The Senior Iranian Military Officers Leading Tehran’s Military Reconstitution

Introduction

On June 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assassinated at least 20 senior Iranian military personnel as part of its strikes against the regime’s military and nuclear infrastructure. These officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, had decades of military experience going back to the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979. During the recent war, the IDF successfully targeted additional senior regime officials.

The regime’s quick reshuffling of its senior military leadership, announced by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, represents an attempt to retain a coordinated chain of command. Iran’s regime wants to showcase that it survived the 12 Day War.

The new senior military officials, like their predecessors, have significant experience, both in Iran’s conventional military (Artesh) and in the IRGC, Iran’s ideological army. Should full-out conflict between Israel and Iran resume, Israel will likely again target Iran’s senior military leadership to further degrade the regime’s defense capabilities.

Below are profiles of each of the replacements for the assassinated officials:

Mohammad Pakpour

New Position: Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC.

Replaced: Hossein Salami, killed on June 13.

Since 2009, Pakpour has commanded the IRGC’s Ground Forces, the IRGC’s land-based leg. Under his command, the Ground Forces deployed to Syria to defend the now-fallen Assad regime and sustained heavy losses. At least a quarter of all Iranian fatalities in Syria between 2012 and 2016 were Ground Forces troops. This deployment to Syria turned the Ground Forces, once focused on countering protests inside of Iran, into an expeditionary force serving the regime’s regional interests.

In 2017, Pakpour unveiled a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit within the Ground Forces to integrate a key component of Iran’s offensive capabilities with his troops, and said that it would carry out different, unspecified missions. This advancement of the Ground Forces’ capabilities demonstrates how Pakpour has integrated and enhanced the capabilities of the Ground Forces.

Pakpour has significant military leadership experience, even prior to his time as Ground Forces head. He previously served as deputy commander of the Ground Forces, deputy director of operations for the IRGC, commander of the 8th Najaf Division, and Commander of the 31st Ashura Division. The last two divisions are units of the Ground Forces. According to Iranian state media, Pakpour holds a master’s degree in geography from the University of Tehran and a Ph.D. in political geography from Tarbiat Modares University. He joined the IRGC shortly after the Islamic Revolution.

On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Pakpour pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for “acting on behalf of the IRGC,” which is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. He has also sanctioned by the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and Australia, according to Iran Watch.

There is precedent for a commander of the IRGC’s Ground Forces to be elevated as commander-in-chief of the IRGC in its entirety. Pakpour follows in the footsteps of previous IRGC chiefs, including Yahya Rahim Safavi and Mohammad Ali Jafari. One of Pakpour's predecessors as commander of the IRGC's Ground Forces, Mohammad Jafer Asadi, was killed by Israel during the 12 Day War.

IRGC Deputy Commander for Coordination Mohammad Reza Naqdi, in a June interview on Iranian state media, noted that Pakpour and his replacement as commander of the IRGC’s Ground Forces, Mohammad Karami, would now adopt a doctrine centered on ground invasion in the aftermath of the 12 Day War. This comment is important, as it may preview some priorities Pakpour will implement given his longstanding tenure in the Ground Forces. His predecessor, Hossein Salami, did not have such a pedigree in the Ground Forces. Salami was elevated to his role following service as commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force and as deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

Abdolrahim Mousavi

New Position: Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Replaced: Mohammad Bagheri, killed on June 13.

A key early loss for Iran was the death of Mohammad Bagheri, the military’s chief of staff, which is considered the highest ranking military officer in the country and is responsible for coordination between the IRGC and Iran’s conventional army. Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi to succeed Bagheri.

Mousavi headed the Artesh from 2017 until 2025, placing its four main branches—the Air Force, Ground Forces, Navy, and Air Defense Force—under his command. The Artesh focuses on preserving Iran’s territorial integrity. Its capabilities are largely conventional, and it comprises most of the Iranian Armed Forces’ manpower. However, the Artesh is also indoctrinated with the Islamic Republic’s ideology—as the supreme leader retains a representative office in the institution—and over the years, it has provided support to the Islamic Republic’s main ideological force, the IRGC.

Under Mousavi’s command, the Artesh has been deployed to brutally quell protests, including those in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini in the Morality Police’s custody. Mousavi also oversaw Khamenei’s development plans to reorganize the Artesh into a more flexible and quick-reaction fighting force following its deployment to Syria in 2015.

Before heading the Artesh, Mousavi was the chief of the Artesh’s Joint Staff from 1999 until 2005 and the deputy commander-in-chief of the Artesh from 2008 through 2016. According to state media, Mousavi was appointed as deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in 2016, serving under Bagheri. Since May 2019, he has additionally served as commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base, which coordinates air defense between the Artesh and the IRGC. 

Mousavi is the first Artesh officer to serve as chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff. His predecessor, Mohammad Bagheri, was a career IRGC officer, and the first chief of staff, Hassan Firouzabadi, lacked formal military training.

Mousavi has been sanctioned by multiple governments in his capacity as head of the Artesh, especially for its lethal role in suppressing mass protests in 2022. Canada sanctioned Mousavi in October 2022 for a “grave breach of international peace and security,” while the EU followed suit in December 2022. Australia sanctioned Mousavi in January 2023 and the U.S. designated him in March 2023 pursuant to E.O. 13553 for “ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses” in Iran on behalf of the regime. Finally, the UK sanctioned Mousavi in October 2024 following Iran’s missile attack against Israel earlier that month.

As the new chief of staff, Mousavi will retain a position on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Mousavi had previously served on the SNSC as commander-in-chief of the Artesh. However, the Artesh will now gain an additional seat on the SNSC as the chief of staff position was formerly held by Bagheri, who was a career IRGC officer.

Majid Mousavi

New Position: Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces.

Replaced: Amir Ali Hajizadeh, killed on June 13.

Ayatollah Khamenei took over a day after Hajizadeh’s killing to announce the appointment of Mousavi as commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Forces. Haijzadeh had served in that role since 2009. The delay may have been due to Israel eliminating the entire leadership of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force as they met to prepare Iran’s initial response to the Israeli operation. The strike killed Hajizadeh and the commanders of the IRGC’s drone, surface-to-surface missile, and air defense units.

Little is known about Mousavi’s involvement in the IRGC. The Iranian state media network Press TV refers to Mousavi as a “quiet but central figure” in the IRGC’s technological evolution and a “key figure” behind Iran’s missile deterrence program, but does not provide specifics. According to Radio Farda, Mousavi has been a “core member” of Iran’s missile program since the mid-1980s. Mousavi became deputy commander around 2009.

Mousavi had close ties to Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the founder of Iran’s missile capabilities, and has continued Moghaddam’s work following the latter’s death in 2011. In 2014, Mousavi disclosed in an interview that Iran was working on technology for missiles with ranges exceeding 2000 kilometers, including a solid-fuel space-launch vehicle (SLV). In remarks in 2020, Mousavi boasted about Iran’s “long-range” missile capabilities and appeared to claim Tehran was developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which could reach Europe and the United States.

Mousavi’s promotion from deputy commander to head of the Aerospace Forces will likely help establish continuity in the branch’s chain of command and sustain its operational capabilities. However, Mousavi was not present at the Aerospace Forces’ emergency response meeting, which raises questions about his prior role within the Aerospace Forces’ chain of command. This may also indicate that the Aerospace Forces will have significant operational issues moving forward. Israel’s degradation of its assets, particularly missile launchers, throughout the war demonstrates these challenges.

Mousavi, like his predecessor Hajizadeh, spent the majority of his career in the IRGC’s Aerospace Forces. Not all commanders of that branch have, however. For example, Hossein Dehghan, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi, all previous Aerospace Forces chiefs, had more experience across the various branches of the IRGC than Mousavi and Hajizadeh. 

Mousavi was sanctioned by the UK in September 2024 for hostile activity on behalf of the Government of Iran to undermine the security and prosperity of Israel. The U.S. designated Mousavi in December 2024 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for “having engaged in activities that have materially contributed to Iran’s ballistic missile program.”

Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi

New Position: Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHQ) (unconfirmed).

Replaced: Ali Shadmani, killed on June 17.

On July 2, unconfirmed reports surfaced that Aliabadi was appointed commander of the KCHQ, replacing Shadmani, who was assassinated four days into the 12 Day War. Shadmani had only held the position since his predecessor, Gholam Ali Rashid, was killed by Israel on June 13.

The IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on July 1 that a new commander of the KCHQ had been appointed, but that his identity was not publicized due to “safety concerns.” A Persian-language X account, @MossadSpokesman, which has not been recognized by the Israeli intelligence agency, claimed a day later that Aliabadi was the appointee.

Like his predecessor, who rose up the ranks of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)’s operations department, Aliabadi has experience in military operations roles, both in and out of the IRGC. In 2014, he was named deputy for “readiness, support, and industrial research” of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). Two years later, he was elevated to deputy for coordination of the AFGS. Previously, he served as chief of staff of the IRGC Ground Forces, deputy head of security and law enforcement, and head of the police force, which is organized under the AFGS. 

During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Aliabadi was appointed Governor of the Gilan Province in 2005, then Governor of the Semnan Province in 2007. As a naval prison warden, he was a member of a “death commission” in 1988 in Rasht that reportedly executed 118 political prisoners, part of a nation-wide massacre that year in which over 30,000 prisoners were killed.

Aliabadi’s experience in operations will be important for managing the KCHQ, which is tasked with coordinating Iran’s military operations, including command-and-control needs. In 2016, the KCHQ was separated from the Armed Forces General Staff and made a permanent command post, with Gholam Ali Rashid as its commander. The KCHQ is Iran’s most important wartime military operational command.

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Aliabadi in 2020 pursuant to E.O. 13876 for being appointed to a position as a state official by the supreme leader.

Mohammad Karami

New Position: Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces 

Replaced: Mohammad Pakpour.

Six days into Israel’s recent operation, Khamenei named Karami the new commander of the IRGC Ground Forces. Karami has significant experience commanding regional IRGC Ground Forces. He previously headed the Ground Forces’ Quds Headquarters, which oversees security in the southeast provinces of Sistan-Baluchestan and Kerman. Sistan-Baluchestan has seen significant unrest from separatist groups and terrorism targeting IRGC forces. In 2019, the U.S.-designated Sunni terror group Jaysh ul-Adl killed 27 IRGC personnel in a bus bombing. The same group attacked an IRGC facility in April 2024, killing at least eleven.

According to the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News, Karami became head of the Quds Headquarters in March 2019 and was appointed governor of Sistan-Baluchestan under then-President Ebrahim Raisi in 2022. While in both roles, Karami was accused of severe human rights violations during the regime’s crackdown on civil protests.

In September 2022, security forces in Sistan-Baluchestan massacred at least 105 civilians protesting the regime following the death of Mahsa Amini. According to Human Rights Watch, this massacre, dubbed “Bloody Friday,” was the deadliest single-day incident across Iran during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.

In December 2021, OFAC designated Karami pursuant to Section 106 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which authorizes sanctions on individuals deemed responsible for gross violations of human rights against individuals in Iran. Canada similarly sanctioned Karami in October 2022, as did the EU in January 2023. The UK followed suit, sanctioning him in February 2023.

Majid Khademi

New Position: Commander of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

Replaced: Mohammad Kazemi, killed on June 15.

Five days after his predecessor was killed, Khademi was elevated by Mohammad Pakpour. Since June 2022, Khademi headed the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization, where he also replaced Kazemi. The Intelligence Protection Organization is focused on counterintelligence efforts and security within the IRGC. Khademi was thus charged with stopping foreign intelligence capabilities, including those of Israel and the U.S.

Under his direction, the Intelligence Protection Organization failed to stop Israel’s devastating string of covert assassinations of top IRGC officials and senior nuclear scientists. This includes failing uncover Israeli plots to smuggle drone parts and build drones inside of Iran and not detecting a ploy that led to the killing of the IRGC Aerospace Forces’ leadership.

Before heading the IRGC’s counterintelligence arm, Khademi commanded the Ministry of Defense’s separate intelligence protection unit. His predecessor was reportedly arrested in 2019 in a crackdown within the IRGC’s intelligence establishment.

Khademi’s appointment as the IRGC’s intelligence chief is telling given his poor track record countering Israeli infiltration. Kazemi’s deputy, Hassan Mohaghegh, was also killed by Israel in the same strike on the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s headquarters. Khademi’s elevation may indicate severe attrition within the IRGC’s intelligence establishment.

It does not appear that Khademi has been sanctioned by any foreign government.

Amir Hatami

New Position: Commander-in-Chief of the Artesh.

Replaced: Abdolrahim Mousavi.

Following the promotion of Mousavi, Hatami was elevated as his replacement to command the Artesh. Like other new replacements, Hatami has decades of military experience that will help preserve some of the Iranian Army’s command-and-control capabilities.

During the second presidential term of Hassan Rouhani (2017–21), Hatami headed the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). The ministry oversees Iran’s military industrial base and procurement. 

Early in his tenure, MODAFL publicly unveiled the Khorramshahr missile at a military parade. Two years later, the ministry showcased an advanced Khorramshahr with a smaller reentry vehicle and longer range. In June 2019, Hatami announced the “Khordad 15” missile defense array, which he claimed could detect and intercept cruise missiles, drones, and stealth fighter jets. Later that year, MODAFL entered Bavar-373 surface-to-air defense system into service, described as an “improvement” over the Russian-provided S-300 batteries.

Hatami is not the first commander-in-chief of the Artesh to serve previously as defense minister. Mohammad Salimi also served as defense minister before heading the Artesh.

According to the Tehran Times, Hatami previously served as deputy defense minister, deputy chief of staff of the Army, and deputy commander of Army Intelligence. He was appointed as an army advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei in 2022. The state media agency Tasnim also claims Hatami has been a senior advisor to the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the KCHQ. This experience demonstrates Hatami’s long-term involvement with decision making at the highest levels of the Iranian defense establishment. He now occupies the role from which his predecessor was elevated to one of Iran’s two highest ranking military posts.

Following the regime’s brutal crackdown on protests in 2022, Canada sanctioned Hatami in his capacity as senior advisor to the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. Australia sanctioned Hatami two years later as a contributor to Iran’s proliferation efforts of missiles and UAVs. Hatami is not sanctioned by the EU or UK, nor has he been designated by the U.S.

Ali Shadmani

Position: Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHQ) (deceased).

Replaced: Gholam Ali Rashid, killed on June 13.

Shadmani was appointed commander of the KCHQ following Israel’s successful assassination of his predecessor, Gholam Ali Rashid. Just four days later, however, Shadmani himself was killed by the IDF, marking the first time Israel has eliminated a successor to a previous target during its strikes on Iran. The position Shadmani shortly occupied in Iran’s chain of command, therefore, is likely to be a significant Israeli intelligence and military target moving forward.

Before his short tenure atop Iran’s wartime military command, Shadmani served as the KCHQ’s deputy commander and, before that, as head of the Armed Forces General Staff’s operations department. These roles provided Shadmani with experience in wartime command and control. Shadmani is also thought to have maintained relations with Tehran’s regional proxies, with a photo surfacing after his death of Shadmani with Hezbollah’s late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

After Shadmani’s assassination, the IDF noted that he was “Iran’s senior-most military officer and Khamenei’s closest military advisor,” highlighting his senior status atop Iran’s military chain of command. The IDF also called Shadmani Iran’s “war-time Chief of Staff.” 

Shadmani was sanctioned by the EU in October 2024 for his role in Iran’s missile attack against Israel that month, and for his role in coordinating Iran’s military support of Russia during its invasion of Ukraine. The EU noted that the KCHQ was “at the core” of Iran’s UAV development and claimed Shadmani had been “actively promoting Iran’s defense capabilities” to Russia.