Shipping

"Wilhelmsen Ship Management is planning to acquire a 50% stake in Ahrenkiel Steamship GmbH, which is a part of the MPC Capital Group. The transaction is subject to approval from the relevant antitrust authorities. Wilhelmsen Ship Management entered an agreement with MPC Capital to combine their activities in the ‘technical management of container ships’. The new entity will operate under the name Wilhelmsen Ahrenkiel Ship Management. It will operate in Hamburg, Germany, and Rhoon, Netherlands." (Ship Technology, "Wilhelmsen Ship Management to acquire 50% of Ahrenkiel Steamship," 7/22/20).

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Wilhelmsen Ship Management's website lists contacts and services in Iran, including ship agency services and ship management.

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According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, Ahrenkiel and Ahrenkiel Steamship owned ships have called at Iranian ports on over 20 occasions.

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, vessels for which AEC is the Operator have called at Iranian ports.

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, AEC ships have called at Iranian ports on thirty-two occasions.

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, vessels for which ADCO is the Operator have called at Iranian ports.

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, Ace Tanker ships have called at Iranian ports over 25 times.

According to publicly accessible ship-monitoring data, since January 1, 2016, ABC-operated vessels have called at Iranian ports on numerous occasions.

"Shipping records, leaked video and internal documents show the movement of a significant haul of urea fertiliser out of Iran last month, through the Middle East and on to China.The shipment was then reloaded onto a cargo ship being used by Quantum Fertiliser, a Hong Kong-based trading subsidiary of the ASX-listed multinational Incitec Pivot, a one-time contractor with the federal government and donor to the Labor party. The company said it was “misled about the origin of the product” and was urgently offloading the suspect cargo, while launching a wider review to “remove the risk of a repeat of this situation”...Internal documents suggest Quantum knew the goods it was loading had just come from a cargo vessel named the CS Future. The Guardian has separately established that the CS Future left Iran’s Bandar Abbas port on 1 July. Vessel inspection reports show it was carrying “urea in bulk”.The vessel arrived at Lianyungang, China, on 25 July, via Oman, and began unloading its cargo, valued at an estimated $10-$15m. The haul was then reloaded onto a second cargo ship, the Bulk Aquila. Quantum said it was assured by its Chinese supplier that it was buying products of Chinese origin. It had since rejected the cargo and alerted authorities." (The Guardian, "Mystery $15m Iran shipment exposes Australian-owned firm to sanctions threat," 8/15/2019).

"A third Mehdi Group subsidiary, Vaniya Ship Management Private Limited, helped Mehdi Group set up three shell companies in the Marshall Islands.  Under Ali Ghadeer Mehdi’s management, the shell companies purchased three crude oil tankers:  the SARAK, the SOBAR, and the SOLAN.  The SOBAR and the SOLAN previously appeared in an OFAC advisory to the maritime petroleum shipping community, which warned of the sanctions risks associated with shipments of petroleum to the Government of Syria.  Both vessels, as well as the SARAK, are identified today as blocked property in which Mehdi Group has an interest.  Notably, the SARAK falsified the Iranian origin of its cargo to port authorities." (U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network That Supports IRGC-QF and Terror Proxies," 9/4/2019).

"Additionally, Mehdi Group has two branch offices:  Singapore-based Mehdi Offshore and Ship Management Pte. Ltd. (Mehdi Offshore) and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Penta Ocean Ship Management & Operation LLC (Penta Ocean).  Mehdi Offshore ostensibly provides various support services, while Penta Ocean and UAE-based Mehdi Group subsidiary Fourteen Star Shipping Management manages billing and payments.  Mehdi Group also is able to draw on expertise in oil-related logistics, including refining and storage, through its UAE-based subsidiary Five Energy Oil Trading.

Additionally, Mehdi Group has two branch offices:  Singapore-based Mehdi Offshore and Ship Management Pte. Ltd. (Mehdi Offshore) and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Penta Ocean Ship Management & Operation LLC (Penta Ocean).  Mehdi Offshore ostensibly provides various support services, while Penta Ocean and UAE-based Mehdi Group subsidiary Fourteen Star Shipping Management manages billing and payments.  Mehdi Group also is able to draw on expertise in oil-related logistics, including refining and storage, through its UAE-based subsidiary Five Energy Oil Trading." (U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network That Supports IRGC-QF and Terror Proxies," 9/4/2019).

"Additionally, Mehdi Group has two branch offices:  Singapore-based Mehdi Offshore and Ship Management Pte. Ltd. (Mehdi Offshore) and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Penta Ocean Ship Management & Operation LLC (Penta Ocean).  Mehdi Offshore ostensibly provides various support services, while Penta Ocean and UAE-based Mehdi Group subsidiary Fourteen Star Shipping Management manages billing and payments.  Mehdi Group also is able to draw on expertise in oil-related logistics, including refining and storage, through its UAE-based subsidiary Five Energy Oil Trading.

Mehdi Group found a partner outside of the company to supplement its efforts to assist the IRGC-QF.  Lebanon-based Africo 1 Off-Shore SAL assists in, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Mehdi Group subsidiary Vaniya Ship Management by operating the tanker JASMINE for the network.  The JASMINE also is being identified today pursuant to E.O. 13224 as blocked property in which Africo 1 Off-Shore SAL has an interest." (U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network That Supports IRGC-QF and Terror Proxies," 9/4/2019).