The Democrats on Iran

As former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders prepare to faceoff in the upcoming presidential debate on March 15, a slate of pressing foreign policy issues looms large in the incoming presidential inbox.  Iran is one of the files that will command the attention of the next president.  While Biden and Sanders remain opposed to the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there are important distinctions and fissures within the Democratic Party and between the candidates which should receive attention—namely what to do with the U.N. arms embargo on Iran which expires in October 2020 and how the next commander-in-chief would use force.

First, under U.N. Resolution 2231—which endorsed the JCPOA—the arms embargo on Iran expires even before the November presidential election.  This would enable the mullahcracy to expand its own military arsenal and provide arms to its proxies.  Russia and China have already signaled an interest in supplying Iran with fighter jets and weaponry, and thus are likely to oppose the Trump administration’s efforts to extend the arms embargo.  Biden and Sanders haven’t stated publicly how they would handle the expiring U.N. arms embargo—except to say that they would reenter the JCPOA with no new preconditions, assuming Tehran falls back into compliance with its own nuclear obligations under the deal.  Both candidates would then use reentry as a platform to extend the existing contours of the deal to address additional dimensions of Iran’s destabilizing behavior.

There are currently bipartisan efforts underway expressing support for an extension of the arms embargo.  However, there are emerging divisions within the Democratic Party.  A prominent supporter of the JCPOA, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, recently told Al-Monitor “[t]he reality is the nuclear deal doesn’t exist today.  You have to live in that reality.  I don’t think it’d be great policy to let the embargo disappear if we’re not in the [deal].  So, I’m generally sympathetic to the idea that we’re going to need to re-up it and be back in a position to negotiate with the Iranians in the next administration.”  But some former Obama administration officials are hesitant about such a push, with one dubbing it a “reasonable concession as a means to keep alive a version of the [deal] to return to future diplomacy.”  With Sanders’ past record of opposing U.S. sanctions on Iran out of fear they would unravel the nuclear deal, questions remain as to whether he would use the same logic to oppose an extension of the arms embargo on Iran in a bid to preserve the JCPOA.  Biden, seeking to adopt a more bipartisan, practical approach, may try to take a different course, in line with Murphy’s comments.  But there hasn’t been much public discussion in this presidential primary cycle on what to do if Russia and China veto an extension of the arms embargo.  In that event, would the candidates be prepared to support snapback sanctions—and in the process collapse the JCPOA—if there is Security Council paralysis over the arms embargo?

Second, Biden and Sanders have taken opposite stances on the U.S. strike which killed former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force Qassem Soleimani.  In recent comments, Biden has hedged.  He has emphasized that Soleimani’s death “takes a dangerous actor off the board.”  However, Biden blasted the Trump administration for its shifting explanations of imminence, a “haphazard decision-making process,” and a potential escalatory cycle.  Sanders has been unequivocal in denouncing the Trump administration’s decision—dubbing it an “assassination” and that “Congress has not authorized any military action against Iran.”  More generally, Biden has expressed a conventional Democratic foreign policy stance towards the use of force.  He’s emphasized the right of the United States to defend itself and its allies “by force, if necessary” and that “force must be used judiciously to protect a vital interest of the United States.”  The former vice president has stated that the “nuclear ambitions of Iran” pose such a vital interest.  The Vermont senator has emphasized diplomacy first and foremost, with force being almost a second tier option.

In the end, Vice President Biden and Senator Sanders want to use reentry into the JCPOA as a means of changing U.S. policy on Iran.  But automatic reentry without insisting on any changes to the existing agreement is more complicated than meets the eye, because Iran is insisting on a return to the pre-2017 sanctions landscape.  Since Trump’s inauguration, the U.S. government has levied nuclear and non-nuclear—some terrorism—sanctions on the Islamic Republic.  A new president of the United States would run into resistance from Congress and the American public in removal of sanctions—especially the terrorism designations—in return for Iran merely returning to compliance with a stale nuclear deal.  Additionally, Tehran has been demanding compensation for U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA—something that’s likely to be a nonstarter in Washington.  Reentry into the JCPOA may receive applause lines on the campaign trail.  But the made-for-2015 rhetoric doesn’t necessarily reflect the reality of 2020.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).