The End of PFLP-GC’s Presence in Lebanon and Future Lessons
The downfall of the Assad regime in Syria and the severe blows to Hezbollah’s leadership and military capabilities present Lebanon with an opportunity to strengthen the country's sovereignty and independence from the influences of foreign forces.
A symbolic example of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) manifesting this opportunity was evident in the past days, as the LAF took over several Palestinian military facilities that have been operating on Lebanon's soil for decades.
The “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command” (PFLP-GC), is a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian militant group, designated by the U.S. and other Western countries as a terror organization, that has held military training camps, headquarters, and ammunition caches in Lebanon since the early 1980’s.
The organization, which was led for years by Ahmed Jibril, and since he died in 2021, by Talal Naji, flourished under Syrian and Hezbollah’s protection. The PFLP-GC ran decades-long military activities on Lebanon’s soil that were a direct challenge to the country’s sovereignty and a constant reminder of the state’s security apparatuses' inability to prevent foreign actors from using Lebanon’s territory as a platform for promoting the interests of others.
Over the years the PFLP-GC carried out numerous terror attacks from Lebanon against Israel and during the Syrian civil war the organization took part in the fighting alongside the Assad regime against the various rebel groups. In the past months, PFLP-GC hailed Hezbollah's war against Israel, but it seems it played little, if any, role in the actual fighting.
Over the years there have been few attempts by the Lebanese authorities to stop the PFLP-GC operations in Lebanon, and reports of negotiations regarding the handing over of the organization’s camps to the hand of the LAF came up occasionally. Nevertheless, as long as the Assad regime was in power, the Lebanese government chose not to confront the organization and was unable to disarm it. Now, with the swift rebel attack this month that has toppled the regime in Syria, the conditions have changed. The new interim government in Syria has reportedly ordered all Palestinian groups to end their activities in the country, including PFLP-GC headquarters in Damascus. This development must have played a significant role in the Lebanese decision to act, exploiting the PFLP-GC vulnerability.
During a few short days, and without a single shot being fired, the LAF entered and took control over the PFLP-GC sites in the Chouf mountains of central Lebanon and the Beqaa valley along the eastern border with Syria. During the takeover, the LAF found a large amount of ammunition and arrested a handful of terrorists, as it seems that most of the PFLP-GC men fled and abandoned the sites. No formal declaration by the PFLP-GC leadership was made, and the current location of Talal Naji, the organization's general secretary, is unknown.
The domestic political framing of those events in Lebanon holds an interesting meaning. Officially, the army states that the move reflects the armed force's commitment to enforce the sovereignty of Lebanon and the army’s sources claim that the operation was carried out due to the opportunity presented by the events in Syria and has no connection to the recent ceasefire agreement signed with Israel.
At the same time, the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar newspaper quoted unnamed PFLP-GC sources claiming that the move was coordinated with the Lebanese authorities, echoing Hezbollah’s calls after the signing of the ceasefire agreement that any move by the army to disarm non-state elements must not be done forcefully.
These different narratives reflect a critical dilemma that challenges the Lebanese authorities regarding their way of fulfilling the obligations they took upon themselves as part of the ceasefire agreement with Israel. Whether Hezbollah will only be disarmed through political understandings and negotiations and how will the LAF act in case Hezbollah refuses to hand over its arms, as instructed by the ceasefire agreement.
Historically, the LAF had never confronted Hezbollah and always refrained from trying to enforce state sovereignty over the organization. Nevertheless, until today the same was also true regarding the LAF approach towards the PFLP-GC. Now, when Hezbollah is weaker than ever due to the blows it suffered from Israel and is isolated after the fall of the Assad regime, the LAF is afforded an opportunity to implement its authority and enforce the Lebanese state sovereignty over Hezbollah, as it did regarding the PFLP-GC.
Over the past weeks, Hezbollah sent clear messages aimed to deter the army from any attempt to do so, in a way that reflected the deep fear of Hezbollah over this exact scenario. The next few months will tell whether the precedence of the LAF ending the presence of PFLP-GC was a tactical win or a sign that marks a new path for Lebanon’s authorities to establish the state’s sovereignty over other non-state actors in the country, and finally face the challenge presented by the unsupervised arms of Hezbollah.
Dror Doron is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) focusing on Hezbollah and Lebanon. He spent nearly two decades as a senior analyst in the Office of Israel's Prime Minister. Dror is on Twitter @DrorDoron.
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