Iran Risk Matrix

Analysis of the Seventh Round of JCPOA Negotiations

Jason Brodsky — Mon, 06 Dec 2021 17:37:02 +0000

The verdicts are in after the seventh round of the Iran nuclear negotiations paused on December 3: doom and gloom across the P5+1, most especially from the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and the United States. Iran came to the talks with maximalist and unworkable demands. As the international community awaits the resumption of dialogue—some reports suggest that it may happen as early as this week—three takeaways loom large: dead cat diplomacy is in full force; Iran is saying and doing enough to earn another meeting but not an agreement; and the Iranian establishment is deprioritizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Dead cat diplomacy

Former US Secretary of State James Baker famously dubbed the tactic “dead cat diplomacy” to describe a situation where warring parties try to position themselves as the innocent party and label others as the guilty ones should a negotiation breakdown. As other observers like Aaron David Miller have also noted, the United States and Iran have already started this process. In the US readout from Vienna on Saturday, a senior State Department official tellingly remarked, “I assume that many countries share the same concerns that we have, if they were to conclude, if we were to conclude of the JCPOA that Iran had killed the JCPOA—not we had killed it, but Iran had killed it because of its inability, unwillingness to come back into compliance in a reasonable way and at a reasonable pace—then I assume that yes, there would be other sanctions that would come in, that would be triggered.” Indeed, unnamed Western diplomats separately indicated to Reuters “Washington’s unspoken goal may be to win support from China and Russia to pressure Iran if the talks fail.” Setting the table for this narrative—that Iran is the recalcitrant party, not the United States—is clearly part of the US strategy in Vienna, despite the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Iran has also attempted its own version of dead cat diplomacy. Nour News, which is linked to the Supreme National Security Council, showcased how Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani suggested that Tehran’s submission of two documents—one on nuclear and the other on sanctions—along with a plan to submit a third on verification is “clear and convincing proof” of its seriousness. The same report suggested that rather than respond to the documents Iran’s team submitted, Western countries “did not put any initiative on the table and practically slowed down the negotiation process” by requesting an adjournment.

But there was no mention that those Iranian proposals contained unserious demands—ones to which no US president, Democrat or Republican, would ever agree. Separately, on Sunday, an unnamed Iranian official went as far as to suggest “it is now clear that Washington’s reluctance to give up sanctions altogether is the main challenge to the progress of the talks.” In addition to boasting about its comprehensive proposals, Iran has repeatedly emphasized the expert nature of its 40-person strong team in Vienna, whose experience was heavily weighted towards economic rather than nuclear matters. This shows that Tehran’s strategy thus far is to hide behind the qualifications of its negotiation team and the fact that it submitted unanswered proposals which substantially reversed all agreements reached in previous rounds to deflect any blame should talks fail.

A meeting but not an agreement

While Iran’s negotiators continue to play hardball, they are still leaving themselves enough room to win support for continuing the talks to buy time to expand the regime’s nuclear program. This was apparent during the seventh round in Vienna in two respects. First, an Iranian diplomat was quoted as saying on December 3, “we see no impasse in the Iran talks. We’ve provided the other parties with clear-cut draft proposals and have encouraged them to come up with written responses or new ideas.” Thus, the framing of the Iranian documents as mere proposals is to prolong the talks themselves—with the hope of winning support from more sympathetic negotiating parties like China and Russia. Russian officials are already seizing on this opening to justify the continuation of the process.

The second sign of Iran demonstrating flexibility to earn more negotiating time was on the issue of guarantees. The Iranian system has for months demanded a guarantee that there would be no US withdrawal from the agreement again. However, that was not part of the original deal as a non-binding political agreement, and President Biden lacks the legal ability to bind his successors given the JCPOA’s current structure. Yet Iran’s deputy foreign minister for political affairs during an interview last week suggested some flexibility, saying “a guarantee could be applied in various areas and various sections.” This may be a tactic to further divide the P5+1 and thwart adverse diplomatic momentum.

A wild card is how the standoff over the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s access to the Karaj centrifuge workshop will be resolved. Since September, Iran has blocked the IAEA from servicing monitoring and surveillance equipment and replacing storage media at the Karaj complex, after it was damaged in a June sabotage operation. This is undermining the IAEA’s ability to guarantee continuity of knowledge into Iran’s nuclear program. With Washington threatening to support the convening of a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting before the end of the year should there be no resolution, Iran could at the last minute allow access to the Karaj site to buy even more time. In the coming days, Tehran may seek to employ these tools in its diplomatic toolkit, which could be enough to earn another meeting, but not enough to earn an accord at this juncture.

The lack of urgency in Tehran

The supreme leader has been notably silent on the Vienna nuclear negotiations in recent months. President Ebrahim Raisi rarely speaks of the Iran nuclear negotiations—and when he does, only briefly. This stands in contrast to his predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, who spoke regularly on the nuclear file. In fact, in an hour-long interview Raisi gave to Iranian media on Sunday, he only devoted around one minute to the subject, while warning that Tehran “won’t link our economy to these issues.” Iran’s government is in fact planning its next budget reportedly on the assumption that US sanctions continue. This shows that the JCPOA may not be as high a priority for the Iranian establishment as it once was. Instead, for the time being, Iran calculates that using the Vienna negotiations as a cover to build its nuclear program, pivoting to Asia—particularly China, creating regional trade linkages, and implementing a resistance economy to neutralize sanctions is the focus of the system.

In the end, Iran feels emboldened because it does not fear the consequences of its escalation. For example, censure resolution after censure resolution before the IAEA Board of Governors has been put on hold to give space for diplomacy. The United States has been lax in enforcing sanctions and treaded carefully in responding to Iranian provocations in the region—most especially after the drone attack on the al-Tanf airbase in Syria in October. It only resulted in a hardened Iranian negotiating position. This is why a reset of US and E3 policy on Iran is long overdue—with more pressure needed to change Iran’s stalling calculus.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.

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Jen Psaki’s Last Mention of a “Longer, Stronger” Iran Deal was 112 Days Ago

Daniel Roth — Thu, 17 Jun 2021 12:58:04 +0000

The last time the White House Press Secretary affirmed President Biden’s pledge to get a “longer, stronger” nuclear deal with Iran was 112 days ago.

Responding to a question about the prospects for a better deal on February 24, Jen Psaki said:

“[T]he President has been clear that if Iran comes back into full compliance with its obligations, we will do the same and, of course, then use that as the platform to build a longer and stronger agreement, including addressing ballistic missiles and many of the concerns that, as you noted, countries in the region, our European partners have about the actions of Iran.”

Since then, however, Psaki has not repeated this robust and reasonable formula, and specific mentions of “longer, stronger” have vanished.

Today, four months later, the White House’s answer to the same question is unmistakably diluted.

Asked expressly about the status of “longer, stronger” dialog on June 9, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan answered:

“We don’t underestimate the difficulty of any nuclear negotiation with the Iranians, since we’ve been through them. But we do believe that there is scope for follow-on negotiations to deal with what — to build on the JCPOA once we are back in it. And we believe the Iranians will ultimately be prepared to engage in those negotiations.”

So, instead of directly promising to secure a longer stronger deal, the White House has retreated to a mere “belief” that there is “scope for follow-on negotiations.”

Instead of addressing ballistic missiles and Tehran’s malign activities, the White House has retreated to a vague impression that it will “build on the JCPOA once we [i.e. the United States] are back in it.”

And instead of the early demand that Iran must take the first step to come back into compliance, the White House was retreated to a synchronized return to the JCPOA involving both Iran and the U.S. - otherwise known as “mutual compliance.”

Predictably, the shriveling of White House promises tracks with a corresponding wilting of State Department discourse over the same period. From February to May, mentions of “longer, stronger” declined from 19 to 3, while mention of “mutual compliance” rose from 0 to 28.

Weaker rhetoric has paired with weaker actions.

In short order, Washington has revoked the terrorist label on Tehran’s proxy Houthi group in Yemen, canceled UN “snap-back” sanctions on Iran, eased travel constraints on Iranian diplomats, declared its willingness to lift most if not all of Trump’s 1,000 or so sanctions not consonant with the JCPOA, and most recently, actually lifted a host of sanctions on individuals tied to Iran’s oil industry.

There is no getting around the fact that these actions are gestures of goodwill, concessions, and inducements aimed at Iran - no matter what State Department officials might say to the contrary.

U.S. goodwill is of course not reciprocated by the Mullahs. In fact it is met with more JCPOA violations, provocations and anti-U.S. hostilities. Any hint of Iranian compromise simply does not exist. Tehran’s dispatch of a warship-flanked convoy of oil tankers - most likely carrying weapons - to President Maduro’s U.S.-sanctioned regime in Venezuela is only the most recent sign of confrontation over cooperation. The election of a new hardline Iranian President this week will merely reinforce Tehran’s non-concessionary stance.

Sadly this is all a long way from then candidate Joe Biden’s own assurance to “strengthen and extend” a deal and “address other issues of concern” in his September 2020 op-ed for CNN, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran.”

Rather than conceding to the Mullahs and dissolving red lines to pink for the sake of simply getting a deal, President Biden and his White House team must remind themselves of their early pledges to the American people. While there are obvious differences in how long and how strong a new deal must be, the fundamental premise of extending and strengthening a deal has wide support from both sides of the aisle. President Biden and his team must revert, and quickly, to the original “longer, stronger” idea, for the current trajectory shows that the U.S. is willing to abandon any prospect of getting a better deal in favor of simply getting any deal.

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The Wilting of State Department Discourse on Iran Nuclear Deal

Daniel Roth — Tue, 08 Jun 2021 17:56:26 +0000

The two rhetorical pillars of President Biden’s Iran strategy are a “longer, stronger” deal and “mutual compliance.” The 135 State Department press briefings between January 26 and June 4 reveal that senior officials have uttered these two phrases more than 100 times.

However, in the same period “longer/stronger” mentions have nosedived while “mutual compliance” mentions have soared:

In the first 33 days (January 26 – February 28):
- “longer/stronger” was mentioned 20 times
- “mutual compliance” was mentioned 0 (zero) times
In the last 33 days ( May 1 - June 4):
- “longer/stronger” was mentioned 4 times.
- “mutual compliance” was mentioned 34 times

The waning of longer/stronger versus the waxing of mutual compliance is shown here:

Longer, stronger

In February, State Department officials affirmed Joe Biden’s campaign pledge to get a “longer, stronger” deal no less than 20 times, calming the worst fears of JCPOA skeptics.

A “stronger” deal would entail a broader JCPOA 2.0 to address “other areas of concern” neglected in the original deal. “We all know them,” affirmed State Department Spokesman Ned Price on February 2, “ballistic missiles, support for proxies; a number of other issues are included in that.”

While the “longer” part of the equation has never been defined, any significant extension would again provide at least some comfort to JCPOA skeptics alarmed by the fact the current arrangement lifts all restrictions by 2031. As it stands, Tehran has a 10 year glide-path, when it will be completely free to produce uranium to weapons-grade with the full ‘sunsetting’ of the JCPOA.

But as noted, the use of this phrasing has plummeted.

Mutual Compliance

While “longer, stronger” was February’s mantra, the phrase “mutual compliance” did not appear once during that month. Its first mention occurred on March 1.

Prior to then, the formula for JCPOA reentry was articulated in quite different terms. Critically it was Tehran that would be required to go first. This was unequivocal.

“If Iran comes back into full compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA,” stated Ned Price (emphasis added), “the United States would do the same…” He reiterated on the same day “the proposition on the table – as President Biden has said – is that if Iran resumes full compliance with the JCPOA, we will be prepared to do so.”

Likewise, Secretary Blinken stressed that the ball was in Iran’s court, since “Iran is out of compliance on a number of fronts. And it would take some time, should it make the decision to do so, for it to come back into compliance in time for us then to assess whether it was meeting its obligations.”

However, three months later, on May 5, this “hardball” formula explicitly softened into the notion that both Iran and the U.S. would need to “come in to compliance.” The onus was no longer exclusively on Iran to go first. Today, the expressed formula is for Iran and the U.S. to come to some kind of synchronized arrangement.

What does it mean?

This rhetorical 5-month swing, from emphasizing a longer, stronger deal to emphasizing mutual compliance, tracks a worrying shift in U.S. negotiating strategy.

“Longer, stronger” made sense when the full weight of existing U.S. sanctions pressure built up since President Trump’s 2018 withdrawal remained on the table. However, once “mutual compliance” entered State’s lexicon – signaling an American willingness to lift the bulk of those sanctions -- it became increasingly implausible that a better deal could really be achieved.

The shift suggests that the U.S. is no longer bullish about improving on the original deal and has already accepted a lowering of the bar. It suggests that the U.S. is willing to make further gestures and concessions even in the face of escalating Iranian provocations and violations. And it suggests, despite the early tough rhetoric, that the U.S. is set to make another bad deal with the Iranian regime.

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Iran Spies on Swedish Companies for Nuclear Program: Swedes Continue Trading

Daniel Roth — Tue, 18 May 2021 12:35:31 +0000

In its latest report the Swedish Security Service revealed that Iran is investing “large sums” in “conduct[ing] industrial espionage, which is primarily aimed at Swedish high-tech industry and Swedish products that can be used in nuclear weapons programs.” The Iranians are “acting more offensively than before,” and their spy operations are taking place over many years, “even decades.” Yet major global Swedish companies, including firms that makes components used for the nuclear industry, still appear to be doing business with and in Iran.

As the name suggests, SKF (“Swedish Ball Bearing Factory”) is known for making high-precision ball and roller bearings -- crucial components in nuclear power plants. SKF’s own in-house magazine confirms that SKF products are used in the nuclear sector, such as the “stainless-steel SKF roller screws” at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre. (It has also advocated for nuclear power as a transitional post-fossil fuel energy source).

Meanwhile, SKF lists an Iran Branch operating as SKF Eurotrade AB, located on Tehran’s Valiasr Street (“the longest street in the Middle East”). The Iranian firm Rayan Bearing prominently advertises SKF on its website, urging customers to “optimize your rotating machinery design with world-class quality and reliability.” And a Google Maps search reveals several SKF locations in Tehran, like this “authorized distributor” store:

SKF also has ‘authorized distributors’ in the United States. In fact it has more than 4,000 of them, as well as 28 manufacturing sites and two “Solution Factories” in Houston, Texas and Cleveland, Ohio. SKF is also a massive beneficiary of U.S. federal contracts, including from Department of Defense entities including the U.S Air Force and DOD combat support arm Defense Logistics Agency. According to Govtribe.com, SKF USA, Inc. has received $15.1 million in federal contract and grant funding from 2002 to 2020, while the Federal Procurement Database System indicates that SKF has received contract awards to the tune of almost $3.5 million in the last 12 months alone.

Given SKF’s vast and lucrative U.S. footprint, it is imperative that SKF provides full disclosure with regard to Iran. UANI has written three times to SKF seeking such clarification, and most recently on May 7 - a copy of which was sent to SKF USA, Inc. based in Lansdale, Pennsylvania. SKF has failed to respond.

Other U.S.-based entities have also made public their concerns about SKF. Most notably, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System CalPERS, the largest public pension fund in America with $444 billion in assets, has placed SKF “in monitor” status for 2020. CalPERS “continues to monitor the company for possible changes in status relevant to the [California Public Divest from Iran] Act.” The Act bars CalPERS and its sister fund CalSTRS from investing in companies with Iran business operations, and requires “each pension system to sell or transfer any investments in a company with business operations in Iran.”

On June 1, SKF will install a new Chief Executive Officer, Rickard Gustafson. UANI trusts that Mr. Gustafson will prove more forthcoming about SKF’s apparent Iran business than his predecessor.

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Business Risk

New UK Report Offers Iran Deal Path

Daniel Roth — Fri, 05 Feb 2021 00:00:14 +0000

The Iran nuclear deal or JCPOA was atop the agenda during the first call between new U.S. Secretary of State Blinken and his UK counterpart Dominic Raab last week. But while the Biden Administration’s approach remains hazy, Britain could soon embrace a coherent strategy based on a recently published parliamentary committee report.

Authored by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, “No Prosperity Without Justice: the UK’s Relationship With Iran” spells out that “the rump JCPOA is imperfect” and provides three key remedies for any new or revised deal.

First, the report urges “regional consensus” involving “the voices of allies in the region.” None of the countries most directly harmed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions – i.e. its neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel – are part of the current JCPOA. Not only was their exclusion a betrayal of key U.S. partners, it raised regional mistrust as well as the prospect of long-term Middle East nuclear proliferation.

With its historic and commercial ties, Britain is “uniquely placed” to get GCC buy-in. And with French President Macron also agreeing last week that Saudi Arabia must have a seat at the table, regional consultation must be a new deal red-line.

Second, the report counsels, “In a treaty fundamentally designed to deliver non-proliferation assurances, it is entirely reasonable that the JCPOA should place a binding restriction on Iran from developing such missiles [capable of delivering a nuclear warhead].”

In characteristically British understatement, this is a point that should likewise have been plain and enforced back in 2015.

Indeed the world will now face the consequences of that insistence on decoupling the missiles threat from the nuclear threat, with the recent JCPOA-mandated lifting of the UN arms transfer ban on Iran. A new deal absent proper restrictions on Iran’s missile program, already the largest in the Middle East and capable of reaching eastern Europe, North Africa and India, will be as deficient as the old.

The missile component is critical not only with respect to conventional armed force. Iran also supplies thousands of rockets directly to its terrorist proxies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and the plethora of Shiite militias in Iraq.

The third recommendation is therefore a much tougher stance on Iranian sponsorship of terrorism (euphemistically described as “destabilizing activities”). Questioned by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Foreign Secretary Raab confirmed:

“Ultimately, we need a longer-term framework that provides greater certainty over Iran’s nuclear program and […] we must also bring Iran’s wider destabilizing activities into scope”.

The report authors agreed, noting the goal should indeed be to “replace the JCPOA with a broader agreement which additionally addresses regional security,” a third critical omission in the original JCPOA.

From a British perspective, the report proposes designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s main terrorism vehicle, as a terrorist organization in its entirety. More broadly, a new deal cannot just ignore the fact that Iran is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.

Whether the White House will embrace these three new deal priorities - regional buy-in, serious missiles restrictions, and ending terrorism sponsorship - is unclear:

The new Administration has already signaled that it will not inevitably accommodate regional Gulf priorities with its “review” of the F-35 jets sale to the UAE.

Nor (unusually) did it criticize Iran’s recent launch of a major new missile test yesterday.

And several Biden supporters and potential Administration officials were critical of the U.S. decision in 2019 to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization in its entirety.

However, when confronted with the stark reality of what a truly better deal must include, the President and Secretary of State would be wise to consider the judicious recommendations from its transatlantic partner in the “special relationship.”

“No Prosperity Without Justice” can serve as a blueprint for not only the UK, but also the U.S. and all other signatories to a potential new deal.

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What’s Snapback and Why Does It Matter?

Alan Goldsmith — Tue, 08 Sep 2020 16:14:40 +0000

The Trump administration has begun a 30-day process to “snapback” international sanctions on Iran that were suspended because of the Iran nuclear deal. What does snapback mean, and why is it important?

The deal, formally titled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), freed Iran from enormous international restrictions imposed in response to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime agreed to temporary, easily reversible limits on its nuclear program in exchange for permanent, sweeping sanctions relief.

But because Iran has repeatedly violated its international commitments—including by secretly pursuing nuclear weapons—the agreement included an unprecedented provision: the aforementioned sanctions could be reimposed (snapback) at the request of a single JCPOA participant- — China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran.

A participant can file for snapback in response to Iranian noncompliance. Normally, such a mammoth change to international sanctions would require approval by the 15-member United Nations Security Council, with at least nine member states voting in favor and no veto by any of the Council’s permanent members (P-5)—the five countries participating in the JCPOA, except for Germany and Iran. But here, the burden is reversed: the Council would have 30 days to vote to prevent snapback and continue the present sanctions relief.

This snapback provision was included in the JCPOA to ensure that if Iran violated the deal, any one P-5 country could mandate snapback even if the other four—indeed, even if the other 14 on the Council—opposed it. This ability to invoke snapback unilaterally was used to sell the JCPOA to Congress and the American people. As then-President Barack Obama said then, “If Iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all of the sanctions can snap back into place. We won’t need the support of other members of the U.N. Security Council, America can trigger snapback on our own.” Thus, what the U.S. is doing now is explicitly provided for by the deal. Snapback is a feature, not a bug.

And the ‘snapped back’ restrictions, imposed over the course of six Council resolutions, would be substantial. As Reuters notes, snapback:

…would require Iran to suspend all nuclear enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and ban imports of anything that could contribute to those activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It would reimpose the arms embargo, ban Iran from developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and reimpose targeted sanctions on dozens of individuals and entities. Countries also would be urged to inspect shipments to and from Iran and authorized to seize any banned cargo.

However, the rest of the P5+1 claim that the U.S. is unable to invoke snapback because it is no longer a participant of the deal. The administration used its withdrawal from the deal to reimpose sanctions it would not have been able to apply if it remained party to the JCPOA. Therefore, the U.S. cannot have its cake and eat it too, they say. Indeed, France, Germany, and the U.K. claim that any actions to implement a U.S.-imposed snapback would be “devoid of any legal effect.” China and Russia have stated that they will ignore such a snapback. And because many Council member states deny the U.S. has any right to request snapback, Niger, which holds the Council’s rotating presidency in September, reportedly may simply decline to hold a vote on the matter.

The State Department has issued a memo defending America’s right to trigger snapback, saying that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed and gave effect to the deal, listed the U.S. as a participating state, and nowhere required that any state who left the deal would lose its rights as a participating state, including the right to trigger snapback. Regardless, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said that the U.S. will “enforce the [snapped-back] sanctions,” regardless of which country violates them.

Critics have argued that, even if the U.S. can invoke snapback, it should not, because such unilateral action would alienate our allies and therefore weaken our ability to address both the Iranian nuclear threat and other national security issues. But again, the very existence of the right of unilateral snapback in the deal was explicitly designed to allow participant states to do exactly what the U.S. is now doing. While supporters of the deal oppose unilateral snapback now, they used its existence to sell the deal in the first place to a skeptical American public.

Supporters of the U.S. invocation of snapback argue that it is justified by Iranian noncompliance and by the looming expiration of the international arms embargo against Iran. Snapback would eliminate the sunset of the embargo, and thereby preserve restrictions on Iran’s ability to buy weapons or provide them to other malign actors like the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

While supporters of the JCPOA argue that the U.S. could have extended the arms embargo if it stayed in the deal and partnered with the E.U. and others to that end, the embargo’s sunset was a key part of the deal and extending it would have drawn objections from Iran as well as P-5 members Russia and China, both of whom want to increase their own arms sales to Iran. Indeed, that is why the sunset of the arms embargo, which has nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear program, was included in the nuclear deal in the first place. The inability to extend the embargo also doesn’t bode well for keeping in place international sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program, which, pursuant to the JCPOA, are due to expire in three years.

If snapback goes ahead and the nuclear deal collapses, can both supporters and opponents of snapback find consensus on a new policy to prevent a nuclear Iran? Such a policy could learn from the JCPOA’s failures.

First, any permanent easing of sanctions on Iran could be tied to permanent concessions by the regime. In particular, as was longstanding international policy until the JCPOA, Iran would be prohibited from ever enriching uranium, as such material could be used for nuclear weapons.

Second, any new agreement could cover the totality of Iran’s threatening behavior, including not only its nuclear-weapons quest but its ballistic-missile program and sponsorship of terrorism.

And third, a new deal could be structured not as another nonbinding political agreement —like the JCPOA—but as a treaty. The U.S. Constitution requires treaties to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. Meeting such a threshold would require bipartisan buy-in—buy-in that could not be obtained without much tougher restrictions on the Iranian regime.

Most likely, international sanctions on Iran will be snapped back into effect on September 19—either de jure, according to the U.S. position, or simply de facto, because of the deterrent effect of the Trump administration’s determination to enforce those sanctions. The day after snapback, all responsible nations should work together about what matters most—stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

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Iran’s Snapback Strategy

Jason Brodsky — Wed, 26 Aug 2020 19:28:50 +0000

Since the U.S. decision to trigger the snapback sanctions mechanism on Iran under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Iran has responded cautiously. While there have been calls from various officials to further violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the regime appears to have adopted a near-term strategy of restraint. It could morph into agitation depending on how the U.S. complaint is received by the U.N. Security Council.

In his criticism of Washington’s decision to trigger the snapback sanctions mechanism, Iran’s foreign minister focused mostly on its legalities, arguing that the term “JCPOA participant” under Resolution 2231 is merely “descriptive and exhortatory; it lists as a factual matter who the participants were at the time of the adoption of the resolution in 2015 and has no other definition.” He also wrote that Iran “has already and clearly shown its good faith and full responsibility. Now, it is the turn of the international community.” This was a signal of the regime’s intent to condition any escalation on developments in the U.N. Security Council.

Around the same time, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations also gave a conciliatory interview, saying “[i]f the next administration, whoever that might be, is going to accept Resolution 2231 and implement the provisions of the JCPOA in all honesty, I believe there is room for the United States to join other members of the JCPOA within the context of the Joint Commission to talk about different issues related to the Iran deal.” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani likewise dismissed the move, dubbing it a “propaganda ploy.”

Indeed, the circumspect Iranian reaction crossed the political spectrum. Last week, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a political nemesis of President Hassan Rouhani, warned “[h]istory shows us that standing against terrorists as well as governing the affairs of the country with ration and prudence will always lead to achieving great victories.” Ghalibaf use of the term “prudence” was particularly noteworthy, as that borrowed from Rouhani’s political brand of a government of “prudence and hope.” Conservative lawmakers also introduced legislation which would require an automatic withdrawal from the JCPOA within 72 hours of prior U.N. Security Council resolutions being re-imposed against Iran. Such positioning may indicate that a consensus has been reached at the highest levels of the Islamic Republic to tread carefully in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. announcement to trigger the snapback mechanism—calculating that the costs of immediately ramping up its nuclear program outweigh any benefit. As of now, it appears only later in the 30-day snapback process is the Islamic Republic positioning itself to take action—at least on the nuclear file.

Iran may also view the recent visit of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) director-general as another opportunity for it to buy political space. While Iranian authorities have publicly said that Rafael Grossi’s trip was unrelated to the snapback effort underway in New York, the timing of the visit comes weeks before the next gathering of the JCPOA Joint Commission and board of governors’ meeting of the IAEA in September—the first one since its resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the agency’s safeguards inquiry. It is also after Grossi’s ultimatum to Iran last month, saying if the safeguards issues weren’t resolved by the end of July, “things will be bad.”

As a result, Iranian officials have been telegraphing openness to avoid further adverse action on the part of the international community in September, which will be a particularly sensitive month for the Iran file. We see this strategy in the comments from the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, who said that Tehran had started a “new chapter” with the IAEA during the visit of the director-general. In their joint statement after the visit, Iran agreed to provide the IAEA access to the two sites it had specified and dates for the visit were agreed to. Tehran also won a commitment from the IAEA that it would not have further questions and further requests for access to locations other than those declared by Iran under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. But that promise was bounded by language saying “in the present context, based on analysis of available information to the IAEA”—meaning that the IAEA is giving itself room, at least on paper, to make future requests if new information arises.

Thus, Tehran is treading carefully and its calculation appears to be aimed at buying time through these concessions, like the agreement with the IAEA on its safeguards case, which it feels will have the added benefit of avoiding a rift with the P4+1 as the snapback debate heats up before the U.N. Security Council. That doesn’t mean the regime’s battles with the IAEA are over. Indeed, it’s likely the distrust will continue. Just as the IAEA’s director-general was finishing his visit, Jam-e Jam newspaper, which is affiliated with Iranian state television, published a cartoon of Grossi depicting him as being under the influence of Israel, the United States, and the European Union.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

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German Academic Cooperation is Potential Sanctions Soft-spot

Daniel Roth — Fri, 17 Jul 2020 17:57:21 +0000

This week German intelligence confirmed (yet again) that Iran was secretly procuring illegal nuclear and missile technology during 2019. The Germans should also look closer to home though, because you don’t have to be a spy to appreciate that Iran has a less furtive route to the same destination: through international academic collaboration.

As the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control notes in its report, “The Academic Pipeline to Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Iran’s universities are crucial elements in the regime’s decades-long pursuit of nukes. In February 2019, the U.S. sanctioned Shahid Beheshti University (SUB) and Sharif University of Technology (SUT) for their nuclear research. Both institutes were already black- or gray-listed by, variously, the EU and the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and Switzerland. Several Iranian universities are also connected to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

But alarmingly, western universities, most especially in Germany, may themselves be feeding the drip of Iran’s relentless quest for nuclear proficiency.

That Germany is a likely weak-spot in the academic sphere is not surprising.

According to the German Chancellors’ Conference (“The Voice of the Universities”), “there are 77 formal agreements between higher education institutions in Germany and Iran, including exchanges of students, doctoral candidates and senior researchers, and encompassing joint research and publications.”

In 2017, the German Chancellors’ Conference held a two-day seminar focusing on German-Iranian university cooperation. Twenty university leaders toured five Iranian universities to discuss “enhancing internationalization and managing partnerships between Universities in Germany and Iran.”

Academic cooperation is strongly supported by influential government and cultural agencies, including the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Goethe Institute, the German Embassy’s Deutsche Sprachintitut Tehran (DST), and the Ministry for Education and Research. In fact, “[m]any Iranian scientists and academics were trained at German universities and support joint German-Iranian research projects and a strengthening of bilateral cooperation in higher education.”

Thus, Oldenburg University runs a program with the Physics department at the University of Guilan on the Caspian Sea. Founded in collaboration with West Germany in 1974, Guilan also happens to be a key hub for Iran’s nuclear physics research, while the German coordinating professor specializes in theoretical physics. (Oldenburg also runs academic exchanges with dozens of American universities, including UC San Diego, Penn State and Lehigh).

Rostock University also has a cooperation agreement with the Institute of Chemistry at Shiraz University through a contract signed as recently as December 2019. Accompanying the signing, the Rostock Chancellor added, “A few years ago I was on a DAAD exploration tour in Iran with Professor Neymeyr and was impressed by the scientific institutions there, but also by the incredible eagerness of the students to learn.” The Iranian counterpart, Professor Bahram Hemmateenejad, is also tied to other German academic institutes including Braunschweig Technical University as well as the Max-Planck Institute for Colloids. Like Rostock, Passau University also has strong connections with Shiraz University in the fields of IT and IT Security.

Finally, the Technical University of Dresden (TUD) has a guest researcher in physical chemistry from Iran’s Amir Kebir University, a subordinate of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) and cited by various nonproliferation agencies as a likely nuclear procurement front and involved in illicit nuclear-related activities. Amir Kebir offers degrees from undergraduate to PhD level in nuclear engineering. Like Oldenberg, TUD also has partnerships with U.S. institutes of higher learning, including the University of Nevada, the Cooper Union in New York City and Rensselaer Polytechnic.

In the U.S., academic exchange with Iran is restricted by OFAC to undergraduate level and non-scientific disciplines like law, business and the social sciences. No such limits apply in Germany, which, for instance, actively encourages Iranians to “graduate-level engineering programs.”

As the present fiasco over the revocation of foreign student visas in the U.S. shows, it is important to ensure as far as possible that the vast swathe of blameless Iranian academics and students are not unfairly penalized due to the behavior of their own government and its agencies. However, as with its long-standing political and commercial patronage of Iran, it is Germany that is once again stretching ‘cooperation’ in higher education to the outer limits of propriety.

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The Democrats on Iran

Jason Brodsky — Wed, 11 Mar 2020 16:23:31 +0000

As former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders prepare to faceoff in the upcoming presidential debate on March 15, a slate of pressing foreign policy issues looms large in the incoming presidential inbox. Iran is one of the files that will command the attention of the next president. While Biden and Sanders remain opposed to the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there are important distinctions and fissures within the Democratic Party and between the candidates which should receive attention—namely what to do with the U.N. arms embargo on Iran which expires in October 2020 and how the next commander-in-chief would use force.

First, under U.N. Resolution 2231—which endorsed the JCPOA—the arms embargo on Iran expires even before the November presidential election. This would enable the mullahcracy to expand its own military arsenal and provide arms to its proxies. Russia and China have already signaled an interest in supplying Iran with fighter jets and weaponry, and thus are likely to oppose the Trump administration’s efforts to extend the arms embargo. Biden and Sanders haven’t stated publicly how they would handle the expiring U.N. arms embargo—except to say that they would reenter the JCPOA with no new preconditions, assuming Tehran falls back into compliance with its own nuclear obligations under the deal. Both candidates would then use reentry as a platform to extend the existing contours of the deal to address additional dimensions of Iran’s destabilizing behavior.

There are currently bipartisan efforts underway expressing support for an extension of the arms embargo. However, there are emerging divisions within the Democratic Party. A prominent supporter of the JCPOA, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, recently told Al-Monitor “[t]he reality is the nuclear deal doesn’t exist today. You have to live in that reality. I don’t think it’d be great policy to let the embargo disappear if we’re not in the [deal]. So, I’m generally sympathetic to the idea that we’re going to need to re-up it and be back in a position to negotiate with the Iranians in the next administration.” But some former Obama administration officials are hesitant about such a push, with one dubbing it a “reasonable concession as a means to keep alive a version of the [deal] to return to future diplomacy.” With Sanders’ past record of opposing U.S. sanctions on Iran out of fear they would unravel the nuclear deal, questions remain as to whether he would use the same logic to oppose an extension of the arms embargo on Iran in a bid to preserve the JCPOA. Biden, seeking to adopt a more bipartisan, practical approach, may try to take a different course, in line with Murphy’s comments. But there hasn’t been much public discussion in this presidential primary cycle on what to do if Russia and China veto an extension of the arms embargo. In that event, would the candidates be prepared to support snapback sanctions—and in the process collapse the JCPOA—if there is Security Council paralysis over the arms embargo?

Second, Biden and Sanders have taken opposite stances on the U.S. strike which killed former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force Qassem Soleimani. In recent comments, Biden has hedged. He has emphasized that Soleimani’s death “takes a dangerous actor off the board.” However, Biden blasted the Trump administration for its shifting explanations of imminence, a “haphazard decision-making process,” and a potential escalatory cycle. Sanders has been unequivocal in denouncing the Trump administration’s decision—dubbing it an “assassination” and that “Congress has not authorized any military action against Iran.” More generally, Biden has expressed a conventional Democratic foreign policy stance towards the use of force. He’s emphasized the right of the United States to defend itself and its allies “by force, if necessary” and that “force must be used judiciously to protect a vital interest of the United States.” The former vice president has stated that the “nuclear ambitions of Iran” pose such a vital interest. The Vermont senator has emphasized diplomacy first and foremost, with force being almost a second tier option.

In the end, Vice President Biden and Senator Sanders want to use reentry into the JCPOA as a means of changing U.S. policy on Iran. But automatic reentry without insisting on any changes to the existing agreement is more complicated than meets the eye, because Iran is insisting on a return to the pre-2017 sanctions landscape. Since Trump’s inauguration, the U.S. government has levied nuclear and non-nuclear—some terrorism—sanctions on the Islamic Republic. A new president of the United States would run into resistance from Congress and the American public in removal of sanctions—especially the terrorism designations—in return for Iran merely returning to compliance with a stale nuclear deal. Additionally, Tehran has been demanding compensation for U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA—something that’s likely to be a nonstarter in Washington. Reentry into the JCPOA may receive applause lines on the campaign trail. But the made-for-2015 rhetoric doesn’t necessarily reflect the reality of 2020.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

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NATO, OPEC, and the JCPOA Joint Commission Meetings

Jason Brodsky — Mon, 02 Dec 2019 15:56:34 +0000

The center of geopolitical gravity will descend on Europe this week. It begins with a NATO Leaders Meeting in London from December 3-4, followed by the Annual OPEC Conference in Vienna from December 5-6, only to be bookended by a meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on December 6 in the Austrian Capital. There’s one common denominator in all these meetings: the challenge of Iran.

Previous gatherings of world leaders have offered an occasion to discuss the threat from Tehran. Last August, French President Emmanuel Macron used the G7 Summit in Biarritz to host a tête-à-tête with Iran’s foreign minister. While there is no sign that any dramatic diplomatic maneuvering is in the offing, Iran will loom large during all these meetings.

NATO Leaders Meeting

Russia, China, defense spending, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, and the U.S. withdrawal from northern Syria will all top the agenda, marking the 70th anniversary of the NATO alliance. But the 800-pound gorilla in the room will be President Macron’s argument that NATO is experiencing “brain death” because of a lack of commitment by the United States and coordination.

Iran fits into this broader dynamic because of the disagreement between Europe and the United States over its maximum pressure campaign. The Europeans are so fearful of being associated with the effort that most countries, aside from Britain, have declined to join the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct to provide a common defense against Iranian aggression targeting maritime activity in the region.

France is seeking to have it both ways. It’s mourning the decline of the U.S. leadership in international institutions and criticizing the United States for an inadequate response in the aftermath of the tanker and Aramco attacks, while effectively creating an end-run around a U.S.-led maritime security initiative in the region.

To make matters worse, the European force is entirely redundant. France’s defense minister announced that a French naval base at Abu Dhabi will serve as the headquarters of the mission. But the United Arab Emirates is already a member of the International Maritime Security Construct.

Beyond Europe’s desperation to preserve a JCPOA that’s on life support, the hypocrisy and redundancy may be explained by Macron’s ambitions for a European Army—a concept of which Germany has been recently skeptical, in part, because it will undermine NATO. Thus, these complicated relationships could impact the debate over Iran.

Washington should consider leveraging this landscape to bring the rest of Europe into its International Maritime Security Construct or at the very least push for increased coordination. The celebration of the 70th Anniversary of NATO offers such a platform for the U.S. government to call for unity going forward. Additionally, with the reports that Germany is preparing a “ban on activities” for Hezbollah, there may be additional momentum for the rest of the European Union to take a harder-line against Iran.

OPEC Conference

The annual OPEC Conference is another theater where Iran will figure heavily. The meeting will feature Saudi Arabia’s new energy minister, Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud, coming face-to-face with Iran’s longest-serving oil minister, Bijan Zanganeh. While tensions will be present—this being the first OPEC Conference since Iran’s September 14 attack on Saudi Aramco, which disrupted 5% of the global oil supply—the Saudi Energy Minister and his Iranian counterpart have a history of dialogue.

In October, when the two came together for a Russian energy conference, Zanganeh claimed that he had been friends with Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman for over 22 years. A Reuters report indicated “the two ministers were later seen holding hands together…and speaking on the sidelines of the conference...” On his panel, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman refused to comment on who may have been behind the attacks. Thus, the existing rapport may reduce tensions in the room.

But while much of the agenda will likely be devoted to the possibility of extending the OPEC+ deal to reduce supply by 1.2 million bpd, the threat of more attacks by Iran and Zanganeh’s future in Tehran may present some complications. Aramco is expected to announce a final price for its shares on December 5, right as the ministers begin their deliberations during the OPEC Conference. It will be a reminder that despite attempts to deescalate tensions in the region, Iran remains intent on building leverage in the energy markets as a means to extract sanctions relief—potentially endangering additional Gulf oil infrastructure and Aramco’s IPO. The head of U.S. Central Command just days ago warned “My judgment is that it is very possible they will attack again.” Reuters reported that even in the final planning meetings ahead of the September 14 strike on Saudi Arabia, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had started “planning for the next one.”

Iranian lawmakers are also attempting to impeach Bijan Zanganeh after the new gas policy was instituted. Already members of Iran’s hardline factions in parliament, the security services, and the judiciary are distancing themselves, arguing that the rationing and price increases weren’t implemented properly. As noted above, Zanganeh is the Islamic Republic’s longest-serving oil minister—having served in the same role under Presidents Khatami and Rouhani. His steady hands at the helm of the Oil Ministry since 2013 stands in contrast to President Ahmadinejad, who cycled through at least four ministers during his eight-year tenure.

Zanganeh has repeatedly been targeted by Iranian legislators over the years, especially after the U.S. government cancelled energy waivers for countries to import Iranian oil. With the gas rationing and price increases infuriating Iranians, Zanganeh is entering the OPEC meeting from a position of weakness.

JCPOA Joint Commission Meeting

The Joint Commission meeting slated for December 6 in Vienna will be held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. As a result, it’s unlikely that any dramatic announcements will be made—like the triggering of the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). Iran is likely continue to warn it’s prepared to further violate the nuclear deal in January, and Europe will reiterate its usual concern and regret over the U.S. withdrawal.

However, this will be the first Joint Commission meeting under the tenure of the new High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Affairs for the European Union Josep Borrell. It also comes on the heels of six additional European countries becoming shareholders of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) and a warning from France’s foreign minister that the DRM remains an option if Iran continues to fall out of compliance with the JCPOA.

In the end, the status quo in Brussels on the Iran file is likely to prevail in the near-term, given Borrell’s commitment at his confirmation hearing to preserve the JCPOA and European redlines likely focusing on 20% enrichment or kicking out IAEA inspectors, among others. Also beyond the symbolism of more countries joining INSTEX, the European Union still hasn’t been able to get the mechanism off the ground after months of repeatedly telegraphing that it was in the final stages of operationalization. Thus, deadlock over the JCPOA will likely continue.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

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