Iran Can’t Be Bought by the U.S.

Philip Gordon, former national security adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris, wrote July 23 in Foreign Policy that the U.S. war against Iran has “failed.” He believes that the U.S. “is unlikely to solve the problem with more bombing” and that there are no good options at Washington’s disposal. The least bad alternative, he says, is to “pay Iran off to end the conflict and open the strait now while accelerating efforts to reduce reliance on it and bolstering U.S. leverage for future negotiations down the road.” Gordon is right that America finds itself in a tight spot regarding Iran, but his suggested path has been tried and did not succeed.

“In the short term,” Gordon writes, his option “means allowing Iran significant economic relief in exchange for refraining from attacking shipping or its neighbors and freezing its nuclear program.” However, the Trump administration made precisely that bargain with the Islamic Republic in the now-comatose Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. 

Under the MOU, the U.S. agreed to immediately lift its blockade on Iran and to work with “regional partners” to put together a plan with at least $300 billion “for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The Trump administration also committed to “issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.” Washington also pledged to “make fully available” frozen Iranian assets—not just for humanitarian assistance, but “for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by” Iran’s Central Bank. America also agreed not to “impose any new sanctions” on Iran and, perhaps most shockingly, undertook “to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran . . . in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal.” The Trump team made other, non-financial concessions in the deal, but I need not mention them now, since this piece focuses on Gordon’s proposal to pay off Tehran.

In return for all that money and sanctions relief, the Islamic Republic was required to do comparatively little. It had to end the war and not initiate or threaten further military action against the U.S. or Israel. Iran also had to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels” through the Strait of Hormuz, charging no tolls for 60 days, and to “conduct dialogue” with the Omani government “to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz” (albeit “in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait”). The regime also had to “maintain the current status quo” of its nuclear program pending a final deal, “reaffir[m] that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons,” resolve the issue of its enriched-uranium stockpile through, at a minimum, “down-blending” it; and “discuss” enrichment “and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal.”

We know the rest of the story. The U.S. Treasury Department issued a sweeping license temporary rolling back sanctions on Iranian oil. The license, combined with the end to the blockade, allowed the regime to earn between five and six billion dollars in oil sales over the following three weeks. The U.S. also took steps toward unfreezing Iranian assets, provided that Iran took steps in keeping with its MOU obligations.

But the Islamic Republic did not hold up its end of the bargain. As I wrote previously, the regime repeatedly violated its MOU commitments. It attacked and threatened U.S. forces and America’s Gulf allies. It first announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and later said ships could only traverse the Strait using an Iran-designated route. When some vessels attempted to take an alternative route promoted by the UN’s International Maritime Organization, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps opened fire on multiple occasions. Tehran also refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency officials to inspect nuclear facilities, rendering it impossible to verify whether the regime was complying with its nuclear obligations under the agreement. And, true to form, Iranian officials played games to delay negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program, instead pushing for frozen funds to be released first (which would, of course, reduce American leverage in subsequent talks). Finally, the U.S. had enough, revoked the Treasury License, reinstated the blockade, and began bombing Iran again.

In short, the Trump administration tried precisely what Gordon recommends—paying Tehran to open the Strait and freeze its nuclear program. U.S. officials hoped that their Iranian counterparts would prioritize economics over ideology. However, regime leaders remain hardcore revolutionaries with no interest in reforming or making peace with the U.S. They interpreted President Trump’s extraordinary concessions as weakness they could exploit, not good faith they should reciprocate. As the president told an interviewer, the MOU “was sort of a test,” and Tehran “never followed it.” He added that to the Islamic Republic, “deals are made to be broken.”

Running this play again will not produce better results. To the contrary, it will signal to Tehran that the Trump administration is desperate to stop fighting and has no confidence in the military option. Why wouldn’t the regime conclude that it’s only a matter of time until the U.S. gives up fighting and goes home, leaving Iran to control the Strait and rebuild its nuclear program?

“An honest politician is one who, when he is bought, stays bought”—so allegedly said nineteenth-century American politician Simon Cameron. The Islamic Republic has demonstrated that it will gladly take payments, but will not be bought. Therefore, any strategy premised on bribing Iran is doomed to fail.