Tanker Tracking

Recent UANI tracking work has focused on non-Iranian, foreign-flagged tankers loading crude oil and gas condensates from Iran.

Of course, Iranian-operated tankers remain highly active in transporting crude oil and gas condensates.

Why would Russia, the world’s number two oil producer, look to buy oil from Iran?  The answer is not exactly clear, but since August, we have seen two Russian-flagged tankers together carrying more than 1.5 million barrels, apparently en-route to Russia. Both have signaled their destination as Port Kavkaz, a small Russian port on the northern section of the Black Sea, at the entrance to the Sea of Azov. Russia would be a new – and for the U.S., a concerning – option for Iranian crude exporters.

Former Bush advisor and UANI board member Michael Singh notes in Foreign Affairs that for President Biden to prevail against Iran, he must plug the widening sanctions gaps. “Foremost among them,” Singh writes, “are Iran’s sales of oil to China, which increased dramatically starting in 2020 and are reportedly facilitated by deceptive maneuvers such as transfers at sea.”  Similarly, former U.S.

This week it was reported that the Biden administration is pressing China to reduce its Iran oil imports. It’s more of a gentle lean. “We have been approaching this diplomatically,” said the unnamed official, because this was, in their view, “a more effective path forward” to deal with the Iran issue.

In August, Lebanon’s Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh announced an end to its fuel subsidies, which have drained the bank’s reserves since the country began descending into a financial crisis. The move, which was expected to cause already high fuel prices to quadruple, plunged Lebanon further into collapse.

For the month of July, UANI estimates Iran’s exports of crude oil and gas condensates at 843,233 barrels of oil per day (bpd), with China again the single biggest importer and “destinations unknown” still accounting for more than half of the total. However, as vessel transponders are turned back on and destinations are updated, UANI’s export figures are revised accordingly.

As part of our campaign to disrupt Tehran’s oil sales revenue, UANI has launched a new resource, the Iran Tanker Tracker. This comprehensively tracks exports of Iranian oil through our ship-tracking methodology dating back to April 2018.  In addition to our monthly Iran Tanker Tracking Blogs, the new resource provides a comparison of where Iran’s oil exports were pre-JCPOA, during the JCPOA, and post-JCPOA.  

Israel and Iran have been engaged in a low-intensity shadow war for over a decade. This clandestine clash has passed through multiple phases. Initially, it was centered on Israel’s attempts to derail Iran’s nuclear program. In 2013, with the entry of Iran and its proxy forces into the Syrian Civil War, Israel’s goal broadened to prevent Tehran’s entrenchment in yet another country on its northern border. The Israelis seemingly expanded to striking Iranian shipping assets shortly after that.

Preliminary data suggests that Iran’s exports of crude oil and gas condensates dropped from 1.2 million to 900,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) in May.  Maritime entities appear to have played their part. In the wake of UANI’s Stop the Hop 2.0 blog on April 16, which highlighted a fleet of 100+ suspect tankers, numerous flag, insurance and classification authorities have stepped up and taken action on many of these identified vessels.

It appears that many classification societies – which certify a vessel’s seaworthiness – are starting to heed last year’s official guidance on maritime malpractice and sanctions.