January 2025: Iran Tanker Tracker

The second Trump Administration has wasted no time signaling a hardline stance on Iran, kicking off what many expect to be "Maximum Pressure 2.0." A key early move was re-designating the Iranian-backed Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a step underscoring the administration’s commitment to ending attacks on U.S. personnel, allies, and maritime shipping in the Red Sea.

National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has made clear that the administration’s strategy will focus on cutting off Iran’s revenue streams, particularly its crude oil exports to China. “As long as Iran is flush with cash, the Middle East is never going to have peace,” Waltz stated, emphasizing that China purchases nearly 90 percent of Iran’s illicit oil.

To help shape a decisive strategy, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has published a 100-Day Plan outlining a whole-of-government approach to counter Tehran’s destabilizing influence. A major focus is dismantling Iran’s "Ghost Fleet"—a network of aging tankers engaged in deceptive shipping practices to evade sanctions.

Key Actions Recommended in UANI’s 100-Day Plan

To neutralize Iran’s illicit oil trade, the U.S. must take decisive action on multiple fronts:

  • Enforce Sanctions with Clarity & Consequence: Publicly commit to the full enforcement of Iran oil sanctions and issue clear warnings to China about serious repercussions for continued purchases.
  • Strengthen Maritime Sanctions: Leverage the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) and CAATSA to penalize entities involved in shipping, insuring, and financing Iranian oil exports.
  • Blacklist Iran’s Entire Ghost Fleet: Designate all vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, cutting off their access to insurance, flagging services, and global markets.
  • Expose and Shame Violators: Public pressure campaigns should highlight shipping firms, insurers, captains, and other enablers complicit in Iran’s illicit trade.
  • Enhance Global Maritime Compliance: Advocate for stricter enforcement of Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking to counter Iran’s deceptive tactics.
  • Expand International Cooperation: Build coalitions with maritime allies, ASEAN nations, and flag states to disrupt illicit transshipments and impose stricter regulations.
China Remains the Largest Purchaser

Despite an increase in sanctions from the previous administration, China remains Iran’s top oil buyer in January 2025. The continued flow of Iranian oil into China will be a critical battleground in the Trump Administration’s push for economic pressure.

Before leaving office, the Biden Administration imposed sweeping designations on entities linked to Russian and Iranian oil trade, but enforcement remained inconsistent. Now, the question is: Will Maximum Pressure 2.0 be enough to change the status quo?

 January 2025 - Barrels Per Day (bpd)*December 2024 - Barrels Per Day (bpd)*November 2024 - Barrels Per Day (bpd)*
China1,098,8541,517,2191,697,987
Syria08,97061,095
UAE13,06900
Unknown268,10928,6830
Total1,380,9331,554,8721,759,082

*figures to be updated over the following weeks

A recent Wall Street Journal report has revealed that China has begun re-exporting Iranian crude from its storage facilities, marking a new tactic in Iran’s oil trade. While China continues directly purchasing Iranian crude, this additional avenue allows Tehran to monetize its oil despite sanctions.

  • Twenty-five million barrels of Iranian crude—worth over $2 billion—had been stored in China since before 2019. Iran is rushing to sell these reserves before stricter U.S. sanctions.
  • Iran owes over $1 billion in unpaid storage fees, limiting its ability to fully profit from these sales.

Even though this oil is being exported from Chinese storage facilities, Iran still benefits financially as the oil stored in Chinese tanks still belongs to Iran or Iranian-linked traders until it is sold. While China allows this oil to be re-exported, Iran can leverage sales to third-party buyers.

This development highlights China’s dual role in Iran’s oil trade—as both a direct buyer and a facilitator of re-exports—further complicating efforts to curb Tehran’s illicit revenue streams.

Some of the key vessels suspected of being involved in this trade include: 

  • MADESTAR (IMO: 9289726)
  • CH BILLION (IMO: 9276585)
  • STAR FOREST (IMO: 9237632)

On January 20, 2025, while manipulating its AIS transponder, UANI identified the crude oil tanker Star Forest loading from China’s Dalian Oil Storage terminal in Changxingdao. On January 24, Star Forest turned its AIS transponder back on and updated its draught to indicate it was fully laden. The vessel is currently sailing back toward Malaysian waters, and its destination is reported as “To Order.” UANI will continue to monitor Star Forest and the other vessels to their final destination.

STAR FOREST
Satellite imagery of STAR FOREST loading from Changxingdao, China on January 20, 2025 (Source: Sentinel Hub)

The next phase of Maximum Pressure must also include:

  • Increased monitoring of bonded storage exports from China.
  • Designation of vessels involved in re-exporting Iranian crude.
  • Pressure on Chinese entities facilitating indirect sales.
  • Stronger diplomatic efforts to curb China’s support for Iran’s illicit trade.

The coming months will determine whether the world is finally ready to shut down Tehran’s financial lifeline—or if China will continue to act as Iran’s economic backdoor.