February 2026 Iran Tanker Tracker: War Erupts Amid Elevated Exports

Iran’s illicit oil trade entered February 2026 back near the elevated levels seen in late 2025, just as Operation Epic Fury began.

February 2026 Oil Export Data 

For the month of February 2026, UANI tracked a total of 60.7 million barrels (averaging 2.17 million barrels per day, or BPD) in physical exports out of Iran, increasing 20% from the previous month in January 2026. The estimated value of oil exported in February 2026 is $4.27 billion.

China took the lion’s share of this surge likely as part of its strategy to shield itself from rising geopolitical tensions, particularly with its other key oil supplier, Venezuela, crippled by a U.S.-imposed maritime quarantine and intensified sanctions. This gave China even more incentive to buffer its energy security by stockpiling heavily discounted Iranian crude.

Record oil at sea, preparing for war

On February 28, 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces launched initial strikes on Iranian regime leadership, security infrastructure, and nuclear sites, marking the beginning of Operation Epic Fury. The conflict continues to escalate, with Iran now targeting military bases, critical infrastructure, civilian buildings, and vessels across the region.

In the weeks before the outbreak of war, Iran sharply increased loadings and offshore stockpiling around Kharg Island, its main export hub. Satellite and tanker tracking data show that between mid and late February, loadings at Kharg surged, with about 20 million barrels loaded in just a few days, nearly triple comparable January volumes, as Tehran rushed to clear onshore tanks and push crude onto the water.

At the same time, Iranian crude and condensate “on the water” reached record levels in early 2026, with about 166 million barrels at sea in January and closer to 190 million barrels by late February, equivalent to roughly 50 days of production. A large share of this oil is now being held or repositioned in floating storage away from the Persian Gulf, particularly in the wider Singapore–Malaysia region, as Tehran has tried to move barrels out of harm’s way and closer to end‑buyers ahead of expected disruptions. 

Approximately half of Iran’s seaborne crude and condensate stockpile has been positioned near Singapore and adjacent waters, effectively transforming the region into an extension of Iran’s floating storage system. This pre‑war build‑up was the clearest indication yet that Iran and its buyers were actively preparing for a conflict scenario—and are now testing how much oil can keep flowing despite active hostilities. Crucially, these oil flows continue to provide a critical financial lifeline for the regime’s nuclear, missile, and regional proxy activities, even as hostilities escalate.

A busy month of STS off Malaysia’s EOPL anchorage

That rush into floating storage has translated directly into an intense month of ship-to-ship (STS) activity at and around the East Outer Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage roughly 70 km off Malaysia, long recognised as a key offshore hub for ghost fleet operations. On February 25, satellite imagery confirmed that there were at least 12 STS transfers in this anchorage. 

There were at least 39 STS transfers observed in Satellite imagery during the month of February. Conservatively, this accounts for about 58.5 million barrels of oil, worth an estimated $3.5 billion.

Despite these trends—and despite the clear warning sign of record Iranian oil on the water in January and February—Malaysia has failed to meaningfully enforce against the core STS hotspot in the EOPL anchorage. UANI calls on Malaysia to stop enabling this illicit oil lifeline for the Iranian regime and help prevent the hundreds of ghost fleet vessels from passing through the EOPL anchorage every month.

The warned about risks are now materialising

For years, UANI has warned that allowing a vast, opaque ghost fleet to concentrate risky operations around international maritime chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz or the EOPL Anchorage, would eventually collide with geopolitical crisis.

Iran entered the war with record volumes of oil at sea, much of it on elderly, underinsured tankers using deceptive practices such as AIS blackouts, flag hopping, and falsified documentation. Buyers, intermediaries, and insurers have continued to rely on this shadow infrastructure to secure discounted Iranian barrels, betting that sanctions would remain weakly enforced and that conflict could be avoided. Now, with war underway, that accumulation of risk is potentially coming to a head: mounting congestion around the Strait of Hormuz and EOPL Anchorage; escalating insecurity for ships caught in the Persian Gulf, and the ever-present danger that any-attempt to transit the Strait of Hormuz could trigger further strikes or accidents with outsized effects on regional security.

Strait of Hormuz flows thin, but Iran’s oil keeps moving

The war has brought the Strait of Hormuz into sharp focus. Iran has already demonstrated its willingness to partially close or restrict the strait for military drills, temporarily altering traffic patterns and reminding the world that roughly one-fifth of global seaborne crude transits this chokepoint.

Current traffic and flow indicators suggest the legitimate traffic has effectively stopped since the outbreak of the conflict, with some tankers rerouting, delaying transit, or waiting at safer anchorages as insurance costs and security concerns spike. Nevertheless, Iranian barrels are still moving—both directly through the Strait of Hormuz on ghost fleet tankers but also via prepositioned floating storage further east that can be drawn down even if Persian Gulf loadings are interrupted. Iran’s apparent strategy of pushing exports up to around 2.1 million barrels per day before the outbreak of full-scale conflict, and of building record oil-on-water stockpiles, now allows Tehran to cushion the immediate impact of disruptions while continuing to finance its war effort.

Looking ahead, it is difficult to predict exactly what will happen to the dark fleet and Iran’s illicit oil trade; much will depend on how the war unfolds and how long it lasts. But as tankers carrying Iranian crude remain in transit, we can expect a growing build-up of oil at sea—with Malaysia’s EOPL anchorage the likely destination for many ghost fleet vessels looking to conduct an STS transfer.