Khomeini Solidifies his Legacy
The ailing Ayatollah Khomeini was embittered by the war's end and was loath to see his revolutionary ardor give way to a spirit of pragmatism. The end of the war removed the pretext of a national security emergency.
The ailing Ayatollah Khomeini was embittered by the war's end and was loath to see his revolutionary ardor give way to a spirit of pragmatism. The end of the war removed the pretext of a national security emergency.
In August 1985, President Ali Khamenei handily won reelection for a second term, prevailing over two other IRP candidates permitted to run with 85 percent of the vote. Immediately following his successful reelection bid, Khamenei’s first order of business was an ill-fated attempt to sack his rival Mousavi, which touched off the largest political crisis in Iran since the removal of Banisadr four years prior.
Concurrent with his administration’s efforts to solidify Khomeinist political and cultural hegemony by crushing MEK and university opposition to clerical rule, Khamenei’s first term was also notable for the conduct of the Iran-Iraq War. Despite diverting significant attention to suppressing internal unrest, dealing with the spate of assassinations of multiple prominent IRP officials, and contending with an economic crisis, the government was able to marshal sufficient resources to turn the tide of the war in the early years of Khamenei’s presidency.
In December 1984, the Committee on the Cultural Revolution was formally institutionalized as an arm of the state by a decree by Khomeini.
The Islamic Republic of Iran held its third presidential election on October 2, 1981. The Guardian Council whittled the field of 46 applicants to four candidates permitted to stand for election, all of whom ran under the banner of the Islamic Republican Party.
Unmoved by the prevailing spirit of unity in the country, Banisadr and the IRP did little to temper their infighting during the early months of the conflict. Prime Minister Rajai sought to sideline Banisadr at every turn, prompting Banisadr to write a confidential letter to Khomeini in October 1980 appealing to him to dismiss Rajai and dismantle the IRP-dominated government, which he claimed was incompetent, lacked public support, and had declared war on his presidency.
Following the passage of Iran’s constitutional referendum in December 1979, the country turned its attention to its first-ever presidential and majles elections in early 1980. Khomeini was wary of the potential backlash among secular and moderate Iranians if the proceedings gave off the appearance of an imposition of clerical rule over Iran’s nascent republican institutions. In the interest of legitimizing the Islamic Republic’s new hybrid system among the population writ large, not just his followers, Khomeini barred clerics from running for the presidency.
As the Khomeinists maneuvered to increasingly encroach upon all facets of state administration and consolidate power, Ali Khamenei’s fervent loyalty to Khomeini and close relationship with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was Khomeini’s closest acolyte, began paying dividends.
Relations continued to deteriorate over the next several months, reaching their apex when President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah into the U.S. for cancer treatment in October 1979. Khomeini was convinced this was evidence of the U.S. plotting to restore its influence in Tehran, and his rhetoric against the “Great Satan” escalated. On November 1, Bazargan traveled to Algeria to represent Iran at a celebration of Algeria’s independence. While there, he met with U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and was photographed shaking his hand.
On January 6, 1979, Bakhtiar announced the formation of a new cabinet, and the Shah announced that as soon as the parliament approved Bakhtiar’s government, he planned to leave Iran indefinitely. Khomeini denounced Bakhtiar’s government as illegal and in an act of defiance that reflected his confidence that victory was imminent, formed a shadow government, the Islamic Revolutionary Council, whose membership was largely kept secret in the early phases of the revolution.
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