Shipping

Iships Management Pte Ltd

Industry
Shipping
Country
Singapore
Contact Information

1, North Bridge Road #18-06, HIGH STREET CENTRE Singapore – 179094; [email protected]

Sources

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, vessels for which Iships is the Operator have called at Iranian ports.

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Iships Management with its head office in Singapore represents a ship management with style, finesse and expertise which stands over and above the rest in the international ship management arena;

According to data, Singapore-based shipping services firm iShips Management – Manages Panamanian-flagged tanker Grace 1;

Documents forwarded to Reuters by ship owners say a 300,000-metric-ton-supertanker, the Grace 1, took on fuel oil at Basra, Iraq, between December 10 and 12, 2018. But Basra port loading schedules reviewed by Reuters do not list the Grace 1 as being in port during those dates. One Iraqi industry source with knowledge of the port’s operations confirmed there were no records of the Grace 1 at Basra during this period. Reuters examined data from four ship-tracking information providers — Refinitiv, Kpler, IHS Markit and Vessel Finder — to locate the Grace 1 during that time. All four showed that the Grace 1 had its Automatic Identification System, or transponder, switched off between November 30 and December 14, meaning its location could not be tracked. The Grace 1 then reappeared in waters near Iran’s port of Bandar Assaluyeh, fully loaded, data showed. The cargo was transferred onto two smaller ships in UAE waters in January, from where one ship delivered fuel oil to Singapore in February;

The ship-tracking data analyzed by Reuters showed the Grace 1 emerged from the period when it did not transmit its location almost 500 kilometers south of Iraq. It was close to the Iranian coast with its draft — how deep a vessel sits in water — near maximum, indicating its cargo tanks were filled. The Grace 1 transferred its cargo to two smaller tankers between January 16 and 22 in waters offshore Fujairah in the UAE, data showed; (Reuters

Suisse Atlantique

Industry
Shipping
Country
Switzerland
Response

"Since President Trump unilaterally decided to leave the Iran Nuclear Deal and impose new sanction to Iran, we have given clear instruction to our chartering department to stop every future business with Iran and to exclude Iran as destination from our charter party, even if EU is still promoting the Iran Nuclear Deal and we are a Swiss and European company, and therefore shall not be oblige to follow the US sanction." (7/3/2018) 

Torm A/S

Industry
Shipping
Country
Denmark
Sources

"Danish oil product tanker operator Torm (TRMDa.CO) on Tuesday said it has stopped taking new orders in Iran as a consequence of U.S. plans to reimpose sanctions on Tehran.

“We follow the situation closely and always follow the rules. Therefore, we have also stopped taking new orders in Iran,” a spokeswoman told Reuters." (5/15/2018)

SUZUE

Industry
Shipping
States
NY
Country
Japan
Sources

"The IRISL signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Japan's Suzue Corporation and Kamigumi in Singapore, Iran's Maritime News Agency reported on April 4. Under the deal, the sides will survey grounds for cooperation in construction of dry ports and investment in Iran's port terminals. Once the preliminary studies are completed, the sides will sign an operational contract." (April 2017)

Safe Bulkers Inc

Industry
Shipping
Symbol
NYSE: SB
Country
Monaco
Sources

According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2019: "From January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, vessels in our fleet made ten calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 773 calls on worldwide ports. Iran and Syria are identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism. Although these designations and controls do not prevent our vessels from making calls on ports in these countries, potential investors could view such port calls negatively, which could adversely affect our reputation and the market for our Common Stock. Investor perception of the value of our Common Stock may be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries.

Our policy is for our vessels to avoid making calls on ports in Iran and Syria unless, in the case of Iran, the charterer represents to us that the cargo is not in contravention with any E.U., U.S. or United Nation sanctions and the export of such cargo has been authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury."

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2018: "From time to time, vessels in our fleet have called and/or may call on ports located in countries identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism and subject to United States economic sanctions. From January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011, vessels in our fleet made 20 calls on ports in Iran and three calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 2,327 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2015, vessels in our fleet did not make any calls on ports in Iran or Syria. From January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, vessels in our fleet made three calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 750 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, vessels in our fleet made four calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 712 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018, vessels in our fleet made five calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 731 calls on worldwide ports. Iran and Syria are identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism. Although these designations and controls do not prevent our vessels from making calls on ports in these countries, potential investors could view such port calls negatively, which could adversely affect our reputation and the market for our Common Stock. Investor perception of the value of our Common Stock may be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries.

Our policy is for our vessels to avoid making calls on ports in Iran and Syria unless, in the case of Iran, the charterer represents to us that the cargo is not in contravention with any E.U., U.S. or United Nation sanctions and the export of such cargo has been authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury."

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2017: "From time to time, vessels in our fleet have called and/or may call on ports located in countries identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism and subject to United States economic sanctions. From January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011, vessels in our fleet made 20 calls on ports in Iran and three calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 2,327 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2015, vessels in our fleet did not make any calls on ports in Iran or Syria. From January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, vessels in our fleet made three calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 750 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, vessels in our fleet made four calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 712 calls on worldwide ports. Iran and Syria are identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism. Although these designations and controls do not prevent our vessels from making calls on ports in these countries, potential investors could view such port calls negatively, which could adversely affect our reputation and the market for our Common Stock. Investor perception of the value of our Common Stock may be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries.

Our policy is for our vessels to avoid making calls on ports in Iran and Syria unless, in the case of Iran, the charterer represents to us that the cargo is not in contravention with any E.U., U.S. or United Nation sactions and the export of such cargo has been authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury."

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According to its Annual report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2016: "From time to time, vessels in our fleet have called and/or may call on ports located in countries identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism and subject to United States economic sanctions. From January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011, vessels in our fleet made 20 calls on ports in Iran and three calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 2,327 calls on worldwide ports. From January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2015, vessels in our fleet did not make any calls on ports in Iran or Syria. From January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, vessels in our fleet made three calls on ports in Iran and no calls on ports in Syria out of a total of 750 calls on worldwide ports. Iran and Syria are identified by the United States government as state sponsors of terrorism. Although these designations and controls do not prevent our vessels from making calls on ports in these countries, potential investors could view such port calls negatively, which could adversely affect our reputation and the market for our common stock. Investor perception of the value of our common stock may be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries.

Our policy is for our vessels to avoid making calls on ports in Iran and Syria unless the charterer provides information certifying that its cargo is licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury."

Oaktree Capital Group LLC

Industry
Shipping
Symbol
NYSE: OAK
Country
USA
Sources

Oaktree Capital Group LLC (a U.S. company) recounts a 2015 seizure by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. of its indirectly owned vessel the Maersk Tigris. The vessel was escorted towards the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and seized. The company noted that, during the seizure, the ship master bought “certain necessary provisions to maintain the health, safety and/or security of the Vessel’s crew,” which generated no revenue for Oaktree.
 

NEWLEAD Holdings

Industry
Shipping
Country
Greece
Sources

According to its Annual report filed with the SEC in 2016: "During 2014 and up to February 2015, the MV Newlead Victoria (the “Newlead Victoria”), which was chartered on a long-term charter signed on December 18, 2012 and redelivered to us on December 23, 2015, was instructed by her time charterers, who are disponent owners, to call at a port in Iran twice. In all cases, based on the information provided by the charterers, we conducted the relevant due diligence in cooperation with the vessel’s War Risk Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharging and transportation of the cargo and the parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. Following this review and after the vessel was insured by the War Association, on October 27, 2014 the Newlead Victoria arrived at Iran’s Bandar Imam Khomeini (BIK) port to discharge a cargo of about 66,000 MT of wheat in bulk which was loaded from Kavkaz, and departed on November 16, 2014. Neither the loading and discharging nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions while the revenue was $12,000 per day gross or $11,700 per day net for 20 days that the discharge operations took place. Furthermore, on January 25, 2015, this same vessel called Bandar Imam Khomeini (BIK) to discharge a cargo of about 62,100 MT of wheat which had been loaded at the port of Paranagua, Brazil and she departed on February 12, 2015. Neither the loading and discharging nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. The vessel’s revenues from this operation were $13,050 gross or $12,723.75 per day net for 18 days. During 2013 also, MV Newlead Markela (Newlead Markela”) was instructed by her time charterers to call Iran twice and Sudan once. In all cases, after the time charterers instructed the vessel to call Iran and Sudan, we asked them to provide us with all necessary information regarding the ports of call, cargo and parties involved, in order to conduct the relevant due diligence. Furthermore, we presented all relevant information to our War Risks Association (in the form of a standard questionnaire), who, after reviewing the facts, insured the vessel for the proposed voyages. Furthermore, In the future our charterers may instruct the vessel to call Iran, or another country which is subject to sanctions, subject to our prior due diligence and approval."

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According to its Annual report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2014 and 2015: "During 2014 and up to February 2015, the Newlead Victoria, which is chartered on a long-term charter signed in 2012, was instructed by her time charterers, who are disponent owners, to call at a port in Iran twice. In all cases, based on the information provided by the charterers, we conducted the relevant due diligence in cooperation with the vessel’s War Risk Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharge and transportation of the cargo and the parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. Following this review and after the vessel was insured by the War Association, on October 27, 2014 the Newlead Victoria arrived at Iran’s Bandar Imam Khomeini (BIK) port to discharge a cargo of about 66,000 MT of wheat in bulk which was loaded from Kavkaz, and departed on November 16, 2014. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions while the revenue was $12,000 per day gross or $11,700 per day net for 20 days that the discharge operations took place. Furthermore, on January 25, 2015, this same vessel called Bandar Imam Khomeini (BIK) to discharge a cargo of about 62,100 MT of wheat which had been loaded at the port of Paranagua, Brazil and she departed on February 12, 2015. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. The vessel’s revenues from this operation were $13,050 gross or $12,723.75 per day net for 18 days. During 2013 also, Newlead Markela was instructed by her time charterers to call Iran twice and Sudan once. In all cases, after the time charterers instructed the vessel to call Iran and Sudan, we asked them to provide us with all necessary information regarding the ports of call, cargo and parties involved, in order to conduct the relevant due diligence. Furthermore, we presented all relevant information to our War Risks Association (in the form of a standard questionnaire), who, after reviewing the facts, insured the vessel for the proposed voyages. Furthermore, In the future our charterers may instruct the vessel to call Iran, or another country which is subject to sanctions, however in any case subject to our prior due diligence and approval."

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According to its Annual report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2013: "During 2013, the Newlead Markela, which was already subject to a long-term charter signed in 2007 before our 2010 acquisition of the vessel, and which did not contain the provisions/exclusions to prohibit the use of the vessel in sanctions-triggering trade with Iran, was instructed by her time charterers, who are disponent owners, to call at a port of Iran twice and a port of Sudan once. In all cases, based on the information provided by the charterers conducted the relevant due diligence in cooperation with their P&I Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharge and transportation of the cargo and the parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. Following this review, on January 24, 2013 the Newlead Markela arrived at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port to load a cargo of about 54,304 MT of iron ore which was discharged to China, and departed on February 3, 2013. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, was subject to any sanctions. Furthermore, on June 15, 2013, this same vessel called Port Sudan to discharge a cargo of about 62,984 MT of wheat which had been loaded at the port of Prince Rupert, Canada. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, was subject to any sanctions. Also later the same year (August 30, 2013) Newlead Markela arrived at Bandar Imam Khomeini (“BIK”) of Iran to discharge a quantity of about 63,945 MT of corn which has been loaded in Nikolayen, Ukraine while she departed on September 6, 2013. Neither the loading, discharge, nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved were subject to any sanctions. During 2012, the same vessel was instructed by her time charterers to call Iran twice. In all cases, after the time charterers instructed the vessel to call Iran, we asked them to provide us with all necessary information regarding the ports of call, cargo and parties involved, in order to conduct the relevant due diligence. Furthermore, we referred to our P&I Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharge or transportation of the cargo and parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. The information was provided to our P&I Association and the facts were reviewed by a legal expert, appointed by the P&I Association, who advised that neither the transportation, loading nor discharge of the cargo nor the parties involved was subject to any sanctions. Furthermore, we presented all relevant information to our War Risks Association (in the form of a standard questionnaire), who, after reviewing the facts, insured the vessel for the proposed voyages. Therefore, on October 14, 2012, the vessel arrived at Bandar Imam Khomeini in order to discharge a cargo of 61,603 tons of maize in bulk which had been loaded in Paranagua, Brazil. The vessel departed from BIK on October 23, 2012. On October 26, 2012, the vessel arrived at Bandar Abbas in order to load a cargo of 70,352 MT of iron ore in bulk and departed on the October 31, 2012. The vessel discharged the cargo of iron ore in Lianyungang, China. Neither the transport, loading nor discharge, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. In addition, during 2011, the same vessel was instructed by her time charterers to arrive in Iran from June 4 to June 14, 2011 in order to discharge approximately 60,000 tons of soya beans. Although this vessel arrived in Iran, neither the transportation nor discharge of the soya beans, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions."

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2012: "As it relates to Iran, the provisions in the charter parties/contracts for our vessels contain exclusions that prohibit the use of our vessels in unlawful and/or sanctions-triggering trade with Iran, or requesting our prior confirmation, not to be unreasonably withheld. Therefore, should any vessel be instructed by her time charterers to call in Iran and our confirmation is required, we ask our charterers to provide clear evidence that neither the transportation, loading nor discharge of the cargo, nor the parties involved, will result in or be subject to any sanctions, respectively. Furthermore, we provide this information to the vessel’s Protection & Indemnity Association (“P&I Association”), a third party liability insurer, asking for legal and/or expert advice.

During 2013, the Newlead Markela, which was already subject to a long-term charter signed in 2007 before our 2010 acquisition of the vessel, and which did not contain the provisions/exclusions to prohibit the use of the vessel in sanctions-triggering trade with Iran, was instructed by her time charterers, who are disponent owners, to call at a port of Iran once and a port of Sudan once. In both cases, the charterers conducted the relevant due diligence in cooperation with their P&I Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharge and transportation of the cargo and the parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. Following this review, on January 24, 2013 the Newlead Markela arrived at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port to load a cargo of about 54,304 MT of iron ore which was discharged to China, and departed on February 3, 2013. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. Furthermore, on June 15, 2013, this same vessel called Port Sudan to discharge a cargo of about 62,984 MT of wheat which had been loaded at the port of Prince Rupert, Canada. Neither the loading, discharge nor transportation of the cargo, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. During 2012, the same vessel was instructed by her time charterers to call Iran twice. After the time charterers instructed the vessel to call Iran, we asked them to provide us with all necessary information regarding the ports of call, cargo and parties involved, in order to conduct the relevant due diligence. Furthermore, we referred to our P&I Association in order to confirm that the loading, discharge or transportation of the cargo and parties involved would not result in, or would not be subject to, any sanctions, respectively. The information was provided to our P&I Association and the facts were reviewed by a legal expert, appointed by the P&I Association, who advised that neither the transportation, loading nor discharge of the cargo nor the parties involved were subject to any sanctions. Furthermore, we presented all relevant information to our War Risks Association (in the form of a standard questionnaire), who, after reviewing the facts, insured the vessel for the proposed voyages. Therefore, on October 14, 2012, the vessel arrived at Bandar Imam Khomeini in order to discharge a cargo of 61,602,90 tons of maize in bulk which had been loaded in Paranagua, Brazil. The vessel departed from Bandar Imam Khomeini on October 23, 2012. On October 26, 2012, the vessel arrived at Bandar Abbas in order to load a cargo of 70,351,648 MT of iron ore in bulk and departed on the October 31, 2012. The vessel discharged the cargo of iron ore in Lianyungang, China. Neither the transport, loading nor discharge, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions. In addition, during 2011, the same vessel was instructed by her time charterers to arrive in Iran from June 4 to June 14, 2011 in order to discharge approximately 60,000 tons of soya beans. Although this vessel arrived in Iran, neither the transportation nor discharge of the soya beans, nor the parties involved, were subject to any sanctions.

Despite the fact that we avoid any sanctioned activity with Iran and all other countries which are subject to sanctions, there is nevertheless some risk that the charter parties may engage in activity that could (indirectly) cause us to violate applicable law, expose us to sanctions under CISADA and any similar laws, and, as a consequence, cause reputational and other damage that could have a material adverse impact on our business and operations. Any such violation could result in fines, penalties, or other sanctions that could severely impact our ability to access U.S. capital markets and conduct our business, and could result in some investors deciding, or being required, to divest their interest, or not invest in us. Additionally, some investors may decide not to invest in our company simply because we do business with companies that do business in sanctioned countries. The determination by these investors not to invest in, or to divest from, our common shares may adversely affect the price at which our common shares trade. Moreover, our charterers may violate applicable sanctions and embargo laws and regulations as a result of actions that do not involve us or our vessels, and those violations could in turn negatively affect our reputation. In addition, our reputation and the market for our securities may be adversely affected if we engage in certain other activities, such as entering into charters with individuals or entities in countries subject to U.S. sanctions and embargo laws that are not controlled by the governments of those countries, or engaging in operations associated with those countries pursuant to contracts with third parties that are unrelated to those countries or entities controlled by their governments. Investor perception of the value of our common stock may be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries."

 

Where trade exclusions with respect to Iran do not exist in our charter parties, we affirmatively notify charterers of our vessels that they themselves could face sanctions if they use our vessels in sanctions triggering trade with Iran.

Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering Holdings (MHB)

Industry
Shipping
Symbol
MYX: 5186
Country
Malaysia
Sources

On March 18, 2014, Malaysia Marine was added to the Florida State Board of Administration List of Prohibited Investments (Scrutinized Companies) due to its involvement in Iran. As of March 9, 2021, Malaysia Marine remains on the SBA list of prohibited investments. 

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In 2020, the U.S. state of Mississippi listed Malaysia Marine on its state lists of Companies Doing Business with the Iranian Petroleum/Natural Gas, Nuclear and Military Sectors, rendering it ineligible for investment and/or state contracting.

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As of May 28, 2020, the Florida State Board of Administration (“SBA”) continues to list MHB on its list of “Scrutinized companies with Activities in the Iran Petroleum Energy Sector.” 

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On January 13, 2020, the South Dakota Investment Council submitted a report to the Executive Board of the Legislative Research Council regarding compliance with SDCL 4-5-48 to 4-5-60, Iran Divestiture. Included in this report is an Iran Scrutinized Companies list of all prohibited investments for which the internal managers and direct external managers are instructed not to purchase any company on the list. MHB is included on this list
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As of December 31, 2019, the Alaska Retirement Management Board lists MHB as a company doing material business with Iran.  

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Malaysia Marine is listed on the June 4, 2019 and July 12, 2019 Florida State Board of Administration list of prohibited investments (Scrutinized companies) for Iran related business.

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Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering is listed on the June 2019 Alaska Retirement Management Board, Companies Doing Material Business with Iran list.

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On March 13, 2019, the Mississippi Department of Finance & Administration identified MHB as a company “engaged in investment activities in Iran, providing funds, goods or services valued at $20,000,000 or more in the energy sector of Iran.”  

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Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering is listed on the March 2019 Alaska Retirement Management Board, Companies Doing Material Business with Iran list.

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In 2017 the U.S. state of Alaska, Florida, Texas listed Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering on its list of companies doing material business with Iran rendering Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering ineligible for investment and/or state contracting.

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In 2018 the U.S. state of Ohio listed Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering as an Iran restricted company rendering Malaysia Marine & Heavy Engineering  ineligible for investment and/or state contracting.

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In 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 Malaysia Marine was listed on the Texas Pension Review Board List of Scrutinized Companies doing business in Iran pursuant to Chapter 807.054, Government Code.  

Kim Heng Offshore

Industry
Shipping
Country
Singapore
Sources

"MAY 14, 2016 —Singapore listed Kim Heng Offshore & Marine Holdings Limited reports that a wholly-owned subsidiary has entered into a non-binding memorandum of understanding with the Iran Marine Fund to explore setting up a strategic partnership. Clarifying Iranian press reports, Kim Heng says that, under the MOU, the total value of the projects to be entered into could be up to an estimated EUR 400 million (about $452 million) over a period of 10 years." (May 2016)