Banking

Allied Engineering Group (AEG)

Industry
Banking
Country
Lebanon
Sources

"The statement called on Allied Engineering Group S.A.R.L. (AEG) and Lebanon's Central Bank to “end their relationships” with Iranian banks and financial institutions. AEG is SWIFT's Beirut-based Regional Partner for the Middle East and Africa, and provides SWIFT services for more than 400 banks in more than 40 countries... UANI called on AEG to confirm that it will not allow Iranian institutions to use it and its Service Bureaus as a work-around following the expected termination of Iranian SWIFT access." (Naharnet, "U.S. Organization Calls on Lebanese Central Bank Not to Help Iran Evade Sanctions," 3/1/2012)

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"Continuing its SWIFT campaign, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) called on the Allied Engineering Group S.A.R.L. (AEG) and Lebanon's Central Bank to end their relationships with Iranian banks and financial institutions, and prevent Iran from using Lebanon as a banking hub to avoid sanctions. AEG is SWIFT's Beirut-based Regional Partner for the Middle East and Africa, and provides SWIFT services for more than 400 banks in more than 40 countries. AEG offers additional add-on electronic services to such institutions through its Beirut, Bahrain, and Egypt-based Service Bureaus (SB's). UANI is concerned that AEG and its SB's will serve as a continuing gateway and electronic work-around for Iranian funds. UANI called on AEG to confirm unequivocally that it will not allow Iranian institutions to use it and its SB's as a work-around following the expected termination of Iranian SWIFT access." (UANI Press Release, "UANI Calls on Allied Engineering Group, Lebanese Central Bank to Close Lebanese Electronic Gateway for Iranian Funds," 2/21/2012)

Noor Islamic Bank

Industry
Banking
Country
UAE
Sources

Subsidiary of Noor Investment Group LLC.

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"The effort was particularly sensitive because the targeted institution in the United Arab Emirates is partly owned by the local government of Dubai, a close U.S. ally. The chairman of the bank, called the Noor Islamic Bank, is the son of Dubai's ruler. In mid-December, Noor agreed to close off what the people briefed on the operation characterized as Iran's single-largest channel for repatriating foreign-currency oil receipts—facilitating as much as 60% of Iran's foreign oil sales by late last year, they estimated... The U.S. targeted Noor Islamic Bank because it had been returning oil profits to Tehran via entities that have been sanctioned by the U.S. and European Union, including banks Saderat and Melli, these people said. In the week after Noor cut off these transactions, the Iranian rial's value fell by around 12% in relation to the dollar in currency markets, from 13,700 rial to the dollar to more than 15,000, according to traders. Trade in bazaars dried up. Many Iranians rushed to foreign currency or gold in black-market deals, and the rial has continued to fall... But the press to shut down Noor's Iran transactions, which the U.S. government hasn't publicly disclosed, was a main trigger, according to the people familiar with the operation. 'Noor was one of the most important channels that Iran was using to get its oil revenues,' said a person briefed on Treasury's action. 'It was a huge node.' A spokesman for Noor Islamic Bank said: 'As a U.A.E. bank, we comply with all U.A.E. Central Bank directives and regulations. We are in close contact with our trading partners in those countries that have imposed sanctions and we do not foresee any difficulties going ahead.' Representatives for the bank and its controlling family declined further comment... Noor emerged as a major center for Iran's oil business only last year, as more and more global banks began cutting off their financial ties to Tehran, said the people familiar with the matter... Last winter and summer, Indian officials openly talked about using Noor Islamic Bank to process its oil purchases from Iran as these other avenues shut down. 'We are exploring if Indian oil firms can open accounts in banks like Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank, so they can undertake a direct transfer of money for oil they buy from Iran,' a senior Indian official told the Press Trust of India last April. Noor brought U.S. focus onto the U.A.E., a federation of seven monarchies including Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which has emerged as perhaps the most important front line in the West's financial campaign against Iran... Toward the end of last year, Noor Islamic Bank—whose chairman is Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, the Dubai ruler's son—risked the distinction of becoming the first foreign entity sanctioned under Mr. Obama's 2010 legislation. Around that time, U.S. Treasury officials detected Iran moving its energy transactions into Noor Islamic Bank, according to people briefed on the action. Treasury officials raised their concerns about Noor's activities, both directly with the bank as well as with Dubai and Abu Dhabi monetary authorities, these people said... 'The U.A.E. government took the concerns very seriously and was helpful in resolving' the Noor Islamic Bank case, said the official briefed on the operation.'" (Wall Street Journal, "U.S. Cuts Iran Cash Pipeline," 2/29/2012)

Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)

Industry
Banking, Financial Services
States
CA
NC
Country
Belgium
Sources

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") is “a member-owned cooperative through which the financial world conducts its business operations.” “More than 9,700 banking organisations, securities institutions and corporate customers in 209 countries” use SWIFT services “to exchange millions of standardised financial messages.” (SWIFT Website. “Company information”)

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SWIFT provides services to Iranian banks sanctioned by the U.S., EU and UN. SWIFT has issued Business Identifier Codes (BIC) codes to sanctioned Iranian institutions, including major Iranian financial institutions designated by the United States.

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"While the US is likely to try to slow down Iran's reintegration into Swift, Swift is a European based organization subject to European law, Senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, James M. Dorsey told Trend. The expert was commenting on the recent news on Iranian Tose-e Saderat (Exports Development) Bank's announcement, as it plans to start talks with EU to re-establish its connection with SWIFT, as soon as EU court upholds its initial ruling for the removal of sanctions against the Bank. 'Ultimately, the U.S. will have to comply. Individual banks will however retain the right not to do business with Iran as will their account holders,' Dorsey underscored. Managing-Director of Iran's Tose-e Saderat Bank, Bahman Vakili said on Sept. 16 that his bank will start talks with EU bank officials to reestablish the SWIFT link between the two sides. 'We will negotiate with them on the re-establishment of SWIFT (the financial messaging provider for more than 10,000 banking organizations, securities institutions and corporate customers) connections after the EU court issues its final verdict,' Vakili told reporters in Tehran. He said his Bank is now waiting for the EU court's final verdict after it ruled in favor of Tose-e Saderat Bank in its initial ruling and called on the European countries to provide it with strong evidence to substantiate their claim that the Bank has acted against the international laws and has helped Iran's peaceful nuclear program. He added that since the EU members seem to have no corroborative evidence to substantiate their claims against the Bank, the court's final verdict will certainly be issued in favor of the Tose-e Saderat Bank, similar to what happened to Iran's Bank Mellat earlier this year." (Trend, "U.S. likely to slow down Iran's re-integration into SWIFT," 9/18/13)

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“The EU has blacklisted 14 of Iran's 30 banks for facilitating illicit activity, including terrorism. The U.S. has designated the 14 banks named by the EU as well as another six Iranian banks for supporting Iran's nuclear program and sponsorship of terrorism. Critically, the U.S. has also blacklisted all 30 Iranian banks for deficiencies present in the anti-money-laundering systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Swift, however, has barred only the 14 banks blacklisted by the EU, leaving the other Iranian banks free to work within the global financial system. This is a clear violation of Swift's own corporate rules, which state that services 'should not be used to facilitate illegal activities.' Moreover, given Swift's large physical presence in New York and its business dealings in the U.S., there are strong legal grounds to argue that it is subject to U.S. law, which would mean it is violating that as well. U.S. banking regulators and Treasury officials have an obligation to make Swift stop its dealings with Iranian banks or cease business operations in the United States.” (Wall Street Journal, "Despite Sanctions, Iran's Money Flow Continues," 6/24/13)

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"Republicans and Democrats are pressuring congressional negotiators to produce legislation imposing the severest penalties on Iran, targeting its energy sector and financial institutions as the United States seeks to weaken Tehran economically and derail its pursuit of nuclear weapons . . . The lawmakers also said any legislation should include sanctions on insurance companies that knowingly provide coverage to an entity that has already been penalized. They also are pressing for sanctions on the directors and shareholders of organizations like SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, unless they stop providing services to the Central Bank of Iran." (Fox News, "Lawmakers press for tough Iran sanctions bill," 7/27/12)

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The SWIFT 2010 Annual Review reported that Iran’s 19 member banks and 25 connected institutions had sent 1.160 million FIN messages and received 1.105 FIN messages. Compared to 2009, this represented a 0.7% growth in FIN messages sent and received. (“SWIFT Annual Review 2010,” April 2011)

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"The committee proposed that the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, shut out Iran's central bank and other financial institutions from the system used to move money between banks around the world. Because of the bill, European regulators ordered SWIFT to disconnect designated Iranian financial companies from its messaging system, the first time the electronic payment system had expelled any banks... It extends sanctions originally aimed at SWIFT to all financial messaging service providers, and bans third-country entities from accessing electronic banking systems on Tehran's behalf, the aide said." (Reuters, "US Senate to consider new Iran sanctions Thursday," 5/17/2012)

 

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“An organization that is central to the international banking system said it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business. Current and former U.S. officials said that if the Belgium-based organization, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or Swift, bans sanctioned Iranian entities from using its network, Tehran could find itself virtually incapable of conducting electronic financial transactions. 'This would be the knockout blow,' said Avi Jorisch, a former U.S. Treasury Department official who has worked on Swift... Swift's board of directors is comprised of executives from some of the world's most important banks. This week, activist group United Against Nuclear Iran wrote to board members arguing that they are acting outside U.S. law by allowing designated Iranian banks to use Swift's services. They argued that Swift's guidelines mandate that its cut ties to Iran.” (The Wall Street Journal. "Banking Hub Adds to Pressure on Iran," 2/4/12)

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"The Senate Banking Committee unanimously approved a new regimen of anti-Iran sanctions on Thursday that would for the first time threaten to punish the global financial telecommunications network that nearly all banks rely on to conduct their daily business. The legislation's banking provision, aimed at forcing the telecommunications network to expel Iranian banks that have already been blacklisted, would be financially catastrophic for Iran if carried out fully, according to proponents and sanctions experts. Expulsion from the network - the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, known as Swift - would deny to Iran many billions of dollars in revenue from abroad that is routinely routed into its domestic banking system. 'The Senate Banking Committee has sent a strong message,' said Mark D. Wallace, the president of United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group based in New York that has been pushing for such a provision. He has argued that Swift, which based in Belgium, is already in violation of other sanctions against Iran as well as its own rules. "Swift must end its business in Iran," he said. The legislation does not specify what action would be taken against Swift if it did not comply. There was no immediate comment by Swift on the legislation. But officials of the network, mindful of pressure from Mr. Wallace's group and others that have increasingly advocated stricter sanctions against Iran, denied it was acting illegally, in a statement posted earlier Thursday on the network's Web site." (The New York Times. "Senate Panel Approves Potentially Toughest Penalty Yet Against Iran’s Wallet," 2/3/12)

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"In a sign that the sanctions could tighten further, United Against Nuclear Iran, a New York-based advocacy group that has successfully promoted other economic penalties against Iran, said it had started a campaign to publicize Iran’s dependence on the global financial telecommunication network that nearly every financial institution uses to conduct business. On Monday the group sent a letter to the network, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, known as Swift, warning it to end all relations with Iran’s central bank and 'deny access to all Iranian banks.' The letter asserted that Iran’s membership in the network already violated American and European financial sanctions as well as Swift’s own rules. There was no immediate comment to the letter from either Iran or Swift, which is headquartered in Belgium. Mark D. Wallace, president of United Against Nuclear Iran, said in a telephone interview that the group might seek Congressional hearings on Iran’s Swift membership, which he described as crucial to the country’s economic survival. 'This campaign has the potential to force action,' Mr. Wallace said. 'In some ways it’s a silver bullet. If the Iranians don’t have access to Swift, they can’t get access to revenue.'" (The New York Times. "Iran Praises Nuclear Talks With Team From U.N.," 2/1/12)

Gazprombank

Industry
Banking
Country
Russia
Contact Information
Sources

"Bank Keshavarzi Iran, state-owned bank specialized in financing agriculture sector, has linked up with a number of major Russian lenders including Sberbank, Gazprombank and Transcapitalbank, announced Behrouz Hassan Olfat, director of Europe and Americas department at the Trade Promotion Organization." (September 2017)

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Gazprombank is a subsidiary of Russian gas producer and exporter giant, Gazprom. (Gazprombank website, "Bank's Shareholders")

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"The semi-official Iranian Mehr news agency said on Friday that importers in India -- Iran's second biggest oil customer after China -- were paying off oil debts through Gazprombank... 'There has been no word of this at all... No name has been mentioned, not Gazprom nor any other particular bank. These news reports are not valid,' said the ministry source... An Indian industry source said there had been talks about paying for Iranian oil via Gazprombank but no Indian companies had yet opened an account there and they were still paying through Halkbank." (Reuters, "Iran downplays report India paying for oil via Russia," 10/29/2011) 

 

Antonov Co.

Industry
Aerospace, Manufacturing
Country
Ukraine
Contact Information
Sources

In November 2017, Iran discussed bilateral cooperation in the field of air industries with Antonov company CEO. Iran and Antonov company have been cooperating in the production and operation of aircrafts for two decades.

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"The Persian Gulf country will buy two Ukrainian-made Antonov-158s, after a test flight of the aircraft earlier this month, Mohammad-Ali Sirati, managing director of the Iranian aircraft company, was cited as saying by the official Islamic Republic News Agency. The countries then will start to jointly build the aircraft next year, Sirati, whose company will be in charge of the project, said in Tehran yesterday. Some 30 percent of each plane will be made in Iran, state-run media reported." (Business Week, "Iran Says Antonov-158 Built With Ukraine May Fly in 2013," 10/6/2011)

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Antonov lists on its website that their AN-24 turboprop aircraft is serially produced at HESA plant in Isfahan, Iran. (Antonov website)

JPMorgan Chase

Industry
Banking, Financial Services
Symbol
NYSE:JPM
Country
USA
Contact Information
Sources

"Americans taken hostage in the 1979 siege of the U.S. embassy in Iran sued JPMorgan Chase & Co. over David Rockefeller’s role in persuading the U.S. to allow the deposed Iranian leader into the country." (Bloomberg, "Iran Embassy Hostages Sue JPMorgan Over Rockefeller Role," 3/19/2020). 

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"Despite the changes to the US, EU and UN sanctions on Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) in January 2016, JPMC is still not permitted either by law or JPMC policy to engage in any activities with or involving Iran, the Iranian government or any Iranian financial institutions. JPMC may consider, on a case-by-case basis, certain activities and transactions that are exempt or licensed by OFAC." (Compliance with Iran Sanctions)

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During the first quarter of 2017, a foreign-incorporated subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. processed a payment in the amount of EUR 1,466 for its client, a non-U.S. international organization, where the payment originated from entities owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. The payment, which was received into the client’s account, was for the purchase of informational materials and was therefore an exempt transaction pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 560.210(c). JPMorgan Chase & Co. charged a fee of EUR 2.50 for this transaction. JPMorgan Chase & Co. may in the future engage in similar transactions for its clients to the extent permitted by U.S. law.

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According to its Annual Report filed for fiscal year 2015: "During 2015, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. processed one payment from Iran Airtours on behalf of a U.S. client into such client’s account at JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Iran Airtours is a subsidiary of Iran Air, which, at the time of the payment, was designated pursuant to Executive Order 13382. This transaction was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a license from the Treasury Department’s OFAC. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. charged a fee of U.S. dollar $4.25 for this transaction. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. may in the future engage in similar transactions for its clients to the extent permitted by U.S. law."

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According to its Annual Report filed for fiscal year 2014: "In addition, during 2014, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. processed one payment from Iran Air on behalf of a U.S. client into such client’s account at JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Iran Air is designated pursuant to Executive Order 13382. This transaction was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. charged a fee of US$ 3.50 for this transaction. Iran Air overpaid such U.S. client when it made the initial payment to the client. Therefore, upon its U.S. client’s request, the Firm transferred the overpayment back to Iran Air in the fourth quarter of 2014 and charged a fee of US$ 5.50 for the transfer. As with the initial transaction, the transfer of the overpayment to Iran Air was authorized by and conducted pursuant to an OFAC license. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. has no current intention to continue such activities but may in the future engage in similar transactions for its clients to the extent permitted by U.S. law."

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"U.S. regulators are expected to order JPMorgan Chase & Co to correct lapses in how it polices suspect money  flows, two people familiar with the situation said, in the latest move by officials to force banks to tighten their anti money-laundering systems. The action against JPMorgan, which is expected as soon as Friday, would be in the form of a cease-and-desist order, which regulators use to force banks to improve compliance weaknesses, the sources said. JPMorgan will probably not have to pay a monetary penalty, one of the sources said... A JPMorgan spokeswoman declined to comment... The inquiry on JPMorgan, the biggest U.S. bank, dates back several months, the sources said. The first public signs that JPMorgan had issues with its transaction monitoring systems emerged in August 2011. At that time JPMorgan agreed to pay $88.3 million to settle Treasury Department allegations that it engaged in prohibited transactions linked to Cuba and Iran. A source familiar with the expected order said JPMorgan did not adequately fix dozens of anti-money laundering issues cited previously by regulators, forcing them to take formal action. Under the order, JPMorgan is expected to be required to bolster systems it uses to monitor risk and transactions, the sources said." (Reuters, "Exclusive: JPMorgan faces action on laundering controls," 1/11/13)

 

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"This license was so heavily redacted by OFAC at the request of JPMorgan Chase that it is impossible to say exactly what was authorized other than the fact that it involved a letter of credit that somehow ran afoul of the sanctions against Iran." (New York Times, "Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut," 12/24/10)

Citigroup Inc.

Industry
Banking, Financial Services
Symbol
NYSE: C
States
NY
Country
USA
Sources

"New details about the U.S. sanctions-busting case against Huawei Technologies Co. emerged in court filings in Canada, including about the Chinese telecom giant’s alleged dealings in Iran, Syria and Sudan. The filings also detailed discussions Huawei held with Citigroup Inc. C +0.68% and BNP Paribas SA BNPQY +0.08% about its Iran business. The documents released Tuesday allege that Huawei also had discussions with two other banks, Citigroup and BNP, about its Iran business, following the publication by Reuters of articles in 2012 and 2013 alleging that Huawei sold U.S.-made computer equipment in Iran via Skycom in violation of U.S. sanctions. They allege that Huawei representatives—including the company’s treasurer and Ms. Meng—told Citigroup that the company was in compliance with all sanctions, according to a 2017 email described in the filings. They also describe a 2014 BNP document in which Huawei described Skycom as “one of the business partners of Huawei.” HSBC and Standard Chartered have cut business ties with Huawei, deeming working with the company too risky, The Wall Street Journal reported in December. As of the end of last year, Citigroup continued to provide day-to-day banking services with Huawei outside the U.S., the Journal reported. A spokesman for Citigroup declined to comment. A Standard Chartered spokeswoman and a BNP spokeswoman declined to comment. An HSBC spokesman didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment."  (The Wall Street Journal, "Huawei Discussed Iran Business with Citi and BNP Paribas, Court Documents Show," 8/22/2019).

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2018: " During the fourth quarter of 2018, Citibank Europe plc, a subsidiary of Citibank, acting as an intermediary bank processed a transaction between two Irish banks involving the Iranian Embassy in Ireland. The total value of the payment was EUR 90.00 (USD 104.24). This transaction was for visa-related fees and is exempt pursuant to the travel exemption of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Citibank Europe plc realized nominal fees for the processing of this payment."

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According to its 2017 SEC filing During the third quarter of 2017, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A., a Citibank subsidiary located in Poland, processed three funds transfers involving the Iranian Embassy in Poland.  The value of the funds transfers was EUR 50, EUR 50, and EU 100 (approximately $60.00, $60.00 and $117.00), respectively.  In addition, a branch of Citibank N.A., located in India, processed a funds transfer involving the Iran Consulate General in India.  The total value of this payment was INR 1,368 (approximately $21.00).  These payments were for visa-related fees and Iran-related travel respectively.”

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2015: "In addition to Citi’s prior disclosures, a subsidiary of Citi, Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), identified that it inadvertently processed five domestic funds transfers to the Embassy of Iran in Mexico during the third quarter of 2015.  The total value of these five funds transfers was approximately MXP 3,320 (approximately $177.00).  Three of the payments were for visa services that are exempt under Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations and two were for consular services that going forward would be permissible under OFAC General License H for Banamex as a non-U.S. subsidiary of Citi.  The transactions, in aggregate, resulted in approximately MXP 10 (approximately $0.53) in revenue for Banamex."

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Over the last three presidential administrations, the United States government has granted Citigroup 37 special licenses to do business in Iran. (New York Times, "Companies with Permission to Bypass Sanctions," 12/24/10)

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"When it comes to U.S. sanctions on Iran, no detail is too small to overlook these days. Since February, publicly traded companies have filed nearly 500 disclosure forms about their business ties to Iran…Citibank disclosed that its branch in Bahrain made $4 in profit in the second quarter by processing ATM transactions involving Future Bank, a joint venture whose owners include two Iranian-linked banks barred from doing business with U.S. companies…And though Citibank’s ATM fees were minimal, the bank involved was partly owned by Bank Saderat, which has been on the Treasury Department’s sanctions list since 2006 for being a 'conduit' between Iran and Hezbollah, the militant Shiite Muslim movement based in Lebanon." (Washington Post, "Under new law, companies disclosing even tiniest dealings with Iran," 12/4/13)

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"OFAC granted a license on Dec. 27, 2007, to Citibank authorizing it to make good on an agreement its Japanese subsidiary had entered into in October. The bank had agreed to confirm that certain conditions in a letter of credit had been meet, after which a Malaysian exporter of split-system air conditioners to Turkey would be paid. Then the bank discovered that the goods were to be shipped aboard a vessel called the Iran Ilam that was owned by the Iranian government-run shipping line known as Irisl, thus requiring that the transaction be licensed. The license was issued even though the Treasury Department and OFAC suspected that Irisl was being used to smuggle goods into Iran in contravention of various embargoes, including banned technology the government needed for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Moreover, at the time the license was issued, the United States had evidence that five months earlier, the Iran Ilam itself had delivered a lathe that could be used to make precise metal parts needed for nuclear centrifuges from China to Iran’s Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, according to government officials who requested anonymity to speak about an intelligence matter. Indeed, within months of issuing the license, OFAC announced at a news conference that the United States was adding Irisl to a special blacklist, after an investigation found that Irisl had falsified cargo records, relied on front companies and used other trickery to mask the true nature and destination of shipments. At the September 2008 news conference announcing the decision, OFAC's director, Adam J. Szubin, warned that banks and companies worldwide should be aware that they could be unwittingly aiding Iran’s quest for banned technology by doing business with Irisl: 'Irisl’s deceptive practices make it nearly impossible to determine whether its shipments are licit or illicit,' he said. Mr. Szubin acknowledged in an interview that he was under no obligation to issue the license to Citigroup, given that banks were already prohibited generally from doing business with Iranian entities. But he said that OFAC had issued licenses in cases like this in the past in which the bank had no way of knowing that Irisl was involved and Irisl would have been paid by a foreign third party anyway. To depart from that norm in this case, he added, risked opening up his agency charges of unfair treatment and litigation, and tipping off Irisl that it was under investigation."

"This license is one of at least three that OFAC issued involving the China Great Wall Industry Corporation. The licenses were issued after the Chinese company was added to the United States' special blacklist for supplying components to Iran's ballistic missile development program and before it was removed from the list on June 19, 2008. In one case, the agency licensed the Chinese company's lawyers, who were challenging the blacklisting, to receive legal fees. Two other cases involved wire transactions to or from China Great Wall. OFAC could have forced Citigroup to seize the funds, but said it chose instead to authorize the bank to return the money because China was unlikely to agree that the funds should be seized and therefore the bank would have almost certainly lost a legal battle to keep the funds blocked." (New York Times, "Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut," 12/24/10)

Bank of America

Industry
Banking, Financial Services
Symbol
NYSE: BAC
Country
USA
Sources

Bank of America's 10-K filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2021 states: "Pursuant to a specific license from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued on May 28, 2021, during the fourth quarter of 2021, Bank of America, National Association (BANA), a U.S. subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation, processed one authorized wire deposit totaling $327,257 on behalf of a U.S. client into its account at BANA. The wire deposit settled invoices owed to the U.S. client and consisted of unblocked funds belonging to Jammal Trust Bank, which at the time of the deposit was designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224 [because of its links to Hezbollah]."

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A proposed class action lawsuit "alleges Bank of America has discriminated against consumers of Iranian and Middle Eastern descent by arbitrarily restricting and closing their accounts." (10/21/21)

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Over the last three presidential administrations, the United States government has granted Bank of America 19 special licenses to do business in Iran. (New York Times, "Companies with Permission to Bypass Sanctions," 12/24/10)

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"OFAC redacted so much of this license file that it is impossible to tell what exactly it authorized, though what is clear is that it was related to another license, granted to BNP Paribas, involving the acquisition of equipment that was of Iranian origin. Bank of America, which was financing the deal, contended that the sale should be licensed because the goods had already been exported to another country." (New York Times, "Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut," 12/24/10)

Misr Iran Development Bank

Industry
Banking
Country
Egypt
Contact Information
Sources

"Egypt is expanding its financial ties with Iran through a jointly owned financial institution: the Misr Iran Development Bank. MIDB was founded in 1975, four years before Iran's Islamic revolution, and has somehow endured the tumult since. Today, the MIDB may have become a vehicle for Iran to circumvent economic sanctions with extensive help from Egypt, one of America's closest allies in the region. It is a testament to how difficult it can be for the U.S. to enforce international sanctions, even among countries that appear to be natural allies in the effort to deter Iran.

Egypt controls 59.86 percent of MIDB, split evenly between the state-owned National Investment Bank and Misr Insurance Company, which is partially owned by the state. Iran's 40.14 percent share in MIDB, worth about $80 million, is held by the Iran Foreign Investment Company. The IFIC is the investment arm of Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund, a sovereign wealth vehicle that generates profits for the Iranian government, with investments in the Middle East, Africa, South America, and beyond.

Tehran created the stabilization fund in 1999 to help insulate it from the gyrations of the oil market. When oil was up, the regime threw money into the fund and invested it through the IFIC. When oil was down, Iran withdrew money from the IFIC's investments to make up the shortfall. In the face of severe international sanctions, Iran has been withdrawing heavily of late. This August, when it became clear that the stabilization fund enabled the Iranians to resist international sanctions, the U.S. Treasury Department placed it on the Iranian Transactions Regulation (ITR) list, an administrative designation that made it unlawful for Americans to do business with the company because it is "wholly owned by the Government of Iran....

In 2009, as the international community began to discuss ways to punish the Islamic Republic for its illicit nuclear program, the bank transferred $50 million to Iran, according tot he govenrment-controleld Tehran Times." (The Atlantic, "How Egypt is Helping Iran to Circumvent Sanctions," 11/15/10)

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Listed as providing services for Iranian banks. (Avi Jorisch, "Iran's dirty banking," 2010) 

Woori Bank

Industry
Banking
States
NY
Country
South Korea
Sources

According to its form 20-F filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2021: "We [Woori Bank] operate certain accounts for the Central Bank of Iran, or the CBI, which were opened by the CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by us and the CBI in September 2010, as amended from time to time, to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran.

In the past, we also provided fund transfer and financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iranian parties that were permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions regime. We have discontinued all trade financing activities relating to export and import trades involving the CBI accounts since November 5, 2018.

We also maintain a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for an Iranian financial institution subject to OFAC sanctions that were opened prior to it becoming subject to OFAC sanctions. The relevant accounts have since been restricted, and no transactions are currently allowed through these accounts."

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"A subsidiary of the company has been identified as potentially providing import/export financing services to facilitate trade with Iran. In 2019 CalPERS designated the company as under review. In 2020 CalPERS changed the designation to “being monitored” because CalPERS’ initial screening has not identified the company as having involvement in the regions and/or activities targeted by the Act. CalPERS continues to monitor the company for possible changes in status relevant to the Act."

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"Woori Finance Holdings Co. was identified as providing import-export financing services to facilitate trade with Iran. In late 2014, Woori Finance Holdings Co. merged with its subsidiary Woori Bank and changed its name to Woori Bank. In 2014, CalSTRS designated Woori Finance Holdings Co. as “Under Review” for potentially having ties to Iran. In 2015, CalSTRS designated the company as “Being Monitored.” In 2020, CalSTRS removed Woori Bank as it no longer held any of the company’s securities."

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC for fiscal year 2019: "In 2019, we engaged in the following activities relating to Iran:         

  • We have operated certain accounts for the CBI, which were opened by the CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by us and the CBI in September 2010, as amended from time to time, to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran. The accounts opened by the CBI consist of Won-denominated accounts that are used for the settlement of exports of goods produced or substantially transformed in Korea to Iran by Korean exporters and Won, U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese Yen-denominated accounts (of which only the Won accounts are in use) that are used for the settlement of imports of crude oil and nauralgas from Iran by Korean importers. By the terms of the service agreement between us and the CBI, settlement of export and import transaction payments due from Iranian entities to Korean exporters or from Korean importers of oil and gas to Iranian entities through such accounts opened by the CBI was effected by crediting or debiting the relevant amount to or from the applicable accounts while a corresponding payment of funds was made to or from an Iranian commercial bank by the CBI. Any funds deposited for the account of Iranian entities as a result of Korean imports of crude oil and natural gas was only to be used by transferring them to the Won-denominated account and then making payment to accounts of Korean persons and entities opened at financial institutions in Korea in respect of Korean exports to Iran. No transfers of funds were to be made from these accounts to Iran, to Iranian accounts in any third country, or for any use other than those described above. In light of the discontinuation of the SRE, from July 8, 2019 to September 20, 2019, we limited activity in the existing CBI accounts to processing payments for exports of humanitarian goods to Iran, and since the imposition of additional secondary sanctions against the CBI on September 20, 2019, we ceased all activity in the existing CBI accounts. In 2019, the total fee revenue from maintaining the CBI accounts amounted to approximately ₩1.8 million. As there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately ₩1.8 million.
  • We have also provided fund transfer and financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iranian parties which were permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions regime and not subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. We have discontinued all trade financing activities relating to export and import trades involving the CBI accounts since November 5, 2018. In 2019, all such exports and imports were settled through telegraphic transfer and did not involve our financing services. In addition, we continued to honor our obligations on a limited basis under previously-issued bank guarantees to the extent that such activities did not violate OFAC sanctions or applicable U.S. secondary sanctions. In 2019, our total fee revenue from the relevant telegraphic transfer services amounted to approximately ₩0.64 million. As there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from such activities also amounted to approximately ₩0.64 million.

  • We also maintain a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for an Iranian financial institution that were opened prior to its designation for U.S. sanctions. The relevant accounts have since been restricted, and no transactions are currently allowed through these accounts. Accordingly, there were no fee revenues from maintaining such deposit accounts, and there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts."

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In May 2016, we established a representative office in Tehran, Iran, which had engaged in the collection of local market information without generating any revenue. Following the re-imposition of sanctions, the representative office is no longer operational and does not have any employees or office space. (2019)

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In 2014, Woori Finance Holdings Co. was identified as providing import-export financing services to facilitate trade with Iran. In late 2014, Woori Finance Holdings Co. merged with its subsidiary Woori Bank and changed its name to Woori Bank. In 2014, CalSTRS designated Woori Finance Holdings Co. as “Under Review” for potentially having ties to Iran. In 2015, CalSTRS determined to classify Woori Bank as “Being Monitored” and maintained that designation in 2018.--

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Woori Bank and IBK partially suspend financial transactions with Iran,” Pulse (South Korea), June 19, 2018.) 

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In 2016, we engaged in the following activities relating to Iran:
 
We operate certain accounts for CBI, which were opened by CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by us and CBI in September 2010 to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran. The accounts opened by CBI consist of Won-denominated accounts that are used for the settlement of exports of goods produced or substantially transformed in Korea to Iran by Korean exporters and Won, U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese Yen-denominated accounts (of which only the Won accounts are in use) that are used for the settlement of imports of crude oil and natural gas from Iran by Korean importers. By the terms of the service agreement between us and CBI, settlement of export and import transaction payments due
 
from Iranian entities to Korean exporters or from Korean importers to Iranian entities through such accounts opened by CBI are effected by crediting or debiting the relevant amount to or from the applicable accounts while a corresponding payment of funds is made to or from an Iranian bank by CBI. Any funds deposited for the account of Iranian entities as a result of Korean imports of crude oil and natural gas may only be used by transferring them to the Won-denominated account and then making payment to accounts of Korean persons and entities opened at financial institutions in Korea in respect of Korean exports to Iran. No transfers of funds may be made from these accounts to Iran, to Iranian accounts in any third country, or for any use other than those described above. In 2016, the total fee revenue from maintaining the CBI accounts amounted to approximately ₩192 million (which represented approximately 0.002% of our total revenue). As there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately ₩192 million (which represented approximately 0.012% of our total net income before tax). We intend to continue maintaining the accounts opened by CBI, and in light of the lifting of certain sanctions against Iran, including U.S. secondary sanctions, the scope of our services provided to CBI may be adjusted to reflect such change in circumstances.

We also provide limited export-import financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iran that were permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and were not subject to U.S. secondary sanctions, primarily by discounting, advising on or issuing letters of credit, and to a lesser extent, issuing performance bonds on behalf of Korean contractors with respect to Iranian construction projects permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. All such transactions are settled through the accounts opened by CBI with us as described above. In 2016, our total fee revenue from such export-import financing services amounted to approximately ₩11.5 billion (which represented approximately 0.11% of our total revenue), while our net income before tax from such activities (net of expenses directly applicable to such activities based on our internal management accounts) amounted to approximately ₩4.2 billion (which represented approximately 0.27% of our total net income before tax). We intend to continue providing the export-import financing services with its current scope, to the extent U.S. secondary sanctions or other applicable sanctions remain lifted.

We also maintain a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for an Iranian financial institution that the U.S. government has historically viewed as controlled by the government of Iran. These accounts were opened with us before the institution was designated for U.S. sanctions. Under Korean customer protection requirements, we are unable to provide specific information identifying this Iranian financial institution or the volume of its deposits. In 2016, there were no fee revenues from maintaining such deposit accounts, and there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts.
 
In May 2016, we established a new representative office in Tehran, Iran, which only engages in the collection of local market information and did not generate any revenue in 2016.

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"Three foreign banks are opening up representative offices in Iran as the country seeks to boost investment after reaching an international sanctions deal last year, a central bank official said. Oman’s Bank Muscat SAOG, Woori Bank of South Korea and India’s UCO Bank Ltd. are all in the process of establishing a presence in Tehran, Central Bank Vice Governor Peyman Ghorbani said Tuesday in an interview." (Bloomberg News, "Three Foreign Banks to Open in Iran, Central Bank Official Says," 11/1/2016).

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC in 2014: 

  • In 2013, we and our affiliates engaged in the following activities relating to Iran:
    • Woori Bank operates certain accounts for CBI, which were opened by CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by Woori Bank and CBI in September 2010 to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran. The accounts opened by CBI consist of Won-denominated accounts that are used for the settlement of exports of goods produced or substantially transformed in Korea to Iran by Korean exporters and Won, U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese Yen-denominated accounts (of which only the Won accounts are currently in use) that are used for the settlement of imports of oil and natural gas from Iran by Korean importers. By the terms of the service agreement (as amended) between Woori Bank and CBI, settlement of export and import transaction payments due from Iranian entities to Korean exporters or from Korean importers to Iranian entities through such accounts opened by CBI are effected by crediting or debiting the relevant amount to or from the applicable accounts while a corresponding payment of funds is made to or from an Iranian bank by CBI. Any funds deposited for the account of Iranian entities as a result of Korean imports of oil and gas may only be used by transferring them to the Won-denominated account and then making payment to accounts of Korean persons and entities opened at financial institutions in Korea in respect of Korean-origin exports to Iran. No transfers of funds may be made from these accounts to Iran, to Iranian accounts in any third country, or for any other use. Furthermore, the applicable laws and regulations and banking guidelines of Korea require that trade transactions between Korean and Iranian parties be subject to prior certification and clearance by relevant Korean governmental authorities (or organizations designated thereby) to ensure compliance with Korean economic sanctions and export controls against Iran, and the settlement of payments through the accounts opened by CBI at Woori Bank are not permitted without such prior certification and clearance. In 2013, the total fee revenue from maintaining the CBI accounts amounted to approximately ₩128 million (which represented approximately 0.001% of our total revenue). As there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately ₩128 million (which represented approximately 0.04% of our total net income before tax). Woori Bank intends to continue maintaining the accounts opened by CBI within the current scope of services, to the extent such activity is permitted under, or otherwise exempted from, the indirect U.S. sanctions or other applicable sanctions.
    • Woori Bank also provides limited export-import financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iran that are permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to the indirect U.S. sanctions, primarily by discounting, advising on or issuing letters of credit, and to a lesser extent, issuing performance bonds on behalf of Korean contractors with respect to Iranian construction projects permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to the indirect U.S. sanctions. All such transactions are settled through the accounts opened by CBI at Woori Bank as described above. In 2013, our total fee revenue from such export-import financing services amounted to approximately ₩3 billion (which represented approximately 0.03% of our total revenue), while our net income before tax from such activities (net of expenses directly applicable to such activities based on our internal management accounts) amounted to approximately ₩2 billion (which represented approximately 0.66% of our total net income before tax). Woori Bank intends to continue providing the export-import financing services with its current scope, to the extent such activity is permitted under, or otherwise exempted from, the indirect U.S. sanctions or other applicable sanctions.       
    • Woori Bank also maintains a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for a certain Iranian financial institution which is currently on the list of specially designated nationals maintained by OFAC (with an “IFSR” designation). Under Korean customer protection requirements, we are unable to provide specific information identifying this Iranian financial institution or the volume of its deposits, which constitute less than 0.05% of the Woori Bank’s total deposit base. These accounts were opened at Woori Bank before such Iranian financial institution was added to OFAC’s list of specially designated nationals, and under Korean law, these financial institutions are generally unable to repatriate the amounts in these accounts from Korea without specific authorization of the Korean authorities. As a Korean bank is generally prohibited under Korean law from unilaterally terminating a deposit account without the consent of the depositor, Woori Bank does not currently have plans to terminate these deposit accounts. In 2013, there were no fee revenues from maintaining such deposit accounts, and there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts."

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“South Korea is set to become the second Asian nation to make a payment to Iran for crude oil imports under an interim nuclear deal…Japan became the first of Iran's oil buyers to make a payment to Iran under the eased sanctions earlier this month. It was not clear the amount to be transferred but the Iranian central bank was holding up to $5.6 billion in two won-denominated accounts, one at Woori Bank and the other at Industrial Bank of Korea as of late 2013, according to one of the sources. A second source who confirmed the money transfer added the payment would be made by the two Korean banks next month - one part on early March and the other later in the month…State-owned Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea declined to comment on the money transfer…Bank of Korea and South Korean finance ministry officials contacted by Reuters said no decision had been made about money transfers to Iran.” (Reuters, “South Korea set to make oil payment to Iran - sources,” 2/12/14)

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“Under penalty of expulsion from the U.S. banking system, Iranian crude customers such as China, Japan and India will be restricted to using their own currencies for the purchases, starting today. Importers will be compelled to keep the payments in escrow accounts that Iran can use only for locally sourced goods and services, in what will amount to barter arrangements…The new blockage on remittances will add to financial restrictions the U.S. imposed last year that curtail Iran’s access to dollars, euros and other hard currencies. Sanctions have already forced it into barter arrangements with China, its largest oil customer…South Korean buyers have been paying for Iranian crude in local won, through two accounts that Iran’s central bank opened in 2010 at the Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank…South Korea’s exports to Iran of goods such as iron, steel and petrochemicals increased 3.2 percent to $6.3 billion last year, while imports dropped 25 percent, to $8.5 billion, according to customs data. Oil made up 99 percent of the goods that Japan and South Korea imported from Iran.” (Bloomberg, “Iran Faces Oil-Cash Squeeze as U.S. Bolsters Sanctions,” 2/6/14)

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“Iran will receive $4.2 billion from its oil sales to be transferred in instalments if it fulfils its commitments in a landmark nuclear deal struck between world powers and Tehran in Geneva. Here is a look at where Iranian oil payments are held in the countries in Asia that are still importing crude from the OPEC producer…

COUNTRY: South Korea

BANK: Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea

ESTIMATED AMOUNT: Iran has about 5.9 trillion won ($5.56 billion) in won deposits, a foreign exchange authority source said.” (Reuters, “FACTBOX-Iran's oil fund stash in Asia,” 11/25/13)

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According to its Annual Report filed with the SEC in 2013: 

  • In 2012, we and our affiliates engaged in the following activities relating to Iran:    
    • Woori Bank operates certain accounts for CBI, which were opened by CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by Woori Bank and CBI in September 2010 to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran. The accounts opened by CBI consist of Won-denominated accounts that are used for the settlement of exports of goods produced or substantially transformed in Korea to Iran by Korean exporters and Won, U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese Yen-denominated accounts (of which only the Won accounts are currently in use) that are used for the settlement of imports of oil and natural gas from Iran by Korean importers. By the terms of the service agreement (as amended) between Woori Bank and CBI, settlement of export and import transaction payments due from Iranian entities to Korean exporters or from Korean importers to Iranian entities through such accounts opened by CBI are effected by crediting or debiting the relevant amount to or from the applicable accounts while a corresponding payment of funds is made to or from an Iranian bank by CBI. Any funds deposited for the account of Iranian entities as a result of Korean imports of oil and gas may only be used by transferring them to the Won-denominated account and then making payment to accounts of Korean persons and entities opened at financial institutions in Korea in respect of Korean-origin exports to Iran. No transfers of funds may be made from these accounts to Iran, to Iranian accounts in any third country, or for any other use. Furthermore, the applicable laws and regulations and banking guidelines of Korea require that trade transactions between Korean and Iranian parties be subject to prior certification and clearance by relevant Korean governmental authorities (or organizations designated thereby) to ensure compliance with Korean economic sanctions and export controls against Iran, and the settlement of payments through the accounts opened by CBI at Woori Bank are not permitted without such prior certification and clearance. In 2012, total fee revenue from maintaining the CBI accounts amounted to approximately Won 55 million (which represented less than 0.001% of our total revenue). As there were no expenses direct applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately Won 55 million (which represented less than 0.01% of our total net income before tax). Woori Bank intends to continue maintaining the accounts opened by CBI within the current scope of services, to the extent such activity is permitted under, or otherwise exempted from, the indirect U.S. sanctions or other applicable sanctions.
    • Woori Bank also provides limited export-import financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iran that are permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to the indirect U.S. sanctions, primarily by discounting, advising on or issuing letters of credit, and to a lesser extent, issuing performance bonds on behalf of Korean contractors with respect to Iranian construction projects permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to the indirect U.S. sanctions. All such transactions are settled through the accounts opened by CBI at Woori Bank as described above. In 2012, our total fee revenue from such export-import financing services amounted to approximately Won 21 billion (which represented approximately 0.12% of our total revenue), while our net income before tax from such activities (net of expenses directly applicable to such activities based on our internal management accounts) amounted to approximately Won 8 billion (which represented approximately 0.3% of our total net income before tax). Woori Bank intends to continue providing the export-import financing services with its current scope, to the extent such activity is permitted under, or otherwise exempted from, the indirect U.S. sanctions or other applicable sanctions.
    • Woori Bank also maintains a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for a certain Iranian financial institution which is currently on the list of specially designated nationals maintained by OFAC (with an “IFSR” designation). Under Korean customer protection requirements, we are unable to provide specific information identifying this Iranian financial institution or the volume of their deposits, which constitute less than 0.05% of the Woori Bank’s total deposit base. These accounts were opened at Woori Bank before such Iranian financial institution was added to OFAC’s list of specially designated nationals, and under Korean law, these financial institutions are generally unable to repatriate the amounts in these accounts from Korea without specific authorization of the Korean authorities. As a Korean bank is generally prohibited under Korean law from unilaterally terminating a deposit account without the consent of the depositor, Woori Bank does not currently have plans to terminate these deposit accounts. In 2012, total fee revenue from maintaining such deposit accounts amounted to approximately ₩1 million (which represented less than 0.00001% of our total revenue). As there were no expenses direct applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately ₩1 million (which represented less than 0.0001% of our total net income before tax)."

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"In response, Rabobank and Société Générale say they have stopped servicing Iran deals or curbed their trade finance. According to Iranian trade professionals, Korea's Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea have done the same. The Korean banks could not be reached for comment." (The Wall Street Journal, "Willing Banks Find Profits in Legal Trade With Iran," 4/8/2012) 

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Woori Bank is the lending unit of South Korea's third-largest financial company, the state-owned Woori Finance Holdings Co. The firm is currently undergoing privatization negotiations and came under investigation for fraud during the summer of 2010. (Businessweek).

In October 2010, Woori Bank, along with Industrial Bank of Korea, have been appointed by the South Korean government to "finance legitimate trade with Iran in sectors unaffected by sanctions, channelled through Iran's central bank." The deal will allow Iran's central bank to deposit oil proceeds in Woori Bank, which will then use the funds to pay South Korean firms exporting to Iran. South Korean trade to Iran amounts to $10 billion annually. A Woori Bank spokesman explained that "Iran's central bank is not the target of sanctions, so transactions through the bank are legal. We do not worry about any possibly sanctinons by the US against us" (Financial Times).