November 2025 Iran Tanker Tracker

For the month of November 2025, UANI tracked a total of 61.3 million barrels (averaging 2.04 million barrels per day, or BPD) in physical exports out of Iran—another new high for this year. The estimated value of oil exported in November is $3.877 billion. The year-to-date total for 2025 through November is $42.7 billion. 

Iran–China Oil Flows

Iran still ships near-record levels of crude and condensate to China despite the imposition of United Nations snapback sanctions. Chinese refiners are not stepping back, either. Beijing has maintained high crude import quotas that allow independent “teapot” refineries to uphold their large imports of sanctioned Iranian crude. Ramped-up Chinese intake will likely start to reduce some of the amount of Iranian oil that has accumulated in floating storage. 

Despite recent reporting that China was going to import less sanctioned oil, our monitoring shows sustained large flows and continued Chinese stockpiling of Iranian oil, in line with UANI’s earlier warnings. 

Exports to Malaysia?

Since September, UANI has observed a small but notable share of exported Iranian fuel oil—refined from crude—heading to Malaysia. It remains unclear whether these volumes are ultimately destined for Malaysian consumption, are being held in offshore storage in the South China Sea pending ship‑to‑ship (STS) transfers, or represent a mixture of both. 

Maritime monitoring and market data show a broader surge in Iranian crude and fuel oil held in floating storage off Malaysia and nearby waters, with tens of millions of barrels parked on tankers that frequently serve as hubs for at‑sea transfers into China‑bound supply chains. This pattern accords with UANI’s recent findings of record‑level STS activity in the region and suggests that at least part of the “exports to Malaysia” is actually Iranian fuel oil carried by tankers using Malaysian and South China Sea anchorages as a staging ground before moving on to Chinese buyers. 

This evasion network is all enabled by current nonenforcement of snapback sanctions.

UN Snapback in Play, but Paralysed

Snapback sanctions still only exist on paper, as implementation is stalled. Neither a Sanctions Committee nor a Panel of Experts has been reestablished by the UN Security Council. Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran are colluding to manufacture confusion and stasis at the Council, using the threat of a Russian and/or Chinese veto of any follow-on measures or enforcement mechanisms to deter and intimidate other states. This mere threat of a veto has a chilling effect: states that should be tightening enforcement instead sit on their hands, allowing Iran’s “Ghost Armada” to prepare and adapt in anticipation of possible snapback sanctions enforcement. 

U.S. Sanctions Steps in November

Last month, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded sanctions measures targeting Iran’s illicit oil networks. On November 20, OFAC designated additional Iranian oil network facilitators and 10 tankers, seven of which were listed by UANI, demonstrating that our continued tracking of the Ghost Armada can and does translate into government action. UANI added an additional 23 vessels to its Ghost Armada list in November.

While this sanctions action is commendable, UANI calls for the U.S., EU, and UK to target the large number of Ghost Armada vessels still awaiting designation. 

Ukraine, the Ghost Armada, and Security Risks

Recent Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) strikes on two Russian “shadow fleet” tankers in the Black Sea and the disruption to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal off Novorossiysk expose the vulnerability of illicit oil tanker networks. Once more, the reported Ukrainian attack on the M/T Mersin, a Russia-linked tanker known to transport Russian oil, off Senegal constitutes further evidence that Ghost Armada shipping is no longer a low-risk way to move sanctioned oil. Operators, insurers, and coastal states are now exposed to safety risks, in addition to security risks, in addition to environmental, legal, and safety ones. 

Taken together, these USV attacks highlight the growing security dangers associated with illicit oil trades. For states along key maritime routes and chokepoints—particularly Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia in Southeast Asia—these strikes should be a clear warning that they can no longer treat Iran’s shadow fleet transiting the Malacca and Singapore Straits as a distant or abstract problem.

At an absolute minimum, systematic action is needed against falsely flagged, undetectable, and grossly noncompliant tankers using their waters and offshore zones for STS transfers. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia should cooperate to monitor and prevent Russia and Iranian Ghost Armada vessels from abusing the Malacca and Singapore straits—particularly conducting STS transfers in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at the rarely-patrolled Eastern Out of Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage. Ignoring Iran’s Ghost Armada today invites sanctions exposure, environmental disaster, and potential military escalation in their own backyards tomorrow. 

Call to action

UN sanctions on Iran have been snapped back into place de jure but are not meaningfully enforced due to political paralysis. Iran’s oil exports to China remain robust, and with newly granted import quotas for independent Chinese refiners, there is little sign that these flows will slow.

Policy makers and maritime companies need to:

• Ensure that major flag states de‑flag high‑risk tankers engaged in sanctions evasion;
• Press coastal and port authorities, especially in Southeast Asia, to act against falsely flagged and non‑compliant vessels conducting ship‑to‑ship transfers in waters off Malaysia, especially at the EOPL area; and
• Encourage the U.S. and its partners to accelerate designations, using UANI’s Ghost Armada list as a force multiplier to disrupt Iran’s shipping network.

Iran’s Ghost Armada enables large-scale sanctions evasion that finances Iran’s nuclear, drone, and missile programmes and the regime’s network of regional terror proxies. This illicit oil trade also exposes coastal states to serious environmental risks through unsafe STS transfers that often spill oil into the waters. These aging, poorly maintained tankers are a health and safety hazard for seafarers and coastal communities, and as they increasingly become potential military targets, they create mounting security risks for states along Iran’s oil routes and key maritime choke points.