The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Implications for the Incoming Trump Administration

The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Implications for the Incoming Trump Administration

President-elect Trump will enter the White House at a tumultuous time in the Middle East and at a watershed moment for Iran’s nuclear program. Though the United States has long looked to pivot U.S. military focus away from the Middle East and towards the Indo-Pacific, the massacre of October 7 and the resulting regional conflict have turned the spotlight once more towards Iran.

Trump will be dealing with an Iran that is radically different than the one he encountered in his first term. Iran’s regional capabilities have been degraded, its proxy network is crippled, and its relationship with its main client state, Syria, has all but eroded. Although Iran is closer than ever to developing a nuclear weapon, its nuclear program is also at its most exposed and vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability is largely due to the Israeli assault in October 2024, which successfully dismantled Iran's Russian-made S-300 air defense system. With tensions alarmingly high between Iran and the West, the Iranian nuclear program will be one of the first foreign policy challenges that the Trump team will need to tackle.

While some members of the incoming administration, including Vice President-elect Vance and DNI nominee Gabbard, have expressed openness to negotiations with Tehran as part of a broader strategic approach, others, such as Secretary of State nominee Rubio and NSA nominee Waltz, have articulated a more assertive stance on Iran, emphasizing the potential necessity of military action to address its nuclear program. The American hostages that remain in the hands of Iranian-backed Hamas and the Iranian-linked assassination attempts against Trump will certainly color Trump’s approach to dealing with the Islamic regime. In all likelihood, the president-elect will reinstate stringent sanctions enforcement as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. However, it remains uncertain whether this strategy will prompt negotiations or lead to a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran’s Challenges: Regional Decline, Economic Struggles, and Nuclear Ambitions

Iran’s economy is in dire straits, plagued by exorbitant inflation rates, record-low currency values against the U.S. dollar, and near-daily blackouts that have strained infrastructure and deepened the hardships faced by the population. Western sanctions, particularly those targeting its oil sector, have drastically curtailed revenues and spurred unrest in Tehran. Despite these setbacks, Iran has partially evaded sanctions using “ghost ships” to disguise oil shipments, primarily to China at discounted rates. These oil exports to China have provided the most crucial financial lifeline for the regime. Additionally, the war in Ukraine and subsequent sanctions on Russian oil have indirectly benefited Iran, allowing its crude to quietly fill gaps in the global market as European nations prioritize limiting Russian energy exports. Yet, these measures have only sustained the regime's fragile survival, with no meaningful economic recovery in sight.

The consequences of these economic struggles extend beyond financial hardship. Iran’s population has grown increasingly disillusioned with the government’s inability to provide basic services or improve living conditions. Unemployment, inflation, and food insecurity remain pervasive, while natural gas shortages persist despite Iran holding the world’s second-largest proven gas reserves. Sanctions and inadequate investment in energy infrastructure have forced Iran to rely on imported gas from countries like Russia. This economic instability has fueled widespread internal unrest. Protests over the killing of Mahsa Amini at the hands of Iranian police authorities, violent clashes with Baloch rebels in the Sistan and Baluchistan province, and anti-government demonstrations by Iranian Azeris reflect the burgeoning frustration of an increasingly mobilized Iranian populace.

Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions and mounting internal unrest, compounded by Trump and Israel’s major strategic wins against its proxies and demonstrated ability to strike within Iran, may compel its leadership to accelerate efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a means of restoring deterrence and securing its regime. Hardline factions within Iran argue that acquiring nuclear weapons would offset the economic and military setbacks. Though Tehran has long claimed its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purposes, recent rhetoric from Iranian policymakers suggests a significant shift in this narrative. Once anchored by Ayatollah Khamenei’s supposed fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons, the narrative now signals an openness to pursuing weaponization if deemed necessary for the state’s survival. The surging rhetoric from Iranian officials, combined with signals from the clerical establishment, points to a growing likelihood that Tehran may bring its nuclear weapons program out of the shadows.

Iran’s nuclear program has advanced far beyond its nascent stages, and recent advancements have significantly reduced the time needed to achieve weapons-grade material. By employing advanced centrifuges and refining its enrichment processes, Tehran is now enriching uranium to 60 percent at an unprecedented rate, bringing it perilously close to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. U.S. intelligence estimates that Iran could accumulate enough fissile material for five to six bombs within two weeks, eliminating any lengthy time buffer that once allowed the international community to respond to Iran’s nuclear advancements. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s inability to account for all centrifuges raises concerns about covert activities and the pace at which Tehran could achieve weaponization. The lack of transparency surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, coupled with Tehran’s perception of its economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities as unsustainable, has brought the risks of an Iranian nuclear breakout to an unprecedented level, requiring urgent international attention. Iran's nuclear advancements have turned time into a rapidly vanishing commodity.

Maximum Pressure 2.0: The Trump Administration’s Strategy

With Iran’s breakout period dangerously short and its regime in a position of economic and political weakness, the incoming Trump administration is poised to exploit this vulnerability. Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which sought to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically, was a hallmark of his foreign policy during his first term. Trump’s re-election is expected to bring a revival of these policies, with potentially significant repercussions for the Iranian economy. With a cabinet mainly composed of Iran and China hawks, the Trump administration’s "maximum pressure 2.0" strategy may even go beyond enforcing existing sanctions by introducing new, more stringent measures. These could include targeting countries that continue to purchase Iranian oil by restricting their access to American energy markets. The administration may move swiftly to choke off Iran’s oil income, instituting bans on Chinese ports that receive Iranian oil and sanctioning traders involved in transporting it—or Chinese banks that are financing the trade. If this maximum pressure campaign is to fully drain Iran’s coffers, it will need to also go after the “ghost armada” (a.k.a. dark or shadow fleet) that moves Iran’s oil. Countries will be forced to decide whether they wish to buy cheap Iranian energy or have access to the U.S. market; most will choose the latter.

European support will be critical to strengthening the maximum pressure strategy. The EU-3—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—have already demonstrated their willingness to pressure Iran through a joint censure at the IAEA in November 2024, signaling alignment with Washington’s goals. The looming expiration of the JCPOA snapback clauses in October 2025 adds a sense of urgency, as European leaders may opt to trigger snapback sanctions before this date, reimposing U.N. measures that would formally obligate even China to reduce its purchases of Iranian oil. In an era of shared hostility between Washington and Beijing, securing China's cooperation in isolating Iran would represent a monumental achievement for U.S. foreign policy. 

Without broad international compliance, particularly from Beijing, sanctions alone may not be enough to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Tehran has already signaled its intent to offset U.S. restrictions by deepening trade ties through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other regional Asian coalitions, further complicating the U.S. strategy. 

Maximum pressure alone is unlikely to achieve the comprehensive dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If sanctions drive Iran to accelerate its already short path to developing a nuclear weapon, the United States may find itself compelled to pursue military action, or more likely, to provide significant military assistance and strategic coordination to Israel. As successive administrations have promised, nothing is off the table in terms of ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. Conversely, if the renewed economic pressure succeeds, there could be an opportunity to negotiate a new nuclear agreement under terms more favorable to Washington. The administration’s immediate focus appears to be on intensifying sanctions to test the limits of Iran’s resilience. However, whether this strategy leads to confrontation or diplomacy will depend on Tehran’s response to the mounting pressure. The Trump transition team is likely to keep its cards close to the vest and continue teasing both options. As Trump said himself in a December 2024 interview regarding Iran: “Anything can happen.”

Military Action: The Possibility of Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure

If the maximum pressure campaign fails to restrain Tehran, and the Islamic regime moves forward in developing a nuclear weapon, the prospect of military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities becomes increasingly plausible. Given the time-sensitive nature of Iran’s potential “breakout” and the narrow margin for error, it is conceivable that the United States might conduct its own strike, participate in a joint operation with Israel, or strongly support an Israeli-led strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.In November 2024, after three calls with Trump, Netanyahu said he and Trump “see eye to eye on the Iranian threat in all its components, and the danger posed by it.” Israel has demonstrated its willingness and capability to disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions through covert means, including the assassination of key Iranian nuclear scientists. The United States and Israel also have a history of collaborative efforts to impede Iran’s nuclear progress, including the covert “Olympic Games” cyber operation, which demonstrated the vulnerability of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and set a precedent for targeted intervention.

While Israel alone could effectively target facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak, more challenging sites like the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant present significant obstacles. Fordow, buried deep beneath a mountain and estimated to be approximately one hundred meters underground, is designed to withstand conventional airstrikes. Reaching such a site would necessitate the use of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a 30,000-pound bunker-buster bomb, which can only be deployed by the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber. Thus, Israel’s ability to strike Fordow hinges on U.S. cooperation, including both access to the MOP and the strategic deployment of B-2 bombers. Of course, maintaining absolute operational secrecy would be essential to prevent Tehran from preemptively fortifying its defenses or relocating critical assets.

Importantly, recent developments have created more favorable conditions for such an operation. Israel’s newly established air superiority over Syria provides more direct pathways for Israeli or American aircraft to reach Iranian targets with reduced resistance. Moreover, Iran faces substantial challenges in replenishing its own air defense systems, as Russia, a key supplier, is constrained by its ongoing military commitments in Ukraine. A full restoration of Iran's air defense capabilities is likely not achievable before an Israeli or U.S. attack would take place.

Israel’s October 2024 operation against Iran, while successful in dismantling air defenses, notably avoided targeting the Kharg Island oil terminal, a critical point for Iran’s oil exports. Under a Trump administration, this strategy could shift. Waltz has suggested targeting both Kharg Island and the Natanz nuclear facility, and Rubio has criticized prior U.S. hesitation to support such aggressive measures. The level of U.S. involvement—whether approving Israeli operations or leading strikes directly—will depend on intelligence assessments of the feasibility and potential effectiveness of a solo Israeli effort.

If successful, a military strike could fundamentally reshape Iran’s strategic options. Tehran would face the enormous challenge of simultaneously rebuilding its nuclear program, restoring its proxies’ strength, replenishing its missile arsenal, and addressing its severe economic woes—all while remaining under sanctions. Losing its primary deterrence capabilities would force Iran to reprioritize, weakening its ability to project power regionally. A well-executed strike could delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for years, reducing the immediate threat of nuclear proliferation and restoring some measure of stability to the Middle East.

However, the risks of a strike are significant. A failed or only partially successful air campaign could embolden Iran to accelerate its nuclear program, expel U.N. inspectors, or withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty entirely, following the precedent set by North Korea. Such a move would escalate global tensions and complicate diplomatic efforts. Additionally, Tehran might relocate its nuclear facilities even deeper underground, rendering future interventions more difficult and costly. Executing a military strike could also require more than just a single round of attacks. A sustained campaign might necessitate a long-term U.S. military presence in the region and potentially broaden the scope of strikes to include regime assets and security forces, increasing the likelihood of internal instability. This could destabilize Iran further, with unpredictable consequences for the region. Balancing the potential benefits of degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities against the long-term risks of escalation and destabilization would be a critical challenge for the Trump administration.

Trump has consistently campaigned on avoiding new wars and has explicitly stated his opposition to imposed regime change in Iran. Any potential strike is therefore likely to focus on precise and limited objectives aimed at dismantling the nuclear program without provoking broader conflict or unnecessary collateral damage. The success of any military strike, whether involving U.S. or Israeli participation, will depend on robust intelligence, careful planning, and the strategic coordination of resources to mitigate risks and maximize impact.

In any event, a military strike on Iran would indeed disrupt global oil markets. In the immediate aftermath, oil prices could spike sharply due to disruptions in Iran’s oil exports and potential instability in the Strait of Hormuz—a critical chokepoint through which half of the world’s seaborne oil supply flows. Such a disruption would amplify global energy insecurity, particularly for nations heavily reliant on Gulf oil supplies. However, after an initial shock, this initial volatility is likely to be mitigated by Saudi Arabia’s capacity to act as a swing producer, leveraging its strategic reserves to stabilize markets. Historically, Saudi Arabia has played a crucial role in offsetting supply shortages during periods of geopolitical crisis. In the medium term, the Trump administration’s commitment to expanding domestic energy production, encapsulated in its “drill baby drill” approach, could likewise alleviate supply constraints by bolstering U.S. output. A potential resolution of the war in Ukraine might reintroduce Russian oil to international markets, further offsetting the supply gap created by tighter sanctions on Iranian oil. This could prevent prolonged surges in oil prices, ensuring greater stability in global markets. Nevertheless, the timing and scale of these mitigating factors would be critical, as delays in increased production or geopolitical resolutions could exacerbate market volatility in the interim. Balancing the short-term shocks against the longer-term adjustments in global oil supply and demand will be a crucial consideration for policymakers navigating the aftermath of a potential strike on Iran.

Diplomacy and Prospects for a New Nuclear Deal

Whether military action is necessary to compel Iran to the negotiating table or whether diplomatic efforts prevail from the outset, negotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran will undoubtedly be a complex endeavor for all parties involved. Trump has expressed interest in pursuing a deal to replace the JCPOA, with his Middle East advisor, Massad Boulos, recently stating that Trump is prepared for “serious negotiations” with Tehran. While Trump remains firm in his commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, his administration has signaled a willingness to engage diplomatically under the right conditions. Elon Musk, ostensibly acting under Trump’s directive, reportedly met with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations shortly after the election to explore de-escalation strategies, highlighting the administration’s interest in dialogue. However, Iran’s window for diplomacy will be limited, particularly if its nuclear program continues to advance.

Tehran has shown some willingness to engage in diplomacy as well. President Masoud Pezeshkian, often described as a moderate and reformist, was elected on promises to address Iran’s economic crisis by engaging in dialogue with the West. He has advocated for renewed talks with the United States, emphasizing the potential for economic relief and a reduction in tensions. His administration, supported by Vice President Javad Zarif, appears eager to assess whether Trump’s stated interest in avoiding further conflict could yield tangible benefits for Iran. However, this moderate stance is likely to face pushback from hardline factions within the Iranian government, who view concessions as capitulation.

The Trump administration has consistently criticized the JCPOA as inadequate and will demand much stricter terms in any new agreement. These terms would likely include a permanent end to uranium enrichment, dismantlement of existing nuclear stockpiles, and unfettered IAEA inspections at all nuclear-related sites, including those with potential military dimensions. The Trump team is expected to push for broader demands, including Iran’s cessation of support for regional proxies and terrorist organizations that have destabilized the Middle East. These requirements would represent a substantial expansion of the envisioned scope compared to the 2015 agreement, which was narrowly and explicitly focused on the nuclear file.

Multilateral talks will also face external challenges. The war in Ukraine and heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington complicate international coordination, creating an environment less conducive to collaborative diplomacy. Key stakeholders such as Russia and China may be reluctant to support new agreements that align with U.S. strategic objectives. Despite these challenges, the Trump administration holds significant leverage. Iran’s economy remains deeply burdened, and its regional position has been weakened. Convincing Tehran to accept stringent conditions will require skillful diplomacy that balances pressure with incentives. The United States could offer calibrated sanctions relief and security assurances while maintaining firm deadlines to prevent stalling tactics. Any agreement must include safeguards to ensure Iran’s compliance and mitigate the risk of Tehran using negotiations to buy time for further nuclear advancements.

Balancing Pressure and Diplomacy

The incoming Trump administration faces a delicate and time-sensitive challenge in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While the administration's expected "maximum pressure 2.0" campaign offers a means to economically weaken Iran and force it to reconsider its nuclear trajectory, it is critical to recognize the potential consequences if this strategy fails. Iranian desperation for a restored deterrence might accelerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons, compelling the United States to confront the prospect of military action.

The stakes of such action are high. Iranian nuclear weapons could destabilize the Middle East, triggering regional arms races and increasing the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye might rush to develop their own nuclear programs, further undermining global nonproliferation norms and increasing the risk of catastrophic escalation.

To avoid these outcomes, the administration must enforce stringent sanctions designed to halt Iran’s nuclear advancements while remaining open to negotiations that demand strict compliance with denuclearization objectives. Simultaneously, detailed military contingency plans must signal that decisive action remains a credible option if Tehran resists diplomatic efforts.

Washington must also prepare for potential Iranian countermeasures, such as withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or covertly advancing its nuclear program. To mitigate these risks, Washington must remain vigilant, leveraging intelligence and military readiness to counter any sudden escalation. Additionally, the administration must address the implications of Iran’s growing ties with both Russia and China. Russia has strengthened its defense cooperation with Tehran, providing military technology and strategic support, while China remains a the most significant lifeline for Iran’s economy as the primary buyer of its sanctioned oil exports. U.S. efforts to counter Iran will require a multifaceted approach that accounts for these influential partnerships.

Ultimately, the Trump administration must navigate a fine line between coercion and diplomacy. Should maximum pressure succeed in altering Iran’s stance, the United States must seize the opportunity to negotiate a robust agreement that—contra the JCPOA—permanently and verifiably prevents Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons while at the same time—contra the JCPOA—properly addresses its broader destabilizing and terror-supporting activities in the region. If diplomacy fails, however—a fairly likely scenario—Washington must be prepared to act decisively, including through military means, to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. By balancing diplomatic engagement with credible military deterrence, the administration can work to secure regional stability and safeguard global security.