Introduction
In August 2026, the U.S. Treasury launched "Operation Economic Outcast" on "Economic D-Day" to intensify economic pressure on the Iranian regime. Coupled with the U.S. naval blockade reinstated on July 14, heightened enforcement has severely crippled Tehran’s primary revenue stream. Iranian oil exports have been driven down to historic lows with only three LPG-laden tankers departing the Gulf of Oman throughout August.
United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has observed zero Iranian crude vessels crossing the blockade line to depart the Gulf of Oman. While crude and petrochemicals accumulate along Iran's coastline, Iran-flagged vessels and Iranian oil-laden Ghost Fleet tankers also continue to cluster across Indo-Pacific anchorages—most notably conducting illicit ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in the Malaysian EOPL anchorage.
To ensure standardized month-over-month comparisons, export figures are presented in barrels per day (bpd). This framing does, however, require clarification. Daily averages imply an ongoing, continuous flow, whereas August 2026 exports were limited to three isolated handymax shipments.
UANI’s export figures are calculated when tankers cross the declared U.S. blockade line, rather than at the point of loading, as there are many vessels that have been unable to sail because of U.S. enforcement.
Iranian oil exports hit historic lows due to the continued enforcement of the U.S. maritime blockade, which prevented outbound crude voyages from leaving the Gulf of Oman. Throughout the entire month of August, UANI observed only three small handymax tankers departing the Gulf of Oman carrying Iranian LPG. In total, these three tankers exported 1.54 million barrels of Iranian LPG. This represents a dramatic decline in Iranian exports, where pre-war monthly figures typically averaged around 55 million barrels per month.
Economic D-Day
The launch of Operation Economic Outcast by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on August 24 ("Economic D-Day") expanded sanctions against international broker networks, front companies, and active Ghost Fleet tankers.
On August 19, President Trump announced a new economic pressure campaign targeting Iran. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent subsequently emphasized that the initiative—paired with the naval blockade—is designed to collapse the regime.
On August 24, termed “Economic D-Day”, Secretary Bessent announced sanctions on an international network of brokers, companies, and ghost fleet tankers responsible for the transportation of Iranian oil. Four out of the five newly sanctioned tankers were previously listed on UANI's Ghost Armada including: G SILVER (IMO 9139696), QUANTUM HOPE (IMO 9233650), VOYAGE ELITE (IMO 9286138) and TELA (IMO 9189110).
China has vowed to protect its interests after the US announced plans to widen economic sanctions against Iran and its trading partners. Beijing being Iran’s primary trading partner, importing approximately 90 per cent of Iranian oil. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said China was firmly opposed to what it called "illegal unilateral sanctions" and would take "all necessary measures" to safeguard its rights.
Blockade Forces Exports Near Zero
New U.S. sanctions on Iran combined with the strict enforcement of the naval blockade has intensified pressure on the Iranian regime. From July 14, U.S. forces have imposed the blockade against vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports and coastal areas while supporting compliant traffic in regional waters. As of August 30, U.S. forces have redirected 83 commercial vessels trying to run the blockade, disabled 3 that didn't comply, and boarded 2 to ensure total compliance. Meanwhile, more than 40 vessels supporting humanitarian aid have been allowed to pass.
No crude oil tankers have successfully departed the Gulf of Oman since July 12, just two days before the reinstatement of the blockade. UANI has only observed five small handymax tankers laden with Iranian LPG managing to depart the Gulf of Oman and breach the blockade.
Due to its strict enforcement, the blockade has caused tankers laden with Iranian cargos to build in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Over 50 laden tankers (carrying crude, petroleum products, and LPG) remain clustered along the Iranian coastline, unable to pass enforcement lines. Iranian loadings have also remained below average, with approximately 14 loadings of Iranian oil and petrochemicals.
During the previous U.S. blockade from April 13 to June 18, large clusters of laden Iranian tankers—often around 13 to 15 vessels—accumulated off Chabahar Port in the Gulf of Oman. This time, however, such a clustering of tankers off Chabahar has not materialized. Rather than accumulating loaded tankers in the Gulf of Oman, Tehran appears to have adjusted its oil export operations by slowing crude production and loading activity at Kharg Island to match the reduced demand from Chinese refiners.
Strait of Hormuz Insecurity and MoU Expiration
Although the U.S. blockade restricts commercial traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports, neighboring Gulf states are able to continue active maritime trade. Oil exports from the Persian Gulf have recovered to roughly two-thirds of pre-conflict levels in August, according to Goldman Sachs. Regional exports of crude and refined products rose to between 15 million and 16 million barrels per day (bpd) supported by increased transits through the Strait of Hormuz.
Following the signing of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), JMIC reported an increase in open transits through the Strait of Hormuz. On June 24, JMIC recorded 54 transits—the highest daily total since the outbreak of the conflict. The MoU officially expired on 17 August following the conclusion of its 60-day negotiating period without a final peace agreement being reached. Despite the MoU’s expiry, transits have not ceased.
Open transits of commercial vessels through the southern corridor in the Omani waters of the Strait of Hormuz did initially drop following IRGC strikes on commercial shipping that began on July 7. By the end of August, however, an increasing number of vessels transited the southern corridor without broadcasting AIS location data, with many movements facilitated by U.S. forces. From June 20 to August 28, JMIC recorded a total of 1,228 U.S. facilitated transits. Following a July low of approximately 4.5 transits per day, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz partially recovered to average roughly 18 transits daily by late August. Despite this partial recovery, overall commercial maritime activity remains far below pre-conflict baseline levels, which previously averaged roughly 138 daily vessel transits.
Drop in Chinese Demand for Oil Imports
Oil production is now closely matching oil consumption as China's demand sharply falls. This shift is fueled by strategic inventory drawdowns, economic shocks resulting from supply disruptions due to insecurity in the Middle East, and most importantly lessons learned from the first months of the war and initial U.S. blockade. China has maintained a policy of energy diversification, ensuring no single country accounts for more than 20 per cent of its crude imports. In tandem, Beijing has aggressively developed domestic green energy sources. In response to the conflict and the U.S. blockade, China has further diversified its supply chain to fortify itself against volatile markets and overreliance on Gulf crude. Consequently, Chinese buyers have limited necessity to risk routing vessels past the blockade, as available inventories in the EOPL are sufficient to meet immediate demand, for the time being.
STS & Illicit Operations in Malaysia Keep China Trade Afloat
Despite Iran’s oil exports falling due to the blockade, the illicit trade supplying independent Chinese refiners ("teapots") persists using pre-existing inventories loitering in Southeast Asia. The Eastern Outer Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage approximately 70km off Johor, Malaysia, remains the central node for dark ship-to-ship (STS) transfers. As of August 31, 7 Iran-flagged tankers—including HUMANITY, STARLA, HILDA I, DAN, HAPPINESS I, HEDY, and DORENA—were located in the EOPL. These tankers have been tracked conducting or awaiting STS operations in Malaysian waters.
In addition to these Iran-flagged tankers, approximately 50 non-Iran-flagged Ghost Fleet tankers loiter in the anchorage, some with active AIS signals openly broadcasting their positions, waiting to receive the Iranian oil. Some Ghost Fleet tankers remain in the anchorages for months, conducting multiple STS transfers and sometimes blending various sanctioned crude oils to obscure origin before final delivery to China. Once the oil reaches China, it is imported under the name “Malaysian blend” in further obscure the origin of the cargo.
On June 26, Malaysia updated maritime regulations that significantly expand its legal authority over dark fleet operations within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Exclusive Economic Zone Regulations 2026 updated the framework originally established under the EEZ Act of 1984. These new regulations grant agencies like the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) clear legal authority to crack down on dark fleet anchorages and illegal STS transfers in international waters within the Malaysian EEZ, the lack of any visible enforcement in practice has remained unchanged. UANI has observed no change in enforcement measures, allowing illegal anchoring and dark fleet transfers off Eastern Johor to continue unhindered.
Large Build-Up of Empty Iran-Flagged Tankers Off Sri Lanka
Unable to return to Iranian ports due to the U.S. blockade, empty Iran-Flagged tankers have retreated to anchorages across the Indo-Pacific. DIONA is loitering offshore Duqm, Oman, while 20 empty Iran-flagged tankers were briefly anchored of Galle, Sri Lanka. Namely, STREAM, HALTI, DREAM II, HERO II, SILVIA I, SEA CLIFF, SNOW, HELM, DIAMOND II, DEEP SEA, DUNE, DINO I, SONIA I, HERBY, SEVIN, AMBER, HENNA, FELICITY, HUGE, and DORE. From August 23, however, these Iran-flagged tankers departed the Galle anchorage and started maneuvering and loitering outside territorial waters, but still within the vicinity of Sri Lanka, possibly driven by heightened regulatory or enforcement pressure following Sri Lankan press coverage of UANI’s monitoring of Iran-flagged tankers in Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on August 23.
Iran-flagged tankers near Sri Lanka on August 18 (Credit: Marine Traffic & ESA Copernicus)
Iran-flagged tankers near Sri Lanka on August 23 (Credit: Marine Traffic & ESA Copernicus)
Iran-flagged tankers near Sri Lanka on August 27 (Credit: Marine Traffic & ESA Copernicus)
Ongoing Illicit Cargo Clustering & Regional Operations
Beyond crude tankers, approximately 50 Iranian-flagged cargo ships continue to operate openly across sea lanes, ports, and anchorages throughout the Indo-Pacific region, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.
Due to the U.S. blockade, Iran flagged cargo ships are clustering in anchorages near Malaysia and China. As of August 28, 11 Iran-flagged bulk carriers, container ships, and general cargo vessels remain stationary in or near the Malaysian EOPL. Meanwhile, 4 Iran-flagged cargo vessels are loitering near Zhuhai Port, China.
Many of these cargo vessels are conducting port calls in the Russian Baltic, Port Klang in Malaysia, Misrata in Libya and all across China. The pattern of vessels transiting from the Russian Baltic to the Malaysian EOPL anchorage to Port Klang has continued. Often two Iran flagged cargo vessels are observed pulling into Port Klang at the same time for possible transshipment operations.
While conducting covert operations, Iran-flagged cargo vessels have increasingly been employing some of the same illicit practices as the ghost fleet tankers. There have been increased instances of dark rendezvous and identity deception. Cargo vessels have spoofed their flags, potentially switched their MMSI numbers and stopped broadcasting their AIS when entering ports in China due to licensing issues, but also when entering the ports in the Russian Baltic. This could be for security reasons due to possible attacks by Ukrainian drones.
Recommendations
- Target EOPL Logistics Support: OFAC and international maritime authorities must target local tugs, bunkering operators, and ship-to-ship service providers operating in the Malaysian EOPL and Sri Lankan waters that service sanctioned Iran-flagged tankers and Ghost Fleet vessels.
- Coastal State monitoring and action: Coastal State nations like Sri Lanka and Malaysia must deny offshore logistics services and long-term EEZ loitering to sanctioned vessels attempting to evade Port State Control inspections.
- Expand Shadow Fleet Sanctions: Continue OFAC designations of the tankers listed on UANI’s Ghost Armada for the transportation of Iranian oil.