October 2024 Iran Tanker Tracker

Since the brutal October 7 attack by Iran-backed Hamas, the Biden Administration has noticeably ramped up sanctions on “Ghost Fleet” tankers. As of October 28, 2024, a total of 98 tankers were sanctioned during the preceding twelve months. 

Some analysts have questioned whether this has significantly hampered Iran’s oil trade, noting that a significant proportion of sanctioned tankers continue to operate in sanctioned oil trade – approximately 70% remaining active.

UANI’s assessment suggests otherwise and shows a substantial impact of sanctions on specific vessels, pointing to disruptions in Iranian oil deliveries, reduced operational flexibility, and increased costs for Iran’s dark fleet operations.^[1]  However, if these designations had been more aggressively enforced in previous years, Iranian oil exports would likely be significantly lower today. 

Iran’s sanctioned tankers have primarily offloaded at Chinese ports such as Dongjiakou and Qingdao, which received significant volumes of oil in the last six months. However, the overall volumes delivered post-designation reveal a downward trend in Iranian crude deliveries to China by designated vessels. Sanctions appear to have discouraged an increasing number of Chinese terminals from receiving Iranian oil. While some tankers have managed to maintain sporadic activity, their ability to deliver large volumes consistently has been curtailed, particularly at high-traffic ports.

Key Statistics

• Total number of barrels of Iranian oil transported by sanctioned tankers pre-designation: Approximately 321 million barrels.
• Total number of barrels of Iranian oil transported post-designation: Approximately 45 million barrels. 
• Reduction in exports per tanker, on average: About 85% decrease in export volume after designation. 
• Reduction in export volumes due to limited STS options: Sanctioned vessels reliant on STS transfers saw an additional 40-50% drop in effective export volumes, as third-party vessels increasingly avoid sanctions risk. 
• Breakdown of Vessel Status & Location:
  • Middle East & Gulf: 30 vessels remain in the region, most of which are stalled or empty. 
  • China Sea & Yellow Sea: 6 vessels have managed to reach ports, but only intermittently, with reduced volumes. 
  • Empty: 70% of vessels are reported as “empty” after designation, indicating limited access to discharge ports. 

While exports on designated tankers have declined, Iran’s overall export numbers have remained relatively steady. This trend points to Iran’s reliance on non-designated “ghost fleet” tankers to maintain trade volumes, underscoring the need for further sanctions on the entire network of Iran-linked vessels. Comprehensive sanctions targeting all dark fleet tankers, rather than a subset, would substantially hinder Iran’s capacity to conduct oil trades and limit the effectiveness of their evasive practices. 

Iranian oil exports for October 2024:

*Figures to be updated over the following weeks

As indicated in the chart below, many designated tankers, such as the ZENITH and MOLECULE, are currently stalled or operating at reduced capacity within the Gulf, indicating a lack of ports willing to receive their cargoes. This situation mirrors the impact of sanctions on other vessels like SANAR, which, despite attempting to offload cargo through ship-to-ship transfers, face logistical and financial barriers that make such operations increasingly unsustainable over time. 

Iran’s crude trade relies heavily on a “ghost fleet” of older vessels with complex corporate ownership structures, specifically deployed to obscure their involvement in sanctioned trades. Contrary to claims that these vessels continue without impediment, many dark fleet tankers, such as the ETERNAL SUCCESS and DIVINE, have had their routes restricted to high-risk zones, facing greater difficulty in securing buyers and port access. Sanctions have also discouraged insurers, brokers, and other legitimate operators from engaging with these vessels, further complicating the dark fleet’s ability to complete deliveries.

Moreover, Iran’s oil trade has grown more costly and complex under sanctions. Many vessels now depend on STS transfers with non-sanctioned tankers to obscure the origin of their cargoes. For example, tankers like DAKSHA and FORTUNE GALAXY have engaged with third-party vessels such as RANI and POMPEI II, respectively. These evasive maneuvers increase operational costs and prolong delivery timelines, emphasizing the indirect financial and logistical impact of sanctions.

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil and tanker network have had a tangible impact, reducing export volumes from these vessels, complicating operations, and isolating sanctioned tankers from international markets. Despite Iran’s attempts to circumvent these measures, the ongoing enforcement actions continue to disrupt oil flows and elevate operational costs for Iran’s sanctioned fleet. This analysis demonstrates that sanctions serve as a powerful mechanism to constrain Iran’s oil trade, challenging Iran’s ability to move crude on a global scale even as it maintains certain levels of activity.

[1] This analysis only includes vessels that have been designated since January 2024 and are transporters of crude oil, gas condensates, and/or fuel oil. It does not include LPG tankers or Handymax vessels.