The Houthis’ Evolution, Governance, and Power

Four key historical events/trends can be attributed with creating an environment fertile for the rise of the Zaydi³ revivalist movement known as BY in the 1980s and 1990s. They are not necessarily responsible for the trajectory that the organization ultimately took, but they do explain how it initially gathered momentum. They include:

Investigating the matter of Houthi governance is complicated by the organization’s lack of transparency and the considerable gaps between formal and informal structures of power. The Houthis have released a document entitled “National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State”¹⁶ which supposedly outlines the organizational vision for the future of Yemen. However, this document appears more geared towards public relations in the West rather than a serious blueprint to reflect Houthi policy or intentions.

The “National Vision” is, like some other long-term plans in the Gulf,¹⁷ geared toward the year 2030. Surprisingly, however, the text describes an aspiration to form a Yemeni state which apparently resembles a liberal democracy. According to the document, the Houthi vision for Yemen includes:

Of course, this discourse is disconnected from the reality on the ground in which the Houthis have an unelected hierarchy vested with the organization’s true power, suppress dissent by deadly force,²¹ are not transparent,²² engage in corruption,²³ and appear to be growing more radical and aggressive over time. Despite the fact that the political aspirations set forth in the “National Vision” appear antithetical to Houthi practice,²⁴ some Western analysts appear to have been convinced that the “National Vision” holds promise for Houthi democratization.²⁵

Since Houthi leadership has been passed from Husayn to Badr al-Din to Abdulmalik, it is reasonable to assume that for the foreseeable future the organization will remain in the hands of members of the al-Houthi family. Leadership may be inherited by a member of the family whose name does not end with al-Houthi, like Mahdi al-Mashat who is the Head of the Supreme Political Council (SPC) as well as Abdulmalik’s brother-in-law.²⁶ It is also conceivable that Abdulmalik’s role, given the personalization of the position and the lack of any official bureaucratic title,²⁷ may be adjusted or defined differently in the future.

Marriage and kinship play a critical role in the power structure of the Houthi movement and Yemeni society more generally. Those connected by blood ties to the Houthi organization are often entrusted with powerful positions, either official or unofficial. The logic behind a nepotistic approach is that not only are blood relatives more trustworthy for sensitive roles within the Houthi regime, but also alienating them by failing to provide positions of prestige and power risks distancing members of a well-connected and influential network.

In addition to kinship, the Houthi inner circle is comprised of longstanding supporters who have been involved in the movement for over a decade.  Those participating in the group’s initial insurgency from 2004-2010, most of whom come from Saada, Amran, Hajjah, and al-Jawf governorates, are viewed as loyalists who can serve as supervisors (mushrifin) to ensure the bureaucracy’s fidelity to the Houthi regime and efforts to carry out its policies.

In taking over sizeable portions of Yemeni territory, including the country’s capital and the vast majority of the Yemeni population, the Houthis did not eliminate existing state structures or bureaucracies and build their own from scratch. In most cases, the Houthis sought to co-opt the existing structures by appointing core loyalists as informal supervisors (mushrifin) to oversee the activities of bureaucrats who are ostensibly supporters of the Houthi cause (mutahawwithin). This has created a discrepancy between the formal power structure and the informal structure, in which the latter tends to be the dominant force.  This arrangement exists all the way down to the neighborhood/village level, on which the ‘aqil is appointed a “local chairman” who discerns whether an individual’s social credit vis-à-vis the regime warrants allowing him/her access to employment or particular goods (cooking gas at subsidized prices, cars, etc.). Of course, this is not simply a unidirectional system which functions to impose the regime’s will on the local population; it also serves to collect high resolution information and intelligence on the population, which is crucial for heading off any potential challenges to the regime.

Predictably, there are reports of friction between the formal and informal power structures. Before it had been clearly established that the newly formed supervisory system exerts more power than the formal bureaucracy, the latter sought to resist the former. For example, according to one report on internal Houthi dynamics, “in April 2017, an altercation erupted between the then Minister of International Cooperation, Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, and his supervisor, Houthi loyalist Yahya al-Babili, after the former refused to be placed under supervision.”²⁸ This tension may be expected to increase frictions within the Houthi movement over time, as members of the organization increasingly assume formal roles in the government and create a growing redundancy between the formal and informal system.²⁹

Those living under Houthi rule include both educated urban folks living in Sana’a as well as Yemeni tribes in the more rural regions of Yemen. While some of the local populations support Houthi rule, presumably more prevalent among particular tribal populations and sayyids sidelined in the aftermath of 1962, others are wary of the new regime due to its radical ideology, violent repression, poor governance, or the harming of particular interests. A 2019 UN report noted:

The Houthis are facing slightly increasing levels of dissent. During the reporting period, the Panel noted an uptick in the number of local protests and the level of dissent. Incidents included a protest at Sana’a University on 6 October and dissent in a village in rural Dhamar on 26 October. More critically perhaps, some tribes within Sufyan and Khawlan have begun to show signs of rejecting Houthi control.³⁰

A paper published the following year by the UN details clashes between the Houthis and Hajour tribe in Hajjah which caused significant casualties. Despite the Saudi-led coalition’s assistance to the Hajour, including airstrikes and military supplies, after two-months under siege the tribes conceded and then suffered displacement, detention, and extrajudicial killings on a large scale.  The report also mentions Houthi assassinations of tribal leaders in the governorates of Amran and Ibb³¹ – presumably for the failure to follow orders from Sanaa. More recently, a 2021 report by ACLED entitled “The myth of stability: Infighting and repression in Houthi-controlled territories” assessed that dissent against Houthi rule is on the rise.³² While educated urban elites and tribal leaders appear to be the two primary sources of opposition to Houthi control, it appears that only the latter have the means or the gall to take up arms against the regime; nonviolent opposition to continued Houthi rule cannot be expected to achieve a great deal against a ruthless regime which does not hesitate to use force against civilians.

Beneath the uncontested leadership of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, comparable perhaps to the position of Supreme Leader of Iran in terms of the supra-political and supremely powerful role, there appear to be two emerging centers of power.³³ The first is the “Saada Wing” coalescing around Abdulmalik’s brother-in-law Mahdi al-Mashat who leads the SPC. This core of Houthi leadership is viewed as most closely connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah, and has been described as “extremely secretive” and “paranoid.” The second is the “Military Wing” led Abdulmalik’s cousin Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, who heads the SRC, and Chief of Houthi Military Intelligence Abdullah “Abu Ali” al-Hakim. According to Yemen researcher Sama’a Al-Hamdani, “evidence of the breakdown in internal Houthi dynamics can be found in recent credible reports of mounting tensions between Mahdi al-Mashat, [Saleh Ali] Sammad’s replacement, and Mohammed al-Houthi, head of the Revolutionary Committee, and allegations that Houthi attempted to assassinate Mashat.” Al-Hamdani went so far as to suggest that the intelligence needed to carry out the assassination of former SPC President Saleh al-Samad may have been provided by members of a competing faction of the Houthi movement.³⁴

Beyond any ideological or strategic divisions that may exist, the rivalry among Houthi factions is undoubtedly based, in part, on a competition for control of institutions and financial resources. Competition between elites for ill-gotten gains takes place in the black market, in the upper echelons of the military, and even spills over into the humanitarian sector and beyond. One example provided by the European Council on Foreign Relations is the clash between Abdulmalik’s uncle Interior Minister Abdulkarim al-Houthi and SPC President al-Mashat over the appointment of 44 police directors in April 2020.³⁵ Another public intra-Houthi dispute involved a disagreement between Education Minister Yahya al-Houthi and head of the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) Ahmed Hamid: After al-Houthi’s overt condemnation of Hamid’s attempt to levy a 2% “tax” on international assistance to Houthi-controlled areas, Hamid reversed course.³⁶

The Houthi mechanism for governance relies heavily on informal positions and relationships/partnerships. As mentioned previously, blood relations and long-term demonstrations of loyalty are two key metrics for determining an individual’s fitness for the Houthi inner circle.  Although numerous lists have been compiled regarding the top Houthi officials, much about the senior decision-making process and advising remains concealed. The opacity of the organization may promote rifts and suspicion between the different wings of the organization, yet that same quality makes it impossible to confirm or disprove the reported organizational dynamics with any degree of confidence.³⁷

Military

The informal “supervisory” system, which was mentioned earlier as a means to ensure loyalty throughout the bureaucracy, extends into the military as well.  According to a report by ACAPS, the “informal system includes the ‘frontline supervisor’ (mushrif al-jabahah), a Houthi loyalist in charge of the units fighting on the frontlines, and the ‘military supervisor’ (mushrif askari) who is, instead, the Houthi military [supervisor] responsible for the whole governorate.”³⁸ The formal structure of the Army has been co-opted rather than dramatically altered by the Houthis, with the governorate-level commanders now reporting to the Jihad Office which, in turn, reports directly to Abdulmalik al-Houthi.

Given the generally paranoid and conspiratorial worldview espoused by the Houthi leadership, they are wary of engaging the international community as they believe it is hostile and dominated by their American and Israeli enemies. Thus, they have fairly limited international relations beyond partnerships with members of the Iran-led “axis of resistance” (Iran, Hezbollah, Syria). While much of the cooperation between Sanaa and the axis is presumably covert, steps taken in recent years indicate that ties are expanding from covert smuggling, funding, and training to political-diplomatic support.⁶⁷

Houthi ambitions and means to build foreign relations are limited. The primary aims of their approach to the international arena appear to be: 1) establishing partnerships with likeminded entities in order to cooperate in the enhancement of military/security capabilities, 2) earning as much domestic and international legitimacy as possible through recognition from additional states, 3) intensifying pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to end its campaign in Yemen due to reputational costs.

To the extent that it exists, the Houthis’ international diplomacy is run largely by the group’s longtime spokesman Mohammed Abdelsalam⁶⁸ who serves as the organization’s de facto foreign minister and chief negotiator. Proof of Abdelsalam’s senior stature can be found in the high-level meetings he convenes with foreign leaders (of the limited number willing to meet with Houthi officials), including Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah,⁶⁹ Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei,⁷⁰ then Foreign Minister of Iran Javad Zarif, U.S. Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking, and then UK Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt.⁷¹ It is likely that the Houthi negotiating team is instructed, trained, and advised by Hezbollah.⁷²

The relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Houthis has grown consistently stronger in recent years, but its precise contours remain unclear.  It would appear that the Houthis need Iran, or the support of Iran-backed groups, for training, advanced weaponry and funding that cannot be acquired elsewhere. In contrast, Tehran is not entirely beholden to the Houthis for gaining leverage over Saudi Arabia – it has other proxies or potential partners that it can utilize to that end. Assuming this imbalance informs the power dynamic, the Iran-Houthi relationship is one of patron-client. But while patronage generally has significant limitations in terms of the influence it earns, the ideological affinity between the two likely enhances the Islamic Republic’s clout in Sanaa. After all, based on public statements by leading Houthi officials, it would be reasonable to assume that the Houthis seek to replicate major aspects of the Islamic Republic and adapt them to the Yemeni context. Yet, the answer to the question of “how much” influence Iran exerts over the Houthis remains elusive as its limits are only evident when their interests starkly diverge and even then it is difficult to quantify.

Beyond Iran, the Houthis have sought to cultivate relations with countries that are either neutral or hostile to the U.S.-led order so that they may serve as useful mediators to advance Houthi interests. For example, because Oman is a neutral party to the Yemeni civil war, the Houthis view Muscat as a useful mediator and a convenient and safe host country for diplomatic meetings with counterparts from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and elsewhere.⁷³ Beyond diplomacy, Oman appears to function as a useful hub for Houthi activity, as noted in a 2017 Chatham House report, “Western and other officials and intelligence analysts believe that at least some of the illicit goods, weapons, technology and cash flowing into Yemen first pass through neighbouring Oman.”⁷⁴ Also, Russia and the Houthis have developed limited ties which allowed for occasional visits by Houthi delegations to Moscow.⁷⁵ Yet this dialogue has not translated into the Kremlin taking on any serious role or pro-Houthi positions with respect to Yemen, and recently Russian policy appears to have taken a turn against the Houthis. For years Moscow staked out a position against the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, but this calculus changed in February 2022 amid the invasion of Ukraine: in what appears to have been part of a “grand bargain” at the UN, Moscow voted in favor of a Security Council resolution imposing an arms embargo on the Houthis in its entirety and labeled the Houthis as a terrorist group for the first time.⁷⁶

While hostility to the U.S. has remained an ideological pillar of the Houthi movement since even before it officially adopted the “death to America, death to Israel” chant in 2002, the militia’s actual hostile engagements with the U.S. have been fairly limited. In 2015, they kidnapped American contractors John Hamen and Mark McAlister in Yemen, and murdered the former before releasing the latter.⁷⁷ The following year, the group also launched anti-ship missiles against U.S. naval forces off the coast of Yemen but those strikes were unsuccessful and were met with a firm response.  Since then, attacks on the U.S. have been confined to strikes on unmanned assets as the Houthis appear to prioritize their fight against the Saudi-led coalition.

Despite the Houthis’ fiery anti-American rhetoric, a recent Foreign Policy article disclosed that the U.S. military was actually cooperating with the Houthis against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until 2015.⁷⁸ This was a contributing factor to the outrage expressed by then-CENTCOM commander and current U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the outset of the Saudi anti-Houthi campaign in 2015.

As for what the Houthis aim to achieve through internationally-brokered negotiations with the Saudi-led coalition, a document they submitted to the UN in April 2020 represents what Yemen researcher Elana Delozier calls a “Houthi wish list.”⁷⁹ As Delozier explains, the document lays out the need to:

This document, given its far-reaching demands, may reflect one of three possible realities: the Houthis are not seriously interested in reaching a negotiated settlement but do not want to be seen as the spoilers and so they have countered a Saudi proposal with non-starters; the Houthis believe they are winning the war and they intend to dictate the Saudi-led coalition’s terms of surrender; or this is an opening negotiating position to extract concessions from the Saudis but the Houthis will ultimately prove willing to compromise. Though it would be foolhardy to claim any deep insight into Houthi negotiating strategy given the opacity of the organization, the expansionist and uncompromising tendencies of the organization make the first answer appears most likely.

While the Houthis publicly call for a united Yemen, this prospect appears increasingly distant. On the military track, it appears improbable that the Houthis could take, let alone hold, southern Yemen which includes tens of thousands of trained and armed soldiers motivated by southern separatist and/or salafi belief.  On the diplomatic track, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which the Houthis opt to become partners in a power-sharing government of Yemen which requires them to compromise and maneuver politically (rather than exercising nearly absolute power as they do now) to advance political aims. This may explain why, according to ECFR, the Houthis “have shown decreasing interest in Aden and neighbouring governorates since they failed in their attempt to take over these areas in 2015. The positioning of their troops suggests that the Houthis have limited interest in expanding into southern Yemen.” Partition of Yemen between the north and south appears more likely than the country’s reunification by papering over the regional and sectarian fissures exacerbated by years of war.

The situation in Yemen is often classified as the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”⁸⁰ Since the start of the civil war in 2014, over 110,000 Yemenis have been killed, including upwards of 12,000 civilians.⁸¹ In frontline governorates, like Marib, al-Jawf, and Saada, over 4% of the adult male population has been killed as a direct result of the war.

But even for those who have escaped direct harm as a result of the conflict, living conditions have deteriorated and the economic situation is increasingly precarious. The UN assesses that upwards of 20 million people require some form of international aid, and nearly 8 million Yemenis “do not know where their next meal is coming from.”⁸²  The Sanaa Center reports that the GDP per capita of what was already the Arab world’s poorest country declined by almost 50% in just four years, sinking from $3,577 in 2015 to US$1,950 in 2019.⁸³ In parallel, since the start of the conflict, the UN estimates that food prices have increased by 150%.⁸⁴ But not all sectors of Yemeni society are growing poorer, rather the inequality between the county’s few rich and poor masses is growing as a result of the wartime economy.

Interestingly despite the fighting taking place on multiple fronts due to the civil war, the Yemeni economy is fairly unified and trade continues to flow between different areas. While it can be difficult to ship goods into Yemen, transporting them once they have entered the country is far less complicated and simply an issue of paying “transport fees” at numerous military checkpoints which tend to add on about 15% to the final price. For that reason, the Yemeni consumer market tends to move in concert, though the prices for wheat, flour, and diesel are usually higher on average in Houthi-controlled areas. According to one merchant interviewed in a Chatham House report, it takes around 48-72 hours between the purchase of electronics in Dubai, UAE until they arrive in Sanaa by truck.⁸⁵ Yet, this “free market” is not limited to civilian items, as even military items are sold and shipped across the frontlines on a regular basis⁸⁶ – usually from the coalition to the Houthis, but also from the Houthis to the coalition at a lesser volume – which has caused the price of ammunition to drop since the start of the civil war.⁸⁷

Several key pillars of the Yemeni economy have declined as a result the Covid-19 crisis. As of 2019, remittances to Yemen stood at nearly $4 billion, or 13% of the Yemeni economy, but after the outbreak of the pandemic the flow of funds into Yemen is believed to have shrunk dramatically and the country’s poorest households suffered an estimated decline in income of over 20%.⁸⁸  

The largest source of income for the Houthi Government is the taxation of the approximately 20 million Yemenis under its control. As of 2017, it was estimated that the Houthi-Saleh alliance extracted about $30 million/month from collecting customs,⁸⁹ which is roughly equal to the monthly support Iran provides to the Houthis via oil shipments.⁹⁰ In addition to the standard duties collected by the Houthi regime, in 2020 SPC President Mehdi al-Mashat signed into law a new regulation expanding the scope of the khums (“one-fifth” or 20%) tax on transactions taking place within Yemen and established a legal framework which allows those funds collected to be channeled to sada, or descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. The recent tax legislation enshrines preferable treatment to sada, including the al-Houthi family, and provides further evidence – beyond rhetoric – that the Houthis intend to restore that segment of society’s status as the privileged class that it was during the time of the Imamate (pre-1962).  A report by the Sanaa Center noted the way in which Houthi co-optation of the khums and its allocation to state “slush funds” resembles the Islamic Republic’s bonyads, or “foundations,” controlled by the Supreme Leader without any oversight or accountability.⁹¹ A significant portion of the funds accrued by the Houthis is allocated toward their war effort, as the Panel of Experts on Yemen estimated that at least $1.8 billion was diverted by the Houthis from legitimate purposes to fund their war effort in 2019.⁹²

The Houthi leadership is also reported to control key smuggling routes, especially for fuel sold to the state or on the black market, and this is believed to provide billions of dollars in revenue.⁹³  According to a Sanaa Center report on the black market and corruption in Yemen, in many cases officials’ business interests supersede their affiliation in the civil war: “Alleged collusion between Houthi-affiliated importers and officials allied with the internationally recognized Yemeni government indicates patronage networks that potentially cross the frontlines of the war themselves.”⁹⁴ Some Yemen experts have even suggested that the Houthis manufacture fuel crises in order to maximize the profits from their fuel sales.⁹⁵

The Houthis, in particular Husayn and his successor Abdulmalik, have developed and promoted a political-religious ideology that is based on pillars of anti-Western sentiment, Shia (Zaydi) revolutionary activism, and a ruling class of sada. The belief system espouses the idea that Muslims are in a “soft war” with the West over culture and values, and that the U.S.-led order is irredeemably hostile to Islam. The internationally recognized Government of Yemen, led by Saleh and then Hadi, was viewed as a co-conspirator with Washington in the “War on Terror” and therefore the principle of khuruj which mandates a rebellion against unjust leaders was invoked. The religious doctrines of Shiism place an emphasis on leadership’s descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and so the government which the Houthis seek to establish is one which allows for sada rule.

Houthi governance thus far appears to enforce radical religious norms and punish those who deviate from them. For example, in April 2021, the Houthis reportedly kidnapped Yemeni model Entesar Hammadi from the streets of Sanaa, allegedly for being photographed without a hijab and then posting the photos online.⁹⁶ More recently, the group has started to enforce a requirement that women be accompanied by a male guardian in public or must have the male guardian’s written permission when traveling.⁹⁷ Liberal women and female political dissidents are especially targeted by the regime, often accused of trumped up charges and while in custody they are subject to sexual harassment and even rape.

Children are also targeted by the Houthi system of governance to ensure that they not only comply with but actively contribute to the organization. In 2014-15, almost immediately after taking Sanaa, the Houthis established a committee to revise the educational curricula to include indoctrination with their own radical ideology.⁹⁸ This also explains why a central figure in the Houthi movement, Yahya al-Houthi, was seemingly “relegated” to the Ministry of Education – because it is in fact a key role.  The Houthi focus on indoctrinating the next generation of Yemenis should not come as a surprise to those who are aware of the organization’s origins, which include running summer camps and infiltrating schools in the Saada Province.  Many of those who attended Believing Youth events decades ago, like Chief of Military Intelligence Abdullah “Abu Ali” al-Hakim, is now among the movement’s most fervent supporters and senior officials.

In addition to the educational system run by the Houthis, the organization has established and co-opted a number of media outlets to present its narrative in the county, region, and around the world. The most notable of these is the satellite television station al-Masirah which is based in Beirut, Lebanon.⁹⁹ The location of the Houthi regime’s key mouthpiece outside of Yemen hardly seems like a coincidental decision but likely speaks to the incredible influence that Hezbollah has over how the Houthis engage the international arena. The messaging and aesthetics of al-Masirah’s products indicate a highly sophisticated media team¹⁰⁰ is supporting the channel’s work. Given the Houthis’ ties to the “axis of resistance,” Iranian and Hezbollah channels and websites also parrot Houthi talking points.

The Houthi approach to Israel is extremely hostile on the ideological and rhetorical levels. On the operational level, the Houthis appear somewhat more cautious for a variety of possible reasons including: Israeli deterrence, Houthi prioritization of ongoing conflict against the coalition, Houthis awaiting an opportune moment, lack of capabilities to launch an attack of any great significance, or general Houthi disinterest in moving from rhetoric to direct conflict. Yet, because it is unclear why the Houthis have not yet attacked Israel, Israel will have a difficult time monitoring indicators that might foreshadow an impending decision to attack.

Given the opacity of Houthi decision-making and the open question of the group’s prioritization of operationalizing hostility toward Israel, Israel would be well served to monitor the group’s capabilities rather than intentions. Should an agreement to end the ongoing Yemeni civil war be reached, the Houthi “resistance” may shift focus to Israel in order to justify military mobilization, repressive policies, and poor quality of life in Houthi-controlled territory. The prospect of a Houthi strike poses a dilemma for Israeli decision-makers in terms of how to reach a critical balance between mitigating potential risks and avoiding inadvertently/unnecessarily instigating a conflict against a determined and radical foe with considerable battlefield experience, a low bar for victory, and located in a faraway and highly complex conflict zone.

Israel should also be cognizant of indirect challenges that the Houthi threat can pose to its national security. The knowledge produced by Houthi “testing” of Iranian weapons systems against Saudi Arabia’s Western-supplied platforms may be relayed to Hezbollah.   Houthi military industries may also begin to supply advanced munitions developed by Iran to Israel’s enemies, particularly along its southern front.

Any realistic solution to the Yemeni civil war – reunification or partition – is unlikely to significantly diminish the Houthi threat to Israel and may actually serve to increase it. Nor do developments within Yemen indicate a high likelihood of deposing the Houthi regime in the near future; the increase of sporadic resistance against the Houthis is unlikely to outmatch the multilayered and ideologically committed cadres of intelligence and security services dedicated to ensuring the regime’s survival. Therefore, the rise of the Houthis should be viewed as a long-term challenge for Israel.

Ari Heistein is a Non-Resident Fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). His main areas of focus include U.S. foreign policy and Yemen. 

1. Sadah, Amran, al-Jawf, Hajjah, Sanaa, al-Bayda, Marib, al-Hudayda, Dhamar, al-Bayda, Ibb, Taizz, al-Dalea, and Raymah.
2. “Death to America, Death to Israel, God curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.”
3. Also known as “Fiver Shia” because they follow the teachings of the fifth Imam Zayd Ibn Ali.
4. Estimated date of establishment is around 1986.
5.  A 2009 cable by the U.S. Embassy in Yemen noted observed that the motivation behind the Houthi insurrection was political participation: [Majed al-]Fahed added that the Houthis are more inspired by political grievances than by religious differences with the central government. This evaluation of the Houthi movement has been echoed repeatedly by other Sa'ada locals, including during discussions PolOff held on September 2 with Sa'ada tribesmen, who characterized the Houthis as a "social and political movement" rather than a religiously or ideologically motivated movement. According to Abdullah al-Muaid, Sa'ada local and Ministry of Local Administration official, the Houthis' primary goal is "convincing the central government to give more authority to the local levels...but not actual independence from Yemen." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANAA2079_a.html
6. https://eeradicalization.com/becoming-ansar-allah-islamic-revolution-yemen-oved-lobel/
7. This crackdown followed the Treaty of Jeddah in 2000 and the Saudi campaign against al-Qaeda beginning in 2003.
8. Isa Blumi, Destroying Yemen: What Chaos in Arabia Tells Us about the World, p. 166.
9. Abdulmalik’s succession was reportedly challenged by a longtime close friend of Husayn named Abdullah Ayed al Ruzami, but ultimately this challenge failed. He maintained a role in the organization as late as 2007, but since then his whereabouts remain unknown. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-02-30-47/Houthi-Rebels-_2D00_-Yemen-15-April-2012.pdf 
10. Saudi forces, primarily aerial, also participated in the last round of the Saada Wars which began in late 2009
11. https://www.peaceagreements.org/masterdocument/1434
12. https://ctc.usma.edu/yemens-Houthi-movement-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring/
13. The subsidy cuts were implemented as part of an agreement to receive a $560 million loan from the International Monetary Fund
14. Other partners in the original coalition included Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.
15. In April 2022, shortly before the publication of this report, President Hadi stepped aside and announced that he would be replaced by an 8-person Presidential Council
16. http://yemenvision.gov.ye/en/upload/National%20Vision%20For%20The%20Modern%20Yemeni%20State.pdf
17. https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en
18. “National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State,” p. 20.
19. “National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State,” p. 18.
20. “National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State,” p. 18.
21. https://twitter.com/YemeniFatima/status/982709040349360128?s=20
22. https://twitter.com/YemeniFatima/status/1096429489544933376?s=20
23. https://twitter.com/Ibrahim4Yemen/status/1271508717499027456?s=20
24. One could argue that Husayn al-Houthi’s participation in electoral politics in the 1990s provides evidence that there is not inherent doctrinal problem with doing so, but that would be to ignore the way in which context influences interpretation/practice of dogma.
25. https://www.facebook.com/170535279424/posts/10156624938654425/?d=n
26. https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1122745264668839937?s=20
27. According to “The Houthi Supervisory System”: Abdulmalik al-Houthi is often referred to as “Leader of the Quranic March” or “Leader of the Revolution” (meaning the 21st September 2014 Revolution). He holds no official position. https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf
28. https://tinyurl.com/2p9b6cu7
29. https://tinyurl.com/3mnytf6f
30. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_83_E.pdf
31. https://tinyurl.com/ycy4wv26
32. https://acleddata.com/2021/02/09/the-myth-of-stability-infighting-and-repression-in-houthi-controlled-territories/
33. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/324258 
34. https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen
35. https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/
36. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/corruption-reports-divide-yemens-houthis
37. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/324258
38. https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf
39. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_326_E.pdf
40. https://acleddata.com/2021/02/09/the-myth-of-stability-infighting-and-repression-in-houthi-controlled-territories/
41. https://tinyurl.com/2p9b6cu7
42. https://ye.usembassy.gov/treasury-sanctions-serious-human-rights-abusers-on-international-human-rights-day/
43. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/324258
44. https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1122641/%E2%80%98preventative%E2%80%99-security-houthis%E2%80%99-secret-weapon
45. Houthi technology transfers to Tehran do not include indigenous technology, rather the transfer of weapons captured by the Houthis on the battlefield which are then sent to Iran for study.
46. https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/
47. https://www.slow-journalism.com/delayed-gratification-magazine/why-yemens-civil-war-is-personal-for-mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabias-involvement-in-yemen-explained
48. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2693.aspx; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/976083/Yemen.pdf; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0634&locale=ga.  
49. https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/
50. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf
51. https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-and-what-do-they-want/a-50667558
52. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/02/13/Terrorism-Houthis-recruited-more-than-10-000-children-in-Yemen-since-2014-Report; https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthis-recruit-30-000-child-soldiers-minister/1528489
53. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CTC-SENTINEL-092018.pdf
54. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CTC-SENTINEL-092018.pdf
55. According to Ken Pollack, this a key reason that NSAs have become more effective militaries than states in the Arab world.
56. https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/
57. After gradually easing Saleh loyalists out of key positions in order to increase their own control, the Houthis broke with Saleh in 2017 and had the former President of Yemen assassinated.
58. http://www.undocs.org/en/S/2018/594 
59. Rand, 197.
60. Rand, 200.
61. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/03/houthi-rebels-unveil-host-of-weaponry.html
62. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-military-intelligence-chief-dies-of-wounds/1363350
63. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1680566/middle-east
64. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/
65. https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/centcom-weapons-shipment-from-iran-seized-in-arabian-sea-was-on-the-way-to-houthi-rebels-in-yemen-1.619374
66. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/the-houthis-have-built-their-own-drone-industry-in-yemen-1.1032847; https://www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=3185&file_id=3189. 
67. In August 2019, the Houthis appointed an ambassador, Ibrahim Mohamed al-Dailami, to represent the organization in Tehran.  In October 2020, Iran appointed IRGC-QF official Hassan Irlu to serve as its ambassador in Sanaa; though Irlu’s past is shadowy, it is reported that in previous decades he trained Hezbollah on anti-aircraft weaponry. In November 2020, reportedly under pressure from Iran, Damascus recognized Houthi Ambassador to Syria Abdullah Sabri.
68. https://twitter.com/abdusalamsalah
69. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_79.pdf
70. https://twitter.com/A7medJa7af/status/1161304292864737280?s=20
71. https://twitter.com/ElanaGulf/status/1101585033045962753?s=20
72. Also mentioned https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order p. 32
73. https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/
74. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order 
75. https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-growing-ties-iran-aligned-militia-groups; https://twitter.com/narrabyee/status/1154038626537263109?s=20
76. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2033376/middle-eas
77. https://apnews.com/article/a488e2b9b9be4503abf3782ae4617922
78. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/16/lloyd-austin-isnt-who-you-think-he-is/
79. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthis-release-their-wish-list-ending-yemen-war
80. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1843591/middle-east The degree to which this is true is subject to debate, as the Yemeni conflict’s death toll of 110,000 is only one quarter of that of the civil war in Syria.
81. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_79.pdf
82. https://gho.unocha.org/yemen; according to the UN, the five largest donors to the Yemen Humanitarian response plan are Saudi Arabia, the U.S., UAE, UK, and Germany.
83. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628
84. https://gho.unocha.org/yemen
85. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order-0/3-resources-revenue-and-incentives-spoil
86. According to a 2018 report from the Sanaa Center: “The ease with which weapons are being transferred from Yemen’s eastern governorates, particularly al-Mahra and Shabwa, to Houthi-controlled areas via al-Bayda or Marib governorates is testament to the fact that “business as usual” continues with regard to weapons smuggling. As long as each party along the way is paid their share – from arms dealers to those driving the trucks and individuals stationed along the road manning the checkpoints – then arms sales run smoothly, no matter where those arms are destined.” https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/6614
87. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order-0/3-resources-revenue-and-incentives-spoil
88. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/model-impact-falling-remittances-amid-covid-19-yemens-war-torn-economy
89. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order-0/3-resources-revenue-and-incentives-spoil collect import taxes at Hodeida and al-Salif ports, and at a checkpoint in Dhamar province through which nearly all of the country’s imports pass https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/damning-report-un-panel-details-war-economy-yemen
90. https://iranintl.com/en/iran-in-brief/israel-has-targeted-least-dozen-ships-carrying-iranian-oil-syria
91. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628
92. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-s202179-enar
93. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/yemen-coalitions-blocking-aid-fuel-endangers-civilians
94. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/6614
95. https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1275160980671148034?s=20
96. https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_43546/
97. https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1514794717514371076?s=20&t=WTgYmEXM0FqJ4Ap6MJEQlg
98. https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/
99. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-07-ch-5-yemen
100. This team is likely connected to and/or trained by personnel at Hezbollah’s media channel al-Manar.