December 2025 Iran Tanker Tracking and Year Review

UANI’s final tanker tracker of the year reviews topline data points for 2025, UANI’s impact and offers prescriptions for 2026.

December 2025 Data

For the month of December 2025, UANI tracked a total of 48.3 million barrels (averaging 1.56 million barrels per day, or BPD) in physical exports out of Iran, dipping about 20% from the previous month in November. The estimated value of oil exported in December is $3 billion. The year total for 2025 through December was $45.7 billion. 

Annual Oil Data: 2024–2025

The chart below shows the total number of Iranian barrels exported to each country during 2025 compared to 2024:

Note: 2024 data include a substantial "Other" category, reflecting 22.3 million barrels exported to Syria's former Assad regime.

Assessment of Iranian Oil Exports

Iran’s oil exports continue to fuel the regime despite the reinstatement of UNSC snapback sanctions in September 2025 as well as targeted U.S. and Israeli military strikes on its nuclear and missile infrastructure. Ship-to-ship transfers, rerouting, and reliance on Chinese buyers illustrate Tehran’s strategic focus. Yet persistent tracking and international cooperation, have proven effective in exposing and disrupting illicit networks.

The past year’s data confirms that while the regime is adaptable, it is not invincible. To compel meaningful change, the international community must move beyond passive designations toward the decisive enforcement models successfully deployed in Venezuela. Without coordinated maritime interdictions and the physical disruption of the "Ghost Armada," Iran will continue to exploit global oil markets to sustain its regional destabilization and fund its weapons programs.

Major Developments in 2025

Tehran increasingly relied on clandestine shipping networks to supply Chinese buyers, employing shell companies, flags of convenience, and route obfuscation. Increased international cooperation and intelligence sharing, potentially reinforced by UNSC snapback sanctions, has the potential to expose more vessels and illicit actor networks.

Following the Trump Peace Plan, Houthi maritime attacks on commercial shipping largely ceased, reducing a major risk to global trade through the Bab el-Mandeb, giving some relieve to global shipping and legitimate trade flow.

Regional authorities still lack effective enforcement along routes used by Iranian-linked tankers. Despite the Malaysian Foreign Minister’s pledge at a recent ASEAN event to crack down on illicit ship-to-ship (STS) transfers off Eastern Johor, maritime operations show little change. This area remains the most critical logistical node in the illicit supply chain from Iran to China.

Major Incidents of 2025

Several high-impact events defined the geopolitical environment:

• Israel-Iran war: Regional hostilities underscored the strategic risks associated with Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Shipping lanes were closely monitored for potential naval escalation. Although Iranian oil sales experienced a slight decline amid the Israel-Iran conflict, the disruption proved limited.
• U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities: Bombing operations designed to degrade Tehran’s nuclear progress may have caused significant damage to nuclear capabilities, but barely disrupted oil terminals and energy infrastructure, causing no observable changes to Iran’s illicit export facilities.
• Iranian threats toward the Strait of Hormuz: Repeated warnings of closures were broadcast in Iranian media throughout the year, but no material action occurred, highlighting the gap between rhetoric and reality.
• Red Sea Houthi attacks: Following the Trump Peace Plan, attacks on commercial shipping effectively ceased, improving regional shipping security for the time being.
• UNSC snapback sanctions impact: Reinstated sanctions increased legal and financial exposure for intermediaries, shipping companies, and port operators dealing with Iran, further constraining Tehran’s ability to conduct overt oil sales.
• Chinese stockpiling of Iranian crude: Despite sanctions, China continued to accumulate significant volumes of Iranian oil, underscoring the challenge of enforcing international restrictions in the face of large-scale state-backed procurement.
• U.S. operations in Venezuela: The months long buildup of U.S. naval focus in the Caribbean, and enforcement on drug smuggling boats, culminated in the seizure of multiple vessels carrying Venezuelan oil with histories of carrying Iranian oil, exposing the Venezuelan-Iranian oil nexus and the increasingly interconnected nature of global dark fleets, as well as illustrating the broader implications for sanctions enforcement and regional energy security.

2025 UANI Impact

Sanctions

In 2025, UANI identified 83 new vessels engaged in smuggling Iranian oil, bringing the total number of ghost fleet tankers tracked to 560 vessels. Out of the 180 tankers sanctioned in 2025, 108 were previously identified by UANI on its Ghost Armada list, showcasing UANI’s pivotal role in preemptive tracking. 

Of the four vessels recently seized by the U.S. naval forces, two were listed on UANI’s Ghost Armada, namely SKIPPER and BELLA 1.

Thought Leadership

In May 2025, UANI revealed that 17% of vessels suspected of participating in the illicit transfer of Iranian oil are currently flagged by Panama, raising urgent questions about the Panama Maritime Authority’s (AMP) ongoing role in undermining global sanctions enforcement. This pressure was amplified by a series of high-level challenges in the U.S. media, most notably a scathing August 2025 op-ed in The Hill by UANI CEO Ambassador Mark D. Wallace and Chairman Governor Jeb Bush. In the article, titled "Panama deserves sanctions, not the Security Council presidency," UANI leadership argued that Panama’s ongoing complicity should disqualify it from international leadership roles and called for direct U.S. sanctions against the registry. The Panamanian government attempted to push back against this narrative, with Ambassador José Miguel Alemán publishing a response in The Hill titled "Panama stands firm on Iranian, Russian sanctions and maritime security," in which he defended the AMP's "proactive heightened security cooperation" with the U.S. Treasury. However, UANI immediately dismissed the response as "obfuscation," noting that Panama typically only acts after UANI or OFAC identifies specific vessels. Facing the threat of a complete loss of credibility during its tenure as President of the UN Security Council, the AMP took its most decisive action to date in August 2025: the removal of 650 vessels from its registry. 

In June 2025, UANI participated in a high-level UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme meeting in Malta linked to the launch of the Global Centre for Maritime Sanctions Monitoring (GCMSM). UANI delivered a presentation on Iranian maritime sanctions evasion, including "Ghost Armada" operations, flag-hopping, and ship-to-ship transfer networks. This engagement reinforced UANI’s role as a key contributor to emerging multilateral maritime sanctions enforcement efforts.

In July 2025, UANI’s investigative reach was showcased globally when CBS News featured Senior Advisor Charlie Brown in a high-impact investigation into Iran’s maritime evasion. In a rare firsthand look at the dark fleet, Brown was filmed aboard a vessel in the STS transfer hotspot near the Riau Archipelago, offshore from Eastern Johor, Malaysia. From this vantage point, Brown provided expert analysis on how sanctioned Iranian oil is covertly transferred at sea and shipped to China. The segment underscored UANI’s crucial role as a trusted entity in exposing sanctions evasion, informing both the media, maritime professionals and policymakers.

UANI has also expanded its focus to the regional "chokepoints" that facilitate these illicit flows. In a September 2025 article published in The Diplomat, UANI CEO Ambassador Mark D. Wallace and Chairman Governor Jeb Bush identified Malaysia as a critical, yet often overlooked, node in the supply chain. By failing to intervene in STS transfers within its Exclusive Economic Zone, Malaysia has effectively become a "silent enabler" of the Iranian regime. The scale of this negligence is immense: in October 2025 alone, UANI observed 68 separate STS operations in Malaysian waters—specifically the Eastern Out of Port Limits (EOPL) anchorage—where the regime continues to mask the origin of its oil before shipping it to Chinese buyers.

2026 Priorities 

To address evolving threats to maritime security, UANI calls for the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms and robust, proactive risk mitigation.

• Multilateral maritime domain awareness, information sharing and enforcement of existing shipping regulations and international maritime conventions.
• Enhanced intelligence sharing between government agencies for timely and coordinate inter-agency action by Flag States, Coastal States and Port and Maritime authorities.
• Strategic focus on chokepoints and high-risk vessels to pre-empt sanction evasion.

Conclusion

2025 demonstrated both the ingenuity of Iran’s oil export apparatus and the limits of sanctions and military strikes when enforcement is incomplete. While threats and rhetoric remain tools for Tehran, operational reality is increasingly constrained by coordinated monitoring, intelligence, and strategic interventions, including the strengthened framework of UNSC snapback sanctions and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

As 2026 begins, continued vigilance, cooperation, and proactive disruption will be essential to maintain pressure on Iran’s illicit oil networks, secure global energy supply chains, and prevent further proliferation of Iranian crude into international markets.