Despite the burgeoning power struggle, in June 1993, Rafsanjani handily won a second term as president, although his share of the vote shrunk from 95 percent in 1989 to 63 percent. Voter participation dropped precipitously from 70 percent to 56 percent, indicating frustration with Rafsanjani’s failure to deliver economic benefits and the broader failures of the Islamic Republican system to achieve social and political reform.

The majles elections led to the first major realignment of Iranian politics under Khamenei’s Supreme Leadership. Following its resounding defeat through largely anti-democratic means, the left’s focus turned toward reforming the Islamic Revolutionary system, emphasizing democracy, greater transparency in government, and respect for human and civil rights.

The ailing Ayatollah Khomeini was embittered by the war's end and was loath to see his revolutionary ardor give way to a spirit of pragmatism. The end of the war removed the pretext of a national security emergency.

In August 1985, President Ali Khamenei handily won reelection for a second term, prevailing over two other IRP candidates permitted to run with 85 percent of the vote. Immediately following his successful reelection bid, Khamenei’s first order of business was an ill-fated attempt to sack his rival Mousavi, which touched off the largest political crisis in Iran since the removal of Banisadr four years prior.

Concurrent with his administration’s efforts to solidify Khomeinist political and cultural hegemony by crushing MEK and university opposition to clerical rule, Khamenei’s first term was also notable for the conduct of the Iran-Iraq War. Despite diverting significant attention to suppressing internal unrest, dealing with the spate of assassinations of multiple prominent IRP officials, and contending with an economic crisis, the government was able to marshal sufficient resources to turn the tide of the war in the early years of Khamenei’s presidency.

In December 1984, the Committee on the Cultural Revolution was formally institutionalized as an arm of the state by a decree by Khomeini.

The Islamic Republic of Iran held its third presidential election on October 2, 1981. The Guardian Council whittled the field of 46 applicants to four candidates permitted to stand for election, all of whom ran under the banner of the Islamic Republican Party.

Unmoved by the prevailing spirit of unity in the country, Banisadr and the IRP did little to temper their infighting during the early months of the conflict. Prime Minister Rajai sought to sideline Banisadr at every turn, prompting Banisadr to write a confidential letter to Khomeini in October 1980 appealing to him to dismiss Rajai and dismantle the IRP-dominated government, which he claimed was incompetent, lacked public support, and had declared war on his presidency.

Following the passage of Iran’s constitutional referendum in December 1979, the country turned its attention to its first-ever presidential and majles elections in early 1980. Khomeini was wary of the potential backlash among secular and moderate Iranians if the proceedings gave off the appearance of an imposition of clerical rule over Iran’s nascent republican institutions. In the interest of legitimizing the Islamic Republic’s new hybrid system among the population writ large, not just his followers, Khomeini barred clerics from running for the presidency.