Hossein Hamedani
June 2009–August 2009



Mehdi Rabbani
September 2009–2012



Mohsen Kazemini
2012–2017



General Esmaeil Kowsari
2017–2019




General Hossein Nejat
2019–present

3

IRGC THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

The Tharallah Headquarters, like the 10 other security-military headquarters, falls within the structure of the IRGC Ground Forces. Tharallah operates as the Guards' primary security headquarters.⁶

IRGC STRUCTURE



IRGC PROVINCIAL GUARD AND SECURITY HEADQUARTERS ⁷

Province	IRGC Provincial Guard	Operational Headquarters
Kurdistan	Sepah-e Beit al-Muqaddas	
West Azerbaijan	Sepah-e Shohada	Hamze-ye Sayyed al-Shohada
Ardabil	Sepah-e Hazrat-e Abbas	
East Azerbaijan	Sepah-e Ashura	Ashura
Zanjan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Mahdi	
Hamedan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Hossein	
Ilam	Sepah-e Amir al-Momenin	Najaf-e Ashraf
Kermanshah	Sepah-e Nabi Akram	
Markazi	Sepah-e Ruhollah	
Qazvin	Sepah-e Saheb al-Amr	
Qom	Sepah-e Ali bin Abu Taleb	Saheb al-Zaman
Semnan	Sepah-e Ghaem al-Muhammad	
Gilan	Sepah-e Qods	
Golestan	Sepah-e Neynavā	Ghadir
Mazandaran	Sepah-e Karbala	
Khuzestan	Sepah-e Vali-ye Asr	
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad	Sepah-e Fath	Karbala
Lorestan	Sepah-e Abolfazl	
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	Sepah-e Ghambar Bani Hashem	
Isfahan	Sepah-e Saheb al-Zaman	Sayyed al-Shohada
Yazd	Sepah-e al-Ghadir	
Razavi Khorasan	Sepah-e Imam Reza	
North Khorasan	Sepah-e Javad al-Aeme	Samen al-Aeme
South Khorasan	Sepah-e Ansar al-Reza	
Bushehr	Sepah-e Imam Sadeq	
Fars	Sepah-e Fajr	Madineh-ye al-Munavareh
Hormozgan	Sepah-e Imam Sajjad	
Kerman	Sepah-e Sarallah	
Sistan and Baluchestan	Sepah-e Salman	Qods
Alborz	Sepah-e Imam Hassan Mojtaba	
Tehran province	Sepah-e Sayyed al-Shohada	
Tehran city	Sepah-e Muhammad Rasoul Allah	Tharallah



THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS' INFRASTRUCTURE AND ASSETS

Since 2007, the IRGC has decentralized through the establishment of its Provincial Guards, which operate under the control of the 11 IRGC security-military headquarters. These Provincial Guards serve as military commanders for their respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij bases within their areas. The Tharallah Headquarters oversees three Provincial Guards for Tehran and Alborz Province. These include the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran City, the IRGC Seyyed Ol Shuhada Corps in other cities within Tehran Province, and the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps in Alborz Province.

THE IRGC'S MOHAMMAD RASULLAH CORPS

Among these three Provincial Guards, the IRGC's Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran is the most critical and Tehran's main IRGC force. Created in 2007, it is responsible for maintaining the political order in Tehran city from hard threats (either external or civil conflict), semi-hard threats (domestic protests and uprisings), and soft threats (such as cultural and societal ones).

The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps operates a main staff base on Niayesh Highway in the north of Tehran. It has also established 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases (*nahiyeh*), each located in one of Tehran's 22 municipality regions. The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps also operates two regional bases across Tehran's first municipality region. These regional bases are responsible for preserving order and security in their respective municipality regions from hard, semi-hard, and soft threats.



Map of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah 23 Basij Regional Bases (*nahiyah*) ⁸

THE IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULLAH 23 BASIJ REGIONAL BASES (NAHIYAH)

- 1st Tehran municipality region: Jamaran Basij Resistance Regional Base
 - Mahalati Township: Amir al-Momenin Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 2nd Tehran municipality region: Bahoner Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 3rd Tehran municipality region: Muftah Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 4th Tehran municipality region: Karbala Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 5th Tehran municipality region: Quds Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 6th Tehran municipality region: Valiasr Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 7th Tehran municipality region: Motahari Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 8th Tehran municipality region: Beheshti Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 9th Tehran municipality region: Hamzah Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 10th Tehran municipality region: Moqdad Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 11th Tehran municipality region: Salman Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 12th Tehran municipality region: Khomeini Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 13th Tehran municipality region: Kamil Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 14th Tehran municipality region: Mahalati Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 15th Tehran municipality region: Malik Ashtar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 16th Tehran municipality region: Rajaei Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 17th Tehran municipality region: Habib Ibn Mazher Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 18th Tehran municipality region: Muslim Ibn Aqeel Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 19th Tehran municipality region: Abu Dhar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- The 20th Tehran municipality region is outside of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's jurisdiction
- 21st Tehran municipality region: Maysam Temar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- 22nd Tehran municipality region: Amariasar Basij Resistance Regional Base
- Lavasanat and Rudbar Qasran: Al-Ghadir Basij Resistance Regional Base – This regional base is in the northeast of Tehran city but falls under the jurisdiction of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah.

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULLAH'S BASIJ DISTRICT BASES (HOWZEH)


In the vertical command structure, beneath the regional base level, lies the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's 300 Basij District Bases (*howzeh*). These are spread across Tehran city's 123 municipality districts.

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULLAH'S BASIJ'S NEIGHBORHOOD BASES (MAHALAAT)

The final layer in the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah's vertical structure is the Basij's Neighborhood Bases (*mahalaat*). In total, 3000 Basij Neighborhood Bases exist across Tehran's 375 neighborhoods.

CASE STUDY 1ST TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY REGION: JAMARAN BASIJ RESISTANCE REGIONAL BASE

For example, Tehran's 1st municipality region, under the Jamaran Basij regional base, has eight Basij District Bases (*howzehs*). This municipality region has a total of 32 Basij resistance bases (*mahalaat*) spread throughout the area.



Basij District Base Zones in District 1 Tehran controlled by the
Basij Jamaran Regional Base

DISTRICT 1 IS CONTROLLED BY JAMARAN REGIONAL BASE (*NAYIHEH*). SOME OF THESE DISTRICTS INCLUDE:


1. Basij District Base 131: Basij Jundullah Base / Martyr Chamran Base / Martyr Valenjak / Martyr Modares
2. Basij District Base 132 Tayybin (only for women): Masjid al-Nabi / Kotsar / Shahid Bakri Basij base
3. Basij District Base 133 Tariq al-Quds: Bases of Azam / Sahib al-Zaman / Defenders of the Province / Wali Asr / Sayed Al-Shahda / Velayat Faqih / Ammar / Tharullah
4. Basij District Base 134 of Sabrin (only for women): Wilayat / Zahra/ Seyd al-Shohda bases
5. Basij 136 Base Mansurin area (only for women): Ansar / Alawi (Hazrat Zahra) / Qaim bases
6. Basij District Base 137 of Ramadan: Martyrs' bases of Jamaran / Imam Khomeini / Wahdat / Shahid Timuri / Shahid Bahnar / Imam Hassan Mojtabi / Walfajr

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH OPERATIONAL WINGS

IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah has two operational wings: an infantry branch and a security branch.

MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH INFANTRY BRANCH

The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps' infantry branch is the 27th Division (or Lashkar-e 27 in Farsi), comprising five IRGC infantry battalions of full-time IRGC members. It also has an additional 22 Basij Imam Hussain Infantry Units. These units are composed of active Basij members who are paid IRGC employees. Theoretically, each IRGC-Basij Resistance Regional Base (*nahiyah*), such as the Jamaran Regional Base, has at least one Imam Hussein Infantry Unit.



While these forces are primarily composed of infantry units focused on external rather than domestic threats, they are integrated into the security and suppression apparatus during times of protest or domestic crises.

In addition to the Basij Imam Hussein Infantry Battalions, the 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Brigade also commands the Fateheen Basij Unit (*yegan-e fateheen-e basij*), which operates as the Basij's special infantry force—the most critical Basij infantry force. According to reports, there are at least four Basij Fateheen special unit battalions in Tehran.⁹

IRGC MOHAMMAD RASULULLAH SECURITY BRANCH

The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Security branch is the main operational security force for Greater Tehran. It has established two key security brigades: the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade, located in the northeast of Tehran, and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade, located in Tehran District 11.¹⁰

In addition to these security brigades, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Security Branch also has five security units (bigger than battalions, but smaller than brigades):

1. Imam Hadi Unit.
2. Imam Sajad Unit
3. Imam Hussain-Mojtaba Unit
4. Imam Reza Unit
5. Saheb al-Zaman Unit.

These five security units have three teams apiece, each with ten motorbikes manned by two recruits. In other words, each security unit has 60 motorbike riders (see case study). Each security force combines both IRGC and Basij members. For example, the Aaleh-e Mohammad Security Brigade and the Al-Zahra Security Brigade each have five IRGC battalions comprised of full-time IRGC special security forces with distinct security insignia. They command several Imam Ali Basij Security units, comprising 70 to 150 recruits.

Founded after the 2009 Green Movement protests, the primary mission of these units is to address security threats, making them the most prominent Basij unit for handling anti-riot operations. Each IRGC-Basij Resistance Regional Base (*nahyiheh*) is required to have at least one Imam Ali Unit, which receives orders from the Guards' security branches. These security units specialize in suppressing urban protests and are equipped primarily with anti-riot gear, including shields, batons, paintball guns, shotguns, pepper spray, and casket hats.

The Imam Ali Units comprise active Basij members between the ages of 15 and 30 who have received training from the IRGC's security brigades for neighborhood-suppression operations. Regarding logistics and training, they are all under the control of the Imam Ali Central Headquarters, which oversees all the Imam Ali Units nationwide. According to some reports, the Imam Ali Units have also recruited criminals and thugs who often act with greater brutality, spreading fear and discouraging dissent.

Each Imam Ali Unit has a motorcycle division that has been utilized for psychological intimidation through irregular violence. Similar to the Basij special infantry unit, the Fatheen (located at the Resistance Village in East Tehran; [click here for location](#)), a new Basij special security force, the Navab Unit, has also been established in recent years. The Navab Unit comprises the most highly trained and skilled active Basij members specializing in protest-suppression methods.

Every unit within the Mohammad Rasulullah Security branch consists of several teams, including: barrier teams, responsible for blocking and/or separating protesters from the rest of the people; motorized assault teams, tasked with attacking protesters at the right time, when the barrier and separation work have been done well; pursuit teams, whose job is pursuing and arresting individuals identified as protest leaders; documentation teams, in charge of filming protests and identifying their leaders; intelligence teams that specialize in infiltrating protests, intelligence gathering, and identifying the protest leaders; and interrogation teams, in charge of conducting initial and street interrogations as well as separating important detainees from unimportant ones.

MOTORBIKE UNIT CASE STUDY

Primary documents from the Imam Ali Security Central Headquarters reveal key details on the deployment, formation, and tactics used by the motorbike units within the battalion. The motorbike units within the Imam Ali Security Battalions are fast-moving, two-person teams designed for suppressing protests. One person drives, while the other rides with a baton, a taser, pellet guns, or even launchers. They are part of the Basij's security frontline response when unrest breaks out, especially in big cities like Tehran, Shiraz, or Mashhad.



These teams are trained for speed, intimidation, psychological operations, and crowd disruption. Their main job is to scatter crowds before they grow. By weaving through alleys, flanking protest groups, and circling demonstrators, they aim to cause panic and confusion. The internal manuals from the Imam Ali Security Battalion Headquarters outline the deployment formation of these motorcycle units. According to these internal documents, “the best formation during the motorcycle parade to display the number of riders is a two-column formation.” It also states that “the speed of the column should be low so that the column remains exposed to public view for a longer time.”

نکات قابل توجه در خصوص انجام این تاکتیک به شرح ذیل می باشد:

(۱) سرعت موتورسیکلت‌ها: در هنگام انجام رژه موتوری باید هم موتورسیکلت‌ها با سرعت یکسان حرکت نمایند. در این تاکتیک باید سرعت حرک ستون کم باشد تا زمان بیشتری ستون در معرض دید عموم قرار گیرد. سرعت بالا دستون کشی باعث به هم ریختن ستون، احتمال تصادف موتورسیکلت‌ها و کاهش زمان نمایش قدرت در سطح معابر می شود.

(۲) آرایش حرکت موتورسیکلت‌ها: بهترین آرایش در هنگام رژه موتوری برآ نمایش اقتدار گردان، آرایش دو ستونی می باشد. هر قدر طول ستون بیشتر باشد، حجم نیرویی گردان بیشتر نشان داده شده و نظم ستون نیز بهتر خواهد بود. البته در این حالت ممکن است بستگی به شرایط ترافیکی، بین ستون فاصله افتاده و در اصطلاح ستون پریله شود.

The presence of the motorbike units is loud, aggressive, and meant to show control. To wage what it calls “psychological warfare” against protestors, the Imam Ali Security Battalion internal manuals call on motorbike units to “deliberately create loud noise and sounds [from their motorbikes] to create psychological warfare.”

(۱۱) ایجاد سرو صدا توسط موتورسیکلت: یکی از عواملی که می‌توان توسط موتورسیکلت برای ایجاد جنگ روانی انجام داد ایجاد سرو صدا توسط موتورسیکلت می‌باشد:

Likewise, the motorbike units are instructed to “turn on motorcycle headlights to inflict psychological warfare against rioters” during their deployment suppressive parades.

(۵) روشن نمودن چراغها در هنگام حرکت: یکی از روش‌هایی که در بالا بردن اقتدار گردن در هنگام رژه موتوری نقش دارد، روشن کردن چراغهای موتورسیکلت‌ها بوده که ایجاد جنگ روانی در بین اغتشاشگران می‌کند.

Motorbike units were heavily used during the November 2019 protests, when the regime responded with brutal force. They have also been deployed in their numbers during the ongoing winter 2026 protests. Videos from that time show swarms of bikes chasing down protesters, even running them off roads. They are often deployed first, ahead of riot police or heavier security units such as the Imam Hossein Battalions.

Command for these units comes from the local IRGC and the Tharallah Headquarters. They are often called up in what is known as a “yellow” security alert during the early phases of unrest.

Despite receiving criticism and condemnations from human rights groups and the broader Iranian population, the Imam Ali Battalion’s—not least its lethal motorcycle units—have been expanding and intensifying their repression, which is visible in the ongoing winter 2026 protests in Iran. In short, motorbike units are the Basij’s hit-and-run tool for fast, cheap, and brutal repression and intimidation, aimed at keeping people off the streets.





THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS, OPERATIONS AND SITUATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

To control Tehran and manage its security forces, the Tharallah Headquarters has established four operational sub-headquarters, dividing Tehran into four sections: Quds (northwest Tehran), Nasr (northeast Tehran), Fath (southwest Tehran), and Ghadr (southeast and central Tehran).

Each sub-headquarters oversees several districts within the Tehran Municipality and coordinates with various IRGC security units and brigades in those districts. Each sub-headquarters coordinates between IRGG and Basij forces across the districts that fall within its remit.


Crucially, the sub-headquarters operate as the key command and coordinating link to the main Tharallah Headquarters.

Quds Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising North and Northwest Tehran, specifically covering the municipality districts of 2, 5, 21, and 22. Its central operational units are the Imam Hadi and Imam Sajjad Security Units.

Fath Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Southwest Tehran, specifically covering the municipality districts 9, 10, 17, and 18. Its central operational unit is the Imam Reza Security Unit.

Nasr Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Northeast Tehran, specifically covering municipality districts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. Its central operational units are the Ale-e Mohammad Security Brigade and Saehb-e Alzaman Security Unit.

Ghadr Sub-Headquarters: Responsible for supervising Southeast Tehran, specifically covering districts 10, 11, 12, 16, 19, and 20. Its central operational units are the Al Zahra Security Brigade and Imam Hasan Security Unit.



Tehran's Tharallah zoning, showing operational command areas ¹¹

THE THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS: OPERATIONS & SITUATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

According to official security documentation, the Islamic Republic has four national-security situational threat levels, codenamed:

White (*vaziat-e sefid*), Yellow (*vaziat-e zard*), Orange (*vaziat-e narenji*), and Red (*vaziat-e ghermez*).¹²

1. **White (normal):** No incidents, intelligence, or evidence indicate disruption of public order or threats to the internal security of the regime. During this situation, “enemies of the Islamic Revolution” and their affiliated elements are not carrying out open and public activities—except “propaganda measures”—against the security of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic’s security doctrine describes the White level as a “normal situation or situation that is under control... [where] the possibility of threats from enemies is weak or very weak.”
2. **Yellow (abnormal):** There are signs of public disorder, and small, localized groups may initiate uncoordinated anti-security activities. According to official documentation, Yellow status is characterized by a perceived threat level ranging from low to medium, with the situation still considered controllable. The anticipated consequences are expected to remain manageable. Examples of potential unrest include labor strikes at factories and other workplaces.
3. **Orange (extraordinary):** A phase of large-scale, coordinated anti-regime actions, both armed and unarmed, that have become organized and disruptive. The actions of “gathering elements” escalate from a calm state into protests, riots, and acts such as road blockades and attacks on government, military, or other sensitive sites. In response, the IRGC’s Provincial Guards become active, deploying Basij units—including the Imam Hussein, Imam Ali, Bayt al-Muqaddas, and local Basij neighborhood forces—across provinces to restore control.
4. **Red (critical):** A shift to a revolutionary phase, where opposition forces have expanded in both organization and geographic scope. Armed resistance, including the use of firearms or improvised explosive devices—such as Molotov cocktails—emerges, and protesters actively work to undermine the regime. Attacks may target high-value or symbolic locations, including government offices, military facilities, and state-owned media outlets (e.g., national television networks). The unrest moves beyond protest into a systemic threat, prompting full-scale security responses. This is the point at which the IRGC’s 11 security headquarters—including the Tharallah Headquarters—assume full provincial authority.

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE WHITE SITUATION

During the White situation, when there are no threats to the regime's survival, the central role of the Tharallah Headquarters is to research, train, and plan. The bulk of the Tharallah Headquarters' attention during this period is dedicated to territorial use planning (*amayesh-e sarzamini*) and scenario planning. Additionally, the Tharallah Headquarters will assess situations at both national and local levels that could potentially pose security threats in Tehran and establish policies to mitigate these threats. *Amayesh Sarzamini*, a.k.a. Spatial Planning, is a strategic framework focusing on efficiently distributing security resources across regions to meet security and defense objectives. It refers to the deliberate and systematic planning of geographic space to enhance national security, territorial integrity, and regime stability. It aids in identifying and preparing for potential threats in urban and national defense planning.

For instance, the Tharallah Headquarters utilizes *Amayesh Sarzamini* to determine the optimal locations for military and security installations, such as IRGC and Basij bases—particularly in vulnerable areas like central Tehran. The framework also helps identify protest hotspots, enabling the strategic deployment of resources to maintain control during unrest. Vital infrastructure, including power plants and transportation hubs, is protected through the targeted placement of security and surveillance.

Amayesh Sarzamini extends to digital security by restricting sensitive data to secure government-controlled areas, thus minimizing cyber vulnerabilities.¹³ Additionally, resource allocation prioritizes high-risk regions, enhancing emergency preparedness against potential adversarial exploitation during crises. For border provinces, the framework supports measures against smuggling and illegal immigration by allocating border security forces based on geographic vulnerability.

The Tharallah Headquarters applies these principles by assessing and securing critical locations in Tehran, while coordinating aerial surveillance and local security efforts to ensure operational readiness.

OPERATIONAL READINESS AND MONITORING

Throughout periods of stability, the Tharallah Headquarters continuously monitors the capabilities and readiness of operational security forces in Tehran, the Greater Tehran area, and the Alborz region. This includes routine inspections and visits to various sub-branch headquarters to evaluate the preparedness and training of the IRGC and Basij security brigades for suppression operations. In one instance, a smuggled 2016 video reveals joint exercises involving Iran's Law Enforcement Force, the IRGC, and the Basij, all operating under the supervision of the Tharallah Quds Operational Headquarters. The footage highlights coordinated drills designed to improve synergy between police and paramilitary units, ensuring their ability to respond effectively to potential protests.¹⁴


DRONE REGULATIONS AND SECURITY

A recent security assessment identified private drones and quadcopters with cameras as potential security risks. Consequently, under orders from Alireza Rabiei, deputy for operations at the Tharallah Headquarters, drones and quadcopters equipped with cameras have been restricted over security-sensitive areas and residential neighborhoods in Tehran. Permits are now mandatory for operating quadcopters, with Tharallah Headquarters overseeing the issuance of all flight licenses in Tehran.¹⁵

According to Rabiei, aerial vehicles with cameras are banned from flying over sensitive and residential areas to ensure safety and privacy. Many drones imported by various organizations have been used without authorization, leading to their confiscation. To address security and community concerns, a recent directive restricts the use of private drones and quadcopters, particularly in areas where they could be used to monitor homes or critical sites, thereby raising privacy concerns. Permits are now required for flying drones, including helicopters and quadcopters. However, these permits are not issued directly to individuals.

THARALLAH TRAINING AND WORKSHOPS

During the White situation, another mission of the Tharallah Headquarters is to coordinate and organize seminars and workshops for various organizations to improve security and increase preparedness for encountering threats. One example is the educational seminar on cybersecurity aimed at managers of state organizations. This seminar focuses on identifying the latest vulnerabilities and enhancing collaboration among information technology managers from national and military agencies. It includes the fourth conference of cybersecurity managers, which took place following the Israeli cyberattacks (see below).



Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on Cybersecurity for State Organizations

متحدة
الولايات
الامريكية
الولايات
المتحدة



جزئی ۱۰: مدل از محدودت کارتوئنی سازمانی فرد یا گروهی یا تکه یا تکه
دارای میزان احیات همیشگی، شخصی، غنی و ایندیکاتور

ANSWER

برنامه مذکور (۱۳۹۷) انتشار از تاریخ ۰۹/۰۷/۲۰۲۰ تا ۰۹/۰۷/۲۰۲۱ و فقط روزهای چهارگانه را پوشش دارد. از این‌جا و پس، محدوده از ساختهای ۱۰۰۰ متر مربعی و پرتری ۱۰۰۰ متر مربعی خارج شود. گزینه

Ergonomics 2020, 3

مکالمہ اسلام

۱	نهادهای سایبری و غیربروتکلی و محدودیت امنیتی اطلاعات	۱
۲	ریکاوری هایی محدودیت امنیت اطلاعات	۲
۳	بررسی امنیت داده و پردازه	۳
۴	بررسی امنیت سیستم های داخلی	۴
۵	بررسی امنیت پایگاه داده	۵
۶	بررسی امنیت سیستم های کنترلی و پردازه	۶

سکان و گزارش ۲۰۰

سیستان از دیگر داشتگان سیاست نیز بود. سیستان همانند داشتگان دیگر

220-221

۸۱- سازمانها ۷ تا تشریف ۲۲۲ (چهارچند) لیست اساسی و اعضا در ترتیب (حقیقت چندول صفت ائم) را علی نام نهاده
۸۲- شناسایی ۲۲۲۷۶۱۱ (اعمار نمره) و تغییر اکسل آن را به زبانهای chmaweb.org و chmaweb.org ارسال نماید
۸۳- با توجه به محدودیت قدری امور اسی، سازمانهایی که لیست آنها پس از تکمیل تغییرات اعماق امور و زیارتی ایشان را در تغییر اکسل گذشتند در فوریه، پیش از مراجعت این امور، معرفت شوند.

آداس: اسرائیل بزرگداشتی از این سنت غرب سعادت‌آمیز، انتخاب قرآن‌گاه نمایندگان شریعت

Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on Cybersecurity for State Organizations



2474

- مدیر عامل و فرمانده ایندیس سخت‌گیر HSE پندت خیرپوشل و
- مدیر عامل سازمان ملی اقتصاد و امور پولیسی
- رئیس محترم سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات وزارت
- جهاد کشاورزی
- مدیر عامل سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات وزارت
- ندو
- مدیر کل محترم دفتر تحول اداری و اداری اطلاعات و ارتباط همراه تلفن و فاکس فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات
- مشاور سخنگو وزیر و مدیر عامل سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات و تحول اداری و مدیر امور اسناد و داد و دادگستری اجتماعی
- رئیس محترم سرکر نویسه سیاسته ها و فناوری اطلاعات
- سازمان پژوهش و تحقیق اکتوبر
- پندت تهدید لفاب اسلامی
- سازمان پژوهات اسلامی
- مدیر کل محترم پژوهشگاه، فنی هندسی و فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات سازمان حفاظتی است
- سازمان سیرات فرهنگی، سایه سفی و گردشگری
- سازمان ملی استاندارد ایران
- مدیر عضو خواستگار سازمان نهاده پوداری گذشته
- پاک مکری
- مدیر کل محترم دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و دروس های امروزی سازمان هواشناسی کشور
- مدیر کل محترم دفتر فناوری ارتباطات و اطلاعات شرکت راه آهن ۱
- مدیر عضو سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات سازمان
- فور مالکیت اکتوبر
- رئیس محترم مرکز های اطلاعات و ارتباطات و اسیتی ریاسته
- مدیر عامل
- رئیس محترم مرکز برترانه ریزی و فناوری اسلامات بخطی
- مدیر عامل سازمان
- مدیر عضو سرکر فناوری اطلاعات مرکز امن فناوری اطلاعات قوه
- مدیر عضو سرکر فناوری اطلاعات سازمان بخطی سدا و سپا
- مدیر عامل محترم سازمان فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات شهرداری اهران
- رئیس محترم مرکز نویسه داده اکتوبرپلک، فناوری اطلاعات و امنیت و ارتباط کشور
- مدیر کل محترم دفتر کمیتی و امنیت ملی از اینجا
- رئیس محترم سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباط پهلوان
- مدیر عامل سازمان فرهنگ و ارشاد اسلامی و ارتباط پهلوان
- شرکت اسکن ارتباطات نوین و ارتباط فناوری اطلاعات
- مدیر عضو سرکر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات فرگ ملی نفت ایران
- وزارت روز و جوانان
- رئیس محترم مرکز نویسه و تحول اداری و ارتباط سند و امنیت
- رئیس محترم مرکز های اطلاعات و ارتباطات مرکز امن ایران
- رئیس محترم سرکر امنیت و ارتباط امپرس و پیروش
- مدیر امنیت اکتوبر اداری امن و اطلاعات گمرک جمهوری اسلامی ایران
- مدیر کل محترم دفتر فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات سازمان هواشناسی اکتوبر

آداب و رسوم اسلامی و اسلامیت در ایران

Tharallah Headquarters Document on Educational Seminar on Cybersecurity for State Organizations

Primary documents reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters, as part of its activities to monitor the security capabilities of state institutions, has ordered all state- and regime-affiliated organizations to store sensitive information in two separate locations to ensure backup, given the rising threat of cyber and phishing attacks.

ACADEMIC COLLABORATIONS AND RESEARCH INITIATIVES

As part of its operations during the White situation, the Tharallah Headquarters collaborates with universities in Tehran to enhance its research capabilities and operational effectiveness. The Tharallah Headquarters collaborates with universities to conduct research that aligns with its security objectives. This collaboration often involves joint projects, seminars, and workshops addressing emerging security challenges. To cultivate expertise in critical areas, the Tharallah Headquarters provides full PhD scholarships to students pursuing research relevant to national security. These scholarships are designed to attract talent into fields that directly support the IRGC's strategic interests.

Additionally, the Tharallah Headquarters emphasizes documenting and disseminating its operational experiences and research findings. This is achieved by publishing books and reports serving as resources for academic and military communities. These publications aim to share insights from past operations and research endeavors, contributing to the broader knowledge base within Iran's security apparatus. Through these collaborative efforts—for example, with Imam Sadegh University—the Tharallah Headquarters leverages academic resources to enhance its strategic capabilities, ensuring that research and education are closely integrated with national security objectives.

The Tharallah Headquarters takes the lead in handling a wide range of cases, even when there is no imminent threat to the regime, including those involving groups the Islamic Republic considers “deviant religious and spiritual organizations,” such as the Taheri group. Mohammad Ali Taheri, an Iranian faith healer, founded the Circles of Mysticism nearly a decade ago, advocating a mystical understanding of the universe and faith healing. Initially, the regime tolerated his activities. However, documents released by this group reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters’ intelligence deputy was responsible for arresting and interrogating Taheri and dismantling the organization.¹⁶ This group posed a dual threat to the regime: it offered an alternative to Islamic spiritualism and successfully recruited and organized a significant number of Iranians.

In some cases, the intelligence deputy also targeted student activists. For instance, the student newspaper *Mowj* was shut down for allegedly mocking the Hidden Imam and Islam, and in May 2008, Majid Tavakoli, a prominent student leader, was arrested by the Tharallah Headquarters.¹⁷

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE YELLOW SITUATION

During the Yellow situation, the initial response in the capital involves deployment of the police force (FARAJA), including units trained for crowd control and suppression. When the yellow alert is triggered in the capital, the Tehran police command (*Farmandehi-e Entezami Tehran-e Bozorg*, or FATEB) takes responsibility for the city's security. In these situations, the Police Intelligence Organization of Tehran is the first group deployed to gather information about the source of the problem or threat and the parties involved. Immediately following disturbances, public security police are deployed to contain and control the situation. These officers and operational forces, which are primarily made up of conscript soldiers, are sent to the affected areas. Tehran has 85 police stations throughout the city and, if protests spread, these stations can request the deployment of operational support units, known as the Emdaad Operational Support Brigades. These units are mobilized quickly to assist during emergencies, public disturbances, or natural disasters, providing rapid backup where needed.¹⁸ Support operational units located in East Tehran are responsible for maintaining order and security in the capital.

If the situation escalates and the support command is unable to restore order, FARAJA's last resort is to deploy its Special Unit (Police Vijzeh). Unlike the other police forces, the Special Police are managed by the Headquarters of FARAJA's special units. The Special Police are elite law enforcement units trained for high-risk operations, including crowd control, counterterrorism, and crisis response. Among them, the Special Units (Yegan Vijeh) focus on managing riots and large-scale public unrest when regular police forces are overwhelmed. The most prominent of these is NOPO, a tactical unit comparable to SWAT or special forces in other countries.

If the situation in Tehran escalates and the regular police cannot restore order, the Tehran Police Command will request the deployment of Special Police units (*police-e vizeh*), which comprise three brigades, to maintain order in the capital.

While FATEB is responsible for restoring order during this phase, it informs the Tharallah Headquarters of potential developments by directly sharing intelligence. The antennas at the Tharallah Headquarters also became operational, collecting information and receiving updates on the unfolding situation. The Tharallah Headquarters will deploy its intelligence assets on the ground during this process.


The Tharallah Headquarters' primary responsibilities during this situation include scenario planning and preparations, threat monitoring and mitigation activities, and intelligence operations. An example of such mitigation interventions occurred under the administration of President Hassan Rouhani, when public discontent began to emerge over unfinished state-subsidized social housing projects (*maskan-e mehr*) in the Paradis neighborhood in Greater Tehran. The dissent stemmed from the preceding Ahmadinejad government's decision to sell social housing to residents without finishing the project and building critical infrastructure in the neighborhood, such as schools, hospitals, and police stations. Subsequently, Rouhani and his minister of roads and urban development, Abbas Akhouni, abandoned the completion of the social housing projects. Having assessed the potential risk of escalation, the Tharallah Headquarters intervened by directly ordering the Ministry for Roads and Urban Development to complete all necessary infrastructure projects in the Paradis neighborhood as a matter of urgency.

FORMATION OF COMMITTEES

As part of its response to emerging or ongoing threats, the Tharallah Headquarters often forms ad hoc committees to bring relevant stakeholders and forces together to command and coordinate. When these committees are formed, a Tharallah Headquarters' deputy assumes commanding authority over the actions of all parties involved in the committee, issuing and delegating their responsibilities. The formation of such committees, which will meet regularly on the headquarters premises, occurs across *Yellow* and *above* threat levels.

For example, during the *Yellow* situation, the Tharallah Headquarters formed a Cyber Committee to implement its “Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran” (*tahr-e amn-sazi-e tablohaye electronic-e shahri*).

The plan sought to implement new security protocols and procedures for all public LED billboards and TVs across Tehran after several were hacked during domestic protests and began circulating anti-regime messages. The specifics of the new plan reveal the extent to which the Tharallah Headquarters micromanages every aspect of security in Tehran. Under its plan, all public LED billboards and TVs must have three locks and be connected to a local Basij base, which would have a two-factor authentication system in place to prevent unauthorized access to the billboards and TVs.

شماره نام پرست ارجع میزبانی عادی عادی	۱۴۰۰/۹/۲۳ ۱/۸۴۰۰ ۱/۱	سازمان کمیته سایبری جمهوری اسلامی ایران	  سازمان کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران		
سال تولید، پشتیبانی ها و مانع زدایی ها					
به: گیرندگان محترم زیر از: دبیر کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران موضوع: دعوتنامه به جلسه					
سلام علیکم اللهم صلی علی مُحَمَّدٍ وَ لِّمَحْمَدٍ با احترام، پیرو صورتجلسه آن به شماره ۱/۱/۷۲۴۵ مورخ ۱۴۰۰/۸/۲۲ جهت پیگیری آخرین اقدامات صورت گرفته و انجام همراهیهای لازمه چلسه ذیل برگزار می گردد:					
(۰۲۲۲۲۶۱۱۲)					
دستور جلسه: ۱- ارایه گزارش اقدامات در راستای امنیت تابلو های شهری از جلسه گذشته تاکنون ۲- ارائه و تصویب طرح امن سازی تابلو های شهری ۳- تعیین دارندگان تابلوی شهری و نحوه تقدارت بر آنها					
مورخه: ۱۴۰۰/۹/۳۰ روز: سه شنبه ساعت: ۱۳-۱۰ اداره کننده: سر هنگ پاسدا شاهرخ دزفولی محل برگزاری جلسه: سالن جلسات شهدا امنیت قرارگاه ثارالله تهران					
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center; padding: 5px;"> شirkat Kandeghan سازمان فاوری اطلاعات شهرداری تهران شرکت کنترل ترافیک شهرداری تهران شهرداری تهران </td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center; padding: 5px;"> گیرندگان محترم سازمان فاوری اطلاعات شهرداری تهران شرکت کنترل ترافیک شهرداری تهران شهرداری تهران </td> </tr> </table>				شirkat Kandeghan سازمان فاوری اطلاعات شهرداری تهران شرکت کنترل ترافیک شهرداری تهران شهرداری تهران	گیرندگان محترم سازمان فاوری اطلاعات شهرداری تهران شرکت کنترل ترافیک شهرداری تهران شهرداری تهران
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رونوشت: ریاست محترم کمیته سایبری قرارگاه ثارالله تهران جهت استحضار و در صورت ملاحظه دیده بریت جلسه دفتر معاونت فاوا چهت همایش					
تقدیر از این امداد و همراهی تقدیر از این امداد و همراهی					
صفحه ۱۳ از صفحه ۱۴					

Tharallah Headquarters Cyber Committee "Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran" Document Page 1 of 3



همچنین اطلاعات بیمانکاران به شرح زیر می باشد:

6- دستگاه تماشگر تجاری: (لیست پیوست)

شرکت پرده بردار: طرح باران سما

نامه: خیابان شهید قدی خیابان این بین بیش کوچه ششم شماره 16 طبقه بیم خانه شرکت: 88526430

میر عامل: آفای محمد قیامی بزدی 09121468022

تمایلده شرکت طرح باران و تلفن ضروری آفای زرخیز: 09125809023

یک دستگاه تماشگر فر هنگی: (لیست پیوست)

پرده بردار: مدیریت ارتباطات و امور بین الملل سازمان ریاست ای

بیمانکار و شرکت نگهداری میلیشگر: شرکت مشاوره و پژوهشی صنعت تماشگر های شرق

میر عامل: خامد طاهره ابراهیمی 09126148837

نامه: کرج کارمده شمالي خیابان شهید موسوی (ششم شرقی) یانک 23 ساختمان پهندت طبقه 4 واحد 8

تلفن 02634211431

Tharallah Headquarters Cyber Committee “Plan to Secure Electronic Billboards in Tehran” Document Page 3 of 3

Under the command of Brigadier General Hossein Namdari, the Information Communication Technologies deputy of the Tharallah Headquarters, the Cyber Committee, and its secretary, Guardsman Shahrokh Dezfully, ordered all relevant organizations, including Tehran and Karaj Municipalities and their sub-branches, to implement this plan as a matter of urgency. Similarly, in another order, the Tharallah Headquarters’ Cyber Committee demanded that state bureaucracy organizations across both the conventional and the unconventional regime apparatus, such as the Centre of Statistics, the Martyrs Foundation, and the Tax Office, upgrade their cybersecurity software and undergo cybersecurity training in collaboration with Sharif University in Tehran.

Another example of such ad hoc committees being formed at the Tharallah Headquarters relates to the deliberations by the administration of former President Ebrahim Raisi regarding the removal of the state-subsidized price for the dollar shortly after Raisi became president in the summer of 2021. Identifying this policy as potentially catalyzing economic instability and provoking a backlash, on November 23, 2021, the Tharallah Headquarters formed the “Working Group for the Prevention of Security Crisis from Worsening Livelihoods” to assess various crisis scenarios should this policy be implemented. The working group, chaired by the intelligence deputy at Tharallah Headquarters, convened a diverse group of stakeholders for weekly meetings at the headquarters to identify potential problems and develop solutions. These stakeholders included the Deputy for Intelligence of the IRGC’s Mohammad Rasulollah; the Tehran MOIS; the Tehran chief prosecutor; the Police Intelligence deputy; and representatives from the Guild Basij (*Basij-e Asnaf*), Industrial Basij, and Agricultural Basij.



Tharallah Headquarters “Working Group for the Prevention of Security Crisis from Worsening Livelihoods” Document Page 1 of 2



Tharallah Headquarters “Working Group for the Prevention of Security Crisis from Worsening Livelihoods” Document Page 2 of 2

In a Yellow threat level, the Tharallah Headquarters continues to monitor the ongoing security situations and provides recommendations to other organizations in order to enhance their security. For example, primary leaked Persian-language documents from the Khamenei-run Bonyad Mostazafan (or Foundation of the Underprivileged of the Islamic Revolution) reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters requested the installation of their internal telecommunications network equipment (“Cellular Novin”) on the roof of the foundation’s headquarters and Plasco buildings. This enables the Tharallah Headquarters to safely communicate with IRGC and Basij brigades, units, and personnel by positioning mobile phone lines and by sending voice signals, text messages, web pages, and audio-visual smartphone files. According to the document, one of this service’s security applications is the positioning of security forces and assets, as well as complete monitoring of the operational area.



Bonyad Mostazafan Document on Request From Tharallah Headquarters
for Installation of "Cellular Novin" Page 1 of 2



Bonyad Mostazafan Document on Request From Tharallah Headquarters
for Installation of "Cellular Novin" Page 2 of 2

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE ORANGE SITUATION

If conditions worsen and FATEB fails to neutralize the threat, the Orange situation is activated. As per protocol, this is the point at which the IRGC's provincial guard is brought in. The Mohammed Rasulullah Corps assumes responsibility for controlling Tehran city, the Seyyed ol Shuhada Brigade gains control over other cities in Tehran province, and the Imam Hassan Mojtaba Brigade takes over Alborz province and Karaj city. All these forces operate under the management of the Tharallah Headquarters.

If the anti-riot police cannot control the situation, the 23 IRGC Basij Regional Bases in Tehran will become operationalized. During the Orange situation, the first forces deployed are Basij members from various units, including the Basij-e Bayt ol Moghadas and Kowsar units (the lowest organized forces in each Basij zone), as well as the Imam Ali Battalions (Basij security forces) and the Imam Hussain Battalions (Basij infantry units). All these are operational, trained Basij units under the IRGC's control. The deployment of Basij units is coordinated through the Mohammad Rasullullah Corps, which controls all Basij forces in Tehran and some IRGC ground forces.


DEPLOYMENT OF BASIJ UNITS

As per protocol, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps deploys a series of tactical formations when the Orange situation is triggered. According to Brigadier General Hassanzadeh, the commander of the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah, the Tharallah Headquarters' patrols, comprising IRGC and Basij members, are now active and deployed throughout the city.

For example, according to an IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps document, the IRGC Jamaran Regional Base will maintain order in the Tajrish neighborhood. In the Tehran Pars and Hafteh-e Hoz neighborhoods located east of Tehran, the Al Mohmmad Security Brigade will oversee crowd control and manage anti-riot efforts. In the northwestern part of Tehran, in the Saadat Abad neighborhood, Basij Fathein units would maintain order. In the south of Tehran, in the Javaideh neighborhood, Alzahra Security Brigade will be in charge.

نام: / / زم	بیانی
کد: ۷۷۷۷۷	سازمان اسناد ایران
پست:	سازمان اسناد ایران
اریخت:	سازمان اسناد ایران
مکان:	سازمان اسناد ایران
سال تولید، داشت پیمان، انتقال آفرین	سازمان اسناد ایران
تب احتیاط سادی دانشکده شهید مطهری تب احتیاط سادی دانشکده شهید مطهری بگان امام رضا (ع) بگان امام حسن (ع) تب احتیاط سادی نرسا تب احتیاط سادی نرسا تب احتیاط سادی نرسا تب احتیاط سادی سازمان بسیج تب احتیاط سادی سازمان بسیج تب احتیاط سادی سازمان بسیج تب احتیاط سادی سازمان بسیج بسیج پیکوپان تب حضرت زهرا (س) تب احتیاط سادی سازمان بسیج تب حضرت زهرا (س) چهار راه معتبر اسلام چهار راه معتبر دولت چهار راه معتبر دولت چهار راه ولی عصر چهار راه ولی عصر تب حضرت زهرا (س) خیان انقلاب از تفاطع قدس نا ۱۶ آذر تب حضرت زهرا (س) ۵- شکر عملیاتی شکر عملیاتی بعورت گردانهای متحرک موتوری از ساعت ۹۳۰ در نقاط زیر مستقر شود: میدان امام حسین (ره) خیان لاله رار میدان بهارستان باع سیه سالار اکستان- ملت	
ب- و مصیت استقرار در بعد از ظهر: قرارگاه های عملیاتی ضمن فراغوان ۱۰۰ درصدی کلیه گردانهای بسیج و کادر تسبیه، بگانها و تواحی معاویت بسیج از ساعت ۱۵۰۰ سبب به استقرار آن ها با اولویت نقاط زیر اقدام نمایند ۱- تب حضرت زهرا (س) ۲- گردان در سملقه باری آندا با مسئولیت برادر عادی خیان انقلاب از سیمان انقلاب نا چهار راه ولی عصر (عج) با مسئولیت برادر معنوی	


IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps document on Distribution of Operational Units in Tehran Page 1 of 3



IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps document on Distribution of Operational Units in Tehran Page 2 of 3

IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps document on Distribution of Operational Units in Tehran Page 3 of 3


At this point, IRGC and Basij battalions are deployed in various city zones and are prepared for operations.



A map of Tehran showing neighborhood names and main roads²⁰


One of the leading brigade and unit formations measures that the IRGC's Mohammad Rasulullah Brigade adopts during the Orange situation is the creation of security rings (*halgheh-hayeh amniatee*) across key locations and neighborhoods in Tehran, such as Enghelab Square.

These security rings consist of several layers: an inner ring covering the most sensitive area, a middle ring encompassing the secondary region, and an outer ring surrounding a broader area. The IRGC's security brigades and units are positioned within the inner ring—the most sensitive geographical location. Covering the middle ring are the Basij's security brigades and units, namely Imam Ali and Imam Hussain. Finally, all other Basij units, such as Bayt ol Moghadas units, Tehran Municipality Basij, the Basij-e Edarat, and Women's Basij, are deployed across the geographical boundaries of the outer ring.




1. **Inner Ring:** IRGC security personnel
2. **Middle Ring:** Imam Ali, Imam Hussain
3. **Outer Ring:** Bayt ol Moghaddas and Basij of the municipality

For example, during the Mahsa Amini protests, the IRGC deployed the three layers of its security rings to shield Friday Prayers at Tehran University, which is led and attended by senior regime officials. The inner ring was deployed in the main prayer hall and garden of Tehran University; the middle ring covered the area outside Tehran University—from 16 Azar Street, Pour Sina, Quds Street and Enghlab Street; and the outer ring was deployed across Kargar, Keshavarz, Vali Asr, and Jomohri Avenue. For the formation and territories covered by the security rings, please see below.



Map of territories covered by the security rings

Beyond operational units, the IRGC Mohammad Rasollullah will also issue orders to deploy additional human resources on the streets and across Tehran. For example, the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah will make a mandatory call on all Basij organizations, such as Basij-e Edarat (the state bureaucracy Basij), especially the Tehran Municipality Basij, to deploy on the streets.



The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Document Instructing Deployment of the Basij—including State Bureaucracy Basij Page 1 of 2



The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Document Instructing Deployment of the Basij—including State Bureaucracy Basij Page 2 of 2

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم


بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم سيداً حضرت محمد رسول الله ...

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم سيداً حضرت محمد رسول الله ...

ردیف	نام معمور	نام قرآنی	ردیف	نام معمور
۱	تبریز	تبریز	۱	سید علی علیائی سیداً حضرت محمد رسول الله ...
۲	پارک وی	حسروی	۲	ناجیه امیر المؤمنین
۳	تهران پارس	پارمحمدی	۳	لیب آل محمد
۴	هشت خوش	قسام	۴	لیب آل محمد
۵	بازار	سروار	۵	لشکر علیائی
۶	نازی آباد	علی‌الدین	۶	لیب حضرت زهرا
۷	سعادت آباد	سید محمد شاهنس	۷	فاتحین
۸	انواعان راکوری	سید امیر موسوی	۸	فرارگاه نصر
۹	نهف ریا	سردار خراسانی	۹	معاون دفاع امنی
۱۰	نهف اسر	فرغناهی	۱۰	ناجیه سنت
۱۱	حوالد	علی	۱۱	لیب حضرت زهرا
۱۲	پونک	کلیمحمد	۱۲	ستاد سیداً
۱۳	سوارخان	سید ابراهیم سیدجاد	۱۳	دیگان ابراهیم سیدجاد

List of Names of Operational Commanders for IRGC
Mohammad Rasulullah

Primary documentation reveals that in November 2022, the Labor and State Employee Basij Organizations, each with its own Baytol Moghadas Battalions of 100 members, were transferred to the Tehran Municipality Basij for one day. IRGC families and retirees are also expected to be ready for mobilization. Primary documents reveal that 400 IRGC families, including retired veterans, were mobilized and placed at the disposal of Tehran Municipality Basij, as were the Women's Basij. (Pirhadi is the commander of Basij Municipality.)



The IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Document Quota for Distribution of Different IRGC and Basij Forces—including 400 IRGC families.

THE THARALLAH INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY: THE INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES AND SUPREME JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

While under the Orange situation, the IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps takes operational command, controlling and deploying the forces. At this security level, the Tharallah Headquarters is responsible for intelligence coordination and command. Practically speaking, in this situation, the deputy for intelligence assumes overall command responsibility at Tharallah Headquarters, coordinating among the Police Intelligence organization, the IRGC Intelligence organization, the Basij Intelligence units, and the Tehran MOIS Intelligence Bureau.

For example, according to a document obtained from Tharallah Headquarters, during the October 23, 2022, labor protests, the Intelligence Deputy at Tharallah Headquarters assigned both the IRGC Intelligence Organization and MOIS to suppress the unrest. Specifically, the IRGC IPO was responsible for suppressing the Kafsheh Shima Factory. At the same time, the Tehran MOIS office was tasked with confronting, crushing, and controlling workers in the communications industry.

تا جلسه بعدی	سرپیگی به مشکلات شرکت و پیگیری حل آن از مراجع مربوطه	مسنونات اطلاعات سپاه سیدالشهداء(ع)	کارخانه کفش شیما	-1
تا جلسه بعدی	سرپیگی به مشکلات شرکت و پیگیری حل آن از مراجع مربوطه یا از طریق قرارگاه ثارالله	- معاونت اطلاعات سپاه سیدالشهداء(ع)	شرکت واگن سازی شهری	-2
در اسرع وقت	- اشراف اطلاعاتی جهت جلوگیری از اقدامات خرابکارانه - توجیه کامل حراست ها	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران - فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله - سازمان اطلاعات سپاه	خرابکاری در زیرساخت های مخابراتی	-3
در اسرع وقت	- افزایش هوشیاری و مراقبت از ایستگاهها	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران - فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - کمیته فنی قرارگاه ثارالله تهران	ایستگاههای گاز و پس: های برق	-4
در دستور	افزایش اشراف اطلاعاتی بر محیط های کارگری در قضای حقیقی و مجازی با هدف جلوگیری ایجاد تحریک و اعتراض و اعتراض در ماههای پایانی سال	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران - فرماندهی انتظامی تهران بزرگ - معاونت اطلاعات قرارگاه ثارالله - تهران	محیط های کارگری	5
تا جلسه بعدی	به دنبال تعارض منافع آستان حضرت امام (ره) با وزارت نیرو در خصوص ساخت تصفیه خانه در جنوب تهران، سازمان اطلاعات تهران گزارش در این خصوصیات تهیه و به فرماندهی قرارگاه ارسال فرمایند	سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران	ایجاد تصفیه خانه آب در جنوب تهران	6
در اسرع وقت	برگزاری جلسه مرتبط سازمان اطلاعات تهران و مشارکت اطلاعات ناجا و ثارالله با سندیکاهای اصناف جهت بررسی پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۰۰ و تدبیر دولت در این رابطه - دریافت نظرات دولت و سازمان بر تامه در مورد پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۰۰ و تدبیر دولت در این رابطه - از رایی کلیه اعضاء از پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۰۰	کلیه اعضا و دستگاههای اطلاعاتی	حذف ارز ترجیحی	7
هفته آینده	بررسی پیامدهای حذف ارز ۴۰۰	قرارگاه ثارالله	برگزاری جلسه فوق العاده	8

Document on Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence Deputy Orders on the Division of Labor Between Security Forces

In this situation, Tharallah Headquarters not only coordinates between different intelligence organizations but also monitors the developments and advises other bodies on how to neutralize threats.

Perhaps more importantly, the Tharallah Headquarters also plays a key role in arresting protesters as well as interrogating detainees during the Orange situation and above. It effectively works as a bailiff unit, arresting and interrogating Iranian civilians alongside the MOIS and the IRGC Intelligence Organization.²¹ In addition to arrests and interrogations, the Tharallah Headquarters also operates several independent detention centers, none of which are under the control of the Organization of Prisons, Security, and Corrective Measures of the Country, which is under the Judiciary and responsible for overseeing all prisons and detention centers in Iran. One of the most recent facilities is *Detention Center Alef-1*, located in eastern Tehran.²² This prison has recently been used as a new holding place for detainees. Reports indicate that the use of beatings and other methods to obtain forced confessions at this facility is unprecedented.

This prison came to public attention only after some students detained here identified it. After the November 2019 protests, during which the regime brutally killed 1500 people in less than a week, the Tharallah Headquarters arrested a group of students who were mourning the victims of a Ukrainian passenger plane that was shot down. The Tharallah Headquarters is so powerful that even when the Judiciary offers clemency to the detained, it has the power to override such decisions, as seen in the case of Soheil Arabi, an Iranian activist accused of posting “blasphemous” content on Facebook.²⁰ The power of the Tharallah Headquarters extends to the authority to determine the length of sentences imposed by the Judiciary. Many detainees have reported that their investigators told them the investigators decide their sentences. Judges simply sign and confirm the verdicts of the Tharallah Headquarters.

OPERATIONAL COMMITTEES DURING TIMES OF UNREST

During the Orange situation, the Tharallah Headquarters assumes authority to neutralize threats from revolutionary actors at their source. For example, during the initial phase of the 2022-23 “Woman Life Freedom” protests, the Tharallah Headquarters focused extensively on universities and students, key drivers of political unrest in Iran. To tighten its grip, it established special committees, including the Security Intelligence Committee for Universities and the Knowledge Committee (“Komite Dansh”), to control academic institutions.




These committees wield considerable influence over university affairs. For example, a leaked document from February 5, 2023, reveals that one committee requested that the Judiciary consult the Tharallah Headquarters before granting amnesty, reducing sentences, or suspending student punishments. Decisions were made explicitly in coordination with the IRGC officer assigned to each case.

Another confidential document shows that university committees opposed SHAK's decision to allow protesting students to access dormitories. Further records indicate that the IRGC disapproves of optional head coverings for female students and seeks control over their registration processes. Moreover, the Deputy of Intelligence at Tharallah Headquarters compiled a list of professors who resisted attempts to suppress student protests and submitted it to the Ministry of Science, demanding their punishment, including transfer to other educational centers in less developed cities.

Tharallah Headquarters Security Intelligence Committee for Universities and the Knowledge Committee (“Komite Dansh”) Document

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS DURING THE RED SITUATION

The Red situation is declared when the demonstrations have spread throughout the country, and the survival of the regime is under imminent threat. If the Red situation is announced in Tehran, it means the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps has failed to neutralize the threat, and protests have spread in scope and scale. During these circumstances, the Tharallah Headquarters takes complete control of all operational decisions. In a Red situation, SHAK, the Interior Ministry's Security Council, gives the Tharallah Headquarters complete control over Tehran. In doing so, all policymaking bodies (such as the Tehran municipality and city council), organizations (including banks), and operational units—including the police, Basij, IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps, intelligence bodies, such as the Office of Tehran Intelligence, Herasat networks, and even some religious associations—fall under its authority.



In a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters assumes total control of the capital's security infrastructure and immediately activates a range of crisis-response mechanisms. At the onset of the situation, a high-level coordination meeting is convened and chaired by the senior commander of the Tharallah Headquarters. Participants typically include the IRGC commander-in-chief and his deputies, commanders of the Mohammad Rasulullah and Seyyed ol-Shohada Corps, Tehran's police chief, Tehran's chief prosecutor, the MOIS Tehran bureau head, and the Tehran governor. In this emergency war room setting, commanders assess the scope and scale of unrest, identify the most volatile districts, and allocate security forces accordingly. At this level of alert, the Tharallah Headquarters becomes the unified military command for Tehran, functioning as both an operational command post and an intelligence fusion center.

As the military command, the Tharallah Headquarters oversees security in Tehran during a crisis to restore order and neutralize threats. It plays a critical role in assessing the situation, gathering intelligence regarding the nature, scope, and origin of the crisis, and clarifying roles and responsibilities among the various security forces.


Ensuring robust communication systems amongst all subordinate units is also essential. To maintain control, Tharallah Headquarters establishes a series of ad hoc committees focused on intelligence, operations, universities, and labor unrest. These committees serve to harmonize the activities of various suppressive institutions, including the IRGC, Basij, MOIS, Herasat, and the regular police. A Tharallah Headquarters deputy typically chairs each committee and includes representatives from multiple security agencies as well as political organizations aligned with the Supreme Leader's office. These bodies coordinate suppression strategies, conduct intelligence assessments, and implement scenario-based planning and response.

In a Red situation, all security units operate under the direct orders of the Tharallah Headquarters. It is at this point that the Tharallah Headquarters assumes operational command of all forces, controlling their deployment and operationalization. In practice, this results in a transfer of command-and-control authority from the IRGC Mohammad Rasoullah Corps to the Tharallah Headquarters. Similarly, in a Red situation, the deputy for operations assumes overall command responsibility at the Tharallah Headquarters from the deputy of intelligence.

TACTICAL FORMATIONS: ACTIVATION OF ALL SECURITY LAYERS UNDER THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS

Upon receiving a mandate for total control over Tehran, the Tharallah Headquarters activates all the security layers under its command structure across Tehran, Greater Tehran, and Alborz Province. While the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps will already have activated this network to a limited extent during the Orange situation, the Red situation sees the Tharallah Headquarters deploy all security layers in a fully-fledged, expansive manner. This results in the immediate installation of security checkpoints and mobile guards at the municipality's regional zones and districts.²⁴ These checkpoints, which are usually controlled by members of the Basij Bayt ol Moghadas Units, are designed to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians to identify dissidents, anyone possessing "sensitive" dual-use items—such as weapons, drones, or communication systems—that could undermine the security forces, or

anti-regime material, either on their phones or in physical form. Roadblocks and guard installations manned by Basij operational units armed with batons are also set up along all major highways and squares within the municipality's regions and districts by the IRGC-Basij Regional Base and Basij District Base. At the neighborhood level, the Basij Neighborhood Base deploys its Ashura and Al-Zahra groups to conduct street patrols across Iranian neighborhoods – a tactical deployment aimed at identifying and countering dissent, as well as intimidating the local population. Primary documents obtained from the IRGC's Imam Ali Battalion Headquarters also reveal that in protest hotspots and sensitive locations, the Imam Ali Battalions even deploy "snipers to target [protest] leaders" across rooftops close to rioting areas.



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of Snipers on Rooftops to Target Protest Leaders

The Tharallah Headquarters framework centralizes crisis control by dividing responsibilities among Basij, IRGC, and police units. In red-level emergencies, it escalates the response through drone surveillance and direct deployment of IRGC ground forces. The use of Imam Hossein Battalions during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests demonstrates how this structure functions as a mechanism for rapid internal mobilization, intimidation, and suppression. Perimeter control—particularly through checkpoints and control of entry and exit routes—is a core element designed to isolate unrest and limit protester mobility.

Much of this tactical deployment was operationalized during and after the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025. As soon as Israel's strikes began, checkpoints were formed throughout Tehran to enable stop-and-search operations against Iranian pedestrians and vehicles. Such measures involved the confiscation of civilian phones without warrants to search for any anti-regime or pro-Israel content, including any material mocking the regime. Vehicles were also searched for drones and any communication equipment.²⁵ Likewise, as reports began to circulate of Iranians taking to their rooftops to chant anti-regime slogans—such as “Death to the Dictator”²⁶—the Basij Neighborhood Bases deployed their Ashura and Al-Zahra units to identify the apartment blocks carrying out such activity.²⁷

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES ACROSS PROTEST HOTSPOTS

Having activated all the security layers under its command, the Tharallah Headquarters allocates the IRGC infantry and security battalions and units to its four sub-headquarters. Subsequently, each day it identifies protest hotspots and unrest-prone areas, then distributes its security forces to those locations under an assigned commanding officer. Primary documents from the Tharallah Headquarters reveal how this was operationalized during the 2022 anti-regime protests.


موضعیت روز ۳۰ آبان ۱۴۰۱			
نوبتچیان	فرماندهی معور	محورها	فرارگاه
توسط فرارگاه اعلام شد		محور هیجان آزادی	
محدوده			
حد فاصل جاده ساوه - احمد حسینی - سدهان ناهاری	برادر صفری	شهرک ولیعصر (ع)	
یک گردان از یکان امام رضا (ع) غرب خ تهدید احمد حسینی			
گردان امام علی (ع) ناحیه گردان بیت المقدس			
یک گردان از یکان امام رضا (ع)	برادر علی	اکاتان	
سایر نقاط طبق ابلاغات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های ایستگاهی پاوه و کلیون ها و همایر و میدانی اصلی با قیام و یکان های ایستگی) پیشنهاد شد			
با ناکنای بر (تفاوت توقیف شده با قاتل) بازار میل یافت آبد، چهار و میان راه پاکت آبد، ملخ ابوفر			
سایر نقاط طبق ابلاغات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های ایستگی پاوه و کلیون ها و همایر و میدانی اصلی با قیام و یکان های ایستگی) پیشنهاد شد			
با ناکنای بر (تفاوت توقیف شده با قاتل) بازار میل یافت آبد، چهار و میان راه پاکت آبد، ملخ ابوفر			

rasuyab2			
نوبتچیان	فرماندهی معور	محورها	فرارگاه
۵ گردان پاسدار محور لشکر ۲۶	سوزان ربانی	محور هیجان امام حسین (ع) شامل - هیجان امام حسین (ع) - هیجان بهارستان - دفع سه ساز - اکاتان - مفت	
یکان امام حسین (ع) با ۲ گردان کامل	برادر علی	محور پیروزی شامل - خیزدی - چهار راه فرهاد - سه هفدهان - انتها پیروزی	
تفاوت های کارگر، نظپنی و ولی صدر - گردانهای نسب خضرت زهرا (س) (حدائق، ۳ گردان)	برادر معموی	چ چمپوری، فر کارگر تا ولی صدر	
دو گردان نسبت (صیب) یک گردان سپاه شهید امیر یک گردان کارگری یکان چنگ یون گردان امام علی ناحیه راحی ام استخراج از گردان ۴۰ حضرت مصطفی (ع)		ملوی آباد	
سایر نقاط طبق ابلاغات قبلی (درون منطقه با فرارگاه های ایستگی پاوه و کلیون ها و همایر و میدانی اصلی با قیام و یکان های ایستگی) پیشنهاد شد			
با ناکنای بر (تفاوت توقیف شده با قاتل) بازار میل یافت آبد، چهار راه مسروس، سه راه چمن خلور، فرسوس توغل ایشان، پارسال خلیل اسلام، جمهوری اسلام			


Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests

نویسنده		فرمانده محور	محورها	قرارگاه
با گزدان کامل	برادر پارمودی	نهوان بارس		
لذکه اول و دوم و سوم و ششم و هشتم	برادر قاسم	۷ جوش و شمع ۲۰۰۰ هشتری		
حذفی ۱ گزدان		۷ نیز		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود		تخریش شامل میدان تخریش + باغ		
یک گزدان شهرداری - یک گزدان امام علی (ع) ناجیه	برادر سهیل گوشناسی	فردوس نام پیغمبری تخریش		
یک گزدان از ناجیه امیر		پارک وی شال از پارک وی نیز		
حذفی ۳ گزدان	برادر اکبری	پیرون تخریش		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود				
۶ گزدان بازنشستگان	برادر میکوس	حباب ازدی از قرب - حباب زاده - ۱۶ آفر-قدس و مال - فلسطین		
یک گویان شهرداری - یک گزدان امام علی (ع) ناجیه	برادر لطفعلی خلیل	میدان الدبور		
یک گزدان بیت المقدس		شروعی بحال		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود				
سایر نقاط عرضی ایجاد نیز (دروز منطقه نا فرازگاه های انتی شیعی موافق و کثون ها و معاشر و میدین اصلی با تیپ ها و یکان های امیتی) پوشش نداشته شود				
با تأکید بر (قطعات توقیق شده نسبتاً فاتح) میدان فدوی و فخری و فنکه اول تهرانپارس				
نویسنده		فرمانده محور	محورها	قرارگاه
یکل امام سعاد (ع) با گزدان امام علی (ع)	سردار خراسان	ستارجان		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود		صادقیه نا پوتک		
یک گزدان از یکان امام علی (ع) ناجیه ای				
یک گزدان بیت المقدس	برادر فخر شاهی	نهانسر		
یک گزدان تازگری				
سایر نقاط عرضی ایجاد نیز (دروز منطقه با فرازگاه های انتی شیعی موافق و کثون ها و معاشر و میدین اصلی با تیپ ها و یکان های امیتی) پوشش نداشته شود				
با تأکید بر (قطعات توقیق شده نسبتاً فاتح) میدان فدوی و فخری و فنکه اول تهرانپارس				
نویسنده		فرمانده محور	محورها	قرارگاه
یکل امام سعاد (ع) با گزدان امام علی (ع)	سردار خراسان	ستارجان		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود		صادقیه نا پوتک		
یک گزدان از یکان امام علی (ع) ناجیه ای				
یک گزدان بیت المقدس	برادر فخر شاهی	نهانسر		
یک گزدان تازگری				
سایر نقاط عرضی ایجاد نیز (دروز منطقه با فرازگاه های انتی شیعی موافق و کثون ها و معاشر و میدین اصلی با تیپ ها و یکان های امیتی) پوشش نداشته شود				
با تأکید بر (قطعات توقیق شده نسبتاً فاتح) میدان فدوی و فخری و فنکه اول تهرانپارس				
نویسنده		فرمانده محور	محورها	قرارگاه
یکل امام سعاد (ع) با گزدان امام علی (ع)	سردار خراسان	ستارجان		
نوسط فرازگاه اعلام شود		صادقیه نا پوتک		
یک گزدان از یکان امام علی (ع) ناجیه ای				
یک گزدان بیت المقدس	برادر فخر شاهی	نهانسر		
یک گزدان تازگری				
سایر نقاط عرضی ایجاد نیز (دروز منطقه با فرازگاه های انتی شیعی موافق و کثون ها و معاشر و میدین اصلی با تیپ ها و یکان های امیتی) پوشش نداشته شود				
با تأکید بر (قطعات توقیق شده نسبتاً فاتح) میدان فدوی و فخری و فنکه اول تهرانپارس				

Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests



Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests



Tharallah Sub-Headquarters Distribution of Security Units During 2022 Protests

PLAINCLOTHES FORCES

The operationalization of plainclothes units under the orders of Tharallah Headquarters is another primary tactic that is activated under the red situation. Primary documents obtained by UANI reveal that plainclothes intelligence patrol teams are deployed amongst protestors to carry out covert intelligence operations across Tehran's unrest hotspots. According to the primary documents acquired from the Imam Ali Security Battalions, these intelligence patrols "blend in with a suitable appearance and clothing so as not to be identified by the rioters, and through operating among them, they were able to identify the protest leaders." Having identified the "ringleaders," once the protest ends, these intelligence teams "track them down, identify their home locations and report them, and then an operational team is dispatched to that location to arrest the leader." Alternatively, as stated in the IRGC documents, if the "conditions are right and/or regime forces attack protestors, they [covert intelligence teams] will quickly detain the leaders and transfer them towards regime forces."

۱۱- بیان برخی از تجارت

(۱) در فتنه ۱۳۸۸ تیمهای گشته اطلاعاتی تیپ امنیتی در سطح شهر و در بین اغتشاش گران بودند؛ اما با ظاهری مناسب و با پوشش هم‌شکل با اغتشاش گران که شناسایی نشوند و در این میان با فعالیت در بین اغتشاش گران خود را به لیدرها و

۶۸ / دانستنی‌های فرماندهان دگان امنیتی و گردان‌های امام علی (ع)

سردسته‌ها نزدیک کرده و آن را شناسایی نموده و بعد از پایان اغتشاش نیز آن‌ها را تعقیب کرده و محل آن را شناسایی نموده و به یگان گزارش کرده و سپس تیم گشت عملیاتی به آن محل رفته و آن لیدر را دستگیر نموده و یا نیروهای اطلاعاتی که در حال شناسایی لیدرها بودند، با مشاهده زمان مناسب و یا حمله نیروهای خودی سریع آن لیدر را دستگیر کرده و به سمت نیروهای خودی انتقال داده.

(۲) در روزهای اغتشاش چند تیم عملیاتی در میدان کاج مستقر بودند و چون مدت طولانی شد، نیاز به آب و غذا پیدا کردند که برای انتقال آب و غذا از پادگان تا میدان کاج و با توجه به اختلال اینکه شاید ماشین به دست اغتشاش گران بیافتد، آب و غذا را داخل ماشین حمل مرغ فرار داده و به بهانه حمل مرغ غذا و آب را به راحتی تا میدان کاج برد و آن را بین نیروها تقسیم نمودند.


Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on
Deployment of Plainclothes Units

THE ACTIVATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL ASSETS

In addition to deploying security forces, in a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters also acquires the authority to mobilize all pro-regime or quasi-regime organizations and individuals for additional staffing to help manage the situation.

DEPLOYING RELIGIOUS AND MOURNING ASSOCIATIONS: THE HEYAT NETWORK

A critical component of this is the deployment of the regime's extensive network of radical religious and mourning associations (*heyat haye azadari*) to suppress protests. Internal documents from a security battalion headquarters reveal that the Tharallah Headquarters deploys this network across Tehran for suppression operations. The documentation states that the network's power and capacity are activated "during crises that last longer than one week." During the 2009 Green Movement uprising, General Hossein Hamedani is on record stating that he ordered the deployment of the network to crack down on civilians.²⁸



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment
of Heyats

SECURITY GUARD (HERASAT) NETWORK AND STATE EMPLOYEE BASIJ MEMBERS


The internal material also reveals how the Tharallah Headquarters gains authority over the Herasat (MOIS security units) and state employee Basij members to obtain additional manpower. During the Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters will deploy Herasat and Basij members, including state employees, to protect critical infrastructure.²⁹ These individuals are automatically considered part of the reserve forces and can be deployed to defend critical infrastructure and sensitive sites during times of unrest. Almost all of these sensitive locations have their own security personnel, who are expected to erect “fixed guard, mobile guards and inspection points” and protect facilities from protesting forces. For example, the document reveals that Iran’s state TV, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has its “own herasat, as well as a defense command and Vali-e Asr unit, along with the presence of members from Ashura and Imam Ali Battalions, to provide security at IRIB.”

در **حیوی سی**، این روش شامل استفاده از نگهبان ثابت، نگهبان متحرک و نقاط بازرسی می‌باشد. در صورتی که تأسیسات مذکور خود دارای عناصر تأمینی باشند در این صورت عناصر کنترل‌کننده اغتشاش با آن‌ها همکاری نموده و از وجود آن‌ها برای تقویت بیشتر امنیت و حفاظت استفاده خواهد کرد. تعداد افراد تیم‌های برقراری تأمین باید به حدی باشند که بتوانند مأموریت را انجام داده و تا رسیدن نیروهای کمکی تاب مقاومت در برابر هجوم اغتشاش‌گران را داشته باشند. به دلیل اینکه احتمال وقوع حوادث غیرمتربقه می‌باشد. بنابراین نیروهای ذخیره را هم برای این امر باید در نظر گرفت. مثال: صداوسیما. خودش نیروی حراست دارد + مجموعه فرماندهی دفاعی و لیکنسر (ع) + حضور نیروهای گردان‌های رزم، عاشورا و امام علی(ع) در صداوسیما برای تأمین امنیت آنجا.

Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment
of Herasat Units

DEPLOYMENT OF PRO-REGIME STUDENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters also gains full authority and access to deploy pro-regime students and student organizations for various operations, not least psychological operations against the protestors. For example—as per official IRGC documentation acquired by the authors—on November 4, 2009, “more than 1500 individuals from among students of the Imam Hussain University were placed, with a specific plan, under the control of the Al-e Mohammad Headquarters.” According to the documents, these plainclothes students were ordered to stage counter-protests as Basij forces neutralized the “rioters” to show strength in numbers and land a psychological blow to the anti-regime protestors.



Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment
of 1,500 Students

COVERT MOVEMENT OF IRGC UNITS VIA CIVILIAN VEHICLES

It has long been suspected and reported by human rights organizations and Iranian protestors that the IRGC uses civilian vehicles to covertly move and position its units against protestors, including the use of ambulances. Primary IRGC documents acquired by the authors confirm this. The documents make it clear that the IRGC uses the cover of civilian vehicles to pass through areas of unrest and covertly deploy its forces. One example even cites how the IRGC used the cover of “trucks for transporting chickens” to pass through protest hotspots and deliver amenities to IRGC and Basij forces.

۴- انواع جابه‌جایی از دیدگاه متفاوت

(۱) جابه‌جایی پنهان (در تجارب فتنه ۱۳۸۸ مواردی شاهد بودیم که نیاز بوده نیروهای امنیتی از یک صحنه درگیری با عبور از میان اغتشاش‌گران خود را به محل دیگری برسانند، بنابراین در چنین مواردی ابتکار عمل در خصوص انتقال پنهان نیروها و رعایت اصل غافلگیری خود را نشان می‌داد)؛

Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Covert Movement of IRGC Units via Civilian Vehicles

(۲) در روزهای اغتشاش چند تیم عملیاتی در میدان کاج مستقر بودند و چون مدت طولانی شد، نیاز به آب و غذا پیدا کردند که برای انتقال آب و غذا از پادگان تا میدان کاج و با توجه به احتمال اینکه شاید ماشین به دست اغتشاش‌گران بیافتد، آب و غذا را داخل ماشین حمل مرغ قرار داده و به بهانه حمل مرغ غذا و آب را به راحتی تا میدان کاج برد و آن را بین نیروها تقسیم نمودند.

Imam Ali Battalion Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Covert Movement of IRGC Units via Civilian Vehicles

ACTIVATION OF UNIVERSITY PROTOCOLS

During a Red situation, universities receive particularly intense scrutiny from the Tharallah Headquarters. The Tharallah's Intelligence-Security Committee for Universities assumes control of academic institutions during such times of unrest, dictating what actions are permissible. The committee, which is chaired by the Intelligence Deputy of the Tharallah Headquarters, includes officials from the IRGC Intelligence Organization, MOIS Tehran, Police Intelligence Tehran, Basij University faculty, the supreme leader's student representatives, and Herasat guards.

As Mahsa Amini's protests spread across Iran in October 2022, the Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities assumed authority for all universities and academic institutions. Primary documents reveal that it issued direct orders to bar protesting students from dormitories, disband student groups, and punish faculty perceived as sympathetic to the protests. In some cases, professors were transferred to remote universities as a form of disciplinary exile. In one leaked case, university administrators were pressured to submit student examination materials to the Tharallah Headquarters after members of the student Basiji complained about grading discrimination.



The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities issued direct orders Against Dissenting students



Imam Ali Battalions Central Headquarters Internal Manual on Deployment of 1,500 Students

The committee also issues explicit orders for its members to carry out. For example, during the Mahsa Amini protests, academics and scholars had signed a petition against the suppression of students, not least after the repressive apparatus turned its attention to universities. This mild form of dissent, however, was considered a step too far by the Tharallah Headquarters. As soon as the petition was published, the Tharallah Headquarters committee instructed the MOIS Tehran intelligence deputy to summon the academics, intimidate them into withdrawing their signatures, and secure pledges from them not to speak out again.



The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities'
Document to Universities on How to Handle Student Protests




The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities' Document to Universities on How to Handle Student Protests

Another instance of how the Tharallah Headquarters Intelligence-Security Committee for Universities micromanages universities in times of unrest occurred during the Mahsa Amini protests, when it overturned a request by the head of Amir Kabir University to allow protesting students to reside in dormitories and use university facilities. SHAK issued an order prohibiting universities from allowing students who participated in protests to live in dormitories or use university facilities, and from taking exams. But when the head of Amir Kabir University sought to challenge this order, the Tharallah Headquarters committee intervened, rejecting it and instructing the university head to take a clear stance on the issue. Additionally, the committee directed the Ministry of Science and the Universities to dissolve any dissident student associations.



The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities
Ordering University Disciplinary Committees How to Punish Dissenting
Student Protests



The Tharallah Headquarters' Intelligence and Security Committee for Universities
 Ordering University Disciplinary Committees How to Punish Dissenting
 Student Protests

In addition to the measures above, during a Red situation, the Tharallah Headquarters will also order university Herasat representatives to install new security gates to monitor students' entry and exit and prevent graffiti bearing protest slogans. On 21 January 2023, the committee requested a list of problematic or dissident students from University Herasat and the representative of the supreme leader.


ب) جمع بندی و مصوبات

۱. با توجه به گزارش حراست و زارت علوم و تحقیقات در مورد عدم کارآمدی و نتیجه بخش بودن سازو کارهای درون دانشگاه و وزارت علوم در برخورد با برخی از اساتید کنش گر و فعال در اغتشاشات اخیر و لزوم برخورد قضایی با این افراد، مقرر گردید توسط سازمان اطلاعات استان تهران، سازمان اطلاعات سپاه، معاونت اطلاعات فرارگاه ثارالله و حراست و زارت علوم لیستی از اساتید تند و مبالغه دار تهیه و جهت تصمیم گیری و اتخاذ شیوه برخورد با این افراد در جلسه آینده ارائه شود.

Tharallah Headquarters Document Requesting a List of Problematic or Dissident Students

THARALLAH HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE PATROLS AND AMBUSHES

According to a confidential IRGC document analyzed and verified by UANI, the Tharallah Headquarters also deploys intelligence patrols and ambushes to target protestors, not least near sensitive locations. The document reveals that the deputy commander of Tharallah Headquarters emphasized the need to deploy targeted intelligence patrols and ambushes around potential protest centers to confront protesters. The document emphasizes the importance of identifying classified locations, including military, government, and judicial sectors, that are vulnerable to "harmful" actions, as well as parks and open spaces within the security perimeter. The aim is to conduct intelligence patrols in a coordinated, targeted, and planned manner, and to initiate ambushes in the security and protection zones surrounding these key areas.



Tharallah Headquarters Document on Intelligence Patrols and Ambushes

Technology also plays an increasingly important role in the Tharallah Headquarters' red-alert operations. During such times, the Tharallah Headquarters issues orders requiring all government agencies and universities to enhance security personnel and install technological equipment, such as facial recognition systems and CCTV, in all state-run buildings. It also requests that all data considered "sensitive" be stored in multiple locations with backups to prevent loss from the source. The Tharallah Headquarters will also install facial recognition technology in state-run buildings.³⁰

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شیخ

جمهوری اسلامی ایران



تولید و انتشار میان، استغال آفرین

حضور محترم برادر احمد محمد نجفی

معاون اول رئیس جمهور

موضوع: وضعیت مطالبات مالی شرکت بوره برداری مترو از دولت

سلام علیکم

اللهم صل على محمد وآل محمد

با احترام، همانطور که مستحضرید، مترو تهران با ۷ خط، ۱۴۴ ایستگاه و پایانه و ۱۲۱ رام قطار وظیفه خدمات رسانی به

صدھا مسافر را در طول روز بر عهده دارد که سهم قابل توجهی از حمل و نقل عمومی تهران را شامل می‌شود.

از طرفی مترو یکی از نقاط شیگفتی ساز و آبسن حوادث در شرایط امنیتی مختلف به خصوص آشوب و افتکشات، به دلیل شرایط

ویژه همچون تراکم جمعیتی بالا، محیط پسته و حالات آشفته روانی و خستگی مسافران از کار روزانه می‌باشد.

از همین رو یکی از محورهای نارضایتی شهروندان که منجر به وقایعی همچون شماردهی در استگاهها و تخریب واگن مترو در

سال‌های اخیر بوده ناشی از فرسودگی ناوگان مترو می‌باشد که منجر به نقص‌های فنی متعدد و حوادث در مترو شده است.

از طرف دیگر فرسودگی و کیفیت پایین سیستم ماتیورنگ و دوربین‌های مدار پسته مترو نیز موجب کاهش بهره‌برداری از آن‌ها

در اغتشاشات اخیر پایتخت گردید که قابل توجه می‌باشد.

توجه به مترو به عنوان شهر زیزمنی و یکی از نقاط حساس، آسیب پذیر و آسیب زا در تمامی وضعیت‌های امنیتی نشان از نیاز به

اهتمام جدی دولت در راستای رفع نیازهای مالی و پرداخت دینون مالی آن جهت بازسازی ناوگان و تأسیسات آن دارد.

لذا در زیر جدول مطالبات مالی مترو تهران از دولت تا پایان سال ۱۴۰۰ و برآورد مالی بروزرسانی و نوسازی سیستم

دوربین‌های مدار پسته مترو تهران ارسال می‌گردد و خواهشمند است به جهت لزوم توجه جدی به مجموعه مترو تهران

و جلوگیری از هرگونه وقایع خد امنیتی دستور فرمایید موضوع برسی و تدبیر لازم در این خصوص اتخاذ گردد:

Tharallah Headquarters Document Orders for CCTV Cameras in Tehran Metro



Tharallah Headquarters Document Orders for CCTV Cameras in Tehran Metro

In sum, a Red situation effectively transforms Tehran into a militarized zone under the centralized authority of the Tharallah Headquarters. Its vertical control over intelligence, operations, education, and labor—not to mention civilian life—makes it the single most powerful institution in Iran's internal security apparatus. Without disrupting Tharallah's command structure and shutting down its surveillance infrastructure, any regime change effort relying on mass protests is unlikely to succeed.



CONCLUSION

Current discussions on whether the ongoing protests or another direct war between the Islamic Republic and Israel could lead to regime change in Iran largely ignore the vast suppressive machinery built by the IRGC. Nowhere is this apparatus more entrenched than in Tehran, where, for the first time, this paper reveals a multilayered security infrastructure extending from district zones down to neighborhood networks.

That being said, the current protests in Iran are not a flash-in-the-pan moment. They are a continuation of a new wave of unrest that began in 2017, reoccurred in 2019, and again in 2022–23. This protest movement is explicitly anti-regime in nature. The pattern of unrest in Iran reveals that protests are increasing in size, scale, and frequency. In turn, the regime is resorting to more violence to reassert control. The cycle of demonstrations and suppression will likely continue until the balance of power shifts between the Iranian people and the vast suppressive apparatus under the IRGC's Tharallah Headquarters. This apparatus is the biggest barrier to regime change in Iran.

Without dismantling this security web, regime change through domestic protest alone is highly unlikely. The Tharallah Headquarters has consistently crushed all unrest in the capital due to its deep and preemptive reach. Even during the 12-day war, amid Israeli strikes and the absence of protests in Iran, the Tharallah Headquarters deployed forces across Tehran to prevent any small-scale gatherings.

As the current protests gain momentum and Israel's objectives evolve toward creating conditions to empower the Iranian people, dismantling the IRGC's internal security infrastructure, especially the Tharallah Headquarters, becomes critical. Simply put, regime change through popular protest can succeed only if external actors target the IRGC's repressive structure at every level.

Drawing on internal IRGC documents obtained from the Tharallah Headquarters and affiliated units, UANI's research presents the first-ever comprehensive assessment of the Tharallah Headquarters' infrastructure, assets, and operational strategies. The findings illuminate how the IRGC maintains control over Iranian society, particularly in major urban centers.

This research provides critical insights for military officials, policymakers, human rights advocates, and scholars. It details the Tharallah Headquarters' coordination with intelligence, military, and paramilitary forces to repress dissent rapidly. Mapping command structures and threat-response tactics reveals how the regime adapts to varying levels of unrest.

The Tharallah Headquarters operates a tiered threat-response model, with colors ranging from white to red, allowing for scalable mobilization from local police to full IRGC deployment. Understanding this system is crucial for predicting the regime's behavior and developing effective strategic countermeasures.

Specialized units, such as the Imam Ali and Fateheen Basij, are central to this rapid-response strategy. Their deployment reflects the IRGC's focus on speed and force to neutralize organized opposition. Undermining these units will be critical to empowering the Iranian people.

The Tharallah Headquarters also utilizes advanced surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, internet shutdowns, and cyber-monitoring, underscoring the urgent need for secure communications among activists and journalists. This technology enables the regime to dominate public discourse and prevent mobilization.

The IRGC has embedded operatives across civilian institutions, universities, municipalities, and workplaces, allowing for constant surveillance and social control. Identifying these embedded agents may help expose vulnerabilities in the regime's oversight network.

Lastly, the Tharallah Headquarters targets economically marginalized areas, recognizing their potential for unrest. Addressing socioeconomic grievances could reduce regime control and open space for resistance, weakening the Islamic Republic's grip on vulnerable communities.

Any meaningful effort to enable regime change in Iran must begin with a strategic dismantling of the IRGC's deeply entrenched internal security infrastructure, especially the Tharallah Headquarters, without which popular protest movements are unlikely to succeed. ■

07

NOTES

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