UANI’s Final Tanker Tracker of 2024: A Year in Review

UANI’s final Tanker Tracker for 2024 reviews the year’s topline data points, UANI’s impact, and offers prescriptions for 2025.

Iran’s ability to sustain and increase its oil exports remains a critical factor in keeping the regime financially afloat. In 2024, despite U.S. sanctions, Iranian exports remained high, benefiting from OPEC+ cuts and the ongoing lax enforcement of sanctions. This helped the regime to bolster its economic resilience while continuing its support for human rights abuses and proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas.

In 2024, Iran exported 587 million barrels of oil, an increase of 10.75% compared to 2023’s 530 million barrels. Over the four years since the start of the Biden Administration, with less than one month remaining in its term, Iran has exported a cumulative total of nearly 1.98 billion barrels of oil.

For the sixth consecutive year since the launch of UANI’s Tanker Tracker, China was the largest importer of Iranian oil, receiving 533 million barrels (an increase of 24% from 2023’s 431 million barrels), constituting 91% of Iran’s total oil exports (an increase of 8% from 83% in 2023). This showcases what is now China’s near total dominance in importing Iranian crude, primarily driven by its Shandong province east coast “teapot” refineries.

Tanker Trends: NITC and STS Transfers

One of the most notable shifts in 2024 was Iran’s reliance on its National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) fleet for direct loadings. Although NITC is also U.S. sanctioned, this represented a departure from previous years, where foreign-flagged vessels often carried oil directly from Iranian ports. In 2024, such activity significantly decreased. This shift occurred as a direct result of the sanctions imposed this year, which targeted foreign-flagged vessels involved in transporting sanctioned Iranian oil. In response, foreign-flagged tankers were increasingly used in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, particularly in international waters. This strategic adjustment reflects Iran’s effort to adapt to heightened sanctions enforcement and minimize the risks associated with the direct involvement of foreign-flagged vessels in its oil exports.

UANI Impact

Sanctions and Enforcement: In 2024, UANI identified 132 new vessels engaged in smuggling Iranian oil, bringing the total number of ghost fleet tankers tracked to 477 vessels. In 2024, the organization’s intelligence led to over 330 flag revocations and contributed to the designation of 139 vessels by the U.S. government. Notably, out of the 139 tankers sanctioned this year, 110 were previously identified by UANI on its Ghost Armada list, showcasing UANI’s pivotal role in preemptive tracking. 

Prescriptions for 2025

Worst Offending Vessels 2024

Many of the worst offenders (vessels transporting the most sanctioned Iranian oil) were designated during 2024 (see italicized entries below). However, there remain 325 vessels yet to be designated.

Italicization indicates the vessel was designated after inclusion on UANI’s Ghost Armada list.

Target Flag States and Companies Enabling Evasion

In 2025, efforts must prioritize targeting flag states and the companies behind them that continue to provide registration to vessels engaged in transporting sanctioned Iranian oil. While 2024 saw a notable increase in due diligence by certain flag states, leading to the removal of numerous vessels from their registries, the problem persists. New and emergent flag states, often based in jurisdictions with limited regulatory oversight, have begun registering these vessels, and false registries—designed to obscure vessel ownership and operations—are a growing challenge. To combat this, the U.S. and its allies must engage in direct diplomatic efforts to encourage stricter enforcement by flag states, impose targeted sanctions on companies enabling these registrations, and expand efforts to expose and dismantle false registry networks. A concerted focus on this issue will be critical to closing the loopholes that allow Iran’s ghost fleet to operate with impunity. The registries that made the most effort to de-register ghost fleet vessels from their registries in 2024 are listed below: 

Ship-to-Ship Sanctions Evaders

With foreign-flagged vessels now primarily used for STS transfers, it is imperative to identify and sanction repeat offenders engaged in multiple transfers. The majority of STS transfers occur in the Riau Archipelago, Malaysia. This year, the most prolific STS offenders were:

Italicization indicates the vessel was designated after inclusion on UANI’s Ghost Armada list.

Seize More Tankers: Legislative measures, such as those introduced by Senators Ernst and Blumenthal, should be expanded to increase funding for interdictions and incentivize rapid seizure actions. 

Hold Captains Accountable for Sanctions Violations

A tanker captain—as the “Ship CEO”—plays a crucial role in facilitating the transport of sanctioned Iranian oil, often knowingly engaging in deceptive practices such as AIS manipulation, false documentation, and illicit ship-to-ship transfers. As part of 2025’s enforcement strategy, authorities should focus on holding captains accountable through targeted sanctions, fines, and potential legal actions. By pursuing those directly responsible for overseeing these operations, it sends a strong message that individual complicity will not be overlooked. Collaborating with international maritime organizations and flag states to enforce these measures can further deter captains from participating in illicit activities. Equally, captains should be rewarded and incentivized to refrain from further sanctionable activity and cooperate with U.S. authorities.

Conclusion

UANI’s shipping work in 2024 showcased the critical importance of rigorous monitoring and enforcement to counter Iran’s sanctions evasion tactics. With a 10.75% increase in exports, the regime’s economic resilience underscores the need for enhanced global cooperation and strategies that go beyond traditional enforcement methods (i.e., satellite and AIS monitoring, blockchain-based trade verification, name and shame campaigns) to disrupt the illicit flow of oil. This year’s data trends reveal a regime that adapts quickly to enforcement measures, requiring equally dynamic responses in 2025.