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Value of USG Contracts:
"Tougher conditions led to AP Moller-Maersk's Maersk Line, the world's biggest container company, pulling out entirely from Iran last year, joining an exodus including the world's number two and three MSC and CMA CGM and smaller groups like Germany's Hapag-Lloyd." (Reuters, "Iran faces fresh trade heat as more shipping firms exit," 5/7/2013)
"CMA CGM, the world's third-largest container shipping group, stopped exports from Iran in July and since September has been scanning all containers bound for Iran from the UAE." (Reuters, "Sanctions blowback crippling Iran's shipping trade," 12/1/2011)
"CMA CGM, the world's third-largest container shipping group, stopped export shipments from Iran in July and has been scanning all containers bound for the Islamic Republic since September, the French company said onWednesday... 'In July 2011 the CMA CGM group decided to stop all exports out of Iran,' the company said in an emailed statement to Reuters on Wednesday... CMA CGM had said in a note to customers in September it was introducing a scanning process from Khor Fakkan for all Iranian inbound container cargo, 'in order to maintain a safe service in regards of the international sanctions'... The shipping restrictions introduced by CMA CGM come after its announcement in June of extra security checks covering its activities in Iran, including the creation of an 'Iran Compliance Desk'. CMA CGM was criticised by certain members of the U.S. Congress for lax security in Iran after an arms seizure in March by Israel aboard one of the firm's ships, which the Israelis said concerned Iranian-supplied weapons bound for Gaza. The French group said it was the victim of a false freight declaration and was not accused of wrongdoing by Israel." (Reuters, "UPDATE 1-French shipper CMA CGM stops exporting from Iran," 11/30/2011)
CMA CGM’s website lists two offices in Iran – an agency in Bandar Abbas and a head office in Tehran. Both are listed under the Jahan Darya Shipping Agency (CMA CGM Website).
CMA CGM’s Cimex 1 Line travels between major East Asian ports [China, South Korea] and the Persian Gulf, stopping in Bandar Abbas and advertising “direct service to Iran.” The route is operated weekly by six vessels over 42 days (Cimex 1 Line Info).
CMA CGM’s Gulf Emirates Qatar Feeder Line is a triangular route between Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran’s Bushehr Container Terminal. The route is operated weekly by two vessels over 14 days (Gulf Emirates Qatar Feeder Line Info).
CMA CGM’s Swahili Express Line is a triangular route between East African ports, India, and the Persian Gulf, including Bandar Abbas. The route is operated every nine days by five vessels (Swahili Express Line Info).
Uses Tidewater Middle East Co.’s private terminals in the Shahid Rajaee Port Complex. (Tidewater: Reflection of Tomorrow)
On June 23, 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Tidewater Middle East Co. (“Tidewater”), Iran’s major port operator, in response to the fact that Tidewater is owned by the IRGC and used by the IRGC for illicit activities including weapons shipments. (U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Center, “Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial Entities,” 6/23/11) Tidewater is also sanctioned by the EU for being owned or controlled by the IRGC. (Official Journal or the European Union: Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2010)
CMA CGM’s wholly-owned subsidiary Delmas, which provides “intermodal services to and from Africa,” lists that it operates out of six Iranian ports: Asaluyeh, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Khomeini, Bandar Shahid Rejaie Sez, Bushehr Container Terminal, and Khorramshahr.
CMA CGM’s wholly-owned subsidiary ANL (Australia National Line), a cargo shipping company which ships “to/from and around Australia/New Zealand to anywhere in the world,” operates under ANL Singapore Pte Ltd in Iran. ANL East West Service covers Asia, the Middle East, Indian Subcontinent and Europe. Its ISC 1 line uses the port of Bandar Abbas.
CMA CGM conducts extensive business with the U.S. CMA CGM America LLC, the company’s U.S. branch, is headquartered in Norfolk, VA. Its website advertises that CGM CMA America provides 21 North American services, has posted sustained double-digit growth, and it is among the top ten container shipping companies in the U.S. (CMA CGM America LLC).
CMA CGM has received over $18 million in US government contracts in the past decade, 97% of which came from the U.S. Navy (USAspending.gov).
In January 2010, CMA CGM started port operations in Iran’s Bushehr port. CMA CGM chose Bushehr “due to its reasonable infrastructure established in the past few years ” and “announced its readiness to work with Bushehr port after months of studying and gaining assurance about the Iranian ports capability in exporting, importing and transiting containers.” CMA CGM announced at the time that it would “increase its activities in the [Bushehr] port 10 times more than present (Tehran Times, "Giant shipping line starts operation in Bushehr", 1/9/10).”
Nigeria Incident – MV CMA CGM Everest
Iranian arms shipment to Africa
Violation: UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (Iran)
- Nigerian authorities seized 13 shipping containers carrying illegal Iranian weaponry at Lagos’ Apapa Port. The containers included 107 mm artillery rockets (Katyushas), explosives and rifle ammunition. The arms were to be shipped next to Gambia, with the final destination of the cargo possibly the Gaza Strip.
- The MV CMA CGM Everest originally picked up the containers from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. CMA CGM says it was victim of a false cargo declaration, claiming the weapons were shipped in packages labeled as “glass wool and pallets of stone” and that the Iranian shipper “does not appear on any forbidden persons listing” (AP, “Nigeria: Shipper confirms weapons came from Iran,” 10/30/10).
- In November, Nigeria reported the seizure of the illegal arms shipment to the UN Security Council, accusing Iran of violating UN Resolution 1929. The resolution bans Iran from "supplying, selling or transferring directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals… any arms or related material.” Two Nigeria-based members of the Qods Force, an elite unit of the IRGC, were implicated in the arms shipment. (Reuters, “Nigeria Reports Iran Arms Seizure to UN,” 11/16/10)
UAE Incident – ANL-Australia
North Korean arms shipment to Iran (potentially including BM-25 missile components)
Violation: UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (North Korea)
- The UAE reportedly “seized a ship secretly carrying embargoed North Korean arms to Iran… The UAE reported the seizure to the UN sanctions committee responsible for vetting the implementation of measures, including an arms embargo, imposed against North Korea under Security Council resolution 1874 [banning all North Korean arms exports].”
- “The UAE reported the ship was carrying 10 containers of weapons and related items, including rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition [as well as detonators]. He [the UN diplomat] said the consignment had been ordered by Iran’s TSS, a company said to be linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and previously subject to international bans on importing weapons-related items” (Financial Times, “‘N Korean arms for Iran’ seized by UAE,” 8/28/09).
- The weapons were carried on the Australian vessel, the ANL-Australia, which was flying under a Bahamian flag. ANL is a wholly-owned CMA-CGM subsidiary. The exporting company was an Italian shipper, Otim, which exported the items from its Shanghai office (loaded in Dalian, China). The cargo manifest reportedly said the shipment contained oil-boring machines.
- The UN Security Council sanctions committee reportedly conducted its own investigation into the violation, as well as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (The Wall Street Journal, “Cargo of North Korea Matériel Is Seized en Route to Iran,” 8/31/09)
- In December 2009, the nature of the cargo was described for the first time, which included: “2,030 detonators for 122mm [short-range] rockets, as well as electric circuitry and a large quantity of solid-fuel propellant” (The Washington Post, “Arms smuggling heightens Iran fears,” 12/3/09)
- In December 2009, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported Iran had postponed the test launch of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile because they had not received the delivery of key electronic components allegedly contained in the intercepted North Korean shipment. According to a diplomatic source, “The shipment of the electronic components was supposed to be part of the new agreement signed in late 2008 between Iran and North Korea for the continued supply of the new missile's technology.” The components are said to be for the BM-25 (or Musudan) missile, which has a target range of 2,500 to 3,500 kilometers, thus posing a threat to most of Europe. Pyongyang reportedly exported components to assemble 19 such missiles to Iran in 2005. The BM-25 would be Iran’s longest-range missile. (Kyodo News International, “Iran delays missile test due to row with N. Korea over parts delivery,” 12/6/09)
- In November 2010, the BM-25 missile transfer was revisited when new information was revealed in the WikiLeaks-released U.S. diplomatic cables. According to the cable, secret American intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran has obtained a cache of advanced missiles, based on a Russian design. The missiles would for the first time give Iran the capacity to strike at capitals in Western Europe or Moscow, and they could potentially carry a nuclear warhead. (The New York Times, “Iran Fortifies Its Arsenal With the Aid of North Korea,” 11/29/10)