Do the UN snapback sanctions on Iran even matter?

United Against Nuclear Iran senior adviser Charlie Brown said the UN sanctions would “significantly increase the responsibility for all UN member states to take action, not quietly ignore Iran’s illicit shipping activities.” He highlighted states in Southeast Asia, in particular Malaysia, whose waters had become a ship-to-ship transfer hotspot for shadow fleet* tankers carrying Iranian oil destined for China. . . . Brown said instead the UN sanctions would give the US a greater mandate to encourage allies and other member states to follow their lead in designating these entities. “There’s an international mandate, there’s the ability to increase the pressure, and there’s accountability,” he told Lloyd’s List. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), which would be reinstated under the snapback mechanism, “calls upon states” to prevent insurance services and “the transfer to, through, of from their territory, or to or by nationals or entities organised under their laws” any “financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe such services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities”. Brown suggests that the phraseology presents enough ambiguity for member states to crank the pressure up. “Other assets or resources” that “contribute to” Iran’s nuclear activities could be interpreted as oil trades, for example. . . . A return of UN sanctions would increase the risk and cost of doing business with Iran though. UANI research director Daniel Roth told Lloyd’s List that Chinese banks that finance these trades may think twice, or hike their transaction fees, meaning Iran will have to offer even greater discounts to attract business.