Indam International, Inc.

Indam appears to have violated the ITSR between July 4, 2006, and October 23, 2008, when Indam attempted to export or exported nine shipments of goods, collectively valued at $27,846, from the United States to the United Arab Emirates, with reason to know that the shipments were intended specifically for supply, transshipment, or reexportation to two oil drilling rigs destined for or located in Iranian waters.

IC Link Industries Ltd.

Parisa Mohamadi, also known as Parisa Javidi, played a key role in the conspiracy to illegally export U.S.-origin industrial goods to Iran. As a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen based in the UAE, she used her company, Intelligent Solutions, to receive and forward shipments from the U.S. to Iran, working closely with IC Link Industries Ltd. and Iranian entities such as Sensor Co. To evade U.S. export controls, Mohamadi coordinated efforts to remove identifying labels and undervalue shipments.

IC Link Industries Ltd.

Mohammad Khazrai Shaneivar, an Iranian national and owner of Sensor Co., orchestrated a scheme to illegally procure and export U.S.-origin industrial goods to Iran by establishing IC Link Industries Ltd. in Canada. The company’s sole purpose was to deceive U.S. suppliers and facilitate the transfer of restricted goods to Iranian government-controlled entities, including the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Working with Parisa Mohamadi in the UAE and Arezoo Hashemnejad Alamdari in Iran, Shaneivar directed shipments through intermediaries to evade U.S.

IC Link Industries Ltd.

Arezoo Hashemnejad Alamdari, an Iranian national and employee of Sensor Co., played a crucial role in the illegal export of U.S.-origin industrial goods to Iran. Based in Iran, Alamdari coordinated procurement requests from Iranian end-users, including government-controlled entities such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). She relayed these requests to Mohammad Khazrai Shaneivar and IC Link Industries Ltd. in Canada, who then worked with U.S. suppliers and intermediaries to acquire and export the goods while obscuring their final destination.

Ibn Khaldoon Drug Store Est.

On eight occasions between on or about May 20, 1998, and June 2, 1999, Ibn Khaldoon aided and abetted the export of bone densitometer equipment, items subject to the Regulations and subject to the Iran Transactions Regulations, from the United States to Iran without prior authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

HyperBranch Medical Training Technology, Inc

On or about April 15, 2011, HyperBranch appears to have violated the Regulations when it exported 1,600 units of Adherus Dural Sealant, 2,000 units of Adherus Spinal Sealant, 20 units of Adherus Dural Sealant samples, and approximately 60 units of Adherus Spinal Sealant samples to its United Arab Emirates distributor with knowledge or reason to know that the goods were ultimately destined for Iran; and (2) on or about May 27, 2011, HyperBranch appears to have violated the Regulations when it exported 400 units of Adherus Dural Sealant to its United Arab Emirates distributor with knowledge or r