Ironically, while Khamenei and the IRGC executed the 2009 electoral coup to retain their preferred candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he would fall out of Khamenei’s favor during his second term. While deferential, Ahmadinejad cherished his nominal independence from Khamenei, as his political brand was that of a populist representative of the people.

Immediately after the results were announced, peaceful demonstrations began and quickly grew in size, initially overwhelming and paralyzing the regime’s security forces. In the early going, riot police provided the first line of security, beating back advancing demonstrators with tear gas and brute force. As images of violence spread, the protests grew and soon were the largest Iran had witnessed since the Islamic Revolution, dwarfing the 1999 student protests that were their direct antecedent.

Although he harbored misgivings that he would again be stymied from governance by Khamenei and the IRGC were he to win office, in February 2009, former President Khatami announced his intention to seek the presidency. Based on name recognition and nostalgia, Khatami seemed like the most viable candidate to win an election against Ahmadinejad, whose iconoclasm and economic shortcomings had dampened enthusiasm among many less extreme conservative Iranians.

By his election, the U.S. was increasingly bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel was contending with the Second Palestinian Intifada. Both were at the nadir of their popularity in the Arab and Muslim world, and Ahmadinejad positioned himself as the leader of Islamic resistance to American and Zionist imperialism. Although he was not in charge of directing Iran’s foreign and military policy, his presidency synched up with Iran taking on a more assertive anti-Western role in the region and building its influence as a counterweight to the U.S.

The reformists had relied on two main constituencies for their electoral successes before their reversal of fortune; cosmopolitan, upwardly mobile, well-to-do Iranians and the urban poor and working classes. The reformist political establishment largely drew its cues from the former, and its policy agenda centered largely around increased cultural liberties.

International affairs, specifically as they related to the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the launching of a U.S.-led “Global War on Terrorism,” was an additional factor undergirding the rise of the Iranian neoconservatives. The 9/11 attacks led to a brief pause in the enmity that had typically characterized the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Khatami began his second term acknowledging the setbacks to reformism in his inaugural address and tried to boldly make institutional changes that would strengthen his ability as president to enact his agenda. In October 2001, Khatami called on the judiciary to rein in its intrusions on press freedom and its campaign of arrests targeting reformists, especially parliamentarians who were supposed to have constitutional immunity.

After the pacification of the student demonstrations, the reformist political establishment urged a renewed focus on political elections rather than street-level activism. Although the seeds of alienation had been planted among their base, the reformists, running under the banner of the 2nd Khordad movement – a reference to the date of Khatami’s improbable 1997 victory – gained outright control of the majles in the February 2000 elections.

Khamenei criticized the assailants for their excesses and called for justice to be served, but his words rang hollow as he had fanned the flames of press hostility and vigilantism since the reformists began their ascent. News of the dorm room attack catalyzed five days of student-led anti-conservative, anti-Khamenei protests, spreading to 18 Iranian cities.