Hassan Rouhani’s Japanese Journey

As Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani prepares to embark on his first trip to Japan from December 20-21, he faces headwinds at home and abroad.  His government is still reeling from the aftermath of mass protests over its new gas policy.  That’s not to mention the regime’s increasing isolation diplomatically and economically.  As Tehran and Tokyo take center stage, there will be three dynamics to watch: Rouhani’s incredibly shrinking presidency; the future of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces; and the potential for surprises in the region.

Rouhani’s visit to Japan will be historic by any measure.  It will be the first time since 2000 that an Iranian president has visited the country.  The last head of government to visit was Mohammad Khatami, who became the first presidential visitor since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  The 2000 visit was fraught with peril from the start, with the Iranian delegation almost cancelling its trip over the prospect that wine would be served on the table during official meals.

A diminished presidential brand

But while Khatami visited Japan as an empowered first term president—he won reelection in 2001—Rouhani will be arriving as a lame duck second termer.  As a result, his administration has been lowering expectations ahead of this trip.  The president’s spokesman this week emphasized that the goal of the trip would be to “expand economic relations” and that “Mr. Rouhani’s trip to Japan has nothing to do with issues such as negotiations with America.  However, our Japanese friends usually convey messages or initiatives, which we welcome…and seriously examine.”  Thus, bilateral ties, rather than multilateral machinations, will be the public objective.

Such framing of the trip is purposeful.  Iran’s president is walking a diplomatic tightrope on this trip—caught between a Japanese rock and an Iranian hard place.  Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will likely be seeking to act as an emissary, passing along messages, pushing for de-escalation in the region, and most crucially trying to convince Iran not to further violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  Iran is scheduled to undertake its fifth reduction in commitments in early January.

Yet Rouhani doesn’t have a great deal of room to maneuver politically at home.  His credibility across the political spectrum has been burned—especially after the new gas rationing and price increases, which sparked mass protests across the country.  Members of parliament object to the Rouhani-chaired Supreme Economic Coordination Council’s unilateral decision-making on the new fuel policy.  Conservative elements of the theocracy—including Friday Prayer leaders—are objecting to the manner in which the gas policy was implemented, arguing a more gradual approach was in order.  That’s not to mention the siege against the presidential administration, with recent impeachment efforts against the oil, interior, and education ministers.  There have even been rumors that Iran’s First Vice President discussed Rouhani's potential resignation. 

While the Japanese government is an important market for Iran—as the world’s fourth largest consumer of oil—Rouhani will also be hamstrung by the nezam’s demand for sanctions relief in advance of a P5+1 meeting.  The collapse of the French credit line initiative offers a cautionary tale for Abe—where Rouhani even resisted Macron’s attempt to schedule a phone call between himself and President Trump.  Thus, Iran’s chief executive is landing in Japan, both weakened and constrained.

Maritime Security

Maritime security will also figure heavily at the tête-à-tête.  Iran’s president and foreign minister have crisscrossed the world, selling their Hormuz Peace Initiative (HOPE), whose stated aim is to form a collective framework for regional security.  Such a proposal provides the Iranian regime with a talking point while its deep state—for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—doubles down on meddling in the region.  It’s this double game which aims to buy time for Iran internationally and break coalitions—namely thwarting U.S. attempts to recruit countries to join its own International Maritime Security Construct.

Japan has kept its distance from these initiatives, seeking to preserve its ties with the Islamic Republic while at the same time demonstrating its concern over instability in the region by deployment of its Maritime Self-Defense Forces.  Japanese media have reported that Rouhani would not oppose a deployment of the force.  However, such a stance is inconsistent with Tehran’s repeated complaints about transregional forces interfering in the region and opens Rouhani up to domestic criticism.  Additionally it’s risky for Tokyo to bet on Rouhani’s public or private assurances because he’s not the constitutional commander-in-chief—that’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  But in the end, the multiple, redundant maritime security efforts—International Maritime Security Initiative, the European-led force, and the Japanese gambit—risk a lack of coordination that undermines their collective effectiveness, redounding to Iran’s benefit.

Surprises

Lastly, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s trip to Iran this past summer will loom large during Rouhani’s stay in Japan.  During his visit—the first for a Japanese premier since 1979—two tankers carrying petrochemicals were mysteriously attacked in the Gulf of Oman.  The United States later released damning video showing Iranian forces removing an unexploded limpet mine from one of the tankers, which happened to be a Japanese-owned vessel.  This is part of a pattern of behavior—in the past, as Iran has engaged with the world during high-profile diplomatic meetings, the IRGC has raged at the world all in an effort to build negotiating leverage.  For instance, as Foreign Minister Zarif visited New York in July, Iran announced the seizure of a foreign oil tanker and its crew of 12 for smuggling.  Given this track record and potential U.S. action against Iran for human rights abuses on December 19, the international community should be on high alert for spoilers and surprises as Rouhani lands in Japan.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)