


# Iran's Proxy Wars: Iraq, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories/Gaza, Syria, Yemen

Updated November 2023



# UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN

Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has aggressively sought to export its Islamic Revolution and remake the Middle East under its dominion. Iran’s primary method to empower itself has been to anchor loyal proxies in the region, which it has done most successfully with [Hezbollah](#) in [Lebanon](#), and more recently in [Iraq](#), [Syria](#), [Yemen](#), and [Gaza](#).

Where its proxies have failed to take root, Iran has engaged in subversive activities to undermine its rivals and enhance its influence, as in [Saudi Arabia](#), [Bahrain](#), [Kuwait](#), and [Afghanistan](#).

Iran’s quest for regional dominance has ultimately triggered immense instability throughout the Middle East, inflaming sectarian divisions and triggering devastating wars that have left hundreds of thousands dead.

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## Country Reports

### *Proxy Wars*

## Iraq

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#)
- [Badr Organization](#)
- [Kata'ib Hezbollah](#)



*Bomb components from Iran used to make deadly improvised explosives devices (IEDs) seized by American forces in Iraq in 2007.*

### *Introduction*

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Iran has waged proxy warfare in Iraq as it has sought to significantly increase its influence and oust America's military presence from the country. Iran's quest for primacy in Iraq is an important component of its hegemonic regional project to export the Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East. Iraq is also an important link in Iran's efforts to establish a "Shi'a crescent" that functionally serves as a land bridge linking Tehran to [Lebanon](#) and the Mediterranean, enabling Iran to more efficiently and lethally arm [Hezbollah](#) and its other regional proxies.

Sharing a 900-mile border with Iran, Iraq under the Sunni Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein was Iran's primary geostrategic adversary. Iran viewed the U.S. invasion in 2003 as an opportunity to transform its foe into a client state and base from which to direct revolutionary activities around the Middle East. To that end, Iran has sought to cultivate loyalty among Iraq's Shi'a majority population, seeking to leverage shared sectarian identity to justify its meddling and anchor its influence in Iraq.

In order to bolster its influence, Iran aims to keep Iraq weak and dependent on Tehran for its security. Iran has stood up and controls a vast network of Shi'a militant groups in Iraq, and uses these proxies to

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“[stoke sectarian tensions](#) and to foment political violence... thereby ensuring for itself a role as mediator in Iraq.” This “[two-faced](#)” strategy has enabled Iran to establish itself as the “[key power broker](#)” in Iraq.

## *Support for Shi’a Militias*

Since the 2003 onset of the Iraq War, Iran [supported, trained, and funded](#) Shi’a militias and Shi’a insurgents in order to “work toward a humiliating defeat for the United States.” Until his death in a U.S. drone strike targeting his convoy as it left Baghdad’s international airport on January 3, 2020, [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani](#) served as Iran’s primary agent of influence in Iraq, overseeing the training and arming and coordinating the battlefield activities of various Iran-backed Shi’a militias operating in Iraq. Through a combination of military aid, cash, favors, bribes, and intimidation, Soleimani came to wield tremendous personal influence over the country’s Shi’a militias and political parties. Politicians were effectively held hostage to Soleimani’s demands, as he could call on the militias under his command to make trouble if they tried to cross him.

Iran supplied these groups with weapons such as IEDs, which were the “[top killer of U.S. troops](#)” in Iraq. In order to move these weapons into Iraq, Iran controlled a number of arms smuggling rings. By 2006 the Quds Force, the extraterritorial military arm of the IRGC, had developed “[a widespread network for transferring and distributing arms from Iran into Iraq through the Ilam region in western Iran.](#)”

Iran’s imprimatur over the militias was most vividly borne out with the evolution from primitive Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks on U.S. service members to more lethal explosively formed projectile (EFP) attacks, whose sophistication U.S. military officials insist point to Iranian origins. In total, the US Pentagon found that Iran-backed militias were responsible for [603 U.S. servicemember deaths between 2003-2011](#), accounting for roughly one in six U.S. casualties during that period. The sectarian violence Iran helped unleash also claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians in the years following the invasion.

According to the [U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2019](#), Iran-backed Shi’a militia groups are believed to be responsible for more than a dozen rocket or indirect fire attacks targeting U.S. or Coalition targets in Iraq in 2019, including the December 27 attack in which KH launched more than 30 rockets at an Iraqi base hosting U.S. forces in Kirkuk, killing one American contractor and wounding several American and Iraqi service members.

On March 5, 2019, the U.S. Department of State [designated Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba](#) (HHN), an Iranian proxy group established in 2013 with [direct support from the IRGC](#). HHN is an Iran-backed Iraqi militia funded by but not under the control of the Iraqi government. HHN has openly [pledged its loyalties](#) to Iran and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The group’s founder, Akram al-Kaabi, was one of the cofounders of the IRGC-backed militia [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) (AAH) and many of the group’s fighters are former members of AAH and [Kataib Hezbollah](#) (KH). Kaabi openly [admitted](#) in 2015 that “technical and logistical support comes from the [Iranian] Islamic Republic.” The group has been active in [Syria](#) as well, and is alleged by Iraqi officials to be “[helping Tehran create a supply route through Iraq to Damascus.](#)”

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On January 3, 2020, the U.S. Department of State [designated](#) Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and designated its leaders [Qais](#) and [Laith al-Khazali](#) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224. In a statement, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo alleged, "AAH and its leaders are violent proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Acting on behalf of their masters in Tehran, they use violence and terror to further the Iranian regime's efforts to undermine Iraqi sovereignty."

## *Fight against ISIS*

Iran's hostile takeover of Iraq stoked sectarian backlash, catalyzing the rise and potency of [the Islamic State \(ISIS\)](#). In 2014, at the apex of ISIS's power, the group took over Mosul with little resistance from Iraqi government forces and began advancing toward the outskirts of Baghdad. At the time, Iran's primary focus had shifted to Syria, and Iran had diverted much of its Shi'a militia personnel to the effort to rescue the Assad regime. When the ISIS situation demanded action, Soleimani ordered the Iraqi militias to cross back over Syria's border to rescue Iraq.

Iran has used the war against ISIS as a pretext to embed [IRGC](#) officials in Iraq and increase support for Shi'a militant groups [loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei](#). In conjunction with the Iraqi government, Soleimani helped stand up the [Popular Mobilization Forces \(PMF\)](#), an umbrella organization of predominantly Shi'a militia groups that coordinated with Iraq's central government in the fight against ISIS. While not all the PMF forces are aligned with Iran, about [50 Shi'a militia groups](#) are backed by Iran including some of the largest, best-funded, and most heavily-armed groups. The creation of the PMF command structure and its integration with the Iraqi central government led to unprecedented coordination among the Iran-backed Shi'a militias and has helped entrench Iranian control over Iraqi affairs.

Reports on the [number of IRGC soldiers killed fighting in Iraq](#) further demonstrate Iran's intense interventions in the area. Iran has supplied Iraq with [\\$10 billion worth of weaponry](#), likely including [T-72S tanks, Safir jeeps, and Sayyad sniper rifles](#).

As a result of these interventions against ISIS, Iranian influence in Iraq reached an "unprecedented level." According to Ali Younusi, an adviser to Iranian [Supreme Leader Khamenei](#), ["Iran is an empire once again at last, and its capital is Baghdad."](#) A member of the Iranian parliament made a similar claim, declaring that Baghdad has ["fallen into Iran's hands](#) and belongs to the Iranian Islamic Revolution." Soleimani also echoed these sentiments boasting, ["We are witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region..."](#) From Bahrain and Iraq to Syria, Yemen and North Africa."

The Iran-backed Shi'a militias engaged in systemic human rights abuses and brutality that rivaled ISIS as they cleared out ISIS territory. Iraqi Shi'a militias [were alleged to have engaged in](#) extrajudicial assassinations, summary executions, kidnappings, and torture of both combatants and civilians, including children.

Due to the armed strength and brutality of the Shi'a militias within the PMF, their power has come to eclipse that of the central government, leading Iraqi officials to either surrender to and appease the PMF, or face reprisals. Iraq's former prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, praised Iran at Davos in 2015 for springing to Iraq's defense and even [singled out Qassem Soleimani as an ally in the fight against ISIS](#).

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There are reportedly around [80,000 to 100,000 Iran-aligned Shi'a fighters inside Iraq today](#), and the government has little recourse to bring the Iran-backed militias, which desire to retain their independence, under its command. It's this Shi'a militia infrastructure that provides Iran a vehicle to threaten U.S. interests in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At Tehran's behest, these militias have been operationalized to push back against the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" campaign, [attacking U.S. personnel and energy interests in Iraq](#).

Reuters [reported](#) in August 2018 that Iran had recently transferred short-range ballistic missiles to its allies in Iraq. These kinds of missiles [include](#) the Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaqar, which can all travel from 200-700 km. This range [places](#) US allies—Israel and Saudi Arabia—within reach. Indeed, the US government was forced to shutter its consulate in Basra in September 2018 after Iranian-supported militias [fired](#) rockets at the compound.

Iran's transfer of [ballistic missiles](#) to its proxies, the establishment of weapons depots in Iraq, and transformation of the country into a transshipment route for arms to the Assad regime and Hezbollah have further undermined Iraqi sovereignty, imperiling the central government's monopoly on the use of force. These provocations have invited [reprisals](#) from Israel, highlighting Iran's willingness to subvert Iraq's security for its own nefarious ends.

## *Political and Economic Influence*

The kinetic power of these militias buys influence in Iraqi politics. The Iranian embassy in Baghdad is a hub of the mullahs' machinations in Iraq—specifically because Iran's former Ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, is himself [a former general in the Quds Force](#) and had served as a top advisor to [former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani](#). It's from this platform that Tehran wields powerful influence over the direction of Iraqi politics.

After the May 2018 parliamentary elections, which saw the Iran-backed Fatah alliance finish second in the vote tally, Iran and its allies were intimately involved in the negotiations over government formation. For example, Muqtada al-Sadr, whose nationalist Sairoon coalition came in first in the elections, [traveled](#) to Lebanon in September 2018 where he was hosted by Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Qassem Soleimani to forge a consensus on who would become the next prime minister of Iraq. The trio settled on Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a former oil minister and vice president of Iraq. According to leaked Iranian [intelligence cables obtained by the Intercept](#), Abdul-Mahdi worked closely with Iran dating back to his time in exile as an opponent of Saddam Hussein's regime and as oil minister, had a "special relationship with the IRI." Abdul-Mahdi was hailed as a compromise candidate palatable to the U.S. and Iraq, but his selection highlighted that no Iraqi prime minister could assume power without Iran's backing. While Mahdi has been described as an independent-minded technocrat, after taking office, he granted Iran preferential access to his inner circle. In October 2018, only [24 hours](#) after announcing he would not meet with delegations from foreign embassies as his cabinet was in the process of being formed—out of fear of an appearance of impropriety in the decision-making process—he hosted the Iranian Ambassador Iraj Masjedi for a discussion.

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Outside the political realm, Iran also maintains economic [leverage](#) over Iraq. [According](#) to Ambassador Masjedi, Iran's second-largest export market is Iraq, with bilateral trade set to reach \$8.5 billion in 2018, with Iran hoping to increase the trade volume to \$22 billion annually. Indeed, the United States has had to continually grant Iraq a periodic [waiver from U.S. sanctions](#) that the U.S. government re-imposed on Iran following its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, allowing it to import gas and electricity from Iran.

An additional node for Iranian influence is its development of Shi'a shrines in Iraq. According to a December 2020 [Reuters report](#), Iran has poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the construction and upgrading of religious sites in Iraq. Construction companies linked to charitable foundations owned by the IRGC are behind the construction bonanza. The primary organization overseeing the development of shrines is called the [Holy Shrines Reconstruction Headquarters](#). It was set up by Supreme Leader Khamenei and is run by IRGC appointees. Such arrangements are part of [Khamenei's](#) efforts to establish patronage links to the IRGC, enriching Guardsmen and ensuring their fealty to the Supreme Leader. In March 2020, the organization was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury which alleged it was controlled by the Quds Force and served as a front for funneling lethal aid to Iran-backed proxies, intelligence activities, and money laundering.

Millions of religious pilgrims pass through Iraq's shrines each year, giving Iran the opportunity to proselytize its [Khomeinist ideology](#). Iran is seeking in the long term to influence the selection of a successor to Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Iraq's most powerful Shi'a cleric and a rival source of emulation for Shi'a Muslims to Khamenei. A successor more favorable to its state ideology in Najaf would cement Iranian cultural and political influence in Iraq in the long term. Thus, even at a time when it faces massive economic pressures due to sanctions, Iran has seen fit to divert massive amounts of funds to shrine development in Iraq.

In moves showcasing Iranian influence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Treasury [sanctioned](#) Iran's Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi as a Specially-Designated Global Terrorist and later the Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee and Iraq's former National Security Advisor Falih al-Fayyadh under the [Global Magnitsky Act](#) for human rights abuses. The designation of Masjedi was significant, especially for shining a light on Iran's embedding of Quds Force generals in Iran's diplomatic postings. The sanction on al-Fayyadh was also important given his history and the fact that al-Fayyadh had visited Washington in the past in order to discuss Iraqi stability. But al-Fayyadh has long been close with Iran, recently [traveling](#) to Tehran for the commemoration of the first anniversary of Soleimani's death.

## *Backlash*

Iran's control over Shi'a militias has made it the dominant military, political, and diplomatic power broker in Iraq, but its quest for domination and subversion of Iraqi interests to its own has weakened Iraq's central government and impeded its ability to provide for the welfare of its citizens. Meanwhile, Iran's project to cultivate patronage links among Iraq's Shi'a population through its militias, which provide social services in addition to security, has failed to take root, as widespread unemployment and economic privation remain the norm. Iran's revolutionary bravado has proved insufficient to override its

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ineptitude at basic governance, and the result has been a backlash against Tehran that has metastasized into a [mass protest movement](#) ongoing since October 2019.

The protests gripping Iraq have witnessed tens of thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets to vent their dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, an out-of-touch class of political elites, and Iran-backed militias. Too often, these forces have placed Iran's interests over the public good, for instance [steering Iraq's oil resources to benefit Tehran](#) while Iraq's own citizens lack healthcare, jobs, educational opportunity, consistent electricity, and clean drinking water. Notably, the Iraqi protestors are almost exclusively Shi'a, showing that Iran's political and military maneuvering has failed to translate to winning over the hearts and minds of the core constituency it needs to continue projecting influence in Iraq. Calls for more inclusive governance were high among the protestors' demands, highlighting the unpopularity of Iran's explicitly sectarian approach.

Iran has responded to the Iraqi protest movement with repression, dispatching former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani to Baghdad immediately after protests began to advise Iraqi politicians and security officials on his best practices for quelling unrest. According to Iraqi security officials present at the meeting, Soleimani, who chaired the meeting in place of Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi, told those present, "[We in Iran know how to deal with protests. This happened in Iran and we got it under control.](#)"

Since Soleimani's ominous proclamation, PMF and Iraqi security forces have responded with excessive and deadly force to quell demonstrations. By the end of December 2019, nearly [500 protestors had been killed, thousands more injured, and about 2,800 were arrested](#). The directive to respond to protests with live fire clearly emanated from Tehran, and numerous reports indicate that Iran-backed forces have been behind the deadliest clashes. For instance, *Reuters* reported that PMF elements close to Iran, reporting directly to their militia commanders rather than the commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces, deployed [snipers on Baghdad rooftops](#) overlooking demonstrations just days after the unrest began, killing several dozen.

While directing the suppression of the Iraqi protests, Soleimani also ordered the Iran-backed militias under his control to undertake a [concerted campaign of rocket attacks targeting U.S. military targets in the country](#). According to a U.S. military official, forensic analysis of the rockets and launchers used during the spate of at least ten attacks indicated the involvement of Shi'a militias, most notably [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) and [Kataib Hezbollah \(KH\)](#). On December 27, 2019, more than 30 missiles were fired at an Iraqi military base near Kirkuk, killing a U.S. contractor and wounding four U.S. troops as well as two members of the Iraqi security forces. The U.S. [accused](#) KH of being responsible for the attack, and retaliated by launching strikes against five KH targets in Iraq and Syria including weapons depots and command and control centers. The U.S. strikes reportedly killed at least 25 KH militants.

On December 31, 2019, protestors, including members and supporters of KH, [attempted to storm the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad](#). Demonstrators threw stones and torched a security post, prompting embassy guards to respond with stun grenades and tear gas. The militia supporters withdrew from the embassy after prominent commanders reportedly spoke to them. On January 1, 2020, following orders from

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Mohammed Mohyee, KH's political spokesman, thousands of protestors dispersed from the American Embassy in Baghdad.

In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020, President Trump greenlit a drone strike targeting Soleimani's convoy shortly after his arrival in Baghdad. The head of KH, [Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes](#), who also served as deputy head of the PMF, was killed in the strike as well. Despite their deaths, the powerful network of Iran-backed Shi'a militias will continue to remain a fixture in Iraq, upholding Iran's influence increasingly through repression.

Iran's leadership has vowed devastating reprisals against the U.S. for the operation that killed Soleimani, and they followed up on this threat by firing a salvo of over [a dozen ballistic missiles at two Iraqi air bases](#) housing U.S. troops in the early morning hours of January 8, [wounding 11](#) U.S. soldiers.

Following the attack, a period of calm prevailed, although Iran signaled that it is likely to strike U.S. interests again at a future time of its choosing. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, intoned that while the ballistic missile attack represented a "[slap on the face](#)" for the U.S., "military action like this (ballistic missile) attack is not sufficient," vowing to refuse to enter negotiations and to continue to confront the U.S. until its influence is expelled from the region. In the intervening period, Iran's leaders maintained a steady drumbeat of threatening rhetoric aimed at the U.S., with Soleimani's successor, [Esmail Qaani](#), for instance vowing to "[hit his enemy in a manly fashion](#)."

On March 11, 2020, the calm was broken as what were presumed to be Iran-backed militia forces [launched a Katyusha rocket salvo](#) targeting U.S. and Coalition troops stationed at Camp Taji, 17 miles north of Baghdad. Two US soldiers and one British soldier were killed in the attack, and an additional twelve soldiers were injured. The attack crossed a U.S. red line as it killed U.S. servicemembers, once again raising U.S.-Iran tensions. The attack coincided with what would have been Qassem Soleimani's 63rd birthday, but it is unclear whether the attack was ordered directly by Iran, as the assassination of Soleimani likely has affected command and control between Tehran and its proxies in Iraq. Following the attack, airstrikes were carried out around the Abu Kamal Syria-Iraq border crossing, where Iran-backed militias are known to have a strong presence. The U.S. has not claimed credit for the airstrikes at this time.

In the aftermath of Soleimani's death, Iraq's protest movement has [continued to gain steam](#), with demonstrators venting their frustration that Iran's disregard for Iraqi sovereignty has increasingly ensnared their country as a staging ground for proxy warfare between Iran and the U.S. Soleimani's successor as Quds Force commander, Brigadier General [Esmail Qaani](#), has struggled to wield control over Iraq in the same manner as Soleimani. Qaani, who previously focused primarily on [Afghanistan](#), Pakistan, and Central Asia, lacks the relationships with Iraqi political and militia leaders of all stripes that Soleimani, who was universally feared if not respected, had cultivated.

As such, [Hezbollah](#) has had to fill the void created by Soleimani's death, taking over coordination of militia operations in Iraq. In April 2020, the U.S. Department of State [announced](#) a \$10 million reward for information on Hezbollah operative Sheikh [Mohammad al-Kawtharani](#), alleging he had "taken over some of the political coordination of Iran-aligned paramilitary groups" that had previously been

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Soleimani's purview. Tehran's command and control of the various militia groups it backs have been degraded as a result. Its ability to dictate outcomes in Iraq's political affairs has been set back as well.

In late March 2020, Qaani made his first visit to Baghdad seeking to establish continuity with his predecessor and reassert the Quds Force's influence. His visit was widely seen as a failure. He sought to unite Iraqi militia and political factions in supporting an anti-American, pro-Iranian prime minister, but Iraq ultimately selected former intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who is viewed as supportive of U.S. interests. Qaani was snubbed on his visit by Moqtada al-Sadr, who refused to meet with him. Such a snub would have been unheard of for Soleimani, and demonstrated that Tehran no longer commanded the fear and respect it previously engendered.

In the final months of the Trump administration, Iran has sought to restrain the Iraqi militias it backs from attacking the U.S., seeking to wait out the clock and avoid any escalations. In November 2020, Qaani reportedly visited Beirut to meet with Hezbollah leader [Hassan Nasrallah](#) to secure his assistance in reining in Iran-backed Iraqi militias. Qaani then went to Baghdad to meet the Prime Minister and several militia leaders to urge restraint. While some militias have followed Tehran's orders, most notably [Kataib Hezbollah](#), others have openly defied Tehran. [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) leader [Qais al-Khazali](#) gave a TV interview after Qaani's visit in which he vowed to continue confronting the U.S., declaring, "The Americans occupy our country, not yours. We will not listen to you anymore because our motives are 100 percent nationalist. The truce with the Americans has ended due to its conditions not being met."

Since Qaani's visit, Iraqi militias have continued to carry out attacks on US interests. On November 17, 2020, militants targeted the U.S. embassy with a volley of rockets. On December 10, two convoys carrying logistical equipment to the U.S.-led coalition were attacked by roadside bombs. On December 20, the embassy was [targeted](#) with another salvo of 21 rockets, in the largest attack on the Green Zone in a decade. The repeat violations of the tenuous cease-fire have been condemned by Kataib Hezbollah and other factions close to Iran, but show that the Iran-backed militias remain divided in their approach to confronting the U.S. and that under Qaani, the Quds Force can no longer enforce discipline among their ranks. Qaani made another [visit](#) to Iraq in December, with *Al-Alam news* network claiming it was unrelated to the December 20 attack.

As the Quds Force's ability to direct and maintain unity among its Iraqi proxies has weakened, it has lost control over the flow of revenues from illicit activities. In May 2021, when Qaani informed the supreme leader that over \$4 billion generated through arms and drug smuggling had disappeared, the supreme leader reportedly responded by calling the militias "[thieves](#)."

IRGC general Haider al-Afghani, a former aide to former IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani, [requested to be transferred out of Iraq](#), reportedly complaining that the militias did not obey his orders. But the link between Iran and proxy violence remains intact, even if the Quds Force has lost a degree of control over the militias. "[The Iranians and the militias are strategic security, military, and economic partners...\[and\] Iran and the IRGC nurture this partnership with money, weapons, and expertise, so that it remains a constant threat](#)," said Ghazi Faisal Hussein, director of the Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies.

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U.S. commander of Central Command Kenneth F. McKenzie testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2022, that Iran continues to “[enable its proxies to conduct implausibly deniable attacks on deployed U.S. forces](#),” even as it conducts diplomacy with the U.S. Its proxy campaign increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation, General McKenzie [explained](#), in part because Iran’s command and control over its proxy network have diminished. Iran may be unable to “govern the initiation and escalation of violence directed at U.S. and Coalition Forces.” Proxy attacks on U.S. forces may temporarily decline given Iraq’s ongoing government formation process, but the Iranian proliferation of weapons to its network of militias presents a growing threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. If efforts to engage Iran diplomatically weakens the U.S. resolve to deter proxy attacks, that threat could continue to metastasize.

Iranian-backed militias have continued to launch attacks against the U.S. military in Iraq since Joe Biden assumed the U.S. presidency, presumably as part of Tehran’s strategy to increase its leverage and compel the U.S. to make up-front concessions ahead of the resumption of nuclear negotiations. Attacks on bases housing U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have drastically increased since Biden took office. Yet, [his administration has been reticent to conduct a kinetic response to deter the proxy attacks](#).

On February 15, 2021, suspected Iran-backed militants launched [a salvo of 14 rockets](#) targeting a heavily fortified U.S. military compound in Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan, with three rockets hitting the base. A civilian contractor to the U.S. military with Filipino nationality was killed, and an Iraqi civilian [died a week later](#) due to injuries sustained in the attack. At least eight others were [injured](#) in the attacks, including a U.S. soldier and five military contractors. On March 3, Kurdish counterterrorism authorities released a confession from one of the perpetrators of the attack, who said he attacked along with other individuals who belonged to the Iran-backed militia [Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada](#) (KSS), which is part of the PMF. The video disconfirmed the claims of a little-known group named Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who [said they had committed the attack](#). The suspected attacker further claimed to have used Iranian-made rockets in the attack. KSS is believed to be an offshoot with operational links to the [Badr Organization](#). The group’s propaganda frequently features images of [Supreme Leader Khamenei](#), indicating the group’s fealty to the Iranian regime.

Several days after the attack on Erbil International Airport, militants fired rockets at the Balad air base, where a U.S. defense firm services Iraq’s fighter jets, and at Baghdad’s Green Zone compound, where the U.S. Embassy is located. The U.S. responded to the uptick in violent attacks by [launching airstrikes](#) targeting Iran-backed militia forces on the Syrian side of the Iraq-Syria Abu Kamal border crossing on February 25, 2021, a choice calibrated to respond to and deter further Iranian aggression while not creating political headaches for the Iraqi central government. According to Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, the facilities targeted were [used by Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada](#). On March 3, 2021, U.S. forces were targeted again by a rocket barrage that U.S. defense officials [believe](#) was launched by Kataib Hezbollah or an affiliated Iran-backed militia. A U.S. contractor suffered a fatal cardiac episode during the attack.

On October 2021, Iran launched a drone attack against a base housing U.S. forces in al-Tanf in Syria, prompting a non-kinetic response from the United States. After that attack, rocket and drone strikes

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against U.S. personnel increased, underscoring the risk-readiness of Iran-backed proxies. There were [reportedly](#) 29 such attacks between October 2021 and June 2022, none of which provoked a kinetic response from the U.S. In fact, the U.S. did not respond with force until [August 2022](#), when the U.S. struck a weapons depot, known as Ayyash, belonging to IRGC-backed militias in Deir Ezzor province, Syria.

Iran's main proxies in Iraq—namely, [Kataib Hezbollah](#), [Badr Organization](#), and [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#)—have turned to the playbook of their Iranian backers to create distance between themselves and the increasingly frequent attacks on U.S. assets. By directing obscure groups to carry out the attacks, [the Iranian proxies seek to maintain legitimacy](#) within the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, which receive government funding and are formally integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus. This way, they also protect themselves from retaliatory strikes and public backlash. The effort to displace responsibility for the above-mentioned attacks, and many others like them, also further distances the [IRGC](#). However, [some reports suggest](#) that the IRGC still maintains operational control over these secretive militias. According to a May 2021 [Reuters report](#), Iran has begun forming smaller, more loyal groups and training them in core capabilities such as drone and information warfare and surveillance operations. This tactical shift partly owes to the recalcitrance of the larger groups upon which Iran has built its influence and leverage in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Iraq's continuing political instability and protests and the sporadic hostilities between Iran-backed proxy forces and the U.S. pose formidable challenges to those wishing to restore sovereignty and democracy to Iraq, a situation that Iran will continue to exploit. While Soleimani's death posed a setback to Iran's ability to project influence in Iraq, it still wields considerable power over the key militias in the PMF. It can marshal groups to confront the U.S. at the time of its choosing.

## *Iran's Grip on Iraqi Politics*

Iraq held parliamentary elections in October 2021. Several political analysts, including Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, pointed out that [a court ruling](#) in August 2022 changed parliamentary rules for voting a president into office. Before the court ruling, if the two-thirds majority could not be reached when voting for the president in the first round, then [a simple majority \(165 seats\) would be required in the second round of voting](#). Now, however, [a two-thirds quorum](#) is necessary to select the president.

Political stalemate—partly a consequence of this court ruling—ensued for months after the parliamentary elections, while many Iraqis went without water and electricity. [Poverty rates and unemployment are high](#), despite enormous oil wealth. Many Iraqis blame these circumstances on the mismanagement and corruption of an out-of-touch political elite. Muqtada al-Sadr—a powerful Shi'a cleric turned populist—claims to represent the fight against corruption. He has framed his opponents—particularly the pro-Iran parties—as responsible for the corruption that plagues Iraq's political system.

As a nationalist, Sadr also claims to oppose Iranian meddling in Iraq, along with the U.S. military presence (though some analysts have pointed out he may be open to relations with the U.S. provided that it [does not infringe on Iraqi sovereignty](#)).

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Muqtada al-Sadr's movement threatened [to push the pro-Iran parties into the opposition](#). His Sairoon ("Alliance for Reform") coalition won the most seats ([74 out of 329](#)) in the October 2021 parliamentary election. Sadr, a Shi'a, then joined a coalition with Kurdish and Sunni parties. This tripartite alliance, known as "Saving the Homeland," sought to form a majority government that would have [excluded the pro-Iran parties](#).

The tripartite alliance [brought together 162 members](#) of parliament—three votes short of a simple majority. However, because of the court ruling mentioned above, the Coordination Framework could obstruct the voting process through a boycott. Sadr offered to compromise with the rival Coordination Framework on the condition that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was excluded from the talks. The leader of the Fatah Coalition, Hadi al-Amiri—also the leader of the powerful Iran-backed Badr Organization militia—rejected his offer after [reportedly](#) agreeing to it, saying to Sadr that he would not proceed without his allies.

In June 2022, Iran-backed parties were obstructing the parliamentary vote for a president, so Sadr told his coalition to resign en masse from parliament. When they obliged, [the candidates who received the second-most votes for those now-vacant parliamentary seats became MPs](#). Because many of the second-place finishers were members of pro-Iran parties, Sadr's resignation resulted in a major shift in the distribution of seats, ultimately culminating in the parliament's [approval](#) of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, approximately one year after the parliamentary elections took place.

A pro-Iran coalition, known as the "Coordination Framework," held the largest number of seats, putting it in a powerful negotiating position. The Coordination Framework had nominated Mohammad al-Sudani—an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—to become the next prime minister, and thousands of Sadr's supporters [broke into the Green Zone](#) ahead of the Shi'a Islamic holy day of Ashura, and stormed the parliament building in protest. They sought to prevent the pro-Iran parties from forming a government based on the new distribution of seats in parliament.

The pro-Iran parties [staged protests of their own](#) in the Jadriya area, close to the suspension bridge leading to the Green Zone, but did not enter the Green Zone to avoid confrontation with the Sadrist.

Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—who has close ties with Iran—is part of the Coordination Framework, which is [a coalition of Shi'a parties](#) composed of [Hadi al-Amiri's](#) Fatah Alliance (which is made up of several prominent Iran-backed militias, including AAH's political wing, and [Kataib Hezbollah](#)), Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa ("State of Law") Party, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's Nasr Alliance, and the Hikma Party.

Maliki was prime minister for two terms (2006-2014). His administration was rife with corruption. He gave Iran an "[open license](#)" to meddle in Iraqi affairs and [installed pro-Iran loyalists in many key institutions](#), including the judiciary. If Maliki came to power again, he might supercharge Iran-backed militias, who operate independently of the state but still reap the benefits of state funding and state legitimacy. His State of Law party [won 33 seats](#), and he put himself forward as a potential candidate for prime minister—a post that a Shiite must fill in in Iraq's political system—but [retreated](#) after Sadr criticized him on Twitter.

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Whereas the Coordination Framework wants a “national consensus government,” Sadr is attempting to form a “national majority government” that would include Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Sunni Taqaddum bloc, and Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party, and exclude the pro-Iran Shi’a parties. If a “national majority government” came to power, it would have undermined Iran’s interests in the Iraqi state.

By some accounts, the Coordination Framework’s nominee, Sudani, is “[one of the least controversial figures from the Coordination Framework](#).” He “represents a very convenient excuse for Muqtada al-Sadr to voice his displeasure with the entire Coordination Framework and the political system in Iraq,” according to Marsin Alshamary, a researcher at the Harvard Kennedy School. Kirk Sowell, an analyst at the political risk firm *Utica Risk Services*, concurs, saying Sudani is “[noncontroversial](#)” among Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish establishment parties. Sowell claims, moreover, that he will likely become the next prime minister, unless “Sadrists really ramp up the street pressure.” Sudani [may have been selected](#), instead of Maliki, to avoid a confrontation with Sadr, but Sadr still rejected his nomination.

Notwithstanding the reforms for which Sadr is advocating, he is an [establishment figure](#), whose [allies dominate the state bureaucracy](#). He [faces fierce opposition](#) to the dismantling of patronage networks that sustain the wealth and influence of public officials. Sadr has to balance popular expectations with those of the loyalists he installed in government posts to do his bidding.

Some analysts are not convinced of Sadr’s nationalist, anti-Iran rhetoric. (It should be noted that Sadr’s militia—formerly known as the Mahdi Army (JAM), and now known as the Peace Brigades—had a long history of receiving Iranian support, notably during the U.S. occupation (2003-2011). Indeed, Sadr, for a long time, was an extremely violent pro-Iranian militia leader). Expert political analyst Marsin Alshamary believes, “[The truth is in Iraq, there is not a single political party, whether Shi’a, Sunni, or Kurd, that does not have some kind of tie with Iran](#).” Another analyst notes that, because Iran maintains close ties with every political party in Iraq, “[whoever wins in the Iraqi elections, Iran wins](#).” It remains to be seen how dedicated Sadr is to his call for curbing Iran-backed militias, fighting corruption, and implementing political reforms.

Sadr claimed, “[there is no place for sectarianism or ethnic division, but a national majority government where the Shi’a defend the rights of the minorities, the Sunnis and Kurds](#).” He also [added](#), “there is no place for militias, and everyone will support the army, police, and security forces.” Both these positions alienated Sadr from the predominantly-Shi’a Coordination Framework.

Sadr refused to engage in dialogue with his opposition, arguing that such dialogues in the past have led to “[nothing but destruction, corruption, and dependency](#).” On August 3, 2022, he [encouraged](#) his supporters occupying the parliament building to stay put. He also [called for the dissolution of parliament and an early vote](#). Maliki [tweeted in support of continued dialogue based on the constitution](#).

The polarization of Iraqi Shiites only worsened when an audio tape, attributed to Nouri al-Maliki, leaked. The voice on the audio recording called Muqtada al-Sadr a “[murderer](#),” and an “[ignorant, hateful Zionist](#),” and dismissed the Iran-backed militias as “[cowards](#).” Sadr responded by saying that Maliki’s words [constituted death threats](#). He said, moreover, “[in my killing, there is joy and honor for Israel](#),”

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[America, the terrorists and the corrupt. But it is all surprising that the threat comes from the Dawa Party.](#)” Sadr’s uncle, ironically, [founded](#) the Dawa Party in 1957.

The political crisis has the potential to turn violent, as both sides are heavily-armed and have long histories of employing violence to accomplish their aims. (According to [one estimate](#), pro-Iran militias are 150,000 strong, while the Peace Brigades could mobilize 50,000 fighters. Most [experts agree](#) that Sadr’s militia would be outgunned in a confrontation). Sadr is not currently advocating violence, perhaps perceiving that the use of violence could alienate certain constituencies. His grass-roots support for a crusade against the Iran-backed parties (and their armed wings) has morphed into a robust protest movement. This movement brings Iraq to a dangerous precipice, because [“if \[Sadr\] attacks...then it is very likely things will devolve into violence,”](#) said expert Marsin Alshamary.

The Iran-backed militias could also attack, but their leaders are reportedly divided. For example, former Prime Minister Maliki, along with the Secretary-General of Iran-backed militia [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) (AAH), [Qais al-Khazali](#), are reportedly [pushing to escalate the protests](#), while the leader of the Fatah Alliance and the [Badr Organization](#), [Hadi Amiri](#), is urging control and moderation.

Ever since former Quds Force commander [Qassem Soleimani](#) and former [Kataib Hezbollah](#) (KH) leader [Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis](#) were killed in a U.S. drone strike in January 2020, the Iran-backed militias have become increasingly [“unruly and disparate.”](#) The militias began to act independently of their benefactor, Tehran, and separately from each other. For example, AAH, on several occasions, [carried out attacks against US forces](#), despite a ceasefire that KH agreed to in October 2020.

The current Quds Force commander [Esmail Qaani](#) has traveled to Baghdad on multiple occasions since the contested October 2021 election to advance Iran’s interests. According to some officials involved in the negotiations that he led, his mission was to motivate [“the \[Shi’a\] parties to stay united and agree on a premier candidate.”](#) He also reportedly sought to calm tensions in the aftermath of a November assassination attempt on Prime Minister Kadhimi.

The Fatah Alliance was, at the time of the assassination attempt, engaged in a legal battle to nullify the results of the election based on claims of fraud, and still had not accepted the results of the election. Qaani reportedly rushed to Baghdad to tell leaders of the Iran-backed militias, including Hadi al-Ameri of the Badr Organization and Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, [to accept the results of the election](#) and control their militias.

Qaani’s call for de-escalation was, presumably, based on a calculation that violence would further isolate the pro-Iran parties. The Iranian strategy to bridge the Shi’a divide does appear, for now, to rely heavily on mediation. Qaani returned to Iraq after Sudani’s nomination in [an effort to mediate the intra-Shi’a dispute](#), but he obviously failed, as the demonstrations took place shortly thereafter.

However, Iran is obviously not an impartial mediator. It wants the Fatah Alliance—the coalition of Iran-backed militias—to emerge as the main power broker in parliament. This would promote a government made up of pro-Iran officials within key government institutions, particularly the state security apparatus. Such a government would likely avoid measures to disband the proxy militias. To that end,

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Iran may attempt to isolate Sadr and Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi, who at least [made an effort to curb the Iran-backed militias](#), albeit with limited success. It may back Sudani and former Prime Minister Maliki, who obediently installed pro-Iran figures—in some cases directly from the militias—in key government posts and kept the PMF well-funded during his time in office.

To ensure their desired results, Iran-backed proxies in Iraq have [increased](#) their violent activities to intimidate and coerce their political opponents. Just as [the Iranian regime gunned down protestors in Iran](#) in December 2019, Iranian proxies, under [the guidance of then Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani](#), [violently suppressed protestors in Iraq](#) in late 2019. Iran's proxies [increased their rocket and drone attacks in Iraq](#) since Mustafa al-Kadhimi became prime minister in May 2020. According to one independent candidate in the October 2021 elections, this violence [hurt the PMF politically](#).

In November 2021, an unknown terrorist group attempted to assassinate then Iraq's prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, in a drone strike. AAH [claimed](#) that the attack was "fabricated." However, [Reuters reported](#) that two Iraqi security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the attack was carried out by both Kataib Hezbollah and AAH. One of the officials noted that the drone was designed in the same way as other Iran-made drones that were used to attack US forces in Iraq earlier in the year—as a "quadcopter" carrying a projectile with high explosives.

The statements of these officials indicated that Iran probably supplied the weapons used in the assassination attempt. Ambassador Nathan Sales of the *Counter Extremism Project* claimed that the failed drone strike "[appears to have Tehran's fingerprints all over it](#)." The Iranians condemned the assassination attempt, and some analysts ask whether the attack is an indication that Iran is "[losing some of its grip on Shi'a militias in Iraq](#)." The prime minister was not harmed in the attack, but had the "[assassination been successful, \[it would have resulted in\] a potential full-blown intra-Shi'a conflict](#)," said Raad Hasan, a Baghdad-based Iraqi political analyst.

Still, [many Iraqis fear](#) that the attack portends such a conflict. If Iraqis perceive Iran and the Iran-backed militias as being violent and destabilizing, it could weaken the pro-Iran parties' support base, and benefit Sadr's nationalist movement. Such an outcome runs contrary to Iran's interests, but violence is the modus operandi of Iran's [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)](#) and the proxies it supports—particularly in situations where Iran's political interests are threatened.

The Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), cooperating with Sadr, has been a target of Iran's violence. On March 13, 2022, the IRGC launched a barrage of missiles from Iranian territory on a private villa in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. The owner of the villa, Baz Karim Barazanji, is [closely associated with the KDP](#). On March 28, pro-Iran militiamen allegedly [burned down the KDP's Baghdad office](#) with impunity. Then, again, in early May, [six rockets were fired at the Kawergosk refinery](#), which is owned by Barazanji. And more attacks on Erbil came in June in what appeared to be a concerted Iranian effort to pressure the KDP to stop cooperating with Sadr and [make concessions to the Iran-backed groups](#). There have also been several [targeted assassinations](#) against Sadrists across Iraq.

KDP leader Masrour Barzani joined with Sadr in the [hopes of stripping the presidency from his rival Barham Salih](#), and he has [advocated for a more decentralized government](#) in which the Kurdish people

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(and other ethno-sectarian constituencies) would have more power over their affairs. Salih's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party, on the other hand, sided with the pro-Iran parties in [boycotting the parliamentary vote for president](#), to deny Sadr and his supporters the required two-thirds quorum.

The KDP also suffered the wrath of Iran in the Iraqi legal system. Dr. Faiq Zaidan, a longtime supporter of Iran, [believed to be affiliated with Hezbollah](#) and president of the Federal Supreme Court, issued a ruling that targeted Kurdish control of oil revenues from the refineries in its autonomous region. (This court issued the ruling that required a two-thirds parliamentary quorum to elect the president). Furthermore, [the court blocked Kadhimi's caretaker government](#) from passing a new budget, enabling PMF militias to maintain their budget of \$2.7 billion. Iran's interests are clearly represented by high-ranking judges within Iraq's judicial system.

Michael Knights of *the Washington Institute* described this legal campaign as "[a judicial coup](#)," in which "one arm of Iraq's government [was] subordinated to a foreign power," through members of the judiciary that had been "cultivated" by former Prime Minister Maliki. This judicial coup effectively gave the parliamentary minority a veto, and pressured the KDP to make concessions.

The stakes are high, given the stark differences in the political platforms of Sadr and his rivals. Sadr's nationalistic rhetoric is an affront to Iran's interests in Iraq. The Coordination Framework, on the other hand, seems to promote Iran's interests in the Iraqi state.

Iran and its Iraqi proxies implemented a multi-pronged campaign to sway the election in favor of the pro-Iran parties. Their loyalists in the judiciary may have given them the edge in parliament, but Sadr's grass-roots support will make it difficult for the pro-Iran parties to shut him out.

## Lebanon

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [Hezbollah](#)

#### *Lebanon's Political Dynamics*

Lebanon gained independence from France in 1943. Responding, in part, to Maronite nationalist aspirations, France—then the mandatory power in control of the lands that would become Syria and Lebanon—created what would be known as the State of Greater Lebanon, combining the Mount Lebanon Mutassarifate, the locus of Maronite settlement, with adjacent predominantly Muslim areas. While this made the Maronite enclave viable, it also included in the would-be state population groups with identities and affiliations strongly at odds with that of the Maronites. This would become the source of Lebanon's regionally unique diverse social fabric, but also the cause of its chronic domestic

instability.



Hezbollah Secretary General [Hassan Nasrallah](#) (L) embracing and showing deference to Iranian Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Khamenei](#) (R)

Maronite preeminence was built into Lebanon's early system. The 1943 National Pact—an informal agreement divvying up sectarian political power in the country—afforded the Maronites primacy of place based on the 1932 census, when the Eastern Christian sect formed a majority, and gave Christians the country's most powerful political offices and a 6:5 majority in parliament. This census was the last Lebanon would ever conduct, in order to maintain the fiction of sectarian balance and avoid religious conflict.

Lebanon's Christian-Muslim divide had broader political implications. Maronites and many smaller Christian sects were oriented towards

Europe and the West. Generally, they rejected Pan-Arabism and denied that Lebanon was an Arab country. For many Lebanese Muslims, however, their country was still an integral part of a greater Syria and the wider Arab and Muslim world—and if the countries comprising greater Syria could not reunite as one state, they should at least be closely tied together culturally and politically.

Sectarian tensions over Lebanon's identity intensified because of the influx of Palestinian refugees after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and after the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan in the early 1970s. Maronites vehemently opposed the refugees' naturalization, which would have tipped Lebanon's delicate sectarian scales against them. The 1969 Cairo Agreement, which removed Palestinian refugee camps from under Lebanese state authority, was meant to alleviate Lebanese-Palestinian tensions. Instead, the pact ended up heightening sectarian conflicts by allowing

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the PLO to establish a state-within-a-state in Lebanon, soon leading to violent clashes with Maronite militias. In 1975, these skirmishes sparked the bloody Lebanese Civil War, which lasted until 1990.

Lebanese Sunnis and Druze, resentful of continued Maronite dominance, sided with the Palestinians against their Christian compatriots. Lebanon's army fractured along sectarian lines, and an alphabet soup of sectarian militias soon emerged, each inviting the assistance of one foreign backer or another—most critically, Syria and Israel

[Syria](#) never properly recognized Lebanon's independence and saw the civil war as an opportunity to reassert control over that country and reverse the effects of the French mandate. Israel, allied with the Maronite Phalangist party, invaded to expel the PLO from the country and create the conditions for Lebanon to sign a peace agreement with Israel.

Israel would succeed in expelling the PLO, but its political aspirations ended in failure. Syria, by contrast, emerged as Lebanon's new hegemon due to the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war.

Now, only vestiges remain of Maronite preeminence in Lebanon. The Taif Agreement gave Sunni and Shiite Muslims parliamentary parity with Christians and increased the powers of their allocated key offices—prime minister and parliamentary speaker—at the expense of the Maronite-controlled presidency.



*Iran supplies the rockets to Hezbollah which threaten Israel.*

## *Lebanese Sectarianism*

Sectarianism is built into Lebanon's national DNA. While it accounts for Lebanon's much-touted multi-religious tapestry, it is also an outgrowth of the country's lack of a supra-religious, unified national identity and prevents the creation of such an identity. Per Lebanon's National Pact, the country's highest political offices are apportioned not based on merit, but sect: the president must always be the most powerful Maronite Christian figure, the prime minister the most powerful Sunni, and the speaker of parliament the most powerful Shiite. Similarly, political parties primarily coalesce around and represent religious sects, or familial/geographic divisions within each sect, rather than agreement over issues or political philosophies.

The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon's civil war, ameliorated the effects of sectarianism by dividing parliament equally between Muslims and Christians and gave some of the Christian president's powers to the Sunni prime minister and Shiite speaker of parliament. However, it did not eliminate old sectarian hatreds and suspicions, nor resolve the struggle over Lebanon's

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identity that led to the country's civil war. To the contrary, this cosmetic change, by ameliorating the worst effects of Lebanon's sectarianism, arguably further entrenched this system.

Lebanon is thus a country that lacks a unified national identity, and foreign powers, like Iran, divide and conquer in this vacuum by stoking or exploiting sectarian grievances or hatreds.

## *Hezbollah: Iran's Long Arm in Lebanon*

For over three decades, Iran has exploited this sectarianism—particularly the Lebanese Shiite community's grievances and disenfranchisement—to establish a solid foothold in Lebanon. The chaos of Lebanon's civil war and the violence wrought upon Shiites during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon enabled Tehran to catalyze the rise of the first foreign extension of its Islamic Revolution: [Hezbollah](#).

Hezbollah has grown into a powerful force in Lebanese politics and society. With Iranian assistance, but also through its own increasingly independent efforts, the group has spawned a vast social apparatus in Lebanon catering to its community's needs; a growing military arm that has withstood three decades of conflict with the Israeli military; and achieved a global reach and ever-growing political power in Lebanon's government.

Lebanon and Hezbollah may not yet be synonymous—though the group is gradually aspiring to achieve that goal—but Hezbollah has asserted its control over critical parts of Lebanese decision-making. At Iran's orders, or to serve its interests, the group de facto decides when Lebanon will go to war or enjoy peace, as with its several rounds of conflict with Israel or unilateral decision to enter the Syrian Civil War. Notably, that decision was made not to defend Lebanon from Sunni jihadists, as is claimed, but rather to rescue the regime of Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad.

On August 6, 2021, Hezbollah militants [launched rockets](#) into Israel for the first time since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. The rocket attack took place on Shebaa Farms, a location [adjacent to the Golan Heights claimed by Israel, Lebanon, and sometimes Syria](#). Hezbollah claimed that the attack was retaliation for an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon. *The New York Times* [described](#) the hostilities as an escalation in a “shadow war” between Iran and Israel. Both Iran and its proxy Hezbollah are ideologically opposed to the existence of Israel; they vow to destroy the nation.

## *Hezbollah's Financing*

A [U.S. Department of State report](#) from 2020 estimated that Iran provided [Hezbollah](#) with \$700 million annually. Hezbollah spent this money on everything from benefits for its fighters to social services for its constituents. Trump's “maximum pressure” campaign, which introduced harsh sanctions on the Iranian regime, [reduced the amount of Iranian funding](#) made available to Hezbollah. As a result, Hezbollah fighters received less benefits, and many were furloughed or placed on reserve. Less money went to social services for the Shi'a community. And Hezbollah had less money to finance its foreign operations, such as its support for President Assad in Syria, and its acquisition of arms.

In December 2021, Hezbollah Secretary-General, [Hassan Nasrallah](#), interviewed with Beirut-based *al-Mayadeen TV*, and [bragged about the quantity and capability](#) of Hezbollah's arsenal of precision-guided missiles. He claimed that “the number of precision missiles at the resistance's disposal has now doubled

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from what it was a year ago,” and that Israel failed to stop the importing of arms. He furthermore stated that these missiles have the capability of reaching anywhere in Israel. And he levied more direct threats against Israel in vowing to avenge the death of a Hezbollah fighter killed by Israel in Syria.

In October 2021, Hezbollah claimed to have 100,000 fighters, but [experts said](#) the real number is somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000. Israeli security officials claimed that Hezbollah possesses somewhere near [130,000 rockets and missiles](#), some of which have the range to reach anywhere in Israel. Many of these munitions, though, cannot be guided to hit specific targets in Israel. That is why Hezbollah [is trying to convert unsophisticated rockets](#) into precision missiles and drones. In February 2022, Hassan Nasrallah explicitly touted the help and cooperation of “experts from the Islamic Republic of Iran” on this project. Hezbollah also imported dual-use technologies, such as [computer programs, laser range finders, and night vision goggles](#).

In October 2020, the U.S. Department of State’s [“Reward for Justice”](#) identified Muhammad Qasir, Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal, and Ali Qasir as the main actors in Hezbollah’s illicit financing, much of which comes from Iran, and offered to pay up to \$10 million for information leading to the disruption of Hezbollah’s financial networks. The U.S. Department of State designated all three actors as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. In the offer, the State Department mentioned how Muhammad Qasir and other Hezbollah officials set up front companies to hide the IRGC-Quds Force’s role in the sale of crude oil. On the other hand, Ali Qasir ran a front company called Talaqi Group to deliver shipments by sea to the terrorist network. A 2018 U.S. Department of the Treasury designation of Qasir (head of Hezbollah Unit 108) [described](#) him as responsible for “facilitating the transfer of weapons, technology, and other support from Syria to Lebanon.” In January 2022, [the Biden administration enacted additional sanctions](#) on several Hezbollah operatives and front companies to “disrupt Hezbollah’s illicit activities and [its] attempts to evade sanctions.”

In March 2022, a U.S. Department of the Treasury delegation held talks in Beirut with the Lebanese president and other high-ranking officials. The [talks were focused on Lebanon’s efforts](#) to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorism financing, and drug and smuggling operations. U.S. officials clarified that sanctions against Hezbollah should be enforced through financial and banking authorities.

## *Smuggling Drugs and Arms*

In April 2021, [five million Captagon pills were discovered](#) at Jeddah Islamic Port in [Saudi Arabia](#) in what was supposed to be a shipment of pomegranates. In a separate shipping container discovered at Dammam’s King Abdulaziz Port, amphetamine pills were found and seized. Saudi officials accused Hezbollah based on the fact that the organization controls the flow of drugs out of Lebanon. This attempt to smuggle narcotics into Saudi Arabia led Saudi Arabia to ban all imports of fruits and vegetables from Lebanon. This was not an isolated event; over the past six years, over 600 million illegal pills were smuggled into Saudi Arabia, the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon [alleged](#). This incident shows how the actions of Hezbollah can isolate the entire country.

The diplomatic fallout from this drug smuggling incident worsened in October 2021, when a Lebanese minister, George Kordahi, made public statements critical of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. Moreover,

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Lebanon's increasing power in Beirut also contributed to the cooling of relations. In what some saw as an effort to ease tensions with the Gulf States, Lebanon's interior minister [ordered the deportation of members of al Wefaq](#), an outlawed Bahraini Shi'a party opposed to the Bahraini monarchy, in December 2021; the political party was gathering in Beirut for a conference in order to criticize Bahrain's human rights record.

In January 2022, Lebanon's foreign minister [met with his Gulf Arab counterparts](#), hoping to further thaw relations. The Gulf Arab ministers have sought the demilitarization of Hezbollah. In response to their requests, Lebanon's foreign minister agreed to issue a statement that his country will not be "a launchpad for activities that violate Arab countries," but he also said that "[he] is not going to Kuwait to hand over Hezbollah's weapons... [that] is out of the question in Lebanon."

In addition to smuggling drugs, Hezbollah smuggles weapons into and out of Lebanon. In July 2021, Israeli security forces [foiled an attempt to transport 43 guns and ammunition](#) worth around \$800,000 across Israel's northern border with Lebanon. In one case, the weapons were concealed in a tractor ostensibly engaged in agricultural activity. Hezbollah has long controlled the area in southern Lebanon from where the weapons were moved, so Israeli police followed up by investigating the militant organization. It is unlikely that the group did not at least know about the smuggling operations.

Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, [wrote in March 2022](#) that "allegations of arms transfers to non-state actors [ie. Hezbollah] continue and remain of serious concern." He wrote this statement before a U.N. Security Council meeting on Hezbollah's violation of U.N. Resolution 1701, which provided the terms of a ceasefire that brought the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel to an end. [U.N. Resolution 1701](#) stated that there should be "no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government."

But notwithstanding the pressure on Lebanon's government from Gulf Arab states and statements distancing the Free Patriotic Movement from [Hezbollah](#) for domestic political consumption, recent comments by Lebanese President Michel Aoun on his trip to visit the Pope suggest that he is siding with Hezbollah—in a nod to his traditional alliance with the group. In [an interview for La Repubblica](#), the president stated that Hezbollah's military power "does not affect the security of the Lebanese in any way." He went on to say that Hezbollah "cooperates" with the Lebanese Army with regard to the "situation at the southern border," i.e., vis-à-vis Israel. These statements [drew the ire of Christian groups](#) in Lebanon.

In April 2021, *Breaking Defense* [reported](#) that Iran was transporting weapons to its Lebanese proxy via the Mediterranean under the cover of Russian ships, given Israel's increasing effectiveness in striking land shipments through [Syria](#). More recently, in March 2022, [two Arab-Israeli citizens were indicted](#) after allegedly being recruited by Hezbollah to hide weapons inside Israel so that they could be picked up and used against Israeli citizens. The man in charge of executing this plot was said to be Hajj Khalil Harb. He works with Hezbollah's Unit 133—some accounts suggest he is its commander—which is responsible for recruiting operatives in Israel and the West Bank. He was also allegedly running a drug smuggling operation across the border between Israel and Lebanon.

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## *Hezbollah in Lebanese Politics*

Hezbollah also asserts outsize influence over Lebanon's political decision-making. The group has become adept at crippling Lebanon's political system to serve its interests. When political maneuvering fails, Hezbollah has resorted to force. Despite its promises to never turn its weapons on its fellow Lebanese, in May 2008, the group invaded and seized Beirut in response to the government's decision to shut down its telecommunications network and remove the pro-Hezbollah security chief from Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport. Evidence also implicates Hezbollah in a campaign of assassinations against its political opponents—most infamously, the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri. In February 2021, another political opponent of Hezbollah, known to be a prominent critic of the group, [was assassinated in his car](#) in an area known to be controlled by Hezbollah.

Hezbollah also can draw on its social support among Shiites to mobilize members of that sect to carry out street violence or simply shut down whole sections of the country—as with the December 2006 political protests, which led to the resignation of the U.S.-backed government.

Hezbollah also prevented Lebanon from electing a president for two years until its opponents caved and appointed its ally Michel Aoun in 2016. In 2018, the group prolonged Lebanon's efforts to form a new government by backing the demands of pro-Hezbollah Sunnis to be represented in Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government to weaken the premier and force him to concede the legitimacy of pro-Hezbollah voices within his sect.

Hezbollah has been a force since that time. For example, it backed two consecutive health ministers—Jamil Jabaq in January 2019 and Hassan Hamad. Jabaq, in particular, was [close](#) with its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who served as his physician. The health ministry is not an insignificant position in the cabinet—it has had the [fourth](#)-largest budget, which, according to the *Washington Institute*, was worth nearly [\\$338 million annually](#) in October 2018. This position gave the group access to funds that it could use to bolster its image among the local Shi'a population.

That's not to mention the other [ministries](#) its allies or members have occupied in the last two governments, for example, the Industry and Sports and Youth Ministries. The former prime minister, Hassan Diab, whose government collapsed after less than a year in office amid the massive explosion of ammonium nitrate at the Beirut port in August 2020 and an economic crisis, was also backed by Hezbollah. His nomination was only [supported](#) by March 8 parliamentarians. By October 2021, the group and its allies are [believed](#) to have gained control over “two-thirds of the governing portfolio.”

Yet those positions of responsibility contrast with how Hezbollah sees its role in Lebanon. It has disclaimed any responsibility for incidents like the one at the Beirut port, despite the Party of God's [reported](#) dominance over Lebanese ports. In fact, Nasrallah [indicated](#) that his organization was more focused on the port of Haifa in Israel than the port of Beirut in Lebanon. It's Iran's transnational revolutionary movement that remains Hezbollah's priority. The Lebanese system's persistent failure erodes popular support for it and furthers Hezbollah's ultimate goal—replacing the Lebanese secular system with an Islamic republic based on the Iranian model.

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In October 2021, [hundreds of armed Hezbollah supporters](#) took to the streets [to protest and call for the removal of Judge Bitar](#), the lead prosecutor investigating the Beirut port explosion. In the investigation, the judge summoned former minister Nohad Machnouk and two senior security officials, leading some to believe that politicians would no longer be immune from the legal system. However, the officials, with the backing of the Ministry of Interior and Higher Defense Council, did not show up for interrogations, and they have filed legal complaints against the judge.

Hezbollah was the most vehement voice to speak out against the judge. This suggests that the group supports the accused political elites. The investigations into the port explosion have been polarizing. At the October protest, snipers fired from a rooftop, and a gun battle ensued, killing seven civilians and combatants. This violence [renewed fears of a civil war](#), given that all seven of the people [allegedly killed by the primarily Christian Lebanese forces](#) were Shi'a supporters of Hezbollah. And these fears remain as both sides continued to stoke sectarian sentiments as a way of gaining public support amid a largely dysfunctional state and failing economy.

Owing to the investigations into the port explosion, which [destroyed Beirut's port and half of the capital, killing over two-hundred people, injuring thousands, and leaving up to 300,000 people homeless](#), [Hezbollah boycotted cabinet sessions](#) for the newly-formed government, leading to a three-month period without cabinet meetings. The boycott only worsened Lebanon's deep economic crisis. In January 2022, Hezbollah, along with its allied political party, Amal, agreed that they would end the boycott, claiming that they were doing so in order to pass a budget. This episode showed the group's influence over Lebanese politics.

Lebanon's parliamentary elections took place on May 15, 2022. The elections, which were expected to be hotly contested because the victorious party would select the next head of state after the end of President Michel Aoun's six-year term in October 2022, led to gridlock. Aoun [stepped down](#) in October, though no successor could replace him. Many hoped this election would lead to a turn-around in the country's current domestic issues, including corruption and mismanagement. Notably, Hezbollah faced opposition from those who view the group as subservient to Iran's interests. However, one expert [argued](#) prior to the parliamentary elections that "Hezbollah and its allies will sweep the majority of districts as the opponents are engaged in fragmenting internal side battles."

The former president of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, has political allies in Hezbollah who are against normalizing relations with Israel; they say that they will never accept peace with Israel. This contrasts [with the president's statements](#) opening the possibility of a peace process that resolves Lebanon's territorial claims. Hezbollah opposes cooperation between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, [including ongoing U.S.-led efforts](#) to resolve a dispute over maritime boundaries.

In January 2022, Sunni Muslim leader and three-time former prime minister, Saad al-Hariri, [said](#) that he was ending his engagement in Lebanese politics, and he called on his party, the Future Movement, to boycott the upcoming elections in May 2022. Hariri [cited Iranian influence in Lebanon](#) as a reason for the country's political and economic stagnation and why he was removing himself from Lebanese politics. "I am convinced that there is no room for any positive opportunity for Lebanon in light of

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Iranian influence, international confusion, national division, flaring sectarianism, and the withering of the state,” Mr. Hariri [said](#).

Hezbollah holds considerable sway over Lebanon’s political system to the detriment of the Lebanese people. Hezbollah [puts its interests before the people of Lebanon](#) through corruption, weakening state institutions, illicit drug production, smuggling, sex trafficking, and military buildup. One analyst says that Hezbollah [benefits from a poor Lebanon](#), partly because poverty increases dependence on Tehran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah fosters this dependence in many ways, including [holding up government processes](#), and exploits it by providing services that the central government fails to provide. For example, Hezbollah [builds schools, runs hospitals, and charitable organizations](#). But an analyst at *Brookings Institution* [views](#) Hezbollah’s role in corruption and its defense of the status-quo as hampering its political prospects. In addition to [opposing government accountability](#), Hezbollah is fundamentally opposed to Lebanon’s national sovereignty as it acts on Iran’s behalf.

## *Hezbollah’s Economic Influence*

Hezbollah receives significant economic support from Iran, which it uses to prop up its image. At the same time, Lebanon is suffering one of the worst economic crises in its history. Flouting U.S. sanctions, Hezbollah [imported millions of gallons worth of diesel fuel](#) into Lebanon from Syria in October 2021. In a country experiencing a fuel shortage, this came as a relief and boosted public sentiment toward the extremist group. Hassan Nasrallah claimed that the fuel would be donated to “hospitals, nursing homes, [and] orphanages.” Hezbollah’s [efforts to propagandize](#) this fuel shipment were extensive, notwithstanding the fact that it did little to alleviate the country’s shortage.

Given Lebanon’s shortage of fuel, the World Bank has offered to finance a project to provide the country with Egyptian natural gas. [The U.S. endorsed this deal](#) that is meant to counter Iran’s attempts to export fuel to Lebanon. The deal would ship natural gas from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon. Both Egypt and Lebanon sought assurances from the U.S. that such a shipment would be allowed under U.S. law. The countries wanted to be sure that they did not need a sanctions waiver from the US, because entities that do business with Syria can be sanctioned under U.S. law. In January 2022, the office of Lebanon’s prime minister issued a statement saying that the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon provided further assurances that the imports would not contravene U.S. sanctions. Egypt was still seeking those assurances as of January 2022. A senior U.S. Department of State official, Victoria Nuland, said that the deal [“falls under the humanitarian category, \[so\] no sanctions waiver would be required.”](#)

Iran is also attempting to be a patron of the Lebanese government. In March 2022, Iranian Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian made an official visit to Lebanon where he met with Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as well as high-ranking Lebanese officials, including the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament. [Iran’s foreign minister discussed](#) political developments in [Syria](#), [Iraq](#), and [Afghanistan](#) with Hezbollah’s leader. Iran’s Foreign Ministry website said that Iran was prepared to provide wheat to Lebanon and assist in the engineering, industrial, and energy sectors.

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Amid the devastating economic crisis in Lebanon, Hezbollah delivers services that the government is not able to provide. For example, Hezbollah makes regular charity donations to Shi'a communities and has even developed its own parallel banking system. Hezbollah's financial arm, known as al-Qard al-Hasan Association, [reportedly](#) stayed reliable for cash withdrawals when other Lebanese banks were implementing capital controls to stanch a run on the banks. The Hezbollah-run banks also reportedly provide interest-free loans. In May 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the U.S. Department of the Treasury [sanctioned several members of Hezbollah](#) who were using "shadow banks," like al-Qard al-Hasan, to evade sanctions and gain access to the international financial system.

Further contributing to its status as a "state within a state," Hezbollah supports poor people, especially those in Shi'a communities, by [funding a low-income grocery store chain](#), known as Makahzen Nour. The group supports [agricultural projects](#), [implements](#) residential construction projects through its charity organization, Jihad al-Bina, and builds schools and hospitals. They also took a hand in mobilizing a COVID-19 response, with up to "1,500 doctors, 3,000 nurses and paramedics, and 20,000 more activists", [according to the group's executive council](#).

Hezbollah even competes with the U.S., a major provider of economic aid to the country, for influence through its own provision of aid. In 2015, the Obama administration [pared back these programs](#), some of which were designed to foster alternative Shi'a political parties, choosing instead to funnel money to a political elite that is widely viewed by the population as incompetent. It is unclear whether the Biden administration has taken the same approach in order to appease Iran in the nuclear negotiations.

## Palestinian Territories/Gaza

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [Hamas](#)
- [Palestinian Islamic Jihad](#)



Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Khamenei](#) embracing Hamas leader [Ismail Haniyeh](#) in Tehran in 2012.

A key [ideological pillar](#) of the Islamic Republic of Iran is its struggle to “liberate” the Muslim lands of Palestine and the holy city of Jerusalem from what it disparagingly refers to as the illegitimate “Zionist Regime.” To help achieve these ends, Iran has armed, trained, and funded –often working indirectly through [Hezbollah](#)—Palestinian terrorist groups like [Hamas](#) and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad](#) (PIJ), despite the Sunni-Shi’a divide between them.

Iran’s primary goal in supporting various militant Palestinian factions is to foment continuous armed struggle against Israel, weakening a key regional foe and enhancing Iran’s image among Muslim and Arab

publics. Arming the Palestinians enables Tehran to play one faction against another, allowing Iran to maintain leverage over the various Palestinian groups and thereby the [Palestinian nationalist movement](#) as a whole, bringing them into line with the regime’s foreign policy objectives.

Iran has been the leading sponsor of Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which was founded in 1979, inspired by the success of the Islamic Revolution. Iranian funding of PIJ has been in place [since 1987](#). During the early 1990s, much of PIJ organizational and operations-based [support came from the Iranian sub-group Hezbollah](#). The PIJ is extremely open about Iran being its main supporter: “[All of the weapons in Gaza are provided by Iran... the largest share of this financial and military support is coming from Iran.](#)”

Iran has also exerted considerable influence over Hamas, the Sunni Islamist terror group in control of the Gaza Strip. In 1993 Iran, pledged \$30 million in annual support for Hamas’ anti-Israel operations. Hamas had consistently enjoyed this financial support, [in addition to military training](#), until [disagreements](#) over Iran’s role in Syria created a rift between the two parties. However, Iranian favor has once again returned to Hamas to the tune of “[tens of millions of dollars.](#)” Israeli media

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[reported](#) in August 2019 that Iran expressed a willingness to increase its funding of Hamas to \$30 million per month in exchange for intelligence on Israel's missile stockpiles.

Iran's rapprochement with [Hamas](#) is part of an effort to restore Tehran's image in the Arab and Sunni world, damaged due to its brutality in propping up the Assad regime, through taking back the mantle of anti-Zionist resistance. Restoring ties with Tehran has helped Hamas whether diplomatic isolation as well. In recent years, Hamas has faced a hostile Egyptian government on its Gaza border and fallen out of financial favor with Gulf monarchies, which have quietly aligned their regional policy with Israel and backed more moderate Palestinian forces in response to the Iranian threat.

Hamas had also suffered fractured relations with the Assad regime and Hezbollah, the other primary actors in the Iran-led "resistance axis," over the Syrian Civil War. At Iran's behest, the [Assad regime](#) and [Hezbollah](#) have mended ties with Hamas in an effort to rebuild the axis. The effort to reintegrate Hamas into the Iranian sphere of influence furthers Iran's hegemonic regional ambitions and gives Iran an ongoing outlet to focus on "resistance" activities against Israel.

Hamas's second in command, [Saleh al-Aroui](#), led a Hamas delegation to Tehran in October 2017 that met with [former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani](#), who assured them that "[Iran's support to the resistance is the main priority now.](#)" Aroui, who vacated his safe haven in Qatar and [set up shop in Hezbollah's Beirut](#) stronghold, subsequently met with Hezbollah Secretary General [Hassan Nasrallah](#) on November 1, 2017. According to [media reports](#) of the meeting, both sides stressed their willingness to place their "misunderstandings" over Syria in the past and form a united resistance front against Israel.

In June 2018, Israel [complained](#) to the U.N. Security Council that it had intelligence showing that Hamas was working with Hezbollah to establish missile factories and training camps for thousands of Palestinian fighters in southern Lebanon. [Hamas](#) and [Hezbollah's](#) growing cooperation lays the groundwork for a future struggle with Israel that may encompass fighting on multiple fronts with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxies all joining the fray. In August 2019, a Hamas official [warned](#), "If the Israeli enemy launches aggression against the [Gaza Strip](#), and we estimate that it is a confined battle that will not develop into a war to break us, we will face it alone. But if the enemy [Israel] tries to break the resistance, the rest of the axis will join the battle," referring to Hezbollah and Iran's foreign legion of proxy militias.

In September 2019, Hamas leader [Ismail Haniyeh](#) wrote a [letter](#) to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei thanking him for Tehran's "extensive" support and for "Iran's readiness to equip the resistance for whatever it needs to discharge its duty."

In February 2020, Israel [seized](#) \$4 million in funds that it alleged were transferred from Iran to Hamas to help the group build its weapons infrastructure and pay its operatives.

Iran's influence extends far beyond financial support, particularly in Gaza. Iran has supplied and trained groups like Hamas and the PIJ in the use of longer-range rockets. In 2002 Israeli forces intercepted the Gaza-bound Karine A vessel in a raid in the Red Sea, which was loaded with 50 tons of advanced weaponry from Iran. Iran has supplied ever increasingly sophisticated and powerful munitions to Hamas

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with [technology including UAVs](#) being delivered to these groups via Iran's [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps](#) (IRGC). Iran has supplied Hamas with [IEDs, anti-tank munitions, and provides training for up to 6 months in modern tactical warfare](#) for Hamas operatives.

In May 2019, Hamas's leader in Gaza [Yahya Sinwar](#) thanked Iran for providing the group with increasingly sophisticated and long-range rocketry. Following a weekend in which Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired 700 rockets into Israeli territory, Sinwar [stated](#), "Iran provided us with rockets, and we surprised the world when our resistance targeted Beersheba. Had it not been for Iran, the resistance in Palestine would not have possessed its current capabilities."

Iran is now also building a loyalist, "[Hezbollah-style terror group](#)" in the Gaza Strip. Known as Al-Sabirin, the organization is funded directly by Tehran. Through Al-Sabirin, Iran is also seeking to make inroads into the [West Bank](#). On January 31, 2018, the U.S. Department of State [designated](#) Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Harakat al-Sabireen, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), noting that they are "sponsored and directed by Iran."

Hezbollah itself has stepped up its activities in the West Bank in recent years. In January 2016, Israeli security forces [dismantled a five-man terror cell in the West Bank city of Tulkarem recruited by Hezbollah's Unit 133](#), which is tasked with recruitment and planning attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. The cell—recruited and trained by Hassan Nasrallah's son, Jawad—was instructed to gather intelligence on IDF training facilities for an attack, and to prepare a bomb for use in a suicide operation against Israeli civilians. In July 2019, Shin Bet [announced](#) that it had thwarted another cell—an Iranian espionage network—based in Syria, which was recruiting operatives in the West Bank and Gaza via social media.

The emergence of these cells within the Palestinian territories appears indicative of a longer-term Iranian strategy. In the short-term, Iran is content to support and ally with extremist groups with shared anti-Israel aims, such as Hamas and PIJ, to fulfill broad geopolitical objectives. Al-Sabirin's name, which translates to "the patient ones," attests to a desire to anchor proxies loyal to Iran and who share its ideological predilections in the Palestinian territories further down the road if conditions on the ground are conducive. In fact, there have been [signs](#) of increased coordination within Iran's broader Axis of Resistance in furtherance of this project. In 2019, Iran's supreme leader reportedly proposed PIJ form a joint operations room in Gaza with Hezbollah and Iraqi militias.

Due to its implacable opposition to Israel's existence, Iran has waged proxy warfare in the Palestinian Territories, backing the most recalcitrant elements of Palestinian society, including terrorist organizations such as [Hamas](#) and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad](#). Iran's bid to hijack the [Palestinian national movement](#) serves to undermine efforts for a peaceable, negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In January 2020, following the Trump Administration's unveiling of the "Deal of the Century," the IRGC [called for resistance](#) against the peace plan and praised the Palestinians for "standing alone" against it.

Iran has also stood against regional initiatives to accept Israel's existence and normalize its position in the Middle East. After Israel and the UAE announced a deal establishing full diplomatic relations in

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August 2020, Iran [condemned](#) the normalization of ties and vowed that the UAE's decision would strengthen the forces of the "resistance axis" in the region. Iran similarly condemned [Bahrain](#) in September 2020 after it decided to normalize ties with Israel, saying, "The rulers of Bahrain will from now on be partners to the crimes of the Zionist regime as a constant threat to the security of the region and the world of Islam."

In May of 2021, during clashes between Israel and Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad significantly improved their rocket capabilities and tactics. Both organizations employed swarming tactics to overwhelm Iron Dome batteries by firing simultaneous barrages consisting of hundreds of rockets at a time. In one case, Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Quds Brigade admitted it [fired](#) volleys of rockets directly at an Iron Dome battery near Nir Yitzhak, near Israel's border with Gaza, to disable the battery and facilitate the group's other rocket attacks on Israeli cities.

In addition to tactics, both militant groups deployed more advanced weapons. Palestinian Islamic Jihad employed [Badr-3 missiles](#) in attacks on Israeli cities, for which a group spokesman [thanked](#) "the Resistance Axis, headed by the Islamic Republic of Iran," for helping the group develop the missile. Hamas spokesmen have been more circumspect about the source of their improved capabilities. However, their arsenal in the round of fighting included a rocket dubbed the "Ayyash 250"—a rocket named after the group's late chief bomb engineer, Yahya Ayyash, who was dispatched in an operation by Shin Bet in January 1996. The rocket, as its name suggests, has a range of 250 km, and was fired by the group for the first time on May 13, 2021, in the direction of Ramon Airport, in Israel's southernmost city of Eilat. The rocket missed its target, but caused [flights](#) from the airport to be temporarily [canceled](#). On May 13, Hamas' Qassam Brigades also [deployed](#) several loitering munitions, colloquially known as (including by the group), "suicide drones," dubbed the "Shihab."

Rocket and incendiary attacks from the Gaza Strip have occurred regularly since the May 2021 fighting. Starting in April 2022, Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip accelerated their attacks against Israel, a trend that continues. UANI has identified over 20 separate rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip on civilian targets in Israel since April 2022. On August 5-6, 2022, Palestinian militant groups launched [over 400 rockets](#) into Israel, a significant escalation that underscored the growing size of the terrorist groups' arsenals and their readiness to use their rockets.

Again on May 10, 2023, Palestinian militant groups launched [over 500 rockets](#) toward Israel, days after Israel carried out airstrikes against PIJ targets that killed three of its leaders. The increasingly large rocket salvos are designed to overwhelm Israel's air defense systems, but they were largely unsuccessful. The Iron Dome battery intercepted most of the rockets. Israel retaliated, striking over 150 PIJ targets in the Gaza Strip. On May 11, 2023, a rocket fire attributed to Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the central Israeli town of Rehovot caused one death and seven injuries. [According](#) to a source from PIJ, the Iranian-made Boraq 85 rocket, a relatively new weapon system fielded by PIJ, was the culprit.

Iran is looking to build up the lethal capabilities of its partners in the Gaza Strip, posing a direct threat to the Israeli homeland. The Quds Force has enhanced its focus on coordinating the activities of these partners with other actors in the "Axis of Resistance" in Lebanon and Syria. It intends to bolster the

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potential for a coordinated, multifront attack against Israel, especially if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In April 2023, rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon were coordinated against Israel. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani [met with senior leaders](#) in Hamas, PIJ, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In one meeting with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy Saleh al-Arouri and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Qaani finalized a decision to launch rockets from southern Lebanon, culminating in the largest such attack since the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

On October 7, 2023, [Hamas](#) and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad \(PIJ\)](#) – two Iran-baked Palestinian terrorist groups – conducted a major terrorist attack against Israel. They infiltrated into Israeli territory after blowing holes in and breaching the Gaza Strip border fence. They proceeded to commit acts of terror and violence, including [murder, rape, and kidnapping](#), against Israeli citizens, including women, children, and the elderly, resulting in the deadliest and most brutal attack in the history of the Israeli state. This unanticipated terrorist attack caught Israel’s intelligence services off guard, perhaps given [their focus on neutralizing threats emanating from the West Bank](#), which the Iranian regime has prioritized as part of a broader strategy to encircle Israel on multiple fronts – including Gaza, the West Bank, [Lebanon](#), and [Syria](#). The regime in Iran has intensified its efforts to arm, finance, and recruit militants in the West Bank, particularly in the Jenin and Nablus areas. Numerous new militant groups, such as the Jenin Brigade, the Balata Brigade, and the Lions’ Den, [have emerged in the West Bank](#). PIJ also [reportedly](#) has a dominant presence in the West Bank and leads recruitment campaigns with financial aid from Iran. Recent personnel, structural, and doctrinal [changes](#) to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the broader military infrastructure in Iran, as part of Ayatollah Khamenei’s “Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution” project, also reveal the IRGC preparing and moving towards for confrontation with Israel.



*Billboard in Tehran's Vali Asr Square, which is managed by the IRGC's Owj Organisation, propagandizing Hamas' brutal assault on Israel that claimed the lives of over 900 Israelis. The billboard, which was unveiled a mere 24 hours after the assault on Israel, revealing Iran had foreknowledge of the attack*

UNITED  
AGAINST  
NUCLEAR  
**IRAN**



*Billboards in Gaza in 2012 thanking Iran for their military support in fighting Israel, particularly their supply of longer-range rockets to target Israeli cities.*

## Syria

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Hezbollah](#)
- National Democratic Forces (NDF)
- Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatemiyoun Division)
- Zainabiyoun Brigade
- Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba

The Iranian-Syrian alliance stretches back to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, constituting one of the most enduring partnerships among authoritarian regimes in the region. Since 1979, Iran and Syria have remained close allies despite fundamental differences in their governments: Iran is a Persian theocracy, and Syria is an Arab secular state. Their partnership [grew out of shared enmity](#) toward Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in Iraq, U.S. regional dominance, and Israel.

In the 1980’s, Syria supported Iran throughout the brutal Iran-Iraq War. President Hafez al Assad, Syria’s president at the time, was the Islamic Republic’s only ally in the region. The rest of the Arab states either sided with Saddam, who was invading the newly-formed Islamic Republic, or remained neutral, fearing that Iran would foment Shi’a revolutions within their borders, as it had been trying to do in Iraq.

Throughout its history, the Islamic Republic has viewed its partnership with Syria as a vital national security interest. When popular uprisings against Bashar al-Assad’s regime broke out in March 2011 amid the “Arab Spring” and turned into a civil war that threatened to unseat Assad, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the support of its proxies, invested massive resources into saving and sustaining its partner. With the help of Iranian troops, Iran-backed militias, and Russian air support, Assad has regained control of most of the country. However, the U.S. military remains present in the east and northeast of the country.

Iran’s partnership with Syria is central to its strategy to dominate the region. Assad allows Iran to set up military bases across the country and conduct military and proxy operations against Israeli and U.S. interests. He also provides the Iranians with access to critical transit routes through Syria. Sometimes referred to as a “[land bridge](#),” these roads connect Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, allowing it to supply Hezbollah—its proxy in Lebanon—with increasingly sophisticated weapons, including [precision-guided missiles \(PGMs\)](#), that are a direct threat to the Israeli homeland. The Syrian Civil War provided Iran with an opportunity to secure its logistics network, which it also uses to distribute arms to its proxies and pro-government forces within Syria.

By supporting Assad, the Iranian regime also denied a victory to its regional Sunni rivals, and further consolidated its “Shi’a Crescent,” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Regional Sunni powers, [along with the U.S.](#), were supporting Sunni rebels fighting against Assad. Jaysh al-Islam was one of those rebel groups [supported by Saudi Arabia](#). Iran’s Sunni rivals saw an opportunity not only to deprive Iran of a key ally, but to support the rise of Sunni political influence in the country. While in the

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interest of Sunni powers, including Qatar and Turkey, who helped Saudi Arabia back rebels against Assad, Iran saw this as a direct threat to its influence in the Levant. Assad's continuation in power provides a check against Sunni power in Syria and the greater Middle East.

Throughout his term of in office, former Iranian President [Hassan Rouhani](#) articulated, on multiple occasions, that the purpose of Iran's intervention in Syria was the defense of the Assad regime. Speaking with Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi in August 2013, Rouhani vowed, "[the Islamic Republic of Iran aims to strengthen its relations with Syria and will stand by it in facing all challenges. The deep, strategic and historic relations between the people of Syria and Iran... will not be shaken by any force in the world.](#)" In December 2020, Rouhani reaffirmed Iran's support for the Assad regime, [declaring](#), "The Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its support to the Syrian government and people as our strategic ally and we will stand by Syria until its final victory." He added Iran will continue fighting in Syria until the Golan Heights are liberated from Zionist occupiers. Given that the supreme leader and the IRGC's Quds Force run point on the Syria file, Iran's policies towards the Assad regime have remained unchanged since the elevation of Rouhani's successor, [Ebrahim Raisi](#), as president in 2021.

While the policies remain unchanged, President Raisi's role in Syria-Iran relations is different from his predecessor's. For example, President Raisi attended a meeting between Iran's supreme leader and President Assad, when the latter made a surprise visit to Tehran in May 2022. He joined Quds Force commander [Esmail Qaani](#) and members of the [Office of the Supreme Leader](#). Former President Rouhani did not attend when President Assad met the supreme leader in February 2019. Furthermore, President Raisi's foreign minister, [Hossein Amir-Abdollahian](#), was invited to attend, unlike former President Rouhani's foreign minister, Javad Zarif. Javad Zarif [resigned](#), because he was cut out of the loop, but the supreme leader rejected his resignation.

President Raisi's attendance at the meeting suggests that the supreme leader [wishes to position him](#) as the leader of an anti-American, anti-Israel informal military alliance, known as the "Axis of Resistance," that includes Iran, Syria, Palestinian terror organizations, and Hezbollah. The meeting also signals Tehran's interest in ensuring that Syria stays a member of this axis, and does not drift toward the Gulf Arab states, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a signatory to the Abraham Accords. Only two months prior to the meeting, President Assad [traveled to the UAE](#).

## *Iranian Economic Support to the Assad Regime*

In support of the Syrian regime's campaign of mass murder to suppress the popular unrest, Iran has [conducted](#) an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power. In the early stages of the conflict, Iran offered [limited assistance](#) to the Assad regime in the form of technical and financial support, facilitated primarily through the IRGC's Quds Force. Beginning in 2012, Iran's economic support increased markedly to forestall the collapse of the Assad regime.

It is unknown exactly how much Iran has spent to prop up the Assad regime, but estimates range from [\\$30 billion to \\$105 billion in total military and economic aid](#) since the onset of the conflict. In 2017, Iran, through its state-run Export Development Bank, extended Syria [an additional \\$1 billion credit line](#),

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adding to the \$5.6 billion total credit lifeline Iran provided the Assad regime in 2013 and 2015 to keep the Syrian economy afloat and facilitate Syrian purchases of petroleum. Iran's provision of credit to the Assad regime underscores its increased reliance on Iran for its survival.

Tehran has also greatly expanded its economic ties with Damascus during the Civil War, boosting bilateral trade from [a peak of \\$545 million per year before the war to over \\$1 billion annually by 2017](#). Trade volume appears to have dipped since then according to Iranian state media reports, but in 2019, an Iranian official stated Iran's intention to [boost trade volume by an additional \\$500 million to \\$1 billion annually](#) within two years. To that end, Iran and Syria held a series of bilateral visits and economic delegations in 2019 aimed at cementing stronger economic ties. Most notably, in January 2019, Iran's vice president traveled to Damascus and inked [agreements](#) solidifying banking cooperation, for Iran to boost Syria's power generation, and for Iran to restore railways and other infrastructure, all with an eye toward boosting trade. In November 2019, Iran and Syria announced a memorandum of understanding to establish three joint state-owned companies that will focus on reconstructing infrastructure and residential properties.

Iran has used its [own oil tankers to transport Syria's embargoed crude oil, disguise its origins, and get it to market](#). Iran stepped up its provision of [diesel fuel](#) to the Syrian regime during the Civil War, [fueling](#) the Syrian Army's heavy ground vehicles – including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy transport. Tehran has done so through direct shipments as well as by providing Assad with credit lines to purchase the fuel. Additionally, Iran has provided Syria [diesel in exchange for gasoline](#), a boon of hundreds of millions of dollars to the cash-strapped Syrian government.

Reports by Syrian government media indicate that in October 2018, Iran, hit hard by the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, [suspended its credit line](#) to the Assad regime, triggering a fuel crisis. For at least a period of six months, Iran was unable to export fuel to Syria, but in May 2019, an Iranian oil tanker [successfully delivered a shipment of oil](#), easing the crisis.

Iran's efforts to provide oil to fuel Syria's war machine have been ongoing, as evidenced by the July 2019 [interdiction](#) by British Royal Marines of an Iranian oil tanker off the coast of Gibraltar carrying 2 million barrels of oil suspected of being destined for Syria. The British operation highlighted Iran's efforts to maintain its lifeline to the Assad regime in violation of EU and other international sanctions.

As the civil war began to wind down, Iran turned to secure its economic influence in the country. In September 2017, Iran's Research Institute of Petroleum, a governmental research institute affiliated with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), [announced](#) that Iran is planning to build an oil refinery in Syria's western city of Homs once the civil war ends as part of a consortium involving Iranian, Syrian, and Venezuelan companies. The consortium has already begun pursuing international investments for the project, which will take an estimated \$1 billion to construct and will have a projected refining capacity of 140,000 barrels per day.

The Homs oil refinery is one of a series of business deals Iran announced that indicate that the Islamic Republic is poised to take a leading role in the rebuilding of Syria, after playing a pivotal role in the nation's destruction. Also, in September 2017, Iran [signed a series of lucrative agreements to restore](#)

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[Syria's power grid](#), and in January 2017, the Iranian government and [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)-affiliated entities inked major mining and telecommunications agreements with Damascus](#). The telecommunications agreements are particularly alarming, as they may provide Iran with communications-monitoring and intelligence-gathering tools.

In the process of shoring up its economic interests in Syria to recoup some of the resources it invested in defending Assad, Iran competed with Russia. In 2018, [a top Iranian military official demanded oil, gas, and phosphate contracts](#), seemingly concerned that the Iranians would not receive a fair share of Syrian assets relative to their economic and military commitment to Assad. Russian companies were pursuing contracts in the same industries, and [landed more deals than the Iranians](#).

## *Iranian Military Support to the Assad Regime*

Iranian military support to the Assad regime was at first limited to advising and training regime forces and pro-Assad militias. However, Iran's support increased markedly in 2012 as Assad risked losing power due to rebel advances and force attrition. Iran began sending [hundreds](#) of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij fighters to Damascus, stanching and eventually reversing Assad's losses. Tehran subsequently [greatly expanded](#) its support to include [deploying thousands](#) of [IRGC](#), [Artesh](#), and [Basij](#) fighters to take a direct part in the Syrian Civil War's battles. These deployments corresponded with Iran taking an increasingly central role in the planning and conduct of the war and [marked a departure](#) from Iran's post-Iran-Iraq War dependence on non-state actors.

Iran has engaged in the facilitation of arms transfers to the Assad regime and proxy militia forces in Syria, including [Hezbollah](#), in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which [endorsed](#) the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and [required](#) Security Council approval for Iranian transfers of any weaponry outside Iran. Resolution 2231 [expired](#) in October 2020, thus removing the U.N. legal framework used to hold Iran responsible for such arms transfers. These arms transfers have helped Assad regain lost territory and have given Iran and its proxies the ability to project power in the Levant militarily, threatening Israel, Jordan, and other U.S. allies and interests in the region.

Iran has sent Syria vast quantities of [military equipment](#) throughout the civil war, including rifles, machine guns, ammunition, mortar shells, and other arms, as well as military communications equipment. These arms transfers began prior to the introduction of Resolution 2231 and continued after it was adopted—much to the chagrin of [JCPOA](#) supporters, who thought that the deal would normalize Iran's relations with the West and promote cooperation. This wishful thinking proved to be incorrect. The arms transfers continue to this day.

Israel referred Iran to the U.N. Security Council on two separate occasions for alleged violations of Resolution 2231 in Syria, once for [launching](#) an "Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)," described as having been launched into Israeli airspace to attack Israeli territory, and once for Iran's [delivery](#) of a Khordad air defense system (which Israel destroyed before it could be set up) to an Iranian air base.

Most of Iran's arms shipments into Syria are supplied via air transport. From January 2016 to August 2017, over [1,000 flights](#), many of them [commercial airlines](#), departed from points in Iran and landed in Syria, indicating an ongoing complex logistical operation to resupply the Assad regime. Air transport

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remains an alternative to ground and sea transport, but it is vulnerable to airspace restrictions and no-fly zones. Prior to 2011, Iran depended on Turkey's airspace to transport weapons and personnel; however, at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, [Turkey denied Iran access to its airspace](#). In March 2011, Turkish authorities interdicted a shipment of machine guns, ammunition, assault rifles, and mortar shells destined for Syria, the U.N. Security Council [reported](#). After U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, Iran began to utilize Iraqi airspace for its operations.

In a testament to Iran's influence in Iraq, in 2012, [Obama administration officials failed to convince then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki](#) to close down its airspace to Iranian flights. Then-Iraqi Minister of Transport, [Hadi al Amiri](#), had close ties with Iran, as he previously led a powerful Iran-backed militia, known as the [Badr Brigade](#). Subsequently, the Obama administration mulled enforcing a no-fly zone, but Obama decided against it, fearing that it would draw the U.S. further into the conflict. Building a friendly relationship with Iraqi political leaders opposed to Iranian meddling in Iraqi politics is key to countering Iran's efforts to dominate the region.

As the tide of the war has shifted in Assad's favor, Iran has moved to establish a permanent military presence in Syria, effectively transforming the country into a forward operating base from which to threaten and occasionally attack Israel. Iran has set about constructing military bases and weapons production and storage facilities to that end. Israel has [targeted Iranian weapons depots](#) on numerous occasions, vowing to strike against Iranian military entrenchment in Syria when it feels threatened. One prominent node for Iranian entrenchment is the T4 airbase, where Iran has sought to establish "[a large air force compound under its exclusive control](#)," according to Haaretz military correspondent Amos Harel. Iran shares the large base with Russian and Syrian forces, but operates independently of them, controlling T4's western and northern sides.

Highlighting the Iranian danger, in February 2018, Iran launched an [armed drone](#) from Syrian territory into Israel, an attack that Israel ultimately repelled. In August 2019, Israel struck Quds Force and Iran-backed Shi'a militia targets in Damascus who were preparing to launch explosives-laden "[killer drones](#)" into Israel's north. Iran's use of Syria as a staging ground for UCAV attacks against Israel illustrates the extent to which Iran has a free hand to operate in Syria, as Assad has allowed Iran to undertake such operations even though they put his own forces at risk.

In September 2019, Western intelligence sources alleged, and satellite imagery confirmed, that Iran's Quds Force is [constructing a military complex](#), the Imam Ali compound, not far from the Abu Kamal / Al Qaim border crossing with Iraq, where it will house thousands of troops. Some of the buildings at the compound appear to be heavily fortified, heightening suspicions that they may be used to store sophisticated weaponry, including precision-guided missiles. The compound was partially destroyed by airstrikes after its existence was exposed, but in November 2019, *Fox News* confirmed that [construction of the base is ongoing](#). In December 2019, *Fox News* reported that Iran is building an [underground tunnel](#) at the Imam Ali complex to store missiles and other advanced weaponry. Western officials claimed Israel destroyed segments of the underground tunnel system in January 2021 [amid an accelerating air campaign against Iranian military assets in Syria](#).

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Besides its use for logistical operations, the Imam Ali compound is also used by the IRGC-QF for training grounds. [Satellite imagery shows](#) that the combat facilities include: “a 100-meter firing range; a second 100-meter open range that could be used for rocket launcher, improvised explosives and other weapons training; a driver training course; an obstacle course; and a combat course consisting of a dispersed collection of small walls, miscellaneous objects and likely small vehicles used to train troops for combat in urban areas.”

While most of Iran’s military hardware and personnel are concentrated in Syria’s north, Israel is increasingly concerned about the transfer of sophisticated weaponry and precision-guided missiles to Hezbollah forces in the country. To that end, Iran has begun to export its military industry to Syria—another dimension of its military entrenchment—in an effort to counter Israel’s ability to gather intelligence and target weapons transfers. It has set up [missile and weapons production capabilities at underground sites](#) in Syria that can be difficult to detect and destroy. These activities may be less vulnerable than land transport to Israeli airstrikes. In some cases, only “bunker-busting” bombs are capable of penetrating the underground fortifications.

The Saudi news agency *Al-Hadath* reported in April 2022 that Hezbollah and the IRGC had begun to develop [ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and UAVs](#) under the “Project 99” program at a facility 25 meters below ground and fortified with a thick layer of concrete and steel in the city Masyaf, Syria. “Project 99” appears to be [an extension of a cooperative program between Iran and North Korea](#) to develop Scud missiles, which, according to the *Wisconsin Project*, are [capable of delivering chemical weapons](#). The production of precision-guided missiles is particularly concerning to Israel.

In April 2022, Israel [struck in the vicinity of the alleged weapons development site](#), and *Al-Hadath* reported at the time that it was targeting a precision-guided missile factory. In Taqsis, Syria, and also in Hama province, Quds Force operatives have taken over an old Syrian regime research facility that is outfitted with tunnels and underground weapons depots. There, they have [reportedly begun work on advanced surface-to-surface missiles and chemical weapons](#). In the Mahin area in the southeastern countryside of Homs, Hezbollah, under the supervision of the IRGC, has [set up fortified workshops for the purpose of manufacturing artillery and missile shells, mines and drones](#), reported the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in April 2022. The human rights organization noted that its source pointed out that these depots [“are considered the second largest arms depots in Syria.”](#)

In addition to focusing on weapons proliferation, Israel is focused on deterring Iranian efforts to establish a presence in the Golan Heights, overlooking Israel’s northern border. In November 2019, an Israeli military official announced, “there are Iranian Quds forces in the Golan Heights and that’s not fear-mongering, they’re there,” increasing the urgency of the IRGC Quds Force threat at Israel’s border.

In July 2020, Iran and Syria [signed](#) a comprehensive agreement to enhance their cooperation in the military and defense spheres. Both sides indicated that the agreement was meant to resist U.S. attempts to pressure and isolate Iran and Syria. Iran noted that as part of the agreement, it will “strengthen Syria’s air defense systems within the framework of strengthening military cooperation between the two countries.” Israeli media reported in August 2020 that Israel has carried out [over 1,000 airstrikes in](#)

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[Syria](#) since 2017, largely in service of its effort to prevent Iranian military entrenchment in Syria and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. During that period, Israel reportedly [took out](#) over one-third of Syria's air to ensure its continued aerial freedom of operation.

Throughout 2021, Israel expanded its attacks [on Iranian arms and missile factories](#) installed in Syria. The Iranians have [reportedly](#) sought to use Russian presence as cover for their weapons proliferation and shipment, thinking that the Israelis would hesitate to strike near Russians. Nevertheless, Israel recently attacked these sites, and Moscow did not condemn the attacks. [Diplomatic and political sources claim](#) that this indicated Moscow's "growing impatience with Iran's involvement in Syria." [According to another expert at CSIS](#), "Moscow has remained wary about the excessive influence of Iranian-backed militias and non-state actors in a post-war Syria."

The Russian war against Ukraine has led to "[increasing military diplomacy](#)" between Iran and Syria. In February 2022, Syria's head of the National Security Directorate visited Tehran and met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. A month later, Iranian Foreign Minister [Hossein Amir-Abdollahian arrived in Damascus to coordinate](#) a "joint position" on the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine could allow Iran to expand its influence in Syria as Russia focuses on Ukraine.

Iran's pledges to bolster Syria's air defenses and increase military cooperation with Damascus show that it remains committed to entrenching itself militarily in Syria. As Iran has entrenched itself, it has used Syria as a weapons transshipment hub, establishing supply lines to provide drones, precision-bombs, and other advanced weaponry to Hezbollah and Iran-backed Shi'a militias. Israel has repeatedly shown that it is willing to strike Iranian targets in Syria to stanch the Iranian proliferation threat and rein in the arms supply network Iran is building in the region. As such, Syria is likely to remain a battleground for direct Israeli-Iranian confrontation for the foreseeable future.

U.S. troops in Syria are also in danger of Iran-sponsored terrorism. According to the Washington Post, which came into possession of leaked intelligence files from communications intercepts between Syrian and Lebanese militias allied with Iran, Iran has begun planning to escalate attacks against U.S. military convoys in Syria by way of the deadly, remote-triggered roadside bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Iran and Russia agreed in late 2022 to establish a jointly-run operations command center in Syria to coordinate the EFP campaign, according to the leaked intelligence files. Both countries have long sought to evict the U.S. military to allow Assad to reassert control over the entire country, including in the autonomous northeast region, where the U.S.-backed, primarily-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are in control,

## *Provision of Proxies*

Iran has deployed an estimated [20-30,000 regional proxies](#) from the Middle East, [Afghanistan](#), and Pakistan into the country. Former IRGC Quds Force commander [Qassem Soleimani](#) was the head of these forces until he died in a U.S. drone strike on January 3, 2020, coordinating activities among the various Shi'a mercenary forces and ensuring they fulfilled Iranian foreign policy objectives. General Petraeus, former director of the CIA, [described Soleimani as](#) "a combination of CIA director, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] commander and regional envoy with the blood of well over 600 U.S. and

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Coalition soldiers on his hands, and the blood of countless others as well, in [Iraq](#), Syria, [Lebanon](#), [Yemen](#) and [Afghanistan](#)—in each of which he supported, funded, trained, equipped and often directed powerful Shiite militias.”

These duties have now shifted to Soleimani’s successor, [Esmail Qaani](#). Tehran’s command and control over its proxy forces in Syria has likely suffered since the transition, as Qaani does not have the stature of Soleimani or benefit of close relationships with the heads of various militias that made Soleimani so effective. In June 2020, Qaani [reportedly](#) visited the Syrian side of the Abu Kamal border crossing with Iraq, where he vowed that Iran would continue to fight the “Zionist regime” and the U.S. Qaani’s visit was meant to show that, like Soleimani, he is capable of clandestinely visiting Iranian proxies around the region to assert his control over and consolidate unity among the various factions Soleimani previously commanded.

In a testament to the tenuous state of the proxy militia command structure, a number of militiamen from IRGC-affiliated militias [were killed fighting among themselves](#) over a dispute regarding the sale of narcotics near Sayyida Zainab shrine, an area controlled by the [IRGC](#) and Syrian regime forces, where drug trading by IRGC-backed militias is prevalent. The militiamen reportedly share their profits with their commanders, which probably include IRGC operatives. In this instance of internecine violence, one of the groups had reportedly sold drugs on another’s territory. Clashes even occasionally [occur between Hezbollah and the Syrian Army’s 4<sup>th</sup> Division](#)—both of which are [deeply involved in the drug trade in Syria](#)—over how to distribute profits from the drug sales. Conflict is frequently reported in the Deir Ezzor region as well, with [an armed altercation between the pro-regime National Defense Forces militia](#), and members of the Fatemiyoun division, serving as a recent example.

## Hezbollah

[Hezbollah](#) is the most prominent proxy acting at the behest of the [Supreme Leader of Iran](#) in Syria. Along with the IRGC-QF, the group [provided](#) (and still does provide) military and ideological training to Iran-backed militias and led them in battle throughout the war. Moreover, Hezbollah troops fought all across the country, [including](#) on the Jordanian and Lebanese borders, Aleppo, and the Golan Heights.

Under Iranian [direction](#), Hezbollah entered the Syrian Civil War on Assad’s side in 2011. Hezbollah spent the first two years of the civil war denying its involvement for fear that it would provoke opposition in Lebanon, but in April 2013, [Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah](#) openly declared Hezbollah’s foray into the conflict, urging his followers to not [“let Syria fall in the hands of America, Israel, or Takfiri \(radical Sunni\) groups.”](#) Since then, Hezbollah has deployed approximately [5,000-8,000 fighters](#) into the Syrian arena, and [between 1,000 and 2,000 of them have been killed](#).

The group has been involved in almost every major battle of the war, including the repeated offensives in [Qalamoun](#) and [Zabadani](#), but most critically [the battle of Aleppo](#). The battle of Aleppo [ended](#) with a regime victory in December 2016, [irreversibly](#) turning the tide of the Syrian war. Hezbollah’s role in the Aleppo offensive was critical to the Assad regime’s victory. The Syrian army’s [heavy, mechanized units](#) were not particularly effective in urban environments. Hezbollah trained and advised the Syrian army and pro-Assad militias to fight against a lightly armed guerrilla opposition in urban areas. Hezbollah

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troops also deployed alongside the Syrian army and [its commanders took charge of militias](#). Its fighters' ability to communicate with Syrians in Arabic made them an asset, compared to their Iranian counterparts who speak Persian (Farsi).

After averting the direct rebel threat to Damascus, Hezbollah acted to re-extend the Assad regime's control over all of Syria. In [May of 2017](#), Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced the withdrawal of his forces from positions on the Lebanese-Syrian border. Rather than demobilizing, however, they were sent deeper into eastern Syria, alongside the Syrian army, as part of a large-scale offensive to retake the country's borders with Jordan and Iraq. At the same time, Iran-backed militias in the PMF charged from the Iraqi side of the border. [In 2018](#), Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias linked up with Iranian proxies on the Iraqi side, defeating ISIS and securing the Abu Kamal / al-Qaim border crossing west of the Euphrates River. South from Deir Ezzor City through Mayadin to Abu Kamal, the IRGC and Iran-backed militias—approximately 4,500 armed personnel in total—hold [“full military authority and executive administration.”](#)

While the number of Hezbollah fighters in Deir Ezzor has decreased since the victory over [ISIS](#), Hezbollah [continues to recruit, train and assist](#) local militia groups in this predominantly Sunni Arab area. Prominent Iran-aligned Iraqi militias and Syrian Local Defense Force militias [continue to be stationed in this area](#), indicating the strategic value to Iran. The city was the target of recent U.S. and Israeli military action. In February 2021, the U.S. [carried out airstrikes](#) on military infrastructure in the city in retaliation for rocket attacks on a U.S. base in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil. In September 2021, an [Iran-backed militia convoy was struck](#), though neither the U.S. or Israel claimed responsibility.

Hezbollah is spread out across the country. Given the strategic importance of the highway that passes through Deir Ezzor province, it is no surprise that Hezbollah (along with the [IRGC](#) and Iran-backed militias) has maintained its presence in this region, but the group has also established key positions in [the southern suburbs of Damascus](#), near the Sayyida Zainab shrine, as well as in [Daraya](#), a suburb in the southwest of the Syrian capital. Since at least 2016, Hezbollah has sustained a demographic-change campaign to solidify regime control over Damascus enclaves. Regime forces, backed by Shi'a militias, [began systematically displacing residents of Daraya in August 2016](#). The Assad regime and Iran's IRGC coordinated efforts to target and remove Sunni populations from these areas.

In the southern suburbs of Damascus, Hezbollah's demographic-change campaign is ongoing as of January 2022, *Diyaruna* reported. The [Diyaruna report](#) noted that Afghanis and Iraqis are being moved in to replace locals that were living near the Sayyida Zainab shrine, as Hezbollah sets up a military base in this area. The group is constructing underground tunnels at this old military site, which could be used to store drones and missiles. The tunnels are intended to protect against Israeli airstrikes, which [intensified throughout 2021](#). Hezbollah is also [using this military site for unmanned aerial vehicle \(UAV\) training operations](#). However, the group's expansion into this area has been unpopular among locals, who view the shrine as one of the holiest. Hezbollah has [removed farmers from their land](#) allegedly to prevent them from documenting their military activities.

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Another important shrine that is attracting Hezbollah militiamen, along with members of Syria's 4<sup>th</sup> division, is the Sayyida Sakina shrine, located in Daraya, a suburb of Damascus. Iran built the shrine, though its location had no religious significance, and today it is the third most holy Shi'a shrine for Iranian people, [said](#) a local Syrian researcher. The shrine, built near the municipality building against the protests of local people, acts as the centerpiece of a kind of settlement, where Iran-backed forces now live. Here, Hezbollah and Assad's army are [acquiring housing](#), either by force or for large sums of money. They have also reportedly looted houses. Other Iran-backed militias present in this region include [the Fatemiyoun Division, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, al-Maqdesiyoun, and Harakat al-Nujaba](#).

To counteract local opposition to its activities, Hezbollah engages in efforts to build popular support for itself and Iran. Hezbollah runs an organization called Jihad al Bina, which [plays an active role in the construction of schools and field hospitals](#) in Deir Ezzor and other government-controlled cities. Iran funds the organization. The Hussein Organization is another so-called charity that, along with Jihad al-Bina, delivers services that the government fails to provide. These organizations [provide](#) food baskets, repair homes, rehabilitate water pipes, and supply generators to provide electricity in the war-torn area. In 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [prohibited](#) transactions between Jihad al Bina and any U.S. persons and froze its assets.

Hezbollah's soft power campaign in Deir Ezzor is only one of many indications that Hezbollah intends to remain in the country after an eventual Assad victory. To that end, it is entrenching itself militarily, similar to its Iranian backers. In December 2021, Hezbollah [reportedly began installing](#) air defense systems in the Qalamoun mountains. These systems threaten to weaken Israeli's ability to conduct air operations against key Hezbollah targets located in the Bekaa valley. Both tactical surface-to-air missile systems and man-portable air defense systems are [suspected](#) to be a part of this arsenal. Furthermore, Hezbollah has reportedly established missile bases [in Qusayr](#) and [Qalamoun](#) to better protect its longer-range projectiles from Israeli aerial attacks.

The group is also aiming to [establish a presence](#) on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. Their presence in this area concerns the Israelis because it could serve as a base to carry out limited strikes against soldiers or civilians in Israeli-held territory in a future conflict. However, this does not threaten Israel's military superiority in the area. Since the Israelis occupy the high-ground, IDF ground troops can easily seize the flat terrain between the Golan and Damascus.

Israeli security officials say Hezbollah is exploiting the chaos of Syria's civil war to clandestinely import advanced, balance-altering weapons—allegedly including [chemical weapons](#), [SCUDs](#), and Yakhont anti-ship missiles—from its Iranian patron and the Assad regime. In 2016, the U.S. Department of State [reported](#) that Hezbollah had already possessed anti-ship and anti-aircraft cruise missile systems. These weapons would be a major upgrade from the short-range and unguided katyusha rockets that have been the group's traditional mainstay, and which make up the bulk of its oft-mentioned arsenal of [150,000 rockets](#). Israel considers these shipments to be [a red line](#) and has repeatedly [intercepted](#) and destroyed these weapons with air strikes. Even the unsophisticated katyusha rockets have the potential to reach population centers in Israel.

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Many of the rockets and other weapons in Hezbollah's growing arsenal [were first flown](#) into Damascus Airport from Iran and then trucked across the border into Lebanon. Ground transportation through [Iraq](#) and Syria remains a viable option given Iran's control of the Abu Kamal / al-Qaim border crossing, but Israel has become increasingly effective at gathering intelligence and targeting convoys and storage facilities used to house weapons en route to [Lebanon](#). In an effort to avoid Israeli airstrikes, Hezbollah recently took to transporting weapons via the sea as well. An April [2021 article in Breaking Defense reported](#) that Iran was smuggling weapons from the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal, and into the Mediterranean Sea under the protection of a Russian fleet.

Hezbollah has engaged in large-scale [sectarian cleansing](#) of Sunnis in Madaya and Zabadini to secure its Beqaa Valley and Baalbek strongholds across the border and guarantee [its land corridor](#) to Damascus. Critically, an Iranian-Qatari brokered population swap deal [in April 2017](#) transferred almost all remaining Sunni combatants from the area, in exchange for the Shiite residents of besieged Foua and Kefraya.

In March 2021, Lebanese Hezbollah militiamen were [conducting military training camps](#) in northeast Syria for [the Shabiba](#), a brutal militia of predominantly Shi'a and Alawite people widely believed to have committed the Houla massacre in 2012 in which [108 people \(mostly Sunni\) were killed](#), many of them women and children. These sectarian acts of violence by Shi'a militias generate fear and resentment among the Sunni population; thus, Sunnis become more inclined to join radical Sunni groups to combat the Shi'a militias. When attacks by Sunni groups increase, so does the motivation to join radical Shi'a groups. In effect, Iran's revolutionary project [fuels a vicious cycle of radicalization](#), which could result in the regrouping of [ISIS](#).

In many ways, Hezbollah has had success in replicating itself throughout Syria. The Iranian proxy group [recruits and indoctrinates members of the minority Twelver Shi'a population](#) in Syria into the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran, *Velayat e-Faqih*, which grants authority to the Supreme Leader of Iran. Hezbollah has even reached out to Sunnis, with some success at converting them to the *Twelver Shi'a* faith. For example, Hezbollah helped recruit from the Sunni tribe, al-Baggara, in the west of Deir Ezzor province. These recruits joined the Baqir Brigade, one of the most prominent militias within the Local Defense Forces, and [some of them converted to Shiism](#). Ideological training is an important dimension of Hezbollah's efforts to construct a network of militias in its image.

To this day, the group continues to recruit and train militias in Syria and lead extensive soft-power initiatives, including building schools, religious shrines, and cultural centers with funding from Iran. These initiatives are designed to build popular support for Hezbollah and the Iranian regime and cement their sociocultural influence in the country.

Hezbollah may also be involved in trafficking drugs through Syria into Jordan. Since the beginning of 2022 alone, Jordan's army has expanded its operations to confront drug trafficking at its border. The army foiled attempts [to smuggle 16 million amphetamine-type Captagon pills and killed 30 smugglers](#) at the border with Syria, said Jordan's army. The smugglers are said to be increasing the sophistication of their drug smuggling operations by employing drones. While the origin of the pills was not clear, Captagon is mostly manufactured in Lebanon and Syria, and Hezbollah is known to be involved in

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smuggling the drug out of its country to finance its operations. A Syrian opposition website reported in May 2022 that Hezbollah operatives from Baalbek had [arrived in the southwestern Syrian city Al-Suwayada to oversee the construction of a small Captagon factory](#).

## Additional Shiite Militia Proxies

In addition to [Hezbollah](#), Iran has [mobilized](#), funded, and armed thousands of Shiite fighters to defend Assad's regime, inflaming [Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions](#) in the process. These fighters, recruited from across the Arab and Islamic world, [including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan](#), were brought under the unified command of [Qassem Soleimani](#).

An estimated 3,000 Afghans, primarily [immigrants, and refugees residing in Iran and Syria](#), form the Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatemiyoun Division). [Afghan children as young as fourteen have died](#) in combat in Syria, revealing the IRGC's shockingly unscrupulous recruitment practices. The U.S. government designated the Liwa Fatemiyoun as a terrorist organization in 2019. Additionally, an estimated 1,000 Pakistanis were trained in Mashhad under the IRGC Quds Force. The Iranian press describes this group, known as the Zainabyoun Brigade, as an [elite assault force](#). The core forces of the Zainabyoun Brigade reportedly initially came from [Al-Mustafa International University](#), an Iranian network of colleges and seminaries tasked with disseminating Iran's religious ideology around the world.

In January 2021, the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division [reportedly](#) transferred 56 short and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles over the Iraqi border to Iraqi Hezbollah forces positioned in Syria's eastern Deir Ezzor province, disguising the weaponry by using vehicles meant for transporting produce. Iran's military entrenchment has eroded Syria's sovereignty and invited increased Israeli [strikes](#) on Syrian territory, indicating that as the Syrian Civil War calms down, the country may become embroiled as a battleground between Israel and Iran and its proxies.

Iran's efforts to recruit Shi'a militants to the Syrian war effort from around the Middle East and beyond center upon the salaries it offers its disaffected conscripts. Recruits are offered monthly salaries on a sliding scale dependent on country of origin and level of military training. Iran offers to [pay the families of "martyrs" for their children's education and to send family members on annual pilgrimages to holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria](#). The salaries are clearly intended to exploit the economic misfortune caused by the war.

Iran's monetary incentives have been effective at recruiting people within Syria as well. In January 2022, the Syrian army was struggling to recruit new fighters in the Deir Ezzor region, even though they were offering defectors and rebels amnesty, because many [of these fighters chose to sign up with Iran-backed militias](#), which offer more attractive benefits, including higher wages. Since the Iran-backed militias are more powerful than the state forces, they also offer a form of protection against the state and terrorist groups. In fact, recent attacks by ISIS [added to the motivation](#) to join Shi'a militias. Now that the Syrian civil war is winding down, the Assad regime and the Iranians are beginning to compete with each other for influence and control.

To grow its base of support in Syria, Iran has recently increased its efforts to convert Sunnis to Shiism, particularly in the predominantly-Sunni Deir Ezzor province. [The Shiite call to prayer can be heard from](#)

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[mosques; and religious shrines are being built at locations with religious significance](#). Iran also relies on material inducements to get people to convert: it has bought property and guaranteed housing to Shi'a converts; and Iran-backed militia leaders have even [paid people to become Shi'a](#). Syrian authorities have [reportedly](#) arrested Sunni imams for refusing to participate in Shi'a prayers. Furthermore, Iran offers financial assistance to tribal leaders in Deir Ezzor, and in return these leaders have [helped the Iranians build religious schools and centers](#).

Beyond cash and benefits, Iran relies heavily on religious and ideological appeals to find recruits willing to be martyred for the cause. The New York Times detailed how recruiters affiliated with the IRGC appeal to the Shi'a faith and identity of potential fighters, reporting that once recruited, fighters train near Tehran where "[Iranian officers delivered speeches invoking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the revered seventh-century Shiite figure whose death at the hands of a powerful Sunni army became the event around which Shiite spirituality would revolve. The same enemies of the Shiites who killed the imam are now in Syria and Iraq, the officers told the men.](#)" These sermons further exacerbate Sunni-Shi'a tensions and violence.

Iran has sought to [frame the fighting in Syria as an urgent necessity to defend Shi'a shrines](#). The golden-domed Sayyeda Zainab shrine, strategically located in south Damascus, is central to this narrative of Iran and its proxy fighters. Attendees at funerals for Lebanese Hezbollah and other Shi'a militia fighters killed in Syria frequently chant "[labaykya Zainab](#)" ([At your service, O Zainab](#)), and these same groups have also produced propagandistic songs featuring the slogan and placed the shrine's iconic dome prominently in the background of martyrdom posters of fallen fighters.

One of the most important and notorious of those groups is [Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba](#), which played a critical role in the battle for Aleppo and is alleged to have [summarily executed](#) 82 civilians—including 11 women and 13 children. Harakat al-Nujaba, an offshoot of [Kataib Hezbollah](#) and [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#), recently formed a "[Golan Liberation Brigade](#)" to fight the Israelis.

In March 2021, Syrian opposition media outlets [reported](#) that the Iran-backed militia Kataib al-Imam Ali had opened a recruiting station in the regime-controlled city of Aleppo. Kataib al-Imam Ali was [created in Iraq in June 2014](#) as the armed wing of an Iraqi political party, Harakat al-Iraq al-Islamiyah (The Movement of the Islamic Iraq). The group has been uniformed and well-armed since its inception. It was founded by Shibl al-Zaydi, a U.S. designated terrorist who has leveraged his position as head of a powerful militia to become [one of the richest men in Iraq](#) with a large business empire and controlling interest in the Iraqi Ministry of Communications.

Assad regime defense officials reportedly approved of the group's recruitment operations and have made allowances not to pursue army defectors and dodgers of compulsory military service if they instead join the militia. The militia appeals to economically disenfranchised Syrian youth, offering \$200 per month for married recruits and \$150 per month for single individuals. The group's nascent presence in Syria is a testament to many of the Iran-backed Shi'a militias' transnational nature.

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## Local Actors

Iran exploits Shi'a religious beliefs and indoctrinates people to motivate them to fight for Iran's interests. [Unlike radical Sunni groups, which threaten the ruling-establishment of Sunni-led states](#), almost all radical Shi'as are influenced by Iran's [state ideology](#) and its revolutionary project. Therefore, Iran pursues a radicalization policy in Syria.

One of the most pernicious ways in which Iran has sought to bolster its influence along sectarian lines in Syria has been by providing ideological guidance for the transformation of elements of Bashar Al-Assad's Popular Committees—small, localized defense units—and other irregular pro-Assad armed groups into [increasingly “regularized” militias](#), known as the National Defense Forces (NDF), modeled after [Hezbollah](#). Iran's [Qassem Soleimani](#) and Hezbollah personally oversaw the creation of the NDF, whose local Syrian recruits receive training in urban and guerilla warfare from both the [IRGC](#) and Hezbollah at facilities in Syria, [Lebanon](#) and Iran. The NDF has participated in critical battles, including the [2016 Aleppo offensive](#) and the campaign to [dislodge ISIS](#), contributing to Assad's surging territorial reconquests. In a 2017 offensive to take back Deir Ezzor from ISIS, the NDF [allegedly committed war crimes and human rights abuses](#) against the local Sunni population.

The militia operates as a part-time volunteer reserve force of the Syrian Army which has opted to fight on behalf of the Assad regime against rebel groups, filling the void created by the depletion of Assad's Syrian armed forces since their creation in mid-2012. Iran has taken the lead in the [“rebranding, restructuring, and merging”](#) of the Popular Committees into the NDF, with Hezbollah playing a critical role in providing military and ideological training. In a similar vein to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed NDF operate in a localized context and are ostensibly Syrian actors, but their true *raison d'être* is the propagation of Iran's supranational revolutionary project.

The NDF is now by far the largest militia network in Syria, estimated at approximately [50,000](#) primarily [Alawite](#) members as of late 2015. The NDF also has a large contingent of Shi'a fighters who, despite being a small minority in Syria, have played an outsize role in supporting the Assad regime against the rebels, which were mostly Sunni. The NDF militants are more audacious than the average member of the regular Syrian army, [according to one rebel](#), who added that they fight with “sectarian zeal.”

In addition to replicating the Hezbollah model in Syria, Iran's role in creating the NDF also mirrors the establishment of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a loosely-knit coalition of predominantly Shi'a militias in [Iraq](#), most of which continue to have close ties to Iran. Both the Syrian NDF and Iraqi PMF are governmentally-sanctioned and financed paramilitary outfits whose fighters are more numerous and powerful than their respective states' official defense forces. Furthermore, both were formed on a sectarian basis: the NDF [mobilized the Alawite community](#) on the basis of a need to defend it against Sunni rebels, and subsequently [ISIS](#); and the PMF was formed after the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the highest Shi'a cleric in Iraq, issued a *fatwa* calling on all able-bodied people to join a militia and fight ISIS. The areas in Iraq that were liberated from ISIS are largely under control of the PMF. In Syria, prominent Defense Force militias, such as the Baqir Brigade, [operate](#) alongside other Iran-backed militias to control

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the areas they liberated from ISIS. PMF militias have [taken control of the roads and levy taxes](#) in Iraq. Likewise, at the Abu Kamal / al Qaim border crossing, these militias [generate billions in tax revenue](#).

A further similarity is that Iran pressured the Iraqi government to integrate the PMF within the state security apparatus, just as it pressured Assad to integrate the NDF. There are some notable differences, though, between the PMF and the NDF. While Iran played a role in the formation of both units, today it appears to enjoy more loyalty from the PMF than it does from the NDF. Most of the Shi'a militias which make up the PMF continue to act at the behest of the Supreme Leader of Iran, even though the group is legally under control of the Prime Minister's office. On the other hand, Iran is [pleading with the NDF in parts of Syria](#) to gain their loyalty, offering to provide financial support.

The NDF appears to be a permanent fixture in Syria, remaking a country that historically "[was home to many competing ideological forms of Shiism](#)" in Iran's image. The militia's secure Iranian alignment and loyalty to its revolutionary ethos ensure that Iran will be the dominant military and cultural power in Syria for the foreseeable future.

Another way Iran strives to remake Syria in its own image is by penetrating the educational system. In January 2018, Iran [announced](#) plans to establish [Islamic Azad University](#) branches in Syrian cities, which would allow it to spread its Islamic revolutionary ideology. Iran has also taken measures to indoctrinate young children. Iran is spreading Shiism in the west Euphrates area, which resembles "[ISIS policy of recruiting and brainwashing children during its control of large areas of Syrian territory](#)." According to The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 20 children under the age of 12 were introduced to Shiism at a school in the town of Hatlah, and given money and gifts for attending the lesson. These material inducements may be intended to exploit the poverty of the population for the purposes of propagating Iran's particular brand of Islam.

The clerical regime in Iran has largely [abandoned any pretense of pan-Islamism](#) to focus exclusively on the Shi'a non-state proxy model, with the aim of dominating the region through loyal Shi'a legions. Iran takes advantage of poverty, chaos, and war to achieve these aims.

## *Iran's Gains in Syria*

The successes of Hezbollah, the NDF, and affiliated Iranian proxy forces in the Syrian theater have expanded Iran's objectives within Syria. What began as an Iranian-sponsored attempt to create a "[Useful Syria](#)" from the regime's major cities and economic centers has now become a more ambitious campaign to [retake the entire country](#). Iran's provision of economic, military, and proxy support was critical in stabilizing Assad's rule until Russia's entry into the civil war in 2015.

Following the Syrian regime's 2016 victory in Aleppo, which followed on the heels of Russia's entry into the conflict, the civil war's momentum swung decisively in Assad's favor. In 2018, the Assad regime consolidated its control in a brutal fashion, pressing an offensive in Eastern Ghouta, the last rebel-held bastion in the Damascus suburbs. The Eastern Ghouta campaign forced the remnants of rebel forces and thousands of civilians to flee to Idlib province, which is now Syria's last-remaining rebel-held enclave on the western Syrian corridor that runs from Damascus-Homs-Hama-Idlib-Aleppo. As of January 2022, millions of displaced people in this province were living under the rule of [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham \(HTS\)](#), a

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jihadist group that became notorious during the Syrian Civil War for suicide bombings against government and civilian targets.

Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif euphemistically declared that Idlib, whose population has [doubled to 3 million people](#) since the war broke out due to internally displaced refugees, must be “[cleaned out](#)” of opposition forces. The U.N. has warned that a regime offensive backed by Iran and Russia would result in the “[worst humanitarian catastrophe](#)” of the century as there are no longer any opposition-held areas left in Syria where those fleeing can evacuate. In September 2018, Russia and Turkey negotiated a tenuous truce to forestall a bloodbath in Idlib, but the Assad regime has referred to the deal as a “[temporary one](#).”

In October 2019, President Trump hastily [announced](#) the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeast Syria and signaled his intention to eventually end US involvement in Syria. The troop withdrawal effectively strengthened Iran’s hand and will facilitate further Iranian military and commercial entrenchment in Syria, presenting a self-inflicted setback to the administration’s concerted effort to pressure Tehran. The U.S. troop withdrawal also increased the chances of a Russian-Syrian-Iranian onslaught in Idlib. Turkey, concerned that an offensive would further increase refugee strains, had stood as a major impediment to an Idlib offensive. In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, however, Turkey has drawn closer to Russia, neutralizing its protestations over a “*fait accompli*” in Idlib.

At a December 2019 summit in Kazakhstan as part of the Russia-Iran-Turkey negotiation track, Turkey joined Russia and Iran in expressing concern over the increased presence of “terrorist groups” in Idlib, and pledged to work cooperatively to pacify the situation. The pledge came in the wake of increased activity by Syrian armed forces, in conjunction with Russian air power, on the outskirts of Idlib in the weeks prior. In November 2019, Syrian and Russian forces killed at least [22 civilians in attacks](#) on an internally displaced person (IDP) camp and a maternity hospital in villages around Idlib, according to opposition monitoring groups. These events indicated that a full-scale offensive in Idlib was imminent.

The Kazakhstan summit ended without a definitive ceasefire agreement, and in the days that followed, Syrian government forces, Russia, Hezbollah, Iran, and other pro-Assad militias launched an offensive to retake Idlib. Nearly one million Syrians, roughly half of them children, were [displaced](#) by the fighting, straining U.N. relief efforts. In March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed to a ceasefire, but the situation remains [volatile](#).

A second consequence of the U.S. troop withdrawal from northeast Syria was that it weakened the deterrent that allowed the Kurdish-led SDF to control a full third of Syria’s territory, home to the country’s richest oil and agricultural resources, keeping it out of the hands of the Russia-Assad-Iran alliance for seven years. As of January 2022, though, the SDF, backed by [a U.S. troop presence at the former Conoco gas facility](#), still controlled the al Omar oilfield, the largest oilfield in the country, in the eastern part of Deir Ezzor. In August 2020, the SDF [signed a contract with an American oil company](#) to extract oil from this lucrative oilfield. The U.S. also conducts counterterrorism operations out of the Conoco base and [recently participated in joint military exercises with the SDF](#) in Deir Ezzor, near the Iraqi border.

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Iran and Iran-backed forces control most of the territory across the Euphrates River from the Conoco base. Further south, the Abu Kamal / Al-Qaim border crossing in Deir Ezzor is, perhaps, the most essential Syrian territory to the Iranian regime, as it serves as the only major route between Syria and Iraq under its control. That is why a large number of Hezbollah forces and the IRGC are stationed there, and west of the Euphrates River. This route—one out of three major routes into Syria from Iraq—is known as [the upper passage of the southern route](#), and it skirts alongside the western edge of the lush Euphrates River Valley, passing through Deir Ezzor city, and eventually connecting to Aleppo, which, as noted, is largely controlled by the Syrian regime.

There is also a lower passage of the southern route, passing through al Tanf; and the third major route, known as the northern route, passing through al Yarubiyah. Of course, overtime, Iran has [adapted its transport routes](#) to avoid detection and Israeli airstrikes, but the Abu Kamal / al Qaim border crossing remains key. As of 2019, *the Atlantic Council* concluded that [neither the southern-most nor the northern-most causeway were open to Iran](#), with the U.S.-held al Tanf garrison and U.S.-backed forces obstructing the al Tanf causeway; and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) [holding al Yarubiyah](#). Given the vulnerability of the Abu Kamal / al Qaim crossing to detection and airstrikes, Iran has occasionally resorted to transporting materials via illegal border crossings on unpaved roads.

[Two-hundred U.S. troops](#) still occupy a military base at the strategic al Tanf border crossing to conduct counterterrorism operations, while also limiting Iran’s ability to ship weapons along this [southernmost transit route](#) from Baghdad to Damascus. However, Iran-backed militias and pro-regime forces [began establishing a presence](#) outside the U.S.-enforced 55-kilometer “de-confliction” zone at al Tanf. Despite U.S. warnings, the Assad regime and allied forces—including Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy militias—established a presence at the key [al-Tanf border crossing](#). These maneuvers indicate the strategic value of al Tanf and create a potential “flashpoint” for escalation between the U.S. and Iran. Iran is looking to open a second route, which would make it more difficult for Israel to track down and prevent arms shipments through Syria.

In October 2021, [a coordinated UAV attack was carried out by Iran](#) on the al Tanf U.S. military base in what American and Israeli officials believed to be retaliation for an Israeli airstrike in Syria. Iran may be trying to push Biden to withdraw the remaining U.S. forces from the Middle East, or make concessions in the ongoing nuclear negotiations. Since Biden took office, the Iranians have carried out increasingly dangerous and frequent attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities in both Syria and Iraq. Between January 20, 2021, when Biden took office, and July 2021, Iran-backed militias had [carried out 20 rocket attacks and 11 drone attacks](#) on U.S. assets in Syria and Iraq, a significant increase compared to Trump’s time in office.

Iranian proxy attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria increased again in 2022. There were [seven attacks in May 2022](#)—as many as in February, March, and April combined. Although they did not result in any deaths, the attacks tested the Biden Administration’s red lines. Whereas the Trump Administration made clear that it would respond if Americans were injured or killed in proxy attacks, the Biden Administration has been less clear about its red lines. Nor did the U.S. [respond with force to any of the 29 attacks](#) launched on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria between October 2021 and August 2022. The failure

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to establish clear red lines, backed up by kinetic action, allows Iranian proxies to carry out attacks with impunity.

[Some analysts view](#) these brazen attacks as a signal from the Iranian system that it will take a more aggressive stance against U.S. presence in the region because it fears no consequences. In this way, it could increase pressure on the U.S. to withdraw and agree to concessions in the Vienna negotiations on the nuclear deal. Through the PMF, Iran may also be planning to increase its pressure on U.S.-backed forces.

Head of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Authority, Faleh al-Fayyad, [reportedly traveled to Damascus in March 2022](#) to meet with President Bashar al-Assad in order to discuss border security cooperation, with the aim of restricting the activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and [shoring up security coordination on both sides of the border](#) at the behest of Iran. Another possible intention behind Al-Fayyad's trip may have been [increasing pressure on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces](#) (SDF), which have a major presence in northeast Syria.

If President Biden brings the remaining troops home, the Iranians would be in an improved position to take full control of the remaining bordering crossings and seize key oilfields. Iran has already begun to invest in its relations with eastern Syrian tribes, like the Baggara tribe, who are [poised to take over SDF-controlled regions in the event of a US withdrawal](#).

The Syrian border with Jordan is also of considerable importance, given that Jordan provides a land bridge to wealthy Gulf markets. Pro-Iranian Syrian army units are reportedly [cooperating with Iran-backed militias to control the flow of drugs from Syria into Jordan](#). The smuggling operations are a critical source of revenue for the militias, which have received less money from Iran ever since the U.S. reimposed sanctions in April 2018. The constant flow of drugs from Syria into Jordan has resulted in a "drug war," in which the Jordanian military and law enforcement frequently engage armed smugglers. In May 2022, the Jordanian army [said it was bracing for an escalation](#), as the armed smugglers attempt to export larger quantities of drugs.

Most common among the drugs smuggled through Jordan from Syria is the Syrian-made cheap amphetamine known as Captagon, which is usually taken in a pill form, and is frequently used by combatants in war to alleviate fatigue. Amid the instability of a civil war, the lucrative trade in Captagon pills has become central to Syria's illicit economy. Although the Syrian government denies its involvement in the multi-billion-dollar industry, the country [now contains the main production sites for this drug](#).

A *New York Times* article from December 2021 referred to Syria as a "[narco-state](#)," given the fact that associates and relatives of President Assad control the trade. Brigadier General Ahmed Hashem Khalifat, director of the Border Security Directorate in the Jordanian Armed Forces, alleged, "[Undisciplined forces from the Syrian army are collaborating with drug smugglers. The gangs...are supported by these forces and by the security apparatuses, in addition to Hezbollah and Iranian militias.](#)" Hezbollah and other Iranian militias, therefore, appear to be facilitating the drug trade in support of the Assad regime.

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The U.S. military presence in Syria, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, are helping to prevent Iran from taking control of the remaining roadways from Iraq into Syria. If these valuable strategic assets come into Iran's possession, Iran would have an easier time shipping weapons to its terrorist proxy in Lebanon, along with the variety of proxy forces it supports throughout Syria. It would also be easier to resupply the Assad regime. The U.S. is also preventing Iran and Syria from seizing key oilfields in the northeast of the country.

## *Iran's Long-Term Influence in Syria*

Iran's Syrian intervention has clearly paid off, guaranteeing both Assad's survival and dependence on Tehran given his weakened position both domestically and within the international community. For its efforts to shore up Assad, Iran and the [IRGC](#)—which has a hand in virtually every sector of the Iranian economy—have the opportunity to further carve out a long-term role for themselves in Syria, utilizing ideology and the cover of military and economic projects to export the Islamic Revolution by creating Shi'a militias and quasi-state institutions loyal to Iran and its [Supreme Leader](#) within Syria.

Iran relied on both local and foreign proxies—trained, funded, armed and directed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and [Hezbollah](#)—to defend Assad against the rebel forces and accomplish core foreign policy objectives. As of March 2021, Iran and Iran-backed militias [controlled the outskirts of Damascus, patrolled strategic towns on the Syria-Lebanon border, were present in large numbers in southern Syria near Israel, had multiple bases in Aleppo, and camps in the west of the Middle Euphrates River Valley \(MERV\)](#), near the border with Iraq. Through its growing proxy network in Syria and its local support, Iran can exert leverage over the central government and coerce Assad to make decisions in its favor, like appointing Iran-aligned figures to key positions in the government, military, or other institutions or providing Iran with lucrative contracts.

Furthermore, Iran uses its Shi'a proxies in Syria to project power into the Levant with a low risk of escalation, for Iran can [deny its involvement in the attacks](#) it directs through proxies. Iran continues to direct attacks on U.S. assets and Israel and [denies any involvement](#). Iran and its proxies now threaten Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, thus opening the possibility of a two-front war with Israel, and have taken an increasingly confrontational posture against the U.S. as well.

Iran plans on using Syria as a base from which to provoke the U.S. and its allies and is not concerned about dragging Syria into its proxy battles. Moreover, Assad permits Iran's expansive military and proxy operations throughout the country, including its weapons shipments and attacks on Israel. He continues to grant permission for these activities even though they increase the risk of Israeli strikes on Syrian interests. For example, in a significant military escalation, Israel struck 70 Iranian military sites throughout Syria in retaliation for an unprecedented rocket attack on Israeli targets in the Golan Heights conducted by Iran in May 2018; [5 Syrian soldiers were killed](#). In December 2021, Israel [bombed a storage container](#) holding Iranian munitions in the Syrian port of Latakia.

Russia cooperates with Israel when Israel carries out airstrikes in Syria. Russia agreed to allow Israel to carry out these strikes, and does not target Israeli jets. However, former Israeli Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister Yair Lapid's [accusations that Russia had committed war crimes](#) in Ukraine raised

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the prospect that the two countries' security cooperation could gradually unwind. The Russians may not turn their air defense systems on Israeli jets in Syria's skies, but there are other ways that Russia might impede upon Israel's security objectives in Syria. Military analyst Brigadier General Asaad Al-Zoubi [claimed that Russia is sending a signal](#) to Israel by allowing Iran to move its forces closer to the Israel border with Syria.

Iran's Foreign Minister [Hossein Amir-Abdollahian traveled to Damascus in March 2022](#) to affirm support for the Syrian regime after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Some members of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's inner circle do not appear to be opposed to a growing Iranian presence in Syria, as one of his advisors suggested in an interview with *the BBC*, that [Iran is still needed to support Syria's war](#). Other members of the president's inner circle reportedly want the Iranians out of the country, [including the powerful General Maher al Assad](#), the president's brother and commander of the Army's notorious 4th Division.

President Assad had already expressed his own discontent with Iran's military activity by [ejecting Iran's top commander of forces in Syria](#), General Javad Ghaffari, in November 2021. The general, who came to be known by the opposition as the "butcher of Aleppo," was reportedly asked to leave the country because he was directing proxy attacks without approval from Syrian officials. Iranian accounts of this situation have [dismissed](#) the notion that he was fired. If it is true that Assad asked Ghaffari to leave, this suggests that the Syrian leadership still maintains a grip over militia activities in Syria, and there is tension, at times, below the surface with Tehran. A Saudi news channel operated by *Al Arabiya* ascribed the Syrian president's decision to eject Ghaffari to an allegation that he had led ["a number of activities against the US and Israel that almost led to the entry of Syria into a regional war, including the attack on American targets in Syria on October 20 by Iranian-backed militias,"](#) *the Times of Israel* reported in November 2021.

It is not clear how President Assad will address these divisions within his inner circle. On the one hand, President Assad has regained control over the country, and may wish to see the Iranian military and proxy presence in his country wind down, so that he can reassert his authority. On the other hand, the Assad regime will still need Iranian security support, given a shortage of resources. And it is possible that that need increased when Russia withdrew some of its forces. Nonetheless, President Assad's ability to dictate outcomes in his country is clearly limited, given the extensive involvement of foreign powers, including Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the U.S.

When the presidents of Russia and Turkey gathered in Iran in July 2022, Syria, still a top foreign policy priority for Iran, likely featured prominently in the discussions, especially amid Turkey's threats to expand its military operations in the north of Syria. President Raisi issued a statement claiming, ["Syria's fate should be decided by the people, without foreign intervention."](#) Of course, Raisi was not referring to Iran's expansive presence. This statement was directed toward the U.S. military presence.

Iran, and its terrorist proxy [Hezbollah](#), seem to be accelerating their military expansion into Syria, especially since the war in Ukraine required Russia to pull forces from Syria. The *New York Times* reported at the end of March 2022, that [at least 1,000 Russian mercenaries from the infamous Wagner](#)

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[Group would be redeployed to Ukraine](#). This shift created a potential power vacuum in Syria that Iran may look to fill. According to Israeli sources, [hundreds of Iranian personnel are moving into strategic areas](#) that were previously dominated by the Russians, including the city of Aleppo and the Mohin warehouse area. Moreover, in May 2022, [Hezbollah and Iranian forces began taking over military bases](#) that were formerly occupied by Russian forces.

The Assad regime's re-consolidation of power, a project in which Iran played an indispensable role, has given Iran and its proxies a foothold to project economic, military, and cultural influence into Syria for years to come. As the civil war winds down, Assad will no longer need the Iranians and their proxy forces to remain in the country. However, Assad owes a huge debt to the Iranians for providing the material, financial, and military support to conduct the war against the rebels. Assad received oil and armaments, economic and military assistance, loans, and increased trade. And, of course, on the military side, Iran was indispensable: Iranian troops and proxies played lead roles in conducting ground operations, and training and commanding pro-Assad militias; Iranian proxies from throughout the Middle East supplied additional manpower; and Iran even recruited and mobilized fighters from within Syria.



*Funeral in Tehran for a senior IRGC commander killed fighting in Syria in 2015.*

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*IRGC-Quds Force  
Commander [Qassem Soleimani](#),  
who is said to be running the war  
in Syria, addressing Iran-backed  
fighters near Aleppo in 2015.*

## Yemen

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Hezbollah](#)
- [Houthis](#)



*The Houthi flag and slogan, which reads “God is great/ Death to America/ Death to Israel /God curse the Jews/ Victory to Islam,” draws inspiration from the Iranian regime slogans “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”*

Iran continues to destabilize Yemen by supporting the [Shiite Houthi insurgency](#) (directly, and indirectly through [Hezbollah](#)) from the beginning of its war against the Sunni-dominated, internationally-recognized central government in 2004. Iran uses the Houthis and Yemen as a proxy and base, respectively, to attack its leading Sunni rival, [Saudi Arabia](#). Iran’s support for the Houthis has helped the latter expand their control of Yemeni territory; capture Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and dethrone Yemen’s central government; and survive a massive air bombardment from a Saudi-led coalition seeking to restore the former Yemeni regime.

Tehran’s [aid](#) to the group has included [funding, Iranian fighter pilots, arms shipments, and military training](#). In 2009, Iran’s support for the Houthis was [exposed](#) when the Yemeni navy apprehended an Iranian ship off the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea carrying

weapons experts and anti-tank weapons sent to replace wounded “Iranians fighting alongside Houthi rebels” against Yemeni government forces. The Houthis’ [motto](#), “God is great! / Death to America! / Death to Israel! / God curse the Jews! / Victory to Islam!” which emulates the Iranian regime’s own “Death to America” slogan and extremist ideology, underscores the group’s links to Tehran. Iranian meddling in Yemen includes arms shipments and support for assassinations and coups; the use of missiles, drones, and roadside bombs; and the deployment of foreign regional proxies, namely Lebanese Hezbollah, on the ground.

According to the [U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2019](#), throughout 2019, Hezbollah, the IRGC-QF, and other Iran backed terrorist groups continued to exploit the political and

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security vacuum created by the ongoing conflict between the Yemeni government under the leadership of President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, recognized by the U.N. Security Council as the legitimate government of Yemen, and the Iran-backed Houthi militants. Additionally, IRGC-QF has exploited the conflict to expand its influence in Yemen.

On [December 5, 2019](#), as part of its reward offer for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran's [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps](#) (IRGC), the U.S. Department of State's "Rewards for Justice" program requested information on the activities, networks, and associates of [Abdul Reza Shahla'i](#), a Sana'a, Yemen-based high-ranking commander of the IRGC's Quds Force (IRGC-QF).

On [January 18, 2020](#), ballistic missiles struck a mosque at the al-Estiqbal military camp in Marib, killing at least 116 people in what was reportedly one of the deadliest attacks in the civil war. There were no immediate claims of responsibility, but Yemen's internationally-recognized government blamed Houthi rebels. The United States blamed Iran, which denied involvement. On January 20, 2020, government forces fought Houthi rebels east of Marib, killing senior Houthi commander Jaber Al Muwaed.

On December 30, 2020, the Houthis [launched](#) an attack against the civilian airport in Aden, where the new Saudi-backed Yemeni government was deplaning. The attack resulted in the deaths of 27 people, including three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Afterwards, the Trump Administration [designated](#) the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

In a particularly audacious attack, in January 2022, the Houthis used ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to launch an attack on the United Arab Emirates. This was a similar swarm attack configuration which was employed during the attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019. They targeted civilian areas—which resulted in the deaths of three civilians—while an international business conference was taking place in the Emirates as well as when South Korea's president was on an official visit. [According to Reuters](#), the Houthis said they fired four Quds cruise missiles at an oil refinery in Musaffah district and the airport in Abu Dhabi, a Zulfiqar ballistic missile at Dubai airport and several drones at those and other sites. This happened while the Houthis chief negotiator was reportedly on a visit to Tehran, with some accounts in Axis of Resistance media indicating he actually met with [Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi](#) on the day of the attack.

## *Arms Shipments and the Houthi Coup*

According to a senior American intelligence official in 2012, intercepted phone conversations between smugglers and the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [revealed](#) that Iran has been "using small boats to ship AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and other arms to replace older weapons used by the rebels." In early 2012, the Yemeni government intercepted another shipment of Iranian manufactured materiel which was destined for a Yemeni Houthi businessman to create explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which are [advanced improvised explosive devices](#) able to penetrate armored vehicles and which [killed hundreds of American servicemen during the Iraq War](#). A year later, in January 2013, a joint U.S.-Yemeni military operation [intercepted](#) an Iranian shipment of

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surface-to-air missiles, C4 explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades in the Arabian Sea. American officials have likened Iran's shipments of "relatively small, but steady stream of automatic rifles, grenade launchers, bomb-making material and several million dollars in cash" to the kinds of materiel Iran provides to its allies in Syria and Iraq.

In September 2014, the Houthis [seized](#) Yemen's capital, Sanaa, and pushed out Yemen's central government four months later. Iranian support for Houthi operations then increased considerably, with Tehran shipping the group [160 to 180 tons](#) of arms and military equipment in March 2015. On September 27, 2014, while speaking about the Houthi coup, Ali Riza Zakani, a member of Iran's parliament and a close confidante of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, [stated](#) that Iran is in a phase of "Grand Jihad" and "Three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad) have already fallen into Iran's hands and belong to the Iranian Revolution," and called Sanaa the fourth. A Saudi-led coalition has undertaken military operations to defeat the Houthis and restore the Yemeni government to power.

### *Missile and Drone Attacks on Saudi Arabia*

Since 2015, the [Houthis](#) have used Yemeni territory under their control as launching pads to fire [more than 100 missiles](#) and drones at Iranian rival Saudi Arabia. Such strikes have landed on multiple cities, including Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Targeted locations include the king's official residence, military bases and encampments, oil refineries, the Riyadh international airport, and shopping malls. Further, as the *Congressional Research Service* [notes](#), "Since 2016, the Houthis have periodically targeted commercial and military vessels transiting and patrolling the Red Sea using naval mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-ship missiles, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). Some of the weapons used reportedly have been supplied by Iran, including sea-skimming coastal defense cruise missiles."

Evidence indicates that Iran is arming and, in some cases, directing the Houthis in their missile campaign, contrary to Tehran's denials and in violation of an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015. An independent U.N. monitoring panel [stated](#) in November 2017 that remnants from four ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia likely came from the Iranian-made and designed Qiam-1 missile. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Pentagon officials [displayed](#) debris from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia, claiming that the markings on and designs of the missiles demonstrated that they were made by Iran.

The U.N.'s finding of Iranian origins in the Houthis' missiles continued well into 2018, with [panel](#) after [panel](#) affirming the Iranian connection. One U.N. [report](#) from January 2018 found that recently inspected missiles and drones "show characteristics similar to weapons systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran," and, therefore, the panel "continues to believe" that Tehran is giving missiles and other arms to the Houthis. Indeed, Iran has recently bragged openly about their support for the Houthis, with an [IRGC](#) general [telling](#) IRGC-controlled media that the Guards had instructed the Houthis to attack two Saudi oil tankers in July 2018.

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Iran reportedly also continues to provide other forms of arms to the Houthis. For example, an independent watchdog organization [claimed](#) in March 2018 that roadside bombs found in Yemen resemble ones used by Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain.

## *Hezbollah's Assistance to the Houthis*

The Iranian proxy group [Hezbollah](#), a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon and elsewhere, also has longstanding ties to the Houthis, who are fellow Shiites. Working with Iran, Hezbollah reportedly operates on the ground in Yemen, arming, training, and even fighting for the Houthis. Analysts have [speculated](#) that the Houthis seek to replicate in Yemen Hezbollah's Lebanese model of a "state within a state."

Hezbollah operatives themselves have reportedly admitted that the group has a ground presence in Yemen and fights directly against the Saudi-led coalition. A Hezbollah commander told the [Financial Times](#) that the group began training with the Houthis in 2005. "They trained with us in Iran, then we trained them here and in Yemen," he said. A Hezbollah commander [reportedly](#) told researchers in 2016, "After we are done with Syria, we will start with Yemen, Hezbollah is already there. Who do you think fires Tochka missiles into Saudi Arabia? It's not the Houthis in their sandals, it's us." A Houthi militia leader [confessed](#) after surrendering to coalition forces in 2017 that Iran and Hezbollah operatives were operating covert training facilities in Yemen.

Coalition and United Nations officials have also claimed that Hezbollah is aiding the Houthis. Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi [claimed](#) in 2016 that Hezbollah Secretary-General [Hassan Nasrallah](#) wrote to him that "Our fighters arrived in Yemen to teach the Yemeni people the essence of governing." In June 2018, the anti-Houthi coalition [stated](#) that coalition forces had killed eight Hezbollah members in Yemen. That August, Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi ambassador to the US, [said](#) that not enough attention was paid to "not only the direct assistance the Al Houthi militia receives from the Iranian regime, but also the existence of Hezbollah commanders on the ground." He added that a coalition raid on a Houthi site had "revealed a Hezbollah operative training, advising [the Houthis] on asymmetric warfare, and showed background portrait [sic] of Iran's 'Supreme Leader' on militia's computer [sic]."

Ambassador bin Salman also [tweeted evidence](#) of ties between the two groups, including footage of a "Hizballah operative in Yemen advising the Houthis to use deception tactics such as using water tanks to store weapons, and smuggling fighters through civilian vehicles; endangering the lives of Yemeni civilians." Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has [repeatedly accused](#) Iran and Hezbollah of being responsible for missile attacks targeting Saudi territory. In July 2018, a coalition spokesman [said](#) "Hezbollah is the Houthis' greatest arms supplier" and said the coalition had evidence that Hezbollah experts were on the ground in Yemen, training the Houthis and giving them a military communications system. And in October 2018, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres [condemned](#) Hezbollah's involvement in Yemen.

In 2018, Nasrallah stepped up his group's public support for the Houthis. On June 29, Nasrallah [paid tribute](#) to the Houthis in a public speech, even [saying](#), "I wish I could be one of your fighters and fight under the guidance of your brave and dear leaders." In mid-August, Hezbollah used its annual

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commemoration of its 2006 war against Israel to display pro-Houthis propaganda—namely, as the National [reported](#), “a reconstruction of a bus hit by a Coalition airstrike which had killed a number of civilians and children in Saada province several days earlier that the Arab-led force later said had been a mistake. Organizers used the bus for journalists to photograph, complete with actors impersonating the victims, special effects smoke, red lighting and fake blood in an evocative image of the war.” And on August 19, Hezbollah [disclosed](#) that Nasrallah had met recently with a Houthi delegation in Beirut.

Houthi leader [Abdul-Malik al-Houthi](#) has [reciprocated](#), praising Iran and thanking Nasrallah for his “solidarity.” He also [promised](#) that Houthis would fight alongside Hezbollah or Palestinian militants in a future war against Israel.

In December 2021, the Arab Coalition [released](#) a video detailing Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen, purportedly showing a Hezbollah commander meeting with the Houthis’ senior military commander Abu Ali Al-Hakim, whom the United States has sanctioned. The Hezbollah commander indicates on the tape that he spoke directly with Hezbollah’s [Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah](#), who reportedly said that “he wishes he could come for (Jihad) himself in Yemen.” In the tape, the Hezbollah commander notes, “the Syrian War is about to end, and most of the Mujahideen will come to Yemen.” This shows increasing coordination and interoperability within Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

## *Saleh Assassination*

In December 2017, the Houthis [assassinated](#) former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, their erstwhile enemy and then ally, after he turned against them again and proposed reconciliation with the Saudi-led anti-Houthi coalition. Iranian leaders and regime-affiliated media outlets [celebrated](#) Saleh’s killing. They said the Houthis are inspired by Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and similar to Iranian-supported militant groups in [Syria](#), [Iraq](#), and [Lebanon](#). After Saleh was assassinated, the forces loyal to him joined the Saudi-led coalition. In 2018, [fierce fighting erupted](#) between the Saudi-led coalition, joined by the Saleh loyalists, and the Houthis over the port of Hodeida. The fighting lasted for approximately six months until a truce in the port city was reached.

In April 2022, the U.N. brokered a ceasefire between the two warring sides, and the Houthis ceased launching missile and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia. The ceasefire did not, however, end hostilities inside Yemen. Days after the truce took effect, the Houthis assaulted government forces in Marib, and have carried out [dozens of attacks since then](#). The ceasefire lapsed in October 2022 and [was not extended](#), and Iran accelerated weapons transfers. In March 2023, weeks before China brokered a normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and the U.K. [interdicted a shipment of arms](#), including Iranian versions of Russian Kornet anti-tank guided missiles and medium-range ballistic missile components, en route to the Houthis in Yemen from Iran.

According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Iran has [committed](#) to halt attacks against Saudi Arabia, including via the Houthis. It remains to be seen whether Iran will abide by this commitment and cease its efforts to arm the Houthis, as it has [agreed](#) to do as part of the normalization arrangement.

The Biden Administration [believes](#) that the China-brokered agreement is a “good thing,” because it could help deescalate regional tensions between the arch-foes. Administration officials view the deal as

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potentially contributing to a ceasefire and the eight-year-long war's winding down. However, the administration has failed to acknowledge the drivers of Saudi Arabia's seeming tilt toward China, or how China's diplomatic foray into Middle East geopolitics could become advantageous to it, particularly when the U.S. intends to shift its attention to Eastern Europe and Asia.



*A shipment of Iranian weapons destined for the [Houthis](#) seized by American naval forces in the Arabian Sea in 2015.*

## *Subversive Activities*

### Afghanistan

#### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)

#### *Support for Afghan Proxies*

Iranian influence in Afghanistan has deep-seated roots reaching back to the 15th century when the [Afghan city of Herat was the capital of the Persian Empire](#). Iran also shares ties with various groups of Afghanistan, particularly the Persian-speaking Tajiks and the Shi'a Hazara. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, [Iran supported Shi'a resistance efforts and opened its borders to Afghan refugees](#). After the first Gulf War, Iraq, which had posed the major proximate threat to Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was effectively neutralized. Neighboring civil war-torn Afghanistan supplanted Iraq as the main threat facing Iran, and in 1996, the extremist Sunni jihadist movement, the [Taliban](#), rose to power, backed by Iranian geopolitical rivals Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

During the Afghan Civil War, Iran defensively sought to cultivate military and political influence in Afghanistan by backing elements hostile to the Taliban with ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic affinities toward Iran, namely the Hazaras in the West of the country and Tajiks in the North who formed the core of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, more commonly referred to as [the "Northern Alliance."](#) By 1998, Iran had amassed 70,000 IRGC troops along its border with Afghanistan to defend against spillover from the conflict next door.

In August of 1998, tensions between Iran and the Taliban reached a boil after the Taliban captured the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, a cosmopolitan and diverse city with a large Shi'a Hazara population. The Taliban brutalized the town's Hazaras, raping and massacring hundreds. Amidst the chaos, Taliban soldiers besieged an Iranian consulate and executed nine Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist. As demands for retaliation grew, Iran [stationed an additional 200,000 conventional forces](#) along the border.

Ultimately, however, Iran, which has since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War sought to avoid confrontation and heavy casualties, refrained from direct intervention and opted instead to escalate its strategy of proxy warfare. Iran ramped up its support for the Northern Alliance, with [former IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani reportedly](#) taking an active role in directing the Northern Alliance's operations from Tajikistan, where the group had established bases from which to launch attacks into Afghanistan and coordinate resupply of its fighters.

The [Taliban](#) offered [Al Qaeda](#) safe haven for its terrorist operations, leading the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to authorize covert assistance to the Northern Alliance in 1999 to facilitate operations against the growing Al Qaeda threat. This marked a rare instance of the U.S. and Iran independently backing a guerilla movement, albeit for different ends. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al

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Qaeda, America initiated hostilities against the Taliban government, a welcome development for Iran at the time.

While wary of the expanding U.S. military footprint in its environs, Tehran was willing to leverage American military might to neutralize its most pressing adversary. The U.S. and Iran held several rounds of secret shuttle diplomacy, leading to [covert cooperation](#) that went as far as Iran sharing intelligence detailing Taliban positions for the U.S. to strike. While many in Iran were skeptical about the efficacy of partnering with the U.S., Soleimani saw the situation as a win-win for Iran. He posited that even if the U.S. ended up betraying Iran after toppling the Taliban, their enemy would be defeated, and America would end up entangled in Afghanistan, similar to the Soviet Union. “Americans do not know the region, Americans do not know Afghanistan, Americans do not know Iran,” [warned](#) Soleimani.

Relations between the U.S. and Iran would ultimately sour following President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union, in which Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were labeled the “axis of evil,” and the subsequent March 2003 invasion of [Iraq](#). Iran’s threat perception changed as the U.S. was no longer the distant “Great Satan,” but a proximate threat with an expanding military footprint in the region that had toppled two neighboring governments and was ultimately bent on Iranian regime change.

As such, Iran’s primary objectives in Afghanistan shifted toward ensuring that the country remained sufficiently weak as to preclude a further military threat toward it, and imposing costs on the U.S. to compel its withdrawal. Iran’s long-term interest is in a stable, friendly, and weak Afghanistan in order to prevent drug trafficking, terrorism, and refugee flows from spilling over into Iran. To that end, Iran pursued foreign direct investment in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and assistance in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, energy, and communications.

At the same time, however, Iran played what former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates termed a “double game” in Afghanistan, seeking good relations with the central government while also modestly funneling arms to insurgents of various ethnic and ideological stripes through the IRGC-Quds Force, according to U.S. intelligence. The haphazard way Iran has sought to play all sides off each other in pursuit of its short-term interests imperils its longer-term interest in a stable, friendly Afghanistan. It has also engendered enmity among broad swathes of the population, as evidenced by [pushback](#) and [demonstrations](#) against Iranian meddling in recent years.

## *Economic and Cultural Influence*

Tehran has dramatically expanded its economic ties with Afghanistan in recent years to buy influence in the country. According to the [Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce](#), Iran surpassed Pakistan as Afghanistan’s largest trading partner from March 2017-2018—with Iran exporting goods worth \$1.98 billion. While foreign investment supports Afghanistan’s development, Iranian investment seeks to undermine NATO and the Afghan regime’s efforts to stabilize the country. In 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai admitted that [Iran was paying his government \\$2 million annually](#), but U.S. officials believe that this is just the “[tip of the iceberg](#)” in a multitude of Iranian cash inflows to Afghan groups and officials.

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Iran's economic influence in Afghanistan is best illustrated by [its development of the western city of Herat](#), where Iran has developed the electrical grid, invested heavily in the mining industry, and invested over \$150 million to build a school, mosque, residential apartments, a seven-mile road, and even stocked store shelves with Iranian goods. According to the head of Herat's provincial council, Nazir Ahmad Haidar, "[Iran has influence in every sphere](#): economic, social, political and daily life. When someone gives so much money, people fall into their way of thinking. It's not just a matter of being neighborly."

Furthermore, Iranian influence in Afghanistan extends past its economy and into Afghan culture and religion. Coordinated by an official under the office of [Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei](#), Iran has funded the development of Shi'a organizations, schools, and media outlets in order to expand Iranian [influence](#) in Afghanistan. Mohammad Omar Daudzai, Afghanistan's former Ambassador to Iran, has stated that "[thousands of Afghan religious leaders are on the Iranian payroll](#)."

Recently, Iran has bridged its regional influence by creating the IRGC-backed Fatemiyoun Division, [a group of Afghan Shi'a fighting in support of the al-Assad regime of Syria](#). Often recruiting Afghan Shi'a refugees in Iran, and to a lesser extent, Shi'as within Afghanistan itself, the IRGC offers a \$500/month stipend and Iranian residency in return for joining pro-Assad militias. The Fatemiyoun was [upgraded from a brigade to a division](#) in 2015, indicating the militia's ranks had grown to at least 10,000 fighters, with some estimates reaching as high as 20,000. The Fatemiyoun militants in Syria have typically been dispatched to dangerous fighting on the front lines with inadequate training and tactical preparation, leading to high casualty rates. Fatemiyoun survivors and deserters have described heavy-handed recruitment methods, including threats of being expelled from Iran and handed over to the Taliban in order to coerce marginalized Afghan refugees to fight in a war they have little understanding of or connection to. Human Rights Watch has identified [at least 14 minors](#) who fought and died in Syria for the Fatemiyoun Division.

## *Support for the Taliban*

Demonstrating the lengths Tehran was willing to go to repel U.S. influence after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, one of the primary groups the Quds Force began arming was its former mortal enemy, the [Taliban](#). Beginning in 2006, the [IRGC-Quds Force began](#) "training the Taliban in Afghanistan on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons" in addition to providing armaments "including small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives." Iran has also permitted the Taliban free movement of foreign fighters through Iranian territory to support its insurgency in Afghanistan.

On October 25, 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [designated](#) the IRGC-Quds Force under Executive Order 13382 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. In 2014, [the U.S. Department of Treasury added](#) three Iranian IRGC Quds Force operatives and one "associate" to its list of global terrorists for their efforts to "plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan," including providing "logistical support" in order to advance Iran's interests in the region. The Treasury Department has [stated](#) that these designations "[underscore] Tehran's use of terrorism and intelligence operations as tools of influence against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan."

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Iran's support for the Taliban was at times short-sighted. For example, the governor of Helmand Province [accused](#) the IRGC in 2017 of giving the Taliban weapons to attack Afghanistan's water infrastructure so that Iran could receive a larger portion of water from the Helmand River. While this was self-serving in the immediate term, such tactics served to weaken the Afghan government and ultimately undermined Afghanistan's longer-term stability.

In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned additional individuals who spearheaded cooperation between the Taliban and Tehran. They [included](#) Mohammad Ebrahim Owhadi, a Quds Force operative, who, according to the U.S. government, provided the Taliban Shadow Governor of Herat Province "with military and financial assistance" in exchange for Taliban forces launching attacks against the Afghan government, and Esmā'il Razavi, who ran a training camp for Taliban forces in Birjand, Iran, which, according to the U.S. government, "provided training, intelligence, and weapons to Taliban forces in Farah, Ghor, Badhis, and Helmand Provinces." News reports indicate that Iran [directly](#) supported the Taliban offensive against Farah Province in May 2018.

[Brigadier-General Esmail Qaani](#) became the head of the IRGC Quds Force, following the death of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Qaani has [deep](#) contacts and experience in Afghanistan—dating back to the 1980s. After Soleimani's demise, Iranian media began [circulating](#) unconfirmed reports that high-ranking Central Intelligence Agency officials perished in a plane crash in Taliban-controlled territory of a Bombardier E-11A electronic surveillance plane, and that one of those officials was involved in the death of Soleimani. Days later, the U.S. government [announced](#) only two U.S. Air Force pilots were killed in the incident, and there was no indication of hostile action in the downing of the jet. There has been speculation that the circulation of this story was part of an Iranian propaganda campaign. Such allegations also come on the heels of an increasingly close relationship between Tehran and the Taliban, with Iranian media repeatedly interviewing its officials.

Days after the plane crash, the head of U.S. Central Command [warned](#) of a "worrisome trend" in intelligence pointing to an uptick of Iran's malign behavior in Afghanistan. This could be evidence of the new Quds Force commander seeking to deploy his existing network inside Afghanistan against U.S. forces.

On February 29, 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban signed a [peace agreement](#) in Doha that envisioned a complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for assurances from the Taliban that the group would prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The agreement was meant to pave the way for negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government on a power sharing agreement that would shape Afghanistan's future.

After the agreement was reached, Iran continued to play a destabilizing double game in Afghanistan, seeking to ensure that it would retain influence in the country regardless of the outcome of the peace process. On the one hand, Iran sought to ingratiate itself with the Afghan government and [encouraged](#) various stakeholder factions from across the political spectrum in the government to form a joint committee to ensure a unified front in future talks with the Taliban. Iran even offered to play a [mediation role](#) in future talks as well between the government and the Taliban. In July 2020, Iran announced that it had formulated a "[Comprehensive Document of Strategic Cooperation between Iran](#)

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[and Afghanistan](#)" whose fundamental principles are "non-interference in each other's affairs," "non-aggression," and "non-use of each other's territory to attack and invade other countries."

At the same time, though, Iran continued to [maintain contact with the Taliban](#) to retain leverage over the Afghan government and peace process. Moreover, Iran evidently worked to sabotage the peace process by [backing more radical elements and splinter groups from the Taliban](#) who oppose negotiations and wish to keep fighting the central government and U.S. military presence. This reality was underscored by an August 2020 *CNN* [report](#) that U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Iran had provided bounty payments to the [Haqqani Network](#), a terrorist offshoot of the Taliban, for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in recent years. The report found that Iran had paid bounties for six Haqqani Network attacks in 2019 alone, including a major suicide bombing at Bagram Air Base in December 2019 that killed two civilians and wounded over 70 people, including four U.S. service personnel. The U.S. ultimately refrained from retaliation for the attack in order to preserve the peace process with the Taliban, but Iran's role in financing attacks targeting the U.S. shows the potential for Tehran to play spoiler through its ties to the Taliban.

Iran, which has been hard hit by sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic, sought to avoid pushing the envelope too hard in terms of proxy confrontation with the U.S., instead pursuing a strategy of strategic patience in the hopes that the U.S. would withdraw on its own accord. At the same time, by retaining its influence over radical Taliban elements, Iran ensured that it would be able to marshal such forces to reengage in hostilities against the U.S. at a time of its choosing should the U.S. have vacillated on leaving Afghanistan. By retaining influence with both the Taliban and its most radical elements, Tehran further sought to ensure that it would not face hostilities from Afghanistan in the event of a Taliban takeover.

In July 2021, after years of playing arsonist in Afghanistan, Iran tried to take on the unlikely role of firefighter, hosting a round of peace negotiations that brought together the Afghan government and the Taliban. The talks signaled that with the U.S. departing from the scene, Tehran would be a major power broker going forward in Afghanistan. Chairing the talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif hailed the defeat of U.S. forces and called for a political solution to the escalating hostilities between the Afghan government and the resurgent Taliban.

Iran's diplomatic overtures were too little too late, however. The last-ditch attempt to revive the stalled intra-Afghan peace process rapidly fizzled for many interconnected reasons. The Trump administration effectively sidelined the Afghan government by bypassing it and entering a bilateral agreement directly with the Taliban in February 2020, signaling that the government would not be a major stakeholder in shaping the country's future trajectory. Further, the Trump administration telegraphed its absolute determination to withdraw from Afghanistan, securing only vague promises from the Taliban to govern more inclusively and prevent the formation of terrorist safe-havens. The U.S. did not attach any conditions to its withdrawal based on progress on the peace process or suitable power sharing arrangements, removing any incentive for the Taliban to negotiate in good faith or make concessions.

Reading the tea leaves, the Taliban opted to wait out the clock on U.S. withdrawal, correctly convinced that its takeover of Afghanistan was a fait accompli. The Taliban, therefore, dragged its feet on entering negotiations and became bolder on the ground, [heavily rearming and reclaiming territory at a rapid clip](#)

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in the months after the Doha agreement. This confluence of factors—the Taliban’s growing strength, the U.S.’s desire to check out, and the Afghan government’s increasingly apparent weakness—had a demoralizing effect on the country’s military and law enforcement forces, contributing to their [unwillingness to fight back](#) against the Taliban’s rapid retaking of two-thirds of Afghan territory, including the seat of government in Kabul, in August 2021.

Iranian officials have been cautiously optimistic in the preceding months about the return to power of the Taliban, clinging to hope that today’s Taliban is a different beast from the 1998 perpetrator of the Mazar-i-Sharif massacre. The marriage of convenience between Iran and the Taliban to repel the U.S. has won Iran some influence with the group that it hopes will endure even after the departure of their common foe. Faced with the challenge of governing Afghanistan’s disparate ethnic, sectarian, and tribal factions and seeking to avoid again becoming an internationally isolated pariah, the Taliban has sought in recent months to portray itself as a nationalistic, as opposed to strictly Pashtun, force, capable of inclusive governance. As such, it has refrained from persecuting Shi’a Hazaras, going so far as to [appoint a Hazara cleric as a northern district governor](#).

In the early following the Taliban’s declaration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Iran reached out to the Taliban with an olive branch. Newly inaugurated [President Ebrahim Raisi](#) issued a [statement](#) hailing the U.S. military defeat in which he declared, "Iran backs efforts to restore stability in Afghanistan and, as a neighboring and brother nation, Iran invites all groups in Afghanistan to reach a national agreement." By invoking "all groups," Raisi was signaling Tehran’s willingness to work with the Taliban.

When the Taliban was the major proximate threat on Iran’s doorstep, Tehran aligned with its primary adversary, the U.S., to remove it from power. Iran evinced a similar pragmatic streak when it feared military encirclement by the U.S., cooperating with its former foe, the Taliban, to expel the U.S. Iran’s strategy of hedging by supporting the Afghan government and multiple opposition factions, including the Taliban, appears to have paid off in the short-term, but the long-term prognosis is far from ideal for Tehran. While Iran only played a minor supporting role in the Taliban’s resurgence, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—Iran’s core objective in Afghanistan—marks a major victory for Iran’s low-investment proxy warfare strategy. As the Taliban finds its footing, it is not likely to instigate hostilities with Iran. Over time, however, old enmities will resurface, especially as drugs, terrorism, and refugees spill over into Iran as a byproduct of restoring the Taliban rule.

At the border of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan provinces and Afghanistan’s Nimroz province, in May 2023, Taliban and Iranian forces [exchanged fire](#) amid a dispute over water rights. The dispute centers around the Helmand River, which empties into the Helmand swamps on the border with Iran. Iran claims rights to the river, which it depends on for irrigation in the Sistan and Baluchestan province. It has asserted that the Taliban have violated a 1973 agreement that guarantees Iran’s access. Iran [alleges](#) that the Taliban is allowing a mere four percent of the agreed amount and has rejected the Taliban’s claim that the reduced flows are due to a lack of rain and drought.


Given that Iran’s ecological problems, including water shortages, are becoming more acute, the Taliban could have the leverage to extract better deals in negotiations over oil, gas, and electricity. Some

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observers even believe that the Taliban could barter water privileges in exchange for these and other commodities from Iran, one of Afghanistan's largest trading partners.



*Iranian weaponry to the Taliban seized by international coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2011.*



*Former IRGC Quds-Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in Syria with commanders of the Iran-backed Fatemiyoun Brigade, an Afghan Shi'a militia.*

## Bahrain

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Hezbollah](#)

The tiny island Kingdom of Bahrain, ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family, has been acutely vulnerable to interference from its much larger Shiite neighbor, Iran, given that approximately [70-75 percent of its population is Shiite](#). In Bahrain, Iran’s revisionist policies are apparent: Tehran aims for no less than the subversion of the ruling Sunni class and the rise of a Shi’a political movement whose leaders are willing and able to do Iran’s bidding. To this day, Iran seeks to export the Islamic Revolution to Bahrain in a clear violation of its national sovereignty.

With its majority Shi’a population, Bahrain constitutes a key node within the “Shi’a Crescent,” which stretches in the shape of an arc through Iran and the Levant. Iran views this arc as a means of acquiring political influence in the sovereign nations where Shi’a reside, namely Bahrain, [Iraq](#), [Syria](#), and [Lebanon](#). Often coopting this demographic with the intention of inspiring acts of loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran—ranging from violently opposing the royals in Bahrain, attacking U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, fighting on behalf of an autocrat in Syria, to menacing Israel at its northern border—Iran advances its foreign policy interest of regional domination.

While Iran’s policy of radicalization of this “Shi’a Crescent” has been notably successful in the Levant, particularly after the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 “Arab Spring,” it has been less successful in the Gulf. Iran covets a foothold in the Gulf, as it seeks to confront [Saudi Arabia](#) and disrupt the mostly cordial diplomatic relations between the predominantly-Shi’a Bahrain and the predominantly-Sunni Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Furthermore, Tehran aims to evict the U.S. military from its bases in the Gulf, including in Bahrain, which hosts the largest U.S. Navy fleet in the region, the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet.

According to a Bahrain expert, the main opposition party’s spiritual leader, [Sheikh Isa Ahmad Qassem](#), is “a religious representative of [Khamenei](#)” who “propagates his religious authority” and “encourages people to follow [Khamenei] rather than other ‘sources of emulation.’” As such, he is laying a foundation for the Iranian state creed of *Velayat-e Faqih*, which places ultimate political authority in the hands of the Supreme Leader of Iran. Like other Iran-aligned Shi’a figures in the region, he is attempting to generate the popular support in Bahrain needed for Iran’s foreign policy objective of subordinating the interests of a sovereign nation to the interests of the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s ties to Bahrain are more than sectarian, though; they are also historical. Up until the 1780s, successive Persian empires controlled Bahrain for centuries. Not until 1970 did Iran, under the leadership of the Shah, drop its territorial claims. Even still, since 1979, the Iranian regime has persistently attempted to return Bahrain to Shiite rule, even referencing its former sovereignty over the island.

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In 2009, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, an advisor to Iran's [Supreme Leader](#), bluntly stated that "[Bahrain was the fourteenth province of Iran until 1970](#)," precipitating a crisis between the two countries. Similarly, in 2018, Hossein Shariatmadari, Iran's Supreme Leader's representative at the *Kayhan* newspaper, [reiterated](#) his statement from ten years prior that "Bahrain is ours [Iran's]" and that the people of Bahrain want their country to become part of Iran again. Even to this day, some fear that Iran's backing of a Bahraini insurgency could pave the way for conventional military action.

## *Iran-Backed Bahraini Insurgency*

The provocations against the Bahraini government started ever since the onset of Iran's Islamic Revolution and continue to this day. In September 1979, only months after [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini](#) returned to Iran from exile in Iraq, Sadegh Rouhani, a prominent Shi'a cleric in Iran, [warned](#) that if the emir of Bahrain did "not want to stop oppressing the [Bahraini] people and restore Islamic laws, we [the Iranians] will call on the people of Bahrain to demand annexation to the Islamic government of Iran." As it does in other parts of the region, Iran posed as a liberator of Shi'a people from the oppression of what it claims to be western-backed tyranny.

Some Bahraini Shiites were inspired by the success of the Iranian Revolution. The most prominent Shiite militia group which formed in Bahrain at this time, under this motivation, was the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB); it was established by Ayatollah Hadi Modarresi, [Ayatollah Khomeini's personal representative to Bahrain](#).

IFLB leaders traveled to Tehran in 1980 and [swore allegiance to the then-Supreme Leader of Iran](#): "Imam Khomeini is the leader and axis around which our oppressed peoples should rally if they truly seek freedom." Seeking to create a theocratic government in Bahrain in the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the group executed a failed coup in 1981. Separately, in 1996 Bahraini authorities [accused](#) Iran of organizing a coup. Forty-four members of a [Hezbollah](#) offshoot, known as Hezbollah al-Hejaz, were arrested. A subsequent investigation showed that [these operatives were trained by the IRGC](#) and intent on recreating the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain.

While Iran continuously denies its involvement in Bahrain, Bahrain repeatedly warns Iran to refrain from meddling in its internal affairs. Bahraini officials, [along with Bahrain experts, viewed the Arab Spring uprising](#) in Bahrain as a culmination of years of Iranian subversion. Iran's efforts to spearhead a series of "popular petitions" to reform the Bahraini monarchy is an example of the subversive activity. In 1994, a Bahraini Shiite cleric, Ali Salman, led a drive which acquired, by some [estimates](#), as many as 25,000 signatures, according to authorities in Manama. This led to Bahrain and Iran [recalling](#) their respective ambassadors, with Bahraini authorities alleging that the petitions were "planned and backed by foreign propaganda" rather than homegrown.

As was the case in other parts of the Arab world, the "Arab Spring" provided Iran with an opportunity to grow Shi'a influence in the country. When [anti-monarchy protests broke out in Bahrain in 2011](#), Tehran increased its efforts to undermine the monarchy. It sought to achieve sectarian aims, namely the rise of Shi'a power and the eventual installment of a Shi'a government. The Bahraini monarchy was not overthrown, partly because one month after the Arab Spring, [Saudi and Emirati armed forces arrived](#) to the island to suppress the protests in operation Peninsula Shield Force. The Bahraini army deployed

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tanks, [shocking and enraging](#) some members of the largely Shi'a opposition. [Partly as a result of this crackdown](#), several Iran-backed Shi'a militant organizations formed in Bahrain.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring, Iran, through the [IRGC](#), [Hezbollah](#), and other Iranian proxies, increased its efforts to provide a Bahraini insurgency not just with soft-power support, as in the instance of the petition drive, but with increasingly effective asymmetric capabilities. Iran prepared Shi'a extremists with the means that they would need to overthrow the government were another popular protest to break out. In the initial period following the uprisings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks became increasingly prevalent, but by 2015 Bahraini insurgents were [being trained in how to create and deploy](#) armor-piercing explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which can be used to destroy tanks.

In September 2020, Bahraini security officials revealed that they had foiled a terrorist plot to attack a visiting foreign delegation shortly after the death of [Qassem Soleimani](#). The newly-formed terrorist organization, which is named after the late Iranian general, claimed to be seeking revenge for his death. The announcement came on the heels of the island kingdom's decision to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. While there are not many details on the perpetrators of the attack, the Bahraini government [prepared a case](#) against eighteen individuals, nine of whom have already fled to Iran, where they received protection from prosecution. More recently, in November 2021, Bahraini authorities [arrested](#) an unspecified number of individuals for planning an attack and confiscated weapons and explosives which came from Iran.

## *Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*

[The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps](#) was created at the time of the Islamic Revolution to protect the revolution from dissidents. The Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Khomeini](#), particularly feared pro-Shah elements within the Iranian military, so he organized an ideologically-driven paramilitary out of Islamists loyal to him. The IRGC continues to take care of domestic security—that is to say, it silences all dissent in Iran—but soon after, the revolution expanded its operations to include coordinating, strengthening, and directing revolutionaries abroad. Today, an elite branch of the IRGC, [known as the Quds force](#), takes the lead on these operations, which are central to Iran's foreign policy.

The IRGC has looked to Bahrain to recruit hardline members of the Shi'a opposition. Often, the IRGC will [bring these recruits to training bases outside of Bahrain and then reinsert them back into Bahrain](#) as cell leaders, able to conduct guerrilla warfare and carry out terror attacks on public facilities as well as civilian populations. The IRGC coordinates all aspects of recruitment, training, funding and arming of these groups with the help of [Hezbollah](#) and Iraqi militias—for example, [Kataib Hezbollah](#).

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) is a radical Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group, backed and directed by the IRGC. Prior to his assassination, [Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis](#), a powerful leader in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), led this group. In June 2015, Bahraini police chief, Tariq al-Hassan, [accused the U.S.-designated terrorist](#) of providing training in EFPs at camps in Iraq and logistical and financial support to Saraya al-Ashtar (discussed below). KH is ideologically committed to Iran's extraterritorial goals, frequently expressing their support for the Bahraini Shi'a and even threatening military action against the Bahraini monarchy.

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Given that Bahrain is an island nation, insurgents (along with arms and other materials) must travel to and from by boat. Researchers at the *Combatting Terrorism Center* at West Point, uncovered their (and their IRGC backers) dependency on maritime routes. [They explained in a January 2018 report](#) that “the most regular known use of militant boat sorties is the inbound smuggling of explosives, weapons components, or whole weapons systems.”

On April 22, 2013, an IRGC member allegedly worked with eight Bahraini citizens to plot the assassination of Bahraini officials and target government buildings and the international airport. The plot was foiled, and the Bahrainis were [arrested](#).

The IRGC not only provides operational support to terrorist individuals and groups in Bahrain, but they also provide material support. Later in 2013, on December 30, the Bahraini coast guard [intercepted](#) an Iranian shipment of over 220 pounds of C4 explosives, 50 hand grenades, land mines, and detonators labeled “made in Syria” that were en route to Shiite opposition groups in Bahrain. During interrogation, the detained suspects “[admitted to receiving paramilitary training in Iran.](#)”

In September 2015, Bahrain [uncovered an illicit Iranian weapons factory](#) aimed at supplying militant elements within the opposition with heavy weaponry to fuel unrest in the kingdom. Bahrain recalled its ambassador to Iran the next month. In November of that year, Bahrain [arrested](#) 47 members of an Iran-linked cell that was plotting to carry out imminent attacks on Bahraini territory.

The IRGC provides training to Bahraini terrorists in conducting subversive activities. In June 2016, two men, [allegedly](#) trained in weapons and explosives by the IRGC, planted a bomb that killed a Bahraini woman. In February 2017, an Iran-linked 14-member cell [bombed](#) a bus carrying Bahraini police officers, wounding five. According to Bahraini officials, six of the arrestees received military training in IRGC-run camps, including [Kata'ib Hezbollah](#) facilities and camps in Bahrain. In March 2017, Bahraini authorities [broke up](#) a terror cell they accused of planning to assassinate government officials and attack police and US military targets with IRGC support. In March 2018, the government [revealed](#) that it had arrested 116 members of an IRGC-coordinated group that was planning to attack senior Bahrain officials and critical infrastructure. Manama claimed that almost half of the arrestees received training from the IRGC in Iran or in Iran-linked facilities in [Iraq](#) and [Lebanon](#).

In April 2019, a Bahraini court [sentenced](#) to prison 139 Bahrainis, of whom 69 received life sentences (25 years), on terrorism charges. The court also revoked their citizenship. The GOB accused the individuals of forming an organization it referred to as “Bahraini Hizballah” with the intention of carrying out attacks in Bahrain.

## *Iranian Illicit Finance in Bahrain*

Iran has a history of laundering money through Bahraini banks to circumvent financial sanctions. Bahraini officials alleged in 2016 that Future Bank, which was set up as a joint-venture with Iranian banks, had laundered \$7.4 billion, using practices such as “wire-stripping,” which is when a bank changes or removes identifying information of financial transactions. More specifically, Future Bank “concealed basic information on international transactions, including through the SWIFT network, to

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disguise entities likely to face US sanctions,” [Bahraini officials found](#). This is a violation of Bahraini law and banking regulations.

In May 2021, Bahraini Attorney-General Ali bin Fadhel Al Buainain announced findings of “unlawful practices” carried out by Future Bank in conjunction with Iranian banks between 2008 and 2012. Thirteen banks were referred to court for prosecution, [including](#) Future Bank, Bank Melli Iran, Bank Saderat Iran, and the Iranian Central Bank. Such money laundering schemes are essential to Iran’s efforts to finance terrorism throughout the region. In August 2021, [Bahrain’s High Criminal Court found the Central Bank of Iran guilty](#) of money laundering and confiscated \$1.3 billion dollars-worth of Iranian funds belonging to Future Bank.

## *The al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)*

In January 2016, Bahrain [caught an IRGC- and Hezbollah-backed cell](#) plotting a series of bombings. The Bahraini authorities claimed that one of the main suspects received \$20,000 from [Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah](#) in Iran. The cell was allegedly part of Saraya al-Ashtar (“[al-Ashtar Brigades](#)”), a Shi’a militant group in Bahrain which has claimed responsibility for more than 20 attacks in Bahrain since 2013, including one in March 2014 that killed three police officers, three of which were Bahraini and one from the United Arab Emirates. The AAB was founded in 2013 and is among the deadliest Shi’a groups operating in Bahrain. [They have called for violence](#) against the U.S., Saudi and Bahraini governments, according to the U.S. Department of State.

The AAB also allegedly engaged in particularly brutal and highly-visible acts of violence against public servants. Relying on urban warfare tactics that they likely learned abroad, soon after the 2011 uprisings, AAB members “[[drew](#)] [security personnel into the villages and kill\[ed\] them in highly publicized, highly charged sectarian violence.](#)” They proceeded to release videos of the executions on social media for propaganda purposes, emphasizing that their aim was to “overthrow [the] Al Khalifa rule.”

In February 2018, the AAB [changed its logo to adopt IRGC branding](#), reflecting its role as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against the U.S. and its allies in the region. The AAB also reaffirmed its fealty to the Iranian regime, stating, “We believe that the commander and ruler of the Islamic religion is the line of the two imams, [Khomeini](#) and [Khamenei](#)...” It outlined new objectives, including cultivating a “resistance and martyrdom culture” and “creat[ing] a deterrent force.”

This latter objective is held in common with all of Iran’s proxies. For example, [Hezbollah](#), located on Israel’s northern border with [Lebanon](#), acts as a deterrent against Israeli strikes on Iranian assets. Similarly, the [Houthis](#) in [Yemen](#), which regularly carry out missile, rocket, and drone attacks on the Saudi and Emirati homeland, act as a deterrent against those countries, while also sapping their resources in a war that has had a devastating humanitarian toll. An armed Shi’a militant group in Bahrain could serve as an additional deterrent directed at Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Hezbollah is a model Iranian proxy. Moreover, AAB may have designs on increasing its political clout by channeling Iranian funding into social or religious services for a marginalized Shi’a community, as Hezbollah does in Lebanon. This would be consistent with the aspiration of Iranian proxies to become a Hezbollah-style “state within a state.”

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Hezbollah has taken a lead role in the ideological and military training of militants throughout the region—and this is no exception in Bahrain. In late 1985, the [CIA reported](#) that over 2,000 Shi'as were training at a Hezbollah-run camp near Bala'bakk; the sixty of them who were from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were expected to perform operations in the Gulf. Later, after Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon in the year 2000, the Lebanese-based Shi'a terrorist organization, probably at the behest of Iran, [shifted its attention to the propagation of the Islamic Revolution](#) throughout the region. The IRGC manages the funding of this organization, and it also facilitates Hezbollah in its efforts to train groups, including AAB.

Bahrain [added](#) the AAB to its list of terrorist groups in 2014. In March 2017, the U.S. Department of State [designated](#) two AAB members, Alsayed Murtadha Majeed Ramadhan Alawi and the Iran-based Ahmad Hasan Yusuf, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). The 2017 designations represented a departure from Obama-era policy, which was geared toward mending ties with a pariah regime in Tehran in order to come to an agreement on the nuclear deal. [For the first time](#), the Trump administration went after Iran's network in Bahrain, with the steadfast support of other GCC nations.

In July 2018, the State Department designated the AAB itself as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and an SDGT, stating that AAB "members have received weapons and explosives from Iran, training at IRGC-funded camps in Iraq, and senior AAB members have taken refuge in Iran to evade prosecution by Bahraini authorities." In August of that year, the U.S. Department of State also [designated](#) an Iran-based AAB senior member, Qassimal-Muamen, as an SDGT. Muamen is [said to be](#) a "principal coordinator" for foreign military training within the AAB, which suggests that he works closely with the IRGC and other IRGC-backed proxies.

On [October 31, 2019](#), the Bahraini judiciary issued life sentences to five nationals for "forming a terrorist cell" affiliated with al-Ashtar Brigades. In [February 2019](#), AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain's Arab Spring-inspired political uprising.

### *Additional Shiite Militant Groups*

In addition to AAB, a variety of other Shiite militant groups remain committed to the overthrow of the Bahraini monarchy. For example, the Saraya Al-Mukhtar Brigade, which has similar [branding](#) to the IRGC, has a history of carrying out terrorist acts in Bahrain and promoting them via social media. The group was created in July 2011, following the Arab Spring uprising. In 2017, at which point the capabilities of the group had substantially improved, Bahrain, [Saudi Arabia](#), the UAE and Egypt [designated](#) it as a terrorist organization. Not until December 2020 did the U.S. [Department of the Treasury impose terrorism sanctions](#) on the al-Mukhtar Brigades. In the designation, the U.S. government cited the significant risk that this group would commit acts of terrorism. It based this assessment on numerous past plots against U.S. personnel in Bahrain and the offering of cash rewards for the assassination of Bahraini officials.

After the death of [Qassem Soleimani](#), the Al-Mukhtar Brigade put out a [statement](#) claiming that they would exact revenge: "We consider all its [the U.S.'s] interests and presence in Bahrain to be legitimate targets for us." The group's rhetoric, though, is more pronounced than its capabilities, [according to one](#)

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[analyst](#). The group relies on rudimentary improvised explosive devices for their attacks, but it also has “[advanced cyber-terrorism capabilities](#),” which are growing from efforts to hack social media accounts used to recruit and radicalize young men, to attacking infrastructure and official government platforms. Moreover, it maintains an extensive social media presence.

Saraya al-Muqawama al-Shabiya (SMS), also known as the Popular Resistance Brigades, is another similar organization with purported [connections](#) to the IRGC. This group [reportedly](#) was behind the detonation of an IED near the U.S. Fifth Fleet and an attack on a branch of the National Bank of Bahrain. Bahrain’s chief of public security [estimated](#) in May 2018 that, since 2011, AAB and other Shiite militant organizations have caused 22 deaths and more than 3,500 injuries to policemen. Bahraini officials have also [arrested members of a group known as Bahraini Hezbollah](#): in 2019, 139 people were sentenced for joining this Iran-linked terrorist group, executing bombings, and receiving arms and explosives training.

Nevertheless, most Shi’a in Bahrain are either against closer relations with Iran or indifferent. According to [a recent poll](#), not even a majority of the Bahraini Shi’a community finds that good relations with Iran are an “important” foreign policy consideration. While the Shi’a community is more inclined to seek relations with Iran than the Sunni community in Bahrain, it is notable that only thirty-nine percent of Bahraini Shi’a think these relations are important, while thirteen percent of Sunnis do.

## *The Abraham Accords*

In September 2020, a month after the Abraham Accords were signed, Sheikh Isa Qassim, the prominent Shi’a spiritual leader of a suspended Bahraini opposition party, al Wefaq, seconded a statement put out by that organization rejecting the Abraham Accords. In the statement, [the non-official party said](#), “the Bahraini government does not possess the legitimacy to normalize [relations with Israel], and because the Zionist entity is itself illegitimate.” He stated, from Iran, that he was against the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel and called for the region to “[resist this defeat](#).” An Israeli think-tank with close ties to the IDF published a report at the time which [anticipated more episodes of Iran-sponsored terrorism](#) in Bahrain with the goal of derailing the normalization trend with Israel.

In September 2021, Israel opened an embassy in Manama and the Foreign Minister of Israel, Yair Lapid, made a landmark trip to the island nation—a trip which was [denounced](#) by [Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian](#). In response to the trip, [the Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson said](#), “This stain will not be erased from the reputation of Bahrain’s rulers. The people of the region will continue to oppose the process of normalization of ties with the Zionist regime.”

Referring to the process of normalization between Bahrain and Israel, the Iranian foreign minister, who was previously the ambassador to Bahrain, said to the ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan: Iran would not tolerate “[activities of the Zionist regime against its national security](#).” Following his remarks, [anti-Israel protests broke out in Bahrain](#), featuring slogans and chants that resemble hardline Iranian rhetoric, including “Death to Israel” chants.

Then in February 2022, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett [traveled to Bahrain to meet the Bahraini King](#) and held discussions about increasing economic and security cooperation between the states. Bennett’s office stated that [the meeting would be geared](#) toward the two countries’ deepening bilateral

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relationship, economic and diplomatic cooperation, and technological innovation. Furthermore, Bennett [described the meeting](#) as an opportunity to coordinate on a mutual threat: Iran.

Tehran reacted furiously. An Iranian news outlet, Fars News, [published an article](#) citing experts who described the cooperation as being geared toward “economic and media pressure [on Iran]” as well as “intelligence operations aimed at sabotage and insurgency inside the country [Iran].”

The [IRGC may seek to coordinate an attack on Bahrain](#) to deter further cooperation, especially military cooperation, with Israel. A commander in the IRGC, Mohammad Tehrani Moghaddam, [warned Gulf Arab rulers](#) against allowing their country to be used for an Israeli strike on Iran: “we [the Iranians] will certainly target them [the rulers of Gulf Arab countries] with the Revolutionary Guards’ invisible arrows.”

The new Abraham Accords will increase Iranian paranoia about Bahrain. Earlier in the month, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed a memorandum of understanding with his Bahraini counterpart in Bahrain, which was created to “help advance intelligence cooperation, a framework for exercises, and cooperation between the countries’ defense industries,” [according to Gantz’s office](#).

Iran views this new military cooperation as a threat; it opposes Israeli military presence in the Gulf. Iran’s foreign minister [described Israeli military presence](#) as “a threat to all countries and the region itself” in a call with the Emirati foreign minister in February 2022. The IRGC has similarly [reacted](#) with alarm. Iran-backed political parties protested the meeting between Gantz and his counterpart, [waving signs that said](#) “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

Israel confirmed in February 2022 that an Israeli naval officer will be stationed in the country. It is the first time an Israeli military officer will be posted in an Arab country. This is not to mention ongoing discussions among the Abraham Accord members—specifically UAE, Bahrain, and Israel—about intelligence sharing and the creation of a regional integrated air and missile defense system.

Bahrain and Israel also seem to be in agreement with regard to the ongoing negotiations in Vienna. Bahrain Under Secretary for International Relations at the Foreign Ministry [said](#) in Jerusalem that the “JCPOA has caused more instigation and extremism in many different regions across the Middle East.”

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*The Iranian proxy Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (logo pictured) failed in its coup attempt in 1981.*



*Iranian weapons and explosives seized by Bahraini authorities in December 2013.*

## Kuwait

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Hezbollah](#)



*Iranian proxies were responsible for a series of coordinated bombings in Kuwait in 1983, which struck the US embassy (pictured), among other targets.*

Iran has long attempted to increase its influence over Kuwait due to the latter's sizeable Shiite minority ([approximately 30 percent](#) of its population), extensive oil reserves, its strategic geographical location between Iran and Iraq at the mouth of the Gulf, and its importance to American and Saudi Arabian security. Kuwait enjoys popular participation in contested parliamentary elections, including by its Shi'a minority. [Some believe](#) that Kuwait's citizenry is the most politically active of all countries in the Gulf. In 2006, the National Assembly approved the crown prince, Sheikh Nawaf al-Amed al-Sabah, who [became the country's leader in 2020](#) after the death of his half-brother, then Kuwait's Emir. Kuwait's vibrant and apparently inclusive political system is an obstacle to Iran's pursuit of influence in the Gulf.

The relationship between Kuwait and Iran was strained during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, because Kuwait, like the other Gulf Arab states, sided with Saddam Hussein of Iraq, hoping to prevent Iran's revolutionary zeal from engulfing the region. Kuwait [extended billions of dollars-worth](#) of loans to Iraq to help it finance its war against Iran. Consequently, [major terrorist attacks tracing back to Iran](#) were committed in Kuwait. These attacks leveraged a network of Shi'a radicals formed by Mohammed Mahdi al-Shirazi, a Shiite who moved to Kuwait from Lebanon after being exiled from the holy Iraqi city of Najaf by Saddam Hussein in 1971. His network extended throughout the Gulf, and became one of the earliest [manifestations of Iran's outward transnational Shiite activism](#) once he moved to Iran after the 1979 Revolution. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran also [attacked](#) Kuwaiti ships and refineries, because Kuwait was shipping Iraqi oil.

Not long after the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein attempted to annex Kuwait in 1990; and the United States mobilized a massive international coalition which quickly repelled him. The war was over by 1991; however, the U.S. troop buildup in the region was not completely drawn down. To this day, large numbers of U.S. troops remain in the Gulf region, at the invitation of the host countries, to maintain regional security; [according to one estimate](#), there were between 60,000 to 80,000 troops deployed to the U.S. military's Central Command area of operations as of January 2020. In the Gulf, they are located

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in [Bahrain](#), Qatar, [Saudi Arabia](#), Kuwait and the UAE, indicating the strategic value of this region of the Middle East. Iran staunchly opposes the U.S. military presence in the region, and foreseeing such as the result of a U.S. troop buildup in the run up to the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), it [remained neutral in that war](#). Part of the reason Iran meddles and supports terrorism in Kuwait is because of the country's alignment with the west.

In April 2011, Kuwait uncovered Iranian covert operations designed to undermine American-Kuwaiti military cooperation and inflame sectarian tensions among Kuwait's Shiite minority. The Kuwaiti foreign minister [reported](#) the discovery of an Iranian spy cell that had [operated in Kuwait since the US invaded Iraq](#) in 2003. The cell "monitored the U.S. military presence and possessed explosives to bomb 'strategic' facilities" in addition to lists of "names of officers" and "extremely sensitive information." This announcement followed the March sentencing of two Iranians and one Kuwaiti for spying on behalf of Iran and coincided with the [expulsion](#) of several Iranian diplomats from Kuwait.

Iran seeks to expand its influence in Kuwait by coopting Shi'a groups. The IRGC "exploits the space for religious freedom that exists in Kuwait to expand its foothold in Kuwaiti society," [said a retired Kuwaiti political officer](#). Since some religious centers, including Shi'a mosques, are not subject to oversight by government institutions, Tehran is given an opening to project its revolutionary message to Shi'a people in Bahrain. Portraits of IRGC commanders and Ali Khamenei and flags of Hezbollah [reportedly show up](#) in private religious institutions.

## *Hezbollah in Kuwait*

Since its creation in 1982, [Hezbollah](#) has carried out operations in Kuwait at the behest of Iran. As early as 1983, [Hezbollah operatives, along with Iraqi Da'wa Party members](#), targeted, as one analyst noted, "the American and French embassies, the Kuwait airport, the grounds of the Raytheon Corporation, a Kuwait National Petroleum Company oil rig, and a government-owned power station" in coordinated suicide bombings which killed six people and wounded another ninety. Kuwait imprisoned 17 people for their involvement in these attacks, including several members of [Hezbollah](#).

In order to pressure Kuwait to release these 17 prisoners, known as the "[Kuwait 17](#)," Iran directed Hezbollah to engage in a campaign of terrorism and kidnappings throughout the Middle East. In 1984, Kuwait Airways Flight 221 was [hijacked](#) on its way to Pakistan and diverted to Tehran. Although Iran eventually arrested the hijackers, the perpetrators, who murdered two employees of USAID, were never tried in Iranian court and were permitted to leave the country. The next year, an individual who later claimed to be part of a group known as Islamic Jihad, [drove a bomb-laden vehicle](#) into the Kuwaiti Emir's motorcade in an attempted assassination. Given the Iranian opposition to Kuwait at this time, the suicide car-bomber had suspected links to Iran and Hezbollah.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, sectarian violence in Kuwait has declined; it began to ease when Kuwaiti Shiites affirmed their loyalty to the defense of the state in the Gulf War. The current lack of sectarian tensions makes the country less susceptible to Iranian destabilizing activities; for example, it cannot as easily stir up and foment fear and animosity against rival Sunni groups. As was seen in the above-section on Syria and elsewhere, such rivalries, which can devolve into vicious cycles of violence,

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serve as breeding grounds for Iran-sponsored terrorism. While Kuwait is not the tinder box that it once was during the Iran-Iraq War, it is still vulnerable to volatility and radicalism, particularly when spurred on by Iran and other external actors like Hezbollah.

The Abdali affair is the most striking example of this vulnerability. In August 2015, Kuwaiti officials [foiled](#) a plot by Hezbollah to carry out attacks in the country's al-Abdali area. The Hezbollah offshoot responsible for planning the attack [was made up of](#) 25 Bahraini nationals and one Iranian. Authorities [seized](#) a huge arms cache that they said was smuggled from Iraq and hidden underneath houses close to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. In Kuwait's Al-Abdali area, they [discovered](#) a total of 42,000 lbs. of ammunition, 144 kg of explosives—including [C4](#)—68 weapons, and 204 grenades. Members of the Abdali cell were [charged](#) with plotting with Iran and Hezbollah to destabilize Kuwait's national security.

In June 2017, Kuwait's Supreme Court [upheld the convictions](#) of 21 members of the al-Abdali terrorist cell, noting the group's intention to carry out terror attacks around the country. Kuwait protested to Lebanon that Hezbollah, which is part of the Lebanese government, played an active role in training the members of the terror cell. Subsequently, the Kuwaiti government [closed Iran's cultural mission and expelled some Iranian diplomats](#). A year later, shortly after [the Gulf Cooperation Council \(GCC\)](#) declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization, Kuwait [expelled](#) over 70 Lebanese nationals who had permanent residency status for alleged links to Hezbollah. Moreover, in May 2018, Kuwait joined the U.S. and other Gulf states in [sanctioning](#) 9 Hezbollah-affiliated persons and entities, but did not join the other governments in designating [Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah](#) as well.

In July 2020, Kuwaiti authorities broke up a [money laundering cell with alleged ties to Hezbollah](#). The cell, whose mastermind was an Iranian resident of Kuwait, was reportedly active for five years. The members reportedly laundered over 3 million dinars (\$9.8 million USD) through online auctions of luxury goods using a Gulf bank, with the money subsequently being sent to an unnamed regional state. These incidents continued in 2021 as well. That November, news [reports](#) circulated that Kuwaiti prosecutors detained 18 people suspected of financing Hezbollah. In September 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [designated](#) Talib Husayn 'Ali Jarak Ismai'l for coordinating the transfer of millions of dollars to Hizballah from Kuwait through Jamal Husayn 'Abd 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Shatti. Al-Shatti is [the brother of former Kuwaiti lawmaker Khaled al-Shatti](#).

Kuwait tried to mediate between Lebanon and Gulf Arab states amid a diplomatic row that began when the Lebanese minister of information [criticized Saudi Arabia's role in the war in Yemen](#). In January 2022, the Kuwaiti foreign minister traveled to Lebanon and presented a set of "[trust-building](#)" proposals, one of which was the disarmament of Hezbollah, who in recent years has increased its influence in Lebanon.

In return for its cooperation, the Gulf state [said that it would help facilitate](#) a World Bank project to help deal with Lebanon's severe economic crisis. Hezbollah, in line with its frequent critiques of Gulf Arab states for [serving the interests of the U.S.](#) and other Western powers, staunchly opposed the Western-backed Kuwaiti offering. Later in January, Lebanon's foreign minister [traveled to Kuwait](#) and

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explained that the disarmament of Hezbollah was not in the offing. Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah [blasted](#) the Kuwaiti proposal for improvement in ties between Lebanon and Gulf Arab states, calling them "dictates." This shows the continued tensions between Iran's proxies and partners and the Kuwaiti leadership.

Although it is clear that Iran seeks to establish influence in the country, given the large population of Shi'a people, and necessary for the Kuwaiti government to remain vigilant, extreme measures to confront the Iranian national security threat could be counterproductive. Such actions could empower radical elements and lead to the mobilization of new Hezbollah cells in Kuwait. On the other hand, if the Kuwaiti government promotes the political inclusion of moderate Shi'a parties and compromises with the majority Sunni population, it may be able to develop a culture of pragmatism among its Shi'a parties to counter Iran.

The National Islamic Alliance (NIA) is Kuwait's main Shi'a Islamist political bloc. While Sunni-Shi'a tensions ran high in 2008, when thousands of Shi'a people gathered to mourn the death of a top Hezbollah commander widely hated by the Sunni community for his alleged role in terrorist attacks in Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war, they have since declined, as the [NIA has taken a pragmatic, rather than an ideological](#), approach to politics. It should also be noted that, [according to an expert](#) at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "the Kuwaiti public, including [the] Shi'a minority, [are] still anti-Iran."

## *Iran-Kuwait Diplomatic Relations*

Despite Iran's meddling and support for terrorism in Kuwait, Kuwait has sought to cultivate good relations with Tehran, placing it at odds with other GCC nations. For the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in June 2014, the Kuwaiti Emir, Shiekh Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah, led a high-level delegation to Iran. As a result of this visit, Kuwait and Iran agreed to a memorandum of understanding, [saying](#) that the two countries would coordinate their security efforts. Unlike [Saudi Arabia](#) and [Bahrain](#), Kuwait initially opted to maintain diplomatic ties with Iran even after Iranians attacked the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran in 2016 in response to Saudi Arabia's [execution](#) of the prominent Shi'a cleric Nimr al-Nimr. However, Kuwait would later cut diplomatic ties with Tehran out of solidarity with Saudi Arabia. More recently, Kuwait has also sought to serve as a mediator in the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, which centers in part on Qatar's links to Tehran.

In August 2022, Kuwait [sent](#) its first ambassador to Tehran since downgrading ties in 2016. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Kuwait and Iran flew under the radar of most Western media outlets. Ongoing talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran overshadowed it. Still, the improvement in relations between Iran and Kuwait was significant because it shows that Iran has been able to counter international efforts to isolate and pressure it. Despite its ongoing efforts to destabilize the region and promote terrorism, and despite the rapid advances in its nuclear program, which also threaten regional security, Tehran has been able to normalize relations with Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Tehran is also [reportedly](#) seeking to improve ties with Bahrain as well. These developments risk normalizing Tehran's malign behavior and threat to regional security while undermining the U.S.'s efforts to isolate Tehran.



A cache of Iranian weapons seized by Kuwaiti authorities in August 2015.

## Saudi Arabia

### Active proxy groups & Military forces

- [IRGC \(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\)](#)
- [Hezbollah](#)
- [Houthis](#)

#### *Iranian Meddling and Terrorism Within Saudi Arabia*

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saudi officials have feared growing [Shiite influence](#) in their country and the region as the Iranian regime has sought to “[export](#)” the revolution throughout the Persian Gulf. [An estimated 15 percent](#) of Saudi Arabia’s 25 million citizens are Shiite Muslims, the vast majority of whom are concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. Shiites are [the majority](#) in key towns such as Qatif, Dammam, and al-Hasa, which, as the *BBC* notes, “are home to the largest oil fields and processing and refining facilities.”

Consequently, Iran has often sought to stir unrest among the Shiite population in these areas. The Islamic Revolution sparked significant unrest in Qatif in November 1979. Emboldened by [Ayatollah Khomeini’s claims](#) that hereditary monarchies were incompatible with Islam, Shiites in Qatif mobilized against the Saudi government.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration that he was the leader of not only Iran but [the entire Muslim world](#) threatened the Saudi monarchy’s religious legitimacy as custodians of Islam’s holiest sites. On July 31, 1987, Iranian [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps](#) operatives incited Iranian pilgrims to riot outside the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the annual hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. As 155,000 Iranian pilgrims chanted “[Death to America!](#)” and confronted Saudi riot police, a stampede ensued, resulting in the death over 400 people, including hundreds of Iranian pilgrims and Saudi policemen.

Shortly following these attacks, Tehran’s proxy [Hezbollah](#) carried out Iranian interference in Saudi Arabia via [attacks](#) on the Saudi petrochemical industry, targeted assassinations of Saudi politicians worldwide, and a foiled plot involving explosives placed near Mecca’s Grand Mosque.

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On June 25, 1996, [Saudi Hezbollah—directed and funded by Iran](#)—bombed the Khobar Towers housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where U.S. and allied forces supporting air operations in Iraq were housed. The attack [killed 19 American servicemen and one Saudi, and injured hundreds of others](#). Iran is also believed to be responsible for the [August 2012 cyberattack](#) on ARAMCO, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company. This attack disabled over 30,000 computers operated by ARAMCO, disrupting operations for nearly two weeks.

Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia ratcheted up further in 2016 after an Iranian mob, chanting “Death to the Al Saud family,” [ransacked and set fire](#) to the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad on January 3 after Saudi Arabia executed outspoken Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Riyadh accused al-Nimr of involvement in Iran-linked Shiite attacks on policemen and civilians in 2011. Iran’s Supreme Leader [proclaimed](#) that “the unjustly spilled blood of this oppressed martyr will no doubt soon show its effect and divine vengeance will befall Saudi politicians” describing the execution as a “political error.”

Al-Nimr’s execution prompted [unrest and anti-monarchy protests](#) in Qatif, his home province. While most of the protests were peaceful, some skirmishes between Shiites and the Saudi security forces resulted in deaths or injuries. Further, in December 2016, Saudi Judge Mohammed al-Jirani was kidnapped in Qatif; his body was found one year later. *Asharq al-Awsat* [reported](#) that an Iranian cleric promulgated a fatwa ordering [terrorists](#) to kidnap and kill al-Jirani.

The Saudi government clamped down on Qatif and protests became [more violent](#) in 2017 and 2018, as Shiite fighters attacked and killed or wounded Saudi police and soldiers. The Saudi government blamed the violence on and [prosecuted terrorists](#), including Saudis allegedly working for Iranian proxies like [Hezbollah](#). Riyadh has pushed back against Hezbollah, joining the U.S. Department of Treasury and other Gulf states in [sanctioning](#) Hezbollah officials and entities in May 2018.

On May 14, 2019, unmanned aircraft systems targeted two pumping stations on the East-West pipeline carrying crude oil from Dhahran to Yanbu. Yemen-based Iran-backed [Houthi](#) militants [claimed](#) responsibility, but the U.S. government later [concluded](#) the systems were launched from Iraq. On June 12, 2019, Saudi-led coalition senior officials reported a cross-border cruise missile attack at Abha International Airport, injuring 26 civilians. Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthi militants [claimed](#) responsibility for this attack. On August 17, 2019, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militants [struck](#) a natural gas liquids plant at Shaybah oilfield in the Kingdom’s Empty Quarter with drones. The drone strike damaged the facility and caused a fire. No deaths or casualties were reported.

On September 14, 2019, Iranian attacks [hit the Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities](#) in the Eastern province, initially taking 5.7 million barrels per day of crude oil production offline. Although Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militants claimed responsibility for the attack, [investigations](#) led by Saudi Arabia and the United States concluded the Iranian government was behind the attack. Saudi Aramco resumed pre-attack production levels less than two weeks later, ahead of schedule.

In early 2021, Iraq-based members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance claimed [responsibility](#) for targeting Riyadh with “missiles or drones.” The incident was more serious than initial reports indicated—with the Saudi

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royal palace in Riyadh being targeted. There is an emerging pattern of using Iraqi militants in Iran's proxy network—as opposed to the Houthis in Yemen—to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia, following the May 2019 attack on the Saudi oil pipeline. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for a March 7 attack on Ras Tanura port, but there are some [indications](#) it originated elsewhere. In early 2021, there was an uptick in drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia after the Biden administration revoked the Houthis' terrorism designations.

## *Iranian Meddling and Terrorism Against Saudi Interests in the Region*

Saudi officials have viewed [Iranian support for Shiite unrest](#) in allied Bahrain during the “Arab Spring” as a “[fundamental risk](#)” to Saudi national security. Consequently, Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 troops to [Bahrain](#) in 2011 in an effort to stabilize the country and prevent [Iranian and Shiite influence](#) from spreading to the Saudi mainland. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has supported [Yemeni government forces](#) against the Iranian-backed Shiite [Houthi rebels](#). Iran's involvement in Yemen has led the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, to conclude that the Saudi government must “[deal with Iran's aggression in the region.](#)” This Saudi determination resulted in the formation of a coalition with [Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar](#), and the United Arab Emirates which began launching airstrikes against the rebels in Yemen in March 2015. Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf harshly condemned Iran's support for the Houthis and its meddling in the affairs of Arab states: “Their interference [has ignited instability](#), they have created havoc in our part of the world...”

Since 2015, the Houthis have used Yemeni territory under their control as launching pads to fire [more than 100 missiles](#) and drones at Saudi Arabia. Such strikes have landed on multiple cities, including Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Targeted locations include the king's official residence, military bases and encampments, oil refineries, the Riyadh international airport, and shopping malls. Further, as the Congressional Research Service [notes](#), “Since 2016, the Houthis have periodically targeted commercial and military vessels transiting and patrolling the Red Sea using naval mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-ship missiles, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). Some of the weapons used reportedly have been supplied by Iran, including sea-skimming coastal defense cruise missiles.”

Evidence indicates that Iran is arming and, in some cases, directing the Houthis in their missile campaign, contrary to Tehran's denials and in violation of an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015. An independent U.N. monitoring panel [stated](#) in November 2017 that remnants from four ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia likely came from the Iranian-made and designed Qiam-1 missile. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Pentagon officials [displayed](#) debris from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia, claiming that the markings on and designs of the missiles demonstrated that they were made by Iran.

The U.N.'s finding of Iranian origins in the Houthis' missiles continued well into 2018, with [panel](#) after [panel](#) affirming the Iranian connection. One U.N. [report](#) from January 2018 found that recently inspected missiles and drones “show characteristics similar to weapons systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and, therefore, the panel “continues to believe” that Tehran is giving missiles and other arms to the Houthis. Indeed, Iran has recently bragged openly about their

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support for the Houthis, with an IRGC general [telling](#) IRGC-controlled media that the Guards had instructed the Houthis to attack two Saudi oil tankers in July 2018.

In January 2023, French special forces [seized](#) Iranian-supplied weapons and ammunition en route to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The forces discovered and seized over 3,000 assault rifles, half a million rounds of ammunition, and 20 anti-tank guided missiles after conducting the operation in coordination with the U.S. military. Then in March 2023, the U.S. and U.K. [interdicted a shipment of arms](#), including Iranian versions of Russian Kornet anti-tank guided missiles and medium-range ballistic missile components, en route to the Houthis in Yemen from Iran. These weapons interdictions occurred in the months and weeks preceding a China-brokered normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This saw Iran [commit to halting attacks](#) against Saudi Arabia, including via the Houthis in Yemen, and end its arms transfers to the Houthis.

The Biden Administration [welcomed](#) the agreement for its potential to deescalate regional tensions, downplaying accusations that China's diplomacy could undermine U.S. regional interests. Administration officials have noted that the U.S. remains Saudi Arabia's security guarantor and that China would be unable and probably unwilling to play that role. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this agreement will de-escalate tensions. Iran and Saudi Arabia had diplomatic relations in 2011 when the Quds Force tried and failed to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S.

Additionally, the agreement signals that Saudi Arabia will work more closely with China when it suits its interests. For example, Saudi Arabia could pursue weapons deals with China. China has already begun lending Saudi Arabia assistance in [developing its ballistic missile program](#).

The normalization agreement could also negatively impact U.S. interests regarding Iran's isolation. The deal, along with upgrading diplomatic relations between Iran and Kuwait and Iran and the UAE, eases international pressure on the regime. The Gulf states could, therefore, undermine U.S.-led efforts to pressure Tehran, especially if they perceive the need to improve relations with Tehran because the U.S. cannot keep Tehran in check.



*Iran was responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 American servicemen based in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.*

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## Proxy Group Reports

### Asaib Ahl al-Haq

Iran provides money, weaponry, training, and operational oversight to Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iraqi Shi'a militia. As a proxy of the Iranian regime, Asaib Ahl al-Haq remains ideologically aligned with Iran's Islamist political goals, and loyal to its Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#). On [January 3, 2020](#), U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. government would designate AAH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

- **Type of Organization:** Militia, political party, religious, social services provider, terrorist, transnational, violent
- **Ideologies and Affiliations:** Iranian-sponsored, Islamist, jihadist, Khomeinist, Shi'a
- **Place of Origin:** Iraq
- **Year of Origin:** 2006
- **Founder(s):** Qais al-Khazali
- **Places of Operation:** Iraq, Syria, Lebanon

#### *AAH: An Iranian-Backed Militia*

[Asaib Ahl al-Haq \(AAH\)](#)—in English, the "[League of the Righteous](#)"—is an Iranian-backed Shi'a militia and political party operating primarily in Iraq, with ancillary operations in [Syria](#) and [Lebanon](#). [Formed in 2006 by Qais al-Khazali](#), AAH has [approximately 10,000 members](#) and is one of Iraq's most powerful Shi'a militias. Until the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, AAH had [launched over 6,000 attacks on American and Iraqi forces](#), including highly sophisticated operations and targeted kidnappings of Westerners. The group seeks to [promote Iran's political and religious influence in Iraq](#), maintain Shi'a control over Iraq, and oust any remaining Western vestiges from the country.

AAH's history in Iraq dates back formally to 2006, [when the group broke away from the Mahdi Army \(JAM\)](#)—the militia run by the violent Shi'a cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr. In August 2007, the U.S. designated AAH as a "Special Group," a label given to Iranian-backed Shi'a militias operating in Iraq. AAH is still one of three prominent Iraqi Shi'a militias funded and trained by Iran's external military wing, the Quds Force of the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps \(IRGC\)](#). AAH [overtly displays its loyalty to Iran's leaders](#), including the current Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#), and his predecessor, the late [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini](#). The group reportedly [operates under the coordination of Iran's Quds Force](#).

After the U.S. withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, AAH announced its intention to lay down its weapons and enter Iraqi politics. The group [opened a number of political offices](#) and religious schools and offered social services to widows and orphans. According to a Reuters report, AAH [modeled its operations after Hezbollah](#), another Iranian proxy.

Since entering politics, AAH has not fulfilled its vow to halt armed resistance, instead [continuing to carry out sectarian violence](#), [execute homophobic attacks](#), [slaughter women alleged to be prostitutes](#), and [threaten the "interests" of Western countries participating in strikes in Syria](#). The group is [one of](#)

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[the militias in Haashid Shaabi](#), Iraq's anti-ISIS volunteer forces, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

In the May 2018 elections, AAH [won](#) 15 seats in the Iraqi parliament—a significant increase from the one seat it had [won](#) in the 2014 elections. Under the newly-formed government, AAH member Abdul-Amir Hamdani was given the [position](#) of minister of culture. On [July 13, 2018](#), Iraqi protesters in the country's south attacked the political offices of AAH and other Iran-backed groups as they called for Iran to withdraw from Iraq.

In January 2020, the U.S. government [designated](#) AAH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The sanctions announcement noted that AAH, led by [Qais al-Khazali](#) and [Laith al-Khazali](#), “has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces since its creation in 2006.”

### *AAH Ideology: Imported from Iran*

AAH is a religiously motivated group with allegiance to Iran. The group is anti-American, sectarian, anti-Kurdish, homophobic, and violent. A former Iraqi MP, Taha al-Lahibi, [said](#) that AAH has “actively served as an Iranian arm that oppresses all Iraqis opposed to the Iranian influence by commanding assassination squads to kill them, particularly in the city of Basra.”

**Pro-Iranian:** AAH seeks to establish an Islamist, Shi'a-controlled Iraq and [promote Iranian objectives](#). While AAH has origins within the Iraqi Sadrist movement, the group is openly loyal to Iranian leaders, most notably the Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei. Similarly, AAH shows deference to the Guardianship of the Jurists (Velayat-e Faqih), a governing structure that serves as one of the cornerstones of Iran's Islamic Revolution system.

Analysts [characterize AAH as a Khomeinist organization](#) that aims “to create a suitable environment for the return of Imam Mahdi through the imposition of strict Shi'a Islamic governance.” This assessment is corroborated by Guardian Middle East correspondent Martin Chulov, who writes that AAH is a “[proxy arm of the Revolutionary Guards' al-Quds Brigades](#), whose main brief is to export Iran's 30-year-old Islamic Revolution.” AAH is also [ideologically aligned with Iranian proxy Hezbollah](#), a Shi'a Lebanese terrorist group.

Declassified interrogation reports of Qais al-Khazali, AAH's founder, underscore the breadth and depth of the relationship between Shi'a militias and Iran. Al-Khazali described multiple trips to Tehran with Muqtada al-Sadr, beginning in 1989 with the funeral of Ayatollah Khomeini, where he met with representatives of the Iranian government. These meetings continued over the next decade, where al-Khazali [met](#) with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, [former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani](#), former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and other senior leaders.

During questioning in 2007, Al-Khazali [emphasized](#) that while Iran did not order the militias to attack specific targets in Iraq, Iranian officials “suggested” the militias concentrate their efforts on British troops in Basra and American troops “to force a withdrawal.” Al-Khazali also spoke at length of generous Iranian provisions of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and their role in the slaughter of American

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troops. According to one [report](#), “[d]etainee said that anyone can receive EFP training and Iran does not care who gets it... this is because of the availability and low cost of EFPs.”

AAH is also present in Syria. The Iraqi militia [coordinates its activities](#) at the Iraq-Syria border with the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)](#). They secure critical transshipment hubs. In particular, the IRGC has a major presence along the western side of the Euphrates River in Syria, extending north from the Abu Kamal border crossing. An unidentified drone struck Iran-backed militias stationed in Abu Kamal in September 2021. It was not entirely clear who carried out the attack, but al-Khazali [threatened](#) the Iraqi government in response.

In addition to fighting in Syria at Iran’s behest, recent reporting shows that Iran-backed militiamen, including from AAH, are also being offered stipends to fight in Ukraine in support of Russia. In March 2022, an individual with AAH [expressed interest](#) in the offer of \$400 a week to fight with the Russian military against “imperialism.”

An Iraqi militia group, Ashab Ahl Kahf, thought to be linked to AAH, claimed a missile attack against Israel at the height of the May 2021 Gaza conflict. Qais Khazali [visited the Lebanese-Israel border](#) in December 2017, vowing “to stand together with the Lebanese people and the Palestinian cause” against “Israeli occupation.” He was subsequently [banned from visiting the country](#) again by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri.

Furthermore, [a March 2022 report suggests](#) that the IRGC may be planning on dispatching a large number of fighters from its Iraqi militias to Yemen, where the Iran-backed Houthis have suffered major losses. The report explicitly states that fighters from AAH would be included.

There is also reason to believe that Iran is losing its control over AAH. AAH is an armed faction within al-Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella group of primarily-Shi’a militias, many of which hold their loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran. While officially integrated within the government, al-Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), seldom obeys the commands of ranking Iraqi officials, nor do the factions within it always act in unison. The [following statement](#) made by a member of the Political Bureau of AAH demonstrates the group’s insubordination: “al-Hashd al-Shaabi is a security system that follows the orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while the resistance factions [i.e., AAH] are the ones that reject the American presence on Iraqi soil.”

Under the command of the late Iranian general, [Qassem Soleimani](#), the Shi’a elements in the PMF loyal to Iran exhibited more cohesion. Since his death, though, Iran’s command and control over the militias that it formed has weakened. The current commander of the IRGC-Quds Force, [Esmail Qaani](#), does not exert the same degree of influence over the Iraqi militias.

The General-Secretary of AAH made this change obvious when on November 19, 2020, after an AAH rocket attack was carried out on the day of Qaani’s visit to Baghdad, [he said](#), “I sent a clear and frank message to Mr. Esmail Qaani ... the Americans occupy our country not yours, those martyred in Qaim were our sons ... then the matter is related to us, regardless of other calculations, so please from now on if someone came to you, embarrassed you, please no one talks to us and we won’t listen... our motives

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are national 100%...” These statements by AAH indicate its increasing defiance: not only does the group disregard the orders of the Iraqi civilian leadership, but it has also been more willing to challenge Iranian oversight.

AAH was the first group to break a ceasefire that a number of [Iran-backed militias had agreed to in mid-October 2020](#) on the condition that Iraq’s government create a timetable for the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops. Militia Spotlight, a program at the *Washington Institute for Near East Studies* that was created to track militia activities in Iraq and Syria, determined that [AAH undertook two rocket attacks](#) on the U.S. embassy complex in Baghdad at the end of 2020. Again, in February 2021, Militia Spotlight assessed that AAH was responsible for [rocket attacks on the U.S. military base in Erbil](#), which is part of Iraq’s Kurdistan region. The attack was claimed by a group that goes by the name of “Awliyaa al-Dam,” but [U.S. and Iraqi officials said](#) that this group is merely a front. Even [Kataib Hezbollah](#), another radical Iran-backed militia in Iraq, complied with the ceasefire and criticized AAH for breaking it.

An unknown terrorist group attempted to assassinate Iraq’s prime minister in a drone strike. AAH [claimed](#) that the attack was “fabricated,” but [Reuters reported in November 2021](#) that two Iraqi security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the attack was carried out by both Kataib Hezbollah and AAH. One of the officials noted that the drone was designed in the same way as other Iranian-made drones that were used to attack U.S. forces in Iraq earlier in the year, as a “quadcopter” carrying one projectile with high explosives. It is unclear whether the Iranians directed the attack, but the statements of these officials indicate that Iran probably supplied the weapons, and some reports suggest Tehran may have had foreknowledge. The Iranians condemned the assassination attempt, and some ask whether the attack is an indication that Iran is [“losing some of its grip on Shi’a militias in Iraq.”](#) Other experts, such as Nathan Sales of the *Counter Extremism Project*, claim that the failed drone strike on Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi [“appears to have Tehran’s fingerprints all over it.”](#) The prime minister was not harmed in the attack, but [many Iraqis fear](#) that the attack was politically motivated and could portend a broader civil conflict.

**Anti-American:** AAH is also virulently anti-American, a stance that has not abated since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. In March 2015, for example, AAH [boycotted the PMF attack against ISIS in Tikrit because AAH rejected U.S. airpower support](#). By the end of the month, AAH only agreed to rejoin the battle against ISIS after then Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised that the United States would stop its airstrikes. AAH Spokesman Naim al-Aboudi said that the Prime Minister “realized this battle can’t be finished” without AAH and other militias, [demonstrating AAH’s continued prioritizing of its anti-American position](#) above its other goals.

In 2018, Qais al-Khazali [framed](#) AAH’s anti-Americanism as a political rather than ideological struggle. As al-Khazali [told](#) reporters, “[i]deologically, we do not consider the U.S. an infidel or its people enemies. The only thing that happened is a phase of American occupation, and it is normal for people to resist occupation.” Yet this convenient rebranding of AAH came on the heels of the U.S. Congress’ [attempts](#) to sanction AAH as a terrorist organization.

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On [May 1 2019](#), AAH militants fired rockets at U.S. contractors working in Taji. Local security forces arrested two AAH militants shortly after. The U.S. [struck the Iraq-Syria border](#) in June 2021, and Khazali [vowed to retaliate](#) against American forces in Iraq. The leader went on Iraqi television and claimed that the U.S. was responsible for escalating hostilities. However, the U.S. strikes at the border were a response [to drone strikes](#) carried out by Iran-backed militias on U.S. forces. In the televised speech broadcast on the group's satellite television channel, *al-Ahed*, Khazali [said](#): "We are not seeking blood... however the American treacherous enemy is the one who started wasting lives and moved the battle to this level."

Also, in June 2021, Khazali [announced on Iraqi television an escalation in drone operations](#) against U.S. assets: "The truce is over...now its war...except for the American embassy...and Balad base...any U.S. military presence is targetable by the fasiqil [armed groups] of the Iraqi muqawama, and the decision is to escalate the operations in terms of quantity and quality."

**Sectarian:** As a Shiite, Iranian-backed group, AAH also follows and implements a sectarian ideology that has deepened the fault lines between Sunnis and Shiites. According to Martin Chulov, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali's speeches have [galvanized "thousands" of Iraqi Shiites to fight for Assad's regime in Syria](#), worrying many Iraqi communities about "a sectarian conflict that increasingly respects no border." In August 2012, AAH militants reportedly [bombed the Sunni Sabatayn Mosque in Iraq](#), an attack that stirred a new wave of sectarian tensions in the country. Since then, Human Rights Watch has [documented numerous AAH attacks on Sunnis in Iraq](#) in which AAH militants target Sunni mosques or towns.

More recently, AAH and the [Badr Organization](#) went on a sectarian "[killing spree](#)" in a majority-Sunni town in Diyala province in revenge for an [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria \(ISIS\)](#) attack on October 26, 2021. This incident underscores how these radical groups take vengeance on innocent civilians.

Sectarian fears are undoubtedly exacerbated by the government formation process. Many of the Shiite Muslim groups, including the political wing of AAH, known as al-Sadiqun, vying for political power in the upcoming formation of a government, command paramilitary branches, and could lash out if they do not accomplish their political objectives. Already AAH, along with its political allies in the Fatah coalition, [took to the streets in protest](#) of the results of the October 2021 parliamentary elections in which they lost handily to the predominantly-Shi'a political bloc led by [Muqtada al-Sadr](#).

These heightened sectarian tensions are playing out against the backdrop of economic turmoil. After all, the parliamentary elections were held a year early due to wide-spread protests against corruption and incompetence. Many of them Shiites opposed Iran's interference in domestic matters. The protestors demanded jobs and basic public services such as electricity and clean water. Over 600 of them [were killed by the security forces](#), which are dominated by Iran-backed militias, including AAH. Others were killed in targeted assassinations.

In line with this sectarian strife, AAH members have reportedly [appropriated the derogatory term rafidah](#) (a pejorative meaning "rejecters" that some Sunnis use for Shiites) as a badge of honor and

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“self-identity.” A January 2014 Foreign Policy piece reported that on an AAH linked-webpage, AAH proudly identified its fighters as rafidah “as a sign of mocking defiance against their foes.”

**Anti-Kurdish:** AAH leaders [frequently demonize and alienate Iraqi Kurds](#). In 2015, AAH’s leader Qais al-Khazali said on live television, “The problem is that the Kurds are operating right now like leeches, which feed on the host’s body—sucking more and more of its blood—in an effort to grow in size.”

**Homophobic:** Members of AAH have [committed numerous acts of violence targeting gays in Iraq](#). In May 2014, AAH members published a list of 24 “wanted” individuals, the vast majority of whom were accused of carrying out “homosexual acts.” Two months later, AAH members beheaded two teenagers believed to be gay, and threw their heads into the garbage. According to police anecdotes, these types of attacks and intimidation are whole.

**Violent:** AAH operates as a militia, with ancillary operations as a political party. The group does not eschew violence in pursuit of its objectives, which include the establishment of an Islamist Iranian-inspired Shi’a state.

## *AAH’s Organizational Structure: A Group that Answers to Iran*

AAH is led by its founder, [Qais al-Khazali](#), who broke off from the Mahdi Army (a.k.a. Jaysh al-Mahdi or JAM), a Sadrist militia, in 2006. According to a 2012 report by analyst Sam Wyer, al-Khazali sits on AAH’s five-person board of trustees along with two deputies. As an Iranian proxy, AAH coordinates with senior Iranian commanders, notably the late [IRGC-Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani](#).

AAH [first began as a military unit within JAM](#). With the 2003 Iraq War, AAH reorganized into battalions assigned to four sectors: Baghdad, Maysan, Najaf, and Samarra. When al-Khazali made AAH an independent group in 2006, he retained this structure. AAH’s military arrangement is thought to be based on fellow Shi’a militant group [Hezbollah](#), with which the group has close ties.

Since the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq in December 2011, [AAH has expanded significantly into politics](#), “opening a string of political offices” throughout Iraq, according to *the Washington Post*. AAH runs two political offices in Baghdad, and others in the Iraqi cities of Basra, Najaf, Hillah, al-Kalis, and Tal Afar. AAH has also sent political representatives to the southern Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar, al-Muthanna, and Maysan to meet with tribal and minority leaders. [The group’s political bloc is called al-Sadiqun](#) (the Honest Ones), and in the May 2018 parliamentary elections, AAH [ran](#) in alliance with [Hadi al-Amiri’s](#) Fatah Coalition. Outside Iraq, AAH has [maintained political representation in Beirut](#), Lebanon, since early 2011. As of early 2011, [Sheikh Ammar al-Delphi headed AAH’s political offices](#) in Beirut. In the April 30, 2014, parliamentary elections, AAH ran in alliance with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon (State of Law).

## *AAH: Financed by Iran*

AAH has [received training, arms, and financial support from Iran](#), particularly through Iran’s external military branch, the IRGC-Quds Force, as well as from Iran’s Lebanese proxy [Hezbollah](#). Col. Rick Welch, a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, said that during the 2007 U.S. surge in Iraq, [Iran was giving AAH](#) “\$20 million a month or some outrageous figure like that” in order to train AAH fighters. After U.S.

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forces withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, the financial pipeline from Iran continued. As of 2012, Iran was giving AAH [\\$5 million in cash and weapons per month](#), according to an Iraqi close to the group. As of March 2014, the group was receiving an estimated [\\$1.5 million to \\$2 million a month from Iran](#).

*Recruitment Tactics and Messaging: AAH as the Protector of Shiites in Iraq*

[AAH recruitment focuses on two strategies](#): traditional propaganda efforts to raise the group's profile, and a comprehensive religious system aimed to indoctrinate and recruit members. AAH has also emulated groups like ISIS by using social media to expand recruitment throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and the West.

One of the main ways AAH draws recruits is by [advertising itself as a protector of the Shiite community within Iraq and abroad](#). AAH uses posters and issues calls for recruits on Iraqi television stations, often emphasizing its connection with Iran and Hezbollah. One AAH member said that he was drawn to AAH because it was "[protecting the Shi'a community inside Iraq and abroad as well](#)." In the past, the most important galvanizing point for Iraqis to join AAH and go to [Syria](#) to fight alongside Assad forces was the defense of the Sayeda Zenab shrine, a Shi'a holy site in a Damascus suburb.

AAH has [seized homes and offices in Baghdad](#) in order to establish recruiting centers where would-be volunteers could go to join other Shiites fighting in Syria. In southern Iraq, [posters urge men to join the fight in Syria](#) with other Iraqi Shiites and provide a hotline number to call. In August 2012, AAH [distributed over 20,000 posters](#) with AAH's logo; a photograph of Iran's Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#); and a photograph of the late Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr. The posters were plastered on buildings and billboards and also used in street demonstrations.

AAH's second, but perhaps most comprehensive, recruitment strategy is a [religious activism and education system](#). The group uses two mosques in particular, the Sabatayn mosque in Baghdad and the Abdullah al-Radiya mosque in al-Khalis, as hubs for recruitment. AAH leaders give sermons at these mosques, advocating social and religious reform in Iraq in an attempt to entice attendees into joining, financing, or otherwise contributing to AAH's mission.

AAH has expanded its reach through a network of religious schools known as the "[Seal of the Apostles](#)." These schools, spread throughout Iraq, serve as propaganda and recruitment facilities for the group. As with its military and political structures, AAH also appears to be emulating Hezbollah by launching social services programs for widows and orphans. AAH's recruitment efforts are [funded in large part by Iran](#).

AAH also disseminates propaganda that features its violence. The group uses Telegram—a free instant messaging service that can be used across different platforms—[to publicize their attacks and recruit new members](#). Videos of attacks and other uploaded propaganda are difficult to trace on this application because it provides encrypted file sharing. AAH balances its interest in publicly taking credit for attacks for propaganda purposes and covering up its involvement.

The *Combatting Terrorism Center* at West Point [produced a report](#), relying heavily on an investigation conducted by the Militia Spotlight into Telegram and other open-source information, that explained how these propaganda efforts work: militia leaders "want to individually brand attacks and claim credit

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in a way that is discernable to their inner circles and followers” but not easily discernable by Iraqi security personnel or U.S. forces. To that end, they set up front groups. The report states that AAH uses Ashab al-Kahf, Liwa Khaibar, and Quwwat Dhu al-Faqar to claim its attacks.

## *Training: Emulating Iran’s Hezbollah Proxy*

Iran’s [IRGC–Quds Force trains AAH in addition to funding and arming the group](#). AAH’s training program reportedly [resembles that of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah](#). In the past, AAH militants have [received training from Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq](#). The Quds Force placed [Ali Mussa Daqduq](#) in charge of overseeing training for Iraqi Shi’a militants in the region, including AAH fighters.

In June 2014, following calls for volunteer fighters from the Iraqi government and Iraq’s highest Shi’a religious authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, there was a [surge in Shi’a volunteers to join the fight against ISIS](#). Many found their way through AAH recruiting centers in Iraq. According to an Iraqi source from 2014, [AAH recruits aiming to join Assad forces in Syria are sent to Iran](#) for approximately two weeks of training before going off to fight.

In December 2017, al-Khazali joined Hezbollah on a tour of Lebanon’s border with Israel. During the visit, he [proclaimed](#), “[w]e declare our full readiness to stand united with the Lebanese people and the Palestinian cause in the face of the Israeli occupation,” Al-Khazali’s trip signaled the transnational nature of Iran’s nurturing of Shi’a militias.

## *AAH in Iraqi Politics: Selection of a President*

Iraqi parliamentary elections were held on October 10, 2021. At 41 percent turn-out, they had the [lowest citizen participation rate](#) of any election since 2005. The Sairoon alliance, created by Muqtada al Sadr in the run up to the 2018 parliamentary elections, [won 73 of the 329 seats in the house](#), the most of any political bloc. Sadr, a populist and a nationalist, has long been viewed as a “[counterweight](#)” against Iranian influence in Iraq, and as such, someone who may be willing to cooperate with the U.S. Opposed to him was the Fatah coalition, which is closely associated with the Iran-backed militias of the PMF. Given their losses, the Fatah coalition [formed an alliance](#) with the State of Law party, which is led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Their newly-formed alliance is known as the Coordination Framework, and it controls 59 seats.

Almost half a year later, the [parliament had not yet selected a president](#), a role that requires the votes of two-thirds of the house’s 329 seats, carries less executive authority than the prime minister’s office, and is typically reserved for a member of Iraq’s Kurdish minority. Formally, though, the role is important, because [the president names the prime minister](#), who must be backed by a majority in the parliament. In turn, the prime minister names the members of his Council of Ministers. The Iraqi parliament [failed for the third time on March 30, 2022](#) to elect a new president.

As the leader of one of the most powerful militias in the PMF, Khazali is a prominent figure in the political bloc opposed to the Sadrist movement. The political wing of AAH, al-Sadiqun, joined the Fatah coalition in rejecting the October 2021 parliamentary election results and boycotting the parliamentary process of voting on a president. Only 178 lawmakers showed up for the vote on March 30, far short of the two-thirds required. Even though they have since admitted that the elections were legitimate, the

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Coordination Framework [boycotted the selection process](#), as they did in previous votes, because they feared a majority government led by Sadr, who could ally with Sunnis and Kurds. More specifically, they fear that they will be shut out of the process of forming the government and have, therefore, gone on the defensive.

Representing the voice of powerful Shi'a militias in the PMF, as opposed to the broader Shi'a community (which is increasingly averse to Iranian influence in the country), Khazali [argued](#) that Sadr's plans would undermine the right of the Shi'a community to have a say in the government. Evidently, [a meeting on December 2, 2021](#), between Sadr, Khazali, Maliki, and the leader of the Fatah coalition (who is also the leader of the powerful Iraqi militia, the [Badr Organization](#)), Hadi al-Amiri, failed to break to deadlock.

Khazali has made his opposition to the Sadrist movement clear. First, he rejected the results of the parliamentary elections. On November 9, 2021, Khazali said that the parliamentary elections, which empowered his political opponents and served as the basis for forming a government, must be held again; and that he would "[completely boycott the political process](#)" to select a president. Then, he accused the current prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, of engaging in anti-democratic practices, including political violence. He asserted that the Kadhimi government arrested people "illegally" and committed "[hideous acts of torture against detainees](#)." These accusations undermine the legitimate authority of the state, and could be used to motivate and justify acts of political violence.

Later, Khazali accepted the Supreme Court ruling that the parliamentary elections were fair. Some analysts say that [the change in position was motivated by Iran](#) as part of a soft-power campaign against Sadr and his parliamentary bloc. Khazali's [conciliatory tone](#) on March 3, 2022, could be understood in this context. But his comments are not backed up by action, as the Coordination Framework did boycott the president selection process. A senior researcher at *the National Endowment for Democracy*, Rahmah al-Jubouri, [said](#) that "the Shiite Coordination Framework may have accepted the election results... [but] should Sadr take control of the government and the state in general, he will likely face a dangerous confrontation with the armed factions—something that he does not want."

## Badr Organization

The Badr Organization is a Shi'a political party and paramilitary force that acts as "[Iran's oldest proxy in Iraq](#)," according to *Reuters*. The group's military wing is "[perhaps the single most powerful Shiite paramilitary group](#)" fighting in Iraq. One Iraqi official described the Badr Organization as "easily" the most powerful force in Iraq, even stronger than the Iraqi Prime Minister. Given the group's deep ties to Iran and its political and military preeminence, analysts have [compared the Badr Organization in Iraq to Hezbollah in Lebanon](#).

- **Type of Organization:** Militia, political party, religious, social services provider, terrorist, transnational, violent
- **Ideologies and Affiliations:** Iranian-sponsored, Islamist, jihadist, Khomeinist, Shi'a
- **Place of Origin:** Iraq
- **Year of Origin:** 1983
- **Founder(s):** Iraqi Shiites loyal to the al-Hakim Shi'a clerical dynasty, with the help of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
- **Places of Operation:** Iraq, Syria

*From Badr (Brigades) to Badr (Organization): the Oldest Iranian Proxy in Iraq*

Since its founding, the [Badr Organization](#) has worked to import Iran's Islamist revolution to Iraq. [Formed in 1983](#) under the name "the Badr Brigades," the Badr Organization originally served as the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iraqi Shi'a political party that sought to expand Iran's revolution into Iraq. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, SCIRI's Badr Brigades fought alongside Iran's [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)](#) against the Iraqi military. [From 1983 to 2003, the Badr Brigades continued to operate out of Iran](#), carrying out intermediary attacks in southern Iraq.

[In 2003, the Badr Brigades returned to Iraq](#) to take advantage of the political vacuum following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. That year, the group formally rebranded, changing its name to "the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development" and publicly pledging to abstain from violent attacks. From 2004 to 2006, however, the Badr Organization launched a brutal sectarian war on Iraq's Sunni population. During this period, Badr leader [Hadi al-Amiri](#) allegedly personally ordered [attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis](#). [According to a leaked cable from the U.S. Department of State](#), "One of [al-Amiri's] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries."

The Badr Organization and Shi'a militias have also "[deployed alongside Iraqi military units as the main combat force](#)," according to Reuters. Reuters reported that in the March 2015 fight for Tikrit, Badr militiamen and the regular army [drove identical tanks](#) with only an army logo differentiating the two forces. Some units in Iraq's army, [including Iraq's 20th Battalion, reportedly answer to Badr commander Hadi al-Amiri](#). [Estimates](#) for the membership of the Badr Organization range between 10,000-50,000 militants.

In analyzing the group, CBS News writes that the Badr Organization "[was born out of Iraq's bloody civil war and their notorious death squads are implicated in the torture and murder of thousands of Sunni](#)

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[Muslims.](#)” According to General Michael Flynn, former director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “[Members of the Badr Corps are responsible for killing many American Soldiers](#) [sic] and they will likely do it again if given the chance... [G]roups like the Badr Corps represent enemies of a stable, secure, and inclusive Iraq. As soon as we get done helping them with [ISIS](#), they will very likely turn on us.” Indeed, in November 2017, following ISIS’ devastating defeats in Iraq, Hadi al-Amiri publicly called on U.S. troops to leave Iraq and warned that the Badr Organization was prepared to “adopt a parliamentary decision” to force the United States to withdraw.

In October 2020, Iran-aligned armed factions of the PMF agreed to an “unofficial truce” with the U.S. that resulted in a temporary cessation of hostilities between the two parties. The armistice was agreed to [under pressure from the Trump Administration](#), which threatened to close the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and target Iranian assets inside and outside Iraq. The Iranian proxies demanded that the Iraqi government engage in dialogue with the U.S. and establish a timetable for the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. forces from Iraq.

In [May 2021](#), the armed factions declared an end to the truce and threatened to target military convoys and army bases. The militias, including Badr, [AAH](#), and [Kataib Hezbollah](#), formed the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission (IRCC), and [issued a statement censuring the Iraqi government](#) for failing to reach an agreement on a complete withdrawal. “What resulted from the [Iraqi-American] round of talks was very bad and unfortunate,” the statement said. The proxy groups then intended to “force the occupation out.”

However, later in 2021, the leader of the Badr organization, Hadi al-Amiri, [shifted his position on the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue](#). Soon after meeting with the head of the IRGC-Quds Force, [Esmail Qaani](#), in July, he “uncharacteristically” praised Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi for his role in the dialogue and described its outcome as a “national achievement,” which led some to believe that Amiri was reverting to the political realm to accomplish his military objectives.

## *Badr Organization Sectarian Violence*

The PMF militias seek legitimacy in the fact that they played a key role in the defeat of ISIS. They justify their actions and existence on the grounds that they are needed to fight ISIS and other “terrorists.”

“We will maintain our presence to fight terrorism in Iraq as long as terrorist groups continue to operate and as long as the Iraqi government asks us for support,” [said Amiri in 2021](#). This is one of the ways they pursue popular support and government funding, as they are officially under the command of civilian leadership. In reality, the situation is more complicated. The Badr Organization, perhaps more than AAH, exists to do Iran’s bidding—even to set up an Islamic government like the one in Iran. Their real reason for existing is to dominate the Iraqi state and act on Iran’s behalf.

After PMF forces defeated ISIS in Diyala province, which is located in northern Iraq on the border of Iran, in 2017, the Badr Organization, one of the most powerful militias in the PMF, [consolidated control over the Sunni-majority area](#). The current governor of Diyala province, Muthanna al-Tamimi, is a member of the Badr Organization. The PMF Diyala Operations Command directs Badr Organization formations and [operates out of Camp Ashraf](#). [U.S. CENTCOM noted that](#) “the 5th Iraqi Army Division, which is

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responsible for Diyala, operates as an extension of the Badr Organization, making it more responsive to Iran than to the Iraqi Prime Minister and the formal Iraqi chain of command.”

Although the group no longer controls the territory, ISIS cells are still operational in the area. In November 2021, the terrorist group carried out an attack in the al-Muqdadiya district of Diyala, which left fifteen people dead. In response, Iran-backed militias, including Badr Organization, went on a “[killing spree](#)” in neighboring Sunni-majority towns. The *Al-Rafidain International Centre for Justice and Human Rights* called for an investigation and [blamed](#) Hadi al-Amiri, along with AAH leader, [Qais Khazali](#), for the sectarian crimes.

The *Afada Observatory* produced a report on [the sectarian violence in Diyala province](#) based on eyewitness accounts. One of the sources in the report said that “They [the PMF militias] carried out field executions, burnt houses, a Healthcare center, vehicles and orchards...the security forces were pre-informed about the attack, but they failed to preclude it.” The report claims that [the PMF militia responsible for the violence](#) was the Badr Organization. Twelve Iraqis, including two children, were killed in Nahr al-Imam.

Sectarianism can also serve a political purpose for Amiri. Purporting to represent the Shi’a population, [he said in January 2022](#), “We agree with the national majority government and we were the first to sign it, but for everyone to agree on the exclusion of a Shiite group is not the name of this national majority.” In reality, he is not so much opposed to a government that excludes Shi’a people, but one that excludes the Iran-backed militias represented by the Fatah Alliance, as described in the following section.

### *The Badr Organization in Iraqi Politics*

In 2007, the Badr Organization’s political wing rebranded, changing its name from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) as part of an effort to de-emphasize the party’s ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 2012, the Badr Organization branched off from ISCI, operating as a political party of its own in addition to its capacity as a militia. As ISIS gained control over large swaths of territory in 2013 and 2014, the Badr Organization overtly mobilized, recruited, and fought ISIS alongside other Shi’a militias and the Iraqi army.

The Badr Organization constitutes an [active political force](#) in Iraq in addition to operating as a militia. From 2011 to 2014, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri served as Iraq’s transportation minister. Since October 2014, two Badr members, Mohammed Ghabban and Qasim al-Araji, have served consecutive terms as Iraq’s interior minister, and another, Mohammad Mahdi al-Bayati, served as minister of human rights until the position was abolished in 2015. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Badr Organization won 22 seats in parliament.

Before the 2018 parliamentary election cycle began, Hadi al-Amiri segregated the military and political wings of the Badr Organization in order to run for parliament—he even ordered his fellow militiamen to take orders from the Iraqi military.

In the run up to Iraq’s May 2018 elections, the Badr Organization, along with other powerful PMF units, [joined together to form the Fatah Alliance](#), a political bloc to be headed by Amiri. In 2018, the political

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bloc was, compared to the more recent October 2021 parliamentary elections, relatively successful, trailing the Sadrist movement by only a few seats. Hadi al-Amiri's Iran-backed Fatah coalition came in second place nationally—earning 47 seats, of which 22 went to Badr—after Muqtada al-Sadr's nationalist Sairoon movement won first place. Amiri, therefore, played a central role in the selection of Prime Minister and his cabinet. In last years' election, though, the bloc lost many of its seats, and the Sadrist movement gained seats. Amiri's Fatah Alliance won [17 seats](#), and the Sadrist bloc won 73.

On October 12, 2021, after the election results came in, the Fatah Alliance and Amiri cried foul. They rejected the outcome of the election, [claiming technical and legal violations](#). In early November of that year, street protests erupted outside the Green Zone, and [clashes with security personnel ensued](#), despite Amiri's assurance that the alliance would [not resort to escalation through protests](#). [Amiri subsequently expressed](#) "extreme anger at the ugly repression of peaceful protesters by government forces." The Fatah alliance then made an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court [rejected the appeal](#) and [ratified the votes](#) on December 27<sup>th</sup>. A day later, the Fatah Alliance [accepted the decision](#). The parliament is now caught in gridlock, with the so-called "[Tripartite Alliance](#)" between Sadr, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance unable to come to an agreement with the Fatah Alliance, who joined forces with former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the Coordination Framework to represent the primarily-Shi'a PMF. Amiri [rejected Sadr's offer](#) to coordinate votes with the Coordination Framework on the condition that former Prime Minister Maliki not be included in the discussions. On March 30, 2022, parliament attempted to select the president but failed, as the Coordination Framework, along with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party of the incumbent president, [continued to boycott the vote](#).

Amiri and Sadr have differing opinions on what the country's security apparatus should look like. In September 2021, a month before parliamentary elections, [Amiri said](#), "There are plots seeking either the merger or dissolution of Hashd al-Sha'abi. We will not allow these schemes to be carried out. The Popular Mobilization Units will stay on, and their main mission will be persevering Iraq's sovereignty, and supporting the country's security forces." This statement contrasts with Sadr's view. In November 2021, [Sadr said](#), "I call for the liquidation of the PMU's undisciplined elements... All armed factions must be dissolved and disarmed at once — their arms to be handed over to the PMF supervised by the commander in chief [Prime Minister Khadimi]." A day after he said this, [he claimed](#) to be dissolving the armed faction loyal to him.

While Sadr was once on the receiving end of Iranian largess, especially during the U.S. occupation and subsequent civil war, when he commanded the violent militia known as the Mahdi Army (JAM), he has since embraced a nationalist position that seeks [to reduce Iran's influence in Iraqi politics](#). In that sense, Amiri can be viewed as the more loyal beneficiary, as he represents the interests of the Iran-backed militias.

But Iran not only extends its influence through Amiri. Some believe that the [IRGC](#) itself has directly tried to intimidate political opposition parties. These analysts explain [Iran's ballistic missile strike in Erbil](#) in March 2022 in this context. Michael Knights at the *Washington Institute*, for example, [explained that the](#)

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[attack was an attempt to pressure Sadr and the KDP](#) to make concessions to Iran-backed groups. The Iranians, on the other hand, claimed to be targeting an Israeli intelligence station. It should also be noted that the U.S. Consulate is located nearby.

Although the Badr Organization's political arm portrays itself as welcoming and conciliatory to Sunnis, the areas where the group fights ISIS have seen "[some of the most high-profile Sunni-Shiite violence of the current conflict](#)," according to the *Washington Post*. This is particularly true in Iraq's Diyala province, where al-Amiri led military operations. [According to one Human Rights Watch employee](#), "We've documented widespread burning and destruction of homes. That's something we've recorded in literally every place where militias are leading the fight against ISIS. In some instances, we have documented them carrying out summary executions of people... the [militias] that we've documented the most abuses by are definitely Badr Organization."

## *Badr Organization's Penetration of Iraqi State Institutions*

The Badr Organization's penetration of government institutions was most apparent in 2011, when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki [appointed](#) Amiri to be minister of the Department of Transportation. In that position, which he held until 2014, Amiri [made sure that Iraq's airspace would be open](#) to Iranian transport planes flying to Syria [with supplies to support Assad's](#) war effort. He resisted [pressure from the U.S.](#) to close down the airspace to Iranian planes.

Moreover, in 2014, Haider al-Abadi became prime minister and appointed Badr-member Mohammed Ghabban to head the Ministry of Interior (MOI), a powerful ministry that oversees key elements of Iraq's security apparatus, including [the federal police and the Emergency Response Division](#). This appointment [gave Amiri control](#) over the institution.

Prime Minister Maliki, with U.S. support, sought to integrate militias into the MOI, ostensibly as a way of bringing the militias under the control of the Iraqi state. As a result, "pro-Khamenei" actors in the MOI have gained substantial influence over the country's security operations. Tehran exerts its influence over the institution through the [nearly seventy percent of MOI personnel](#) loyal to Khamenei.

A [December 2021 Inspector General report](#) on Operation Inherent Resolve reported that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) found that "while the MoI's Federal Police and Emergency Response Division, and the Iraqi Army's 5th and 8th Divisions are the units thought to have the greatest Iranian influence, officers sympathetic to Iranian or militia interests are scattered throughout the security services."

A [recent report](#) by *The Institute for the Study of War* shows that the Badr Organization continues to wield power over the MOI, even though the ministry is now run by former army chief of staff, Othman al-Ghanmi. According to the report, the Badr Organization is engaged in a campaign to increase its presence in urban areas, while weakening the formal Iraqi security apparatus. They have leveraged their influence in the MOI to "push the Iraqi Army away from the capital and other major cities."

The report notes that the Iraqi Joint Operations Command spokesperson confirmed that the army would withdraw from cities and be replaced by forces under the command of the Interior Ministry. Diyala

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province is mentioned as one of the areas where MOI forces will take over control of security. Furthermore, militiamen allegedly conducted high-profile attacks on Iraqi security personnel in Shula and al-Mansour. In June 2021, senior Iraqi intelligence officer [Nebras Abu Ali was killed by gunmen](#) to the east of the capital, Baghdad.

Partly as a result of the above-mentioned DoD report, members of the U.S. Congress are increasing pressure on the Biden administration to halt the provision of U.S. taxpayer dollars to the MOI, given the [“high-ranking presence of the Badr \[Organization\] in Iraq’s security forces.”](#) For example, [Representative Joe Wilson told the Free Bacon](#), “The Biden administration should re-evaluate funding to Iraq’s Ministry of Interior as long as it includes Iran-backed militias, such as the Badr Corps, which were responsible for the terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.” The Pentagon alleges that these militias are [taking advantage of U.S. taxpayer dollars](#) by penetrating the Iraqi security apparatus. The well-documented connection between the IRGC and Badr Organization has also [led to calls](#) on the Biden Administration to designate the group as a terrorist organization. Under the Trump administration, the National Security Council [ran up against resistance](#) from the Pentagon when it tried to reduce the MOI’s funding.

## *Badr: Financed by Iran*

Iran [backs](#) the Badr Organization, according to reports by Reuters and other news outlets, and Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri has confirmed that his group receives support from Iran. Senior Badr official Muen al-Kadhimi has said that Iran [“helped the group with everything](#) from tactics” to “drone and signals capabilities, including electronic surveillance and radio communications.”

The IRGC transferred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to militias in Iraq in 2018, according to a Reuters report. [The Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaqar missiles](#), which have ranges between 200 km and 700 km, were among the weapons shipped to the proxies. With that range, the proxies could strike the capitals of its sworn rivals, Israel and [Saudi Arabia](#). More recently, the [IRGC aided the Badr Organization in the construction of its own rockets](#), which resemble the Naze’at and Zelzal. So not only does the IRGC transfer arms, but it provides know-how.

Another way the Badr Organization acquires funding is through extortion. After [ISIS](#) was defeated and Badr took control of Diyala province, it inherited the Mandali border crossing between Iran and Iraq and began to extort money from truckers and others crossing the border. Renad Mansour, an expert at the *Chatham House*, explained that this source of revenue is the organizations’ [“lifeblood.”](#) Payments for permission to cross can yield up to 120,000 dollars per day, he said. This income compensated for the loss of government funding, which was reduced after ISIS was defeated.

In July 2020, Prime Minister Al-Khadimi deployed the Iraqi Rapid Response Forces to regain control of border crossings with Iran and Kuwait, as well as the port in Basra. These efforts recovered [over 100 million dollars](#) in new revenue, however, none of that came from Diyala province. It appears, then, that the Badr Organization’s extortion at the border went untouched, indicating the influence that the organization continues to have within the Iraqi government. According to [an extensive report on the security situation in Iraq](#) by *The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)*, Badr and AAH “work with”

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the Iraqi army's operations command and the province's governor to collect money from people commuting across the border.

The *EUAA* report describes Diyala as a strategic location. It points out that key roadways pass through the province, including the Baghdad-Tehran highway. The DoD Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve stated [in his report](#) that the Iranian militias in Diyala "are mainly concerned with using Diyala's strategic location to smuggle arms and other assistance from Iran." Furthermore, in April 2021, the Chinese company Sinopec [was awarded a contract](#) to develop the al-Mansouriya natural gas field in Diyala.

### *Badr Ideology: Importing Iran & Emulating Iranian Leaders*

For years, the Badr Organization [served as the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq \(SCIRI\)](#), a political party committed to bringing Iran's revolutionary brand of Shi'a Islamism to Iraq. However, [when SCIRI reemerged in Iraq in March 2003](#), the group insisted that it was not pushing for an Iranian-style government, despite the group's name and ongoing ties to Tehran.

Since 2003, Shiism and Iranian-influenced Islamism have remained central elements of the Badr Organization's identity. In 2011, Badr members celebrated the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq by [plastering the walls of government buildings with posters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#), and his predecessor, [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini](#). [In early 2015, al-Amiri reaffirmed his support for Iran's Supreme Leader](#), saying that Khamenei "has all the qualifications as an Islamic leader. He is the leader not only for Iranians but the Islamic nation. I believe so and I take pride in it."

### *Badr's Organizational Structure: Answering to Iran, Casting Iranian Influence*

[Hadi al-Amiri](#) leads the Badr Organization, but his influence extends beyond the group's confines. For example, Al-Amiri commanded Iraq's army and police in Diyala province. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi also reportedly entrusted al-Amiri with control over the Iraqi Army's 20th Battalion, according to the battalion's commander, General Ali al-Wazir. One *Human Rights Watch* employee said that al-Amiri "is an extremely powerful figure and he's essentially acting with total impunity now. It's not really the government leading the militias; it's the other way around."

In his capacity as leader of the Badr Organization's militia, al-Amiri [claimed](#) in February 2015 that he presented the group's military plans to the Prime Minister for approval. However, in April 2015, then Prime Minister Abadi [ordered](#) that all Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), including the Badr Organization, be placed under his office's direct command. As al-Amiri served at the time as the leader of Iraq's collective popular mobilization, Abadi's order seems to suggest that al-Amiri had, until then, retained significant autonomy when it came to planning and executing paramilitary attacks.

Although al-Amiri appeared to act without much Iraqi government oversight, reports suggest [he may have answered to the former leader of Iran's IRGC-Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani](#). In the fight to retake Tikrit from ISIS militants, Soleimani "was directing operations on the eastern flank from a village about 55km (35 miles) from Tikrit," according to a *Reuters* [report](#). Another *Reuters* report [noted](#) that "Soleimani also directed Iranian-trained Shi'ite militias—including the Badr Brigade." Former *RAND Corporation* analyst Alireza Nader has written that the Badr Organization "[appear\[s\] to be taking direct](#)

[orders from Tehran.](#)” Al-Amiri himself has been [photographed with Soleimani](#) as the two discuss battle strategy and celebrate victories.

## Hamas

Hamas is a US-designated terrorist organization that has killed hundreds of Israeli citizens, as well as Americans, in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks since the early 1990s. Hamas has governed the [Gaza Strip](#) since it violently expelled the Palestinian Authority in 2007. Though funding has slowed in recent years, Iran has provided Hamas with financing, weapons, and military training in order for the group to carry out its deadly campaigns and administer Gaza.

- **Type of Organization:** Political, religious, social service provider, terrorist, violent
- **Ideologies and Affiliations:** Islamist, jihadist, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group, pan-Islamist, Qutbist, Sunni
- **Place of Origin:** Gaza Strip
- **Year of Origin:** 1987
- **Founder(s):** Ahmed Yassin
- **Places of Operation:** Gaza Strip, West Bank, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran

### *Ideology and Tactics*

Hamas is a Palestinian armed group, terrorist organization, and political party. It has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2007, when it violently expelled its rival Fatah and the Palestinian Authority from the coastal enclave. Per its 1988 Charter, Hamas considers itself the Palestinian offshoot of the [Muslim Brotherhood](#) and rejects Israel’s right to exist in any part of historical Palestine, seeking to [violently replace](#) the Jewish state with a Palestinian state comprising all territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In 2017, Hamas issued a [Political Document](#) in which it made no mention of its Brotherhood links but maintained its rejection of Israel.

In the 1990s, Hamas began conducting [suicide attacks](#) and other armed operations against Israeli soldiers and civilians, both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Hamas’ attacks have also led to the deaths of dual-nationals and foreigners—including Americans—residing in Israel. In addition to violence, the group controls a social services apparatus, which it uses to bolster its popular support.

Despite temporary tensions that arose over the Syrian Civil War, Hamas enjoys a close relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its offshoots, including its Lebanon-based extension [Hezbollah](#). Iran [provides](#) the Palestinian group with funds, weapons, and military training.

The United States Department of State [designated](#) Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. On [March 6, 2019](#), Israel designated the Gaza-based, Hamas-controlled Al-Aqsa TV station as a terrorist entity. On [August 20, 2019](#), Paraguay said it had officially recognized the military wing of the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.

From mid-March into April 2022, a spate of terror attacks was committed in Israel. Arab-Israelis [inspired by ISIS](#) claimed attacks in Beersheba and Hadera. Hamas [praised the acts of terrorism](#), while Palestinian

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Authority (PA) President Abbas condemned them. “We commend the valor and courage of the perpetrators of this heroic operation, which comes as retaliation for the blood of the martyrs, and in response to the aggression and terror of the occupation,” Hamas [said in a statement](#) referring to the Hadera attack. This statement of praise is [noteworthy](#) because the attack was committed by ISIS-affiliated militants, and Iran—Hamas’s patron—has often clashed with [ISIS](#).

On March 7, 2022, Hamas [took credit](#) for a stabbing attack in Jerusalem’s Old City. Even though Hamas [may not want a conflict](#) with Israel at this time, the group [vowed to escalate hostilities](#) on account of the death of a Palestinian in an Israeli anti-terror operation in the West Bank. This threat occurred against the backdrop of heightened fears of violence due to the convergence of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religious holidays in the month of April. A similar pattern continued in April 2022—particularly in the April 7, 2022 attack in Tel Aviv—with Hamas praising attacks despite the terrorists having no known affiliation to the organization.

## *Structure*

Hamas’s leadership is split between its political bureau and its local government in [Gaza](#). The political bureau constitutes the party’s internal leadership, whereas the Gaza government consists of Hamas officials conducting day-to-day governance in that territory, which Hamas has ruled since 2007. The political bureau is the organization’s principal authority and was [previously based](#) in [Syria](#) until 2012, when Hamas leaders fled after endorsing the rebellion against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Hamas also fields a military wing, known as the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, [founded](#) in 1992, which fields an [estimated 20,000 fighters](#), with another 20,000 in Gaza’s [Hammas-run](#) police and security forces.

According to political scientists [Ilana Kass and Bard O’Neil](#), “The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders [from Hamas] and do not tell [Hamas] of their plans in advance.” That might suggest that [Ismail Haniyeh](#), who was [elected](#) to another term as leader of the group’s political bureau in 2021, shares command authority over the military wing with [Mohammed Deif](#). Iran has less control over Hamas than other Palestinian militant groups, like [Palestinian Islamic Jihad](#).

## *Hammas: Rulers of Gaza*

Hamas entered Palestinian politics in January 2006, [winning a majority](#) in that month’s Palestinian Authority Legislative elections. The international community [largely refused](#) to deal with Hamas unless it renounced violence, recognized Israel, and abided by past Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Despite its role as Gaza’s government, Hamas continued to launch rockets and other terror attacks at Israeli targets. Hamas rocket fire led to three wars with Israel in [2008-09](#), [2012](#), [2014](#), and [2021](#). Hamas also participated in the [2006 kidnapping](#) of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

In June 2007, Hamas [ousted the Palestinian Authority](#) from Gaza and took control of the coastal enclave. Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh, who had until then served as the Palestinian Authority prime minister, became the prime minister of Hamas’s Gaza government. Hamas and the Palestinian Authority signed a [reconciliation agreement](#) that led to Haniyeh stepping down and the appointment of a new PA prime

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minister. The reconciliation agreement notwithstanding, the PA has yet to reassert its authority over Gaza, where Hamas remains in control.

## *Iranian Support of Hamas*

Hamas has served as Iran's most important Palestinian partner for over two decades. Hamas' military ties with Tehran have involved intelligence sharing, provision of arms, organizing, and training—largely through Hezbollah. Iran has provided [hundreds of millions of dollars](#) in military and financial aid to Hamas since the 1990s.

Former Hamas political chief [Khaled Meshaal](#) began [coordinating](#) his group's ties with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the 1990s. Iran provided generous funding for Hamas' attacks against Israeli targets, aimed at derailing the U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace process. A 2002 [US court case](#) described 1995–1996 as “a peak period for Iranian economic support of Hamas,” because the group was delivering on Iran's desire to torpedo peace talks by carrying out successful attacks, including a [February 1996](#) twin suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed two American citizens.

Yet, despite the financing of discrete projects and strident overtures from [Hezbollah](#) and Tehran, Hamas otherwise kept its distance from Iran at the insistence of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's co-founder and spiritual leader. After Yassin's assassination in 2004, though, Hamas began accepting more aid from Iran and Hezbollah, including funds and logistical support.

As the Second Intifada waned in 2005, Iran used its Lebanon-based extension Hezbollah to strengthen Hamas' military posture vis-à-vis Israel. According to pro-Hezbollah newspaper *Al-Akhbar*, the group's military commander, Imad Mughniyeh, visited Gaza after Israel's 2005 disengagement, meeting with 'resistance' leaders, inspecting rocket production facilities and launchpads, and establishing contact with Hamas' tunnel operatives. After Hezbollah's 2006 war against Israel, Mughniyeh, with Iran's approval, returned to Gaza and spent [months](#) there training Palestinian factions in rocket warfare. This expertise would serve Hamas well in future conflicts against Israel.

When Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Authority's legislative elections in 2006, [Iran provided Hamas an estimated \\$23 million a month](#) in financial and military aid.

Relations between Hamas and Iran cooled for several years in the early 2010s after the onset of the Syrian civil war. In 2012, Iran [reduced its aid](#) to Hamas by approximately \$10 million a month after the Palestinian group sided against Tehran's ally Bashar al-Assad. However, the 2013 overthrow of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi left Hamas without an ally, forcing it to [restore](#) its relationship with Iran, which, in any case, the group's representatives claimed: “had never been conclusively severed.” The Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, [particularly pressed](#) for the full restoration of ties.

Hamas' reconciliation with Iran experienced intermittent setbacks. Iran [armed](#) and [supported](#) the Palestinian group during the latter's 2014 conflict with Israel, including by providing Hamas with the means and knowledge to produce their own rockets. However, as reconciliation attempts sputtered, relations [sour](#) again in [2015](#). Senior Hamas leader [Mousa Abu Marzouk claimed](#) at the time that Iran had halted all military and political aid to the group, and that Tehran had not given them [any](#)

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[money](#) since 2009. However, other Hamas officials have contradicted Marzouk. Ahmed Yousef, a Hamas leader and political adviser to former Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, [claimed](#) in 2016 that Iran had slowed, but never stopped, aid to the Qassam Brigades, and Hamas military leaders reportedly [continued](#) to receive more than \$45 million annually from the IRGC.

Relations have steadily improved since 2017, when Hamas elected [Yahya Sinwar](#) as its new leader in Gaza and [Saleh al-Aroui](#) as the deputy chairman of Hamas' political bureau. Al-Aroui—[described](#) by pro-Hezbollah television channel al-Mayadeen as the “sponsor of reconciliation with Iran and Hezbollah”—began reconciliation efforts even prior to his election. He [visited](#) Iran and met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The discussions reportedly centered on “reconciliation [between Hamas and Iran] and the developments of the struggle against [Israel].” After his election, al-Aroui visited Iran again with a Hamas delegation and met with senior regime officials.

Hamas now appears to have adopted a neutral stance on Sunni-Shiite regional conflicts—in contrast with its approach after the beginning of the Syrian civil war—and focuses on the common ground in combating Israel. During his visit to Iran, al-Aroui—noting the group's good relations with both [Saudi Arabia](#) and Iran—[declared](#) Hamas' [neutrality](#) on all the conflicts dividing the Sunni and Shiite world, including [Syria](#). Al-Aroui added, “Palestinian factions which have involved themselves in these conflicts in the past have harmed the Palestinian cause.” He stressed, however, that Hamas' “strategic relationship” with Iran and [Hezbollah](#) was based on a shared commitment to resistance.

But some Hamas officials in the Palestinian diaspora have even begun expressing friendly sentiments toward the Syrian regime, indicating a further tilt towards Iran's regional policies. In December 2018, Hamas' [representative](#) in Lebanon, Ali Baraka, [described](#) any attack on Syria as an attack on Palestine, while Maher Salah—the head of Hamas' Diaspora Office—expressed the movement's desire to cooperate with Syria, particularly by rebuilding Palestinian refugee camps destroyed during the Syrian civil war. Salah also [welcomed](#) the U.S. decision to withdraw its troops from the country as a [victory](#).

In 2019, media [reports circulated](#) that Hamas had asked Iran to act as a mediator between itself and the Assad regime. Iran also allegedly expressed a willingness to increase its monthly payments to Hamas in exchange for intelligence on Israeli missile capabilities. [According](#) to Israel's Channel 12, during a meeting between Iran's supreme leader and Hamas officials, Tehran offered to provide \$30 million per month. This was a [substantial increase](#) as a previous Ynet report listed the total as \$70 million per year, with other outlets [saying](#) it was as high as \$100 million per year. If accurate, it demonstrated the premium Tehran would pay for intelligence on Israeli military capabilities.

The relations continued to warm in 2020, when Hamas' leader, [Ismail Haniyeh](#), [attended](#) the funeral of [former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani](#). Haniyeh's trip caught some observers by surprise because, in December of the previous year, Egypt had allowed him to travel for the first time since he ascended to Hamas' leadership on the condition that he would not visit Iran. At the funeral, Haniyeh [spoke](#) of Soleimani as being a “martyr of Jerusalem.”

There is also [evidence](#) he met on the sidelines with the new [head of the IRGC Quds Force Esmail Qaani](#), as Haniyeh appeared in photographs alongside Qaani and Hamas official [Saleh al-Aroui](#). This was likely a

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crucial meeting to connect Soleimani's successor with the existing leadership of Iran's Axis of Resistance. Indeed, Hamas officials have made a point of continuing to praise Iran's steady support for the organization even after Soleimani's demise, with Haniyeh [saying](#) in May 2020 that "I am particularly specifying the Islamic Republic of Iran which has not faltered in supporting and funding the resistance financially, militarily, and technically."

An Iranian report provided to the Iranian news outlet *Tasnim News* on the anniversary of [Qassem Soleimani's](#) death revealed how Iranian support for Hamas was [coordinated at the highest levels](#) of the Iranian government. "We [the Iranians] coordinated with the Hamas movement on the issue of missiles and how to build missile propulsion and warheads and guided systems. All this was done with the knowledge and supervision of Soleimani, and this was a very strategic issue for him," the report says.

Notwithstanding its support for the terrorist organization, Iran does not receive total deference from Hamas, because Hamas also seeks the support of Arab countries as well as Turkey. [Palestinian Islamic Jihad \(PIJ\)](#) is more inclined to align with Iranian positions when it comes to the Gulf. In January 2022, PIJ held demonstrations that criticized [Saudi Arabia](#) over its role in [Yemen's](#) war; and Hamas [attempted to distance](#) itself from the protests. Hamas does take a stand against anti-Iran protests, even when it comes to the war in Syria. In February 2022, a Salafist association organized a protest in support of displaced Syrian refugees. Hamas issued [a statement condemning their activities](#), which included burning images of Hezbollah and Iranian leaders.

Sources in [Lebanon](#) [told the Arab Weekly](#) that a meeting in Beirut in January 2021 between Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah and Hamas political chief Haniyeh was focused on coordinating Iran's regional agenda, particularly with respect to Egypt. According to this reporting, Iran opposed Egypt's expanding influence, which owes in part to its successful brokering of the ceasefire to the 2021 Gaza Strip crisis.

In November 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [sanctioned](#) Mahmoud Khaled Zahhar, a senior member and co-founder of Hamas who has worked closely with Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Zahhar has called for violence against Jewish civilians and the destruction of the Israeli state, and has publicly acknowledged and thanked Iran for its support.

### *Illegal Smuggling Operations*

Hamas's network of underground tunnels that are used to smuggle weapons, as well as goods, across the border with Egypt were a target of the Israeli airstrikes, but the Palestinian terrorist organizations are thought to be rebuilding the over [60 miles of demolished tunnels](#) faster than expected. Sometimes referred to as "the Metro," the tunnels [have allowed Hamas to gather](#) up to 500 million dollars a year in tax revenue on smuggled goods, a large share of the group's annual budget, which *The Counter Extremism Project* [estimated](#) to be just under \$900 million. After deposing the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013, the Egyptian government closed down the tunnels, which precipitated an economic crisis in Gaza.

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Hamas also taxes goods and materials shipped over the border above land. A December 2021 *Times of Israel* piece [reported](#) that fuel and cement are among the many goods shipped into the enclave and taxed. Most of this money does not go to the Palestinian people, who are provided for largely by international aid, but is rather used to fund its powerful armed wing.

To curtail the smuggling operations of Hamas and other anti-Israel Palestinian factions, Israel enforces a blockade against the [Gaza Strip](#). Despite the blockade, weapons and weapons components still make their way into the enclave. The tunnels are utilized to escape notice of the Israeli intelligence agencies. *Reuters* [reported](#) in May 2021 that Israeli officials said it was impossible to completely seal off the Gaza Strip. Moreover, rockets are manufactured out of such imported construction materials as metal tubes.

However, Hamas's rudimentary weapons are not the only ones at its disposal. According to an expert at *the Washington Institute*, Hamas [possessed up to 15,000 rockets](#) at the start of the 2021 conflict, many of which were designed with Iranian technical support, with "enhanced accuracy, longer range, heavier warheads, and improved launchers like the A-120." Additionally, Hamas [is believed to have built and deployed](#) six Shahab kamikaze drones that resemble Iran's Abadil model. Iran is [thought to be providing drones](#) to its proxies in the region, including Hamas, though they are not "balance altering" weapons.

## *Financing Hamas*

Hamas has modernized its financing operations to include cryptocurrency, partly because this type of currency is more difficult to trace than hard currency and can be used to circumvent sanctions. *The Counter Extremism Project* [reported](#) that in August 2020, U.S. authorities seized more than one million dollars in cryptocurrency assets controlled by Hamas's armed wing. The May 2021 conflict between Israel and Hamas [resulted in an increase](#) in donations for the group, including through bitcoin.

A U.S. lawsuit filed in June 2020 alleged that [Qatar funneled money](#) to Hamas through Qatari financial institutions: Qatar Charity, Masraf Al Rayan, and Qatar National Bank. Qatar, known to be sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood—the group from which Hamas grew—permits a number of high-ranking Hamas officials to reside in the country. And it provides large sums of aid to Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. In June 2020, the residents [began receiving \\$100 million](#) in Qatari aid.

Palestinian residents in Gaza and the West Bank are also recipients of U.S. economic aid. The Trump administration ended funding for UNRWA, a U.N. program focused on providing food and education in Palestinian territories, in 2018, but President Biden [dedicated](#) \$150 million to the program. Additionally, in April 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken [said](#) that the U.S. would provide \$75 million in economic and development assistance, and \$10 million in peace-building programs. The U.S. Department of State [claimed](#) that the economic aid would not benefit Hamas. But this will be difficult to ensure, given Hamas's ability to manufacture weapons out of everyday construction materials.

Israel also plans on providing economic aid to Gaza if certain conditions are met. As of April 2021, Hamas [was holding four Israeli hostages](#). The Israeli authorities made clear that they must be returned before Israel releases reconstruction aid for the Gaza Strip. This is not the first time Hamas has abducted Israeli

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citizens. In September 2021, an Israeli court [ordered Hamas to pay millions of dollars](#) in compensation to the families of teenagers their group kidnapped and murdered in 2014.

## *May 2021 Conflict with Israel*

In early May 2021, Israel's Supreme Court was set to decide on a case [regarding the eviction](#) of Palestinians living in Sheikh Jarrah, a neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Hamas's military leader, [Mohammed Deif](#), [said](#) that if the Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah were evicted, Hamas "will not stand by helplessly and the enemy will pay a heavy price."

This Supreme Court case could have been part of the catalyst for the 2021 crisis, because, [on the same day](#) that the ruling was to be heard, Hamas began [indiscriminately firing rockets](#) into Israel. In the end, over 3,300 rockets were launched by Hamas into Israel, killing ten people. *Human Rights Watch* [referred to the attacks](#), which hit civilian population centers, as "war crimes."

Israel's missile defense system, known as the "Iron Dome," intercepted [nearly ninety percent](#) of the rockets, but it was at times overwhelmed by the barrage, the military said. The eleven-day conflict between Israel and Hamas (and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) ended in an [Egypt-brokered ceasefire](#) on May 21, 2021.

Ahead of the conflict, Hamas leader [Ismail Haniyeh](#) wrote to Iranian [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei](#) to request Iranian support against Israel. Iran appears to have obliged because, on May 21, Haniyeh [praised Iran for supporting the war effort](#), saying that Tehran "did not hold back with money, weapons, and technical support." Separately, Iran's [Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani](#) sent a letter during the fighting to Mohammed Deif [praising](#) him as a "living martyr."

The conflict boosted Hamas's image among people in the Middle East, as the group was able to [propagandize itself as a victim](#) of Israeli aggression (even though it fired rockets first) and a victor in the war (even though Israeli airstrikes [killed many Hamas terrorists](#) and destroyed [miles of underground tunnels](#)). Hamas's propaganda influenced news outlets like *Shehab News*, with which Hamas is affiliated. The mainstream Qatari news agency, *Al Jazeera*, may have also adopted their narrative, for Hamas praised their coverage of the war. Over the course of the conflict, Hamas's Qassam Brigades Telegram channel [increased](#) by 261,000 followers.

After the airstrikes began, pro-Palestinian sentiment [flooded social media](#) and culminated in street protests throughout the Arab world, including in countries that agreed to normalize relations with Israel. The Muslim-majority countries that signed the Abraham Accords came under pressure to "show solidarity with the Palestinians after being accused of turning their backs on them when they originally agreed to normalize relations with Israel," [said one analyst](#) at the *Middle East Institute*. Some cities across the U.S. and Europe also witnessed protests.

Referencing its support and praise of Hamas's rocket attack, the Iranian regime [signaled to conservative groups](#) in Iran that it had taken action against Israel. It appealed to these groups without provoking Israel or risking a derailment of the Iran nuclear negotiations. In recent years, pressure has grown on

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Iran to take action given Israel's sabotage of Iran's [nuclear facilities](#) and strikes on [IRGC](#) personnel in Syria.

Hostilities broke out again in June 2021, as Hamas lofted incendiary balloons into Israel in response to a march through Palestinian parts of Jerusalem organized by far-right groups. The Israeli military [confirmed that it carried out](#) airstrikes in retaliation.

## *The October 2023 Hamas Terrorist Attacks on Israel*

At dawn on October 7, 2023, the Iran-backed Hamas terror group launched a coordinated multi-front terrorist assault on Israel. An estimated [1,000 Hamas militants infiltrated Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip](#), massacring hundreds of civilians and abducting dozens of women, children, and elderly as hostages. An elite force [blew holes in the Gaza border fence](#). At the same time, an airborne unit flew into Israeli territory using motorized hang-gliders and speedboats carrying Hamas militants who [attempted to penetrate Israeli territory from sea](#). The terrorists deployed drones to map out Israeli positions and identify targets. As Hamas gunmen carried out the ground operation, 2,200 rockets [were simultaneously fired](#) from the Gaza Strip into southern and central Israel. The rocket barrage exhibited a higher degree of lethality and precision than previous attacks, indicating how the terrorists' capabilities have rapidly improved.

Once inside Israel, Hamas carried out horrific acts of terror. An army of militants targeted a musical festival near Kibbutz Reim, firing machine guns into the crowd and [killing over 260 people](#). Graphic videos emerged on social media of savage humiliation and barbarity. In one instance, Palestinian militants "[stamp\[ed\] on \[a\] man's \[dead\] body, cheering and lifting their guns up into the air.](#)" In another video, a mutilated body was paraded through the streets in the back of a pickup truck, and a Palestinian onlooker spat at the body. In Kfar Azar, Israeli soldiers [found babies and children murdered](#); many of them beheaded. A baby was found still attached to the umbilical cord, as Hamas terrorists cut open a pregnant woman's stomach and removed the living fetus. Hamas [burned Jewish children](#) alive. They sexually assaulted and [raped civilians](#) next to dead bodies, which amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Reports suggest that they have begun to [torture](#) hostages, possibly including women, children, and elderly people. The full scale of the savagery may yet to be fully revealed, but [over 900 Israelis were slaughtered; 2,500 were wounded; and at least 150 were taken hostage](#). A total of [14 U.S. citizens](#) were counted among the dead, and Americans are also currently being held hostage by Hamas.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [declared war](#) against the Iranian-backed Hamas terrorist group in response to the unprecedented assault against Israel. There is no question that Iran's regime bears ultimate responsibility. Without the financial, logistical, technical, and operational support from the Iranian regime, particularly through the support of the IRGC, Hamas would not have been able to execute such brutal acts.

However, Iran's regime did not only enable the assault through its various forms of support over decades. Rather, it took [a direct role in the operational planning](#) of the coordinated assault from air, land, and sea. The sophistication and coordination of this attack could not have been conducted without

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significant Iranian involvement. *The Wall Street Journal* [reported](#) that senior Hamas and Hezbollah operatives said that IRGC officials planned the attacks over the course of several weeks at meetings in Beirut, and then finally greenlit the attacks.

In particular, high-ranking IRGC officials, including [Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani](#), met with [Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah](#), [Hamas military chief Saleh al-Aroui](#), and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziad al-Nakhalah](#). The Iranian regime's foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abollahian, who is an IRGC Quds Force affiliate and colonel of the IRGC's Basij Militia, also played a key coordinating role in the attacks, according to the *Wall Street Journal* report. The operatives also described how the attack was intended to disrupt progress in U.S.-brokered efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with Saudi-Israeli normalization.

*The Washington Post* separately reported that the planning for the operation took place [over a year](#), with the buildup of arms and equipment purchased with tens of millions of dollars provided by Iran. As well as this, it is important to underscore that Iran's role in orchestrating and coordinating the October 7 terrorist attacks is also consistent with [recent changes](#) to the IRGC's structures and doctrines, all of which was geared towards confrontation with Israel.

The [Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei's](#) first statement since the attack read, "[We kiss the hands of those who planned the attack on the Zionist regime.](#)" He praised the attack as an "irreparable" defeat of Israeli military and intelligence capabilities. At the same time, he [denied](#) that Iran was involved in planning the attacks, utilizing the regime's plausible deniability strategy to avoid any direct consequences being imposed on Tehran. After the assault, [Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi](#) spoke with the leaders of the Hamas and PIJ and [publicly expressed his support for them](#).

## *Hamas and the Abraham Accords*

In October 2020, the leader of Hamas's political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, called PA President Mahmoud Abbas to express his "[absolute rejection](#)" of the normalization of diplomatic ties between the UAE and Israel in the Abraham Accords. Part of the impetus for the Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and a number of Muslim-majority countries, was countering Iran.

The effect of these accords can be observed in the UAE's response to the 2021 conflict between Israel and Hamas. Seeking not to be too critical of the Israeli government, the UAE [criticized Israel's decision](#) to enter the al-Aqsa mosque on the holiest day of the year, but did not condemn Israel's airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the UAE [has offered to provide funding](#) to help rebuild Gaza in an effort to counter Qatar's influence. However, the UAE is challenged, like the US, to provide funding in a way that does not benefit Hamas.

Hamas opposes any form of rapprochement between Jews and Muslims. A shooting that took place in December 2021 may have been Hamas' response to Abbas's trip to Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz's residence, the first such trip in over a decade; for the attack [took place shortly after Hamas condemned](#) the meeting. "This behavior by the leadership of the Palestinian authority deepens the Palestinian political divide... and weakens the rejection of normalization," [said Hamas's spokesperson](#)

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[Hazem Qassem](#). As a result of the talks, the Israeli Defense Ministry [announced](#): “confidence-building measures” that would streamline the entry of Palestinian business people into Israel.

Turkey [hosted](#) Israeli President Herzog in Ankara in the first trip by an Israeli head of state to the country since 2007. Experts [believe](#) that economic ties were among the topics discussed at the meeting. This meeting may have frayed relations with Hamas’s leader, who in the past visited Turkey often.

## Hezbollah

Hezbollah is a Lebanon-based, transnational, Shiite Islamist terrorist organization founded by Iran in 1982. The group’s common appellation “Lebanese Hezbollah” is a misnomer. Hezbollah’s primary loyalty is to Iran and its supreme leader, not to Lebanon. The organization adheres to the ideology of “guardianship of the jurist” (Velayat-e Faqih), as [expounded](#) by the late [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini](#), Iran’s first supreme leader.

Since its inception, Hezbollah has engaged in terrorism against Iran’s enemies and its own, both in [Lebanon](#) and abroad. These activities have led the U.S. and other countries to designate the group as a terrorist organization.

Hezbollah also operates as a political party in Lebanon, holding parliamentary and cabinet seats. The group, acting in concord with other parties in its coalition, exercises de facto veto power over the formation and operations of the Lebanese government.

In predominantly Shiite areas of Lebanon, Hezbollah also runs a vast social-services network—including hospitals, schools, vocational institutions, and charities—to compensate for the Lebanese state’s incompetence in providing such services. These welfare efforts have earned Hezbollah the gratitude and support of Lebanese Shiites.

### *Velayat-e Faqih and the 1985 Open Letter: Hezbollah’s Khomeinist Doctrine*

Hezbollah’s service to Iran stems from its adherence to [Khomeini’s teachings](#) on the Islamic government, and his religio-political ideology of Velayat-e Faqih. The group first revealed its adherence to this Khomeinist doctrine in its 1985 “Open Letter,” the group’s foundational document which officially announced its existence. In the Letter, it declared its obedience to “one leader, wise and just,” the Wali al-Faqih, and itself a continuation of the Islamic revolution “made victorious by God in Iran.”

Hezbollah updated the Open Letter in 2009 with the release of its “Political Document.” However, both before and after the Document’s release, Hezbollah’s senior leaders [stressed](#) that it would not alter their adherence to Velayat-e Faqih. While [unveiling](#) the 2009 Document, [Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah](#) stressed that it had no impact on his group’s “creed, ideology, or thought”—particularly Velayat-e Faqih – which he said is “not a political stance that can be subjected to revision.” In 2016, [Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem reaffirmed](#) the party’s adherence to the Open Letter and its doctrines, calling it a “permanent and continuous document,” and downplaying the 2009 Manifesto as merely “minor” or “trivial” adjustments with no impact on the group’s core ideology.

### *Iran’s Support for Hezbollah*

Hezbollah makes no secret of receiving extensive [financial backing](#) from Iran. Estimates of Iranian annual funding range from \$100 to \$200 [million](#) per year in cash outlays alone, according to the U.S. intelligence community. However, total financial support is closer to \$800 million per year, [according](#) to a former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff.

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Iran also provides Hezbollah with [weapons](#)—[everything](#) from small arms and Katyusha rockets to more advanced platforms, including anti-tank rockets, longer-range surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-ship [missiles](#). Hezbollah stands today as the most heavily armed and technically capable sub-state actor in the world, but its conventional capabilities still are no match for Israel. Hezbollah has thus relied heavily on psychological warfare designed to terrorize Israeli civilians as part of its military doctrine to bridge the gap. Most infamously, the Iran-backed terror group indiscriminately lobbed up to [160 Katyusha rockets per day](#) at Israeli population centers during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.

Iranian assistance has grown Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal from an estimated 12,000 projectiles in 2006 to a current estimate of over 150,000 rockets—the majority of which are inaccurate, short-range, and low-payload Katyushas. Concurrently, Iran has expanded Hezbollah’s arsenal of mid- and long-range missiles from dozens of each to thousands and hundreds, [respectively](#). Its rocket arsenal serves as the group’s primary deterrent against Israel. All of Israel is currently within range of Hezbollah’s rockets.

[Reports](#) in 2017 claimed the [IRGC](#) had built Hezbollah weapons factories in Lebanon capable of producing surface-to-surface, land-based anti-ship missiles and torpedoes launched from light water craft. The IRGC reportedly also trained Hezbollah’s military specialists in producing arms at the IRGC-affiliated Imam Hussein University. However, it remains unclear how Hezbollah acquires and domestically produces the sophisticated components necessary to manufacture these advanced missiles, which the Iranians themselves have difficulty in doing at home. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israeli intelligence and military efforts have prevented Hezbollah from acquiring large quantities of precision-guided missiles—limiting this arsenal to “[a few dozen](#)”—and Maj. Gen. Tamir Hyman, chief of the IDF’s Directorate of Military Intelligence, [noted](#) that the group lacks the ability to produce such missiles in Lebanon.

Tehran also trains Hezbollah’s fighters and commanders at IRGC-run camps in both [Lebanon](#) and Iran, and has fought alongside the group in multiple engagements—including in the Second Lebanon War against Israel, and in the Syrian Civil War. Additionally, Iran has reportedly built-up Hezbollah’s [cyberwarfare](#) capabilities.

## *Hezbollah in Action: In Service of Iran*

Iran exploited the chaos of Lebanon’s Civil War and the subsequent 1982 Israeli invasion to catalyze the rise of Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s formation extended Tehran’s influence to Lebanon and the Levant and fulfilled Khomeini’s imperative to export the Islamic Revolution. Tehran’s longstanding financial support has proven critical to the quality of Hezbollah’s fighting capabilities, as well as its regional and global reach.

Iran’s investment has paid off. Since its founding, Hezbollah has operated as the spearhead for Iran’s [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)](#) far beyond Lebanon’s borders in order to protect Tehran’s interests. [In the 1980s](#), for example, Hezbollah targeted Europe-based officials of the deposed Pahlavi monarchy and attacked France for supporting Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War.

Hezbollah has also incubated Iranian-branded proxies throughout the region. At Tehran’s behest, the group created Unit 3800 in 2003 to [train](#) and assist pro-Iran Iraqi Shiite militias [fighting](#) American and

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multinational forces. Particularly since the rise of [ISIS](#) in 2014, these militias have multiplied, with most joining Iraq's state-sponsored Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The former PMF deputy commander, [Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis](#), has said that his fighters have "benefited greatly" from the support of Hezbollah, which continues to play a "central" and "very important role" in the PMF's battle readiness, and has even "offered martyrs" for the Iraqi battlefield. Al-Muhandis even claimed Hezbollah's presence in Iraq dated back to the 1980s, when its storied commanders Imad Mughniyeh and [Mustafa Badreddine](#) came to Iraq to train Shiites to fight Saddam Hussein.

Since 2011, Hezbollah has also led the effort to defend Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, whose downfall would pose a strategic threat to Tehran. Hezbollah played a [critical role](#) in important battles—particularly the Qusayr, Qalamoun, Aleppo, Badiat al-Sham, and Eastern Ghouta campaigns. The group has also [recruited](#) and trained Shiites—from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere—and other fighters to buttress Assad's forces, including the National Defense Forces militia.

Hezbollah's advisers have also [traveled](#) to Yemen to provide aid—in the form of funds, arms, etc.—and train the Zaydi Shiite [Houthi](#) rebels in their war against neighboring [Saudi Arabia](#). While the Houthis do not share Hezbollah's religious views, including belief in the Velayat-e Faqih, Hezbollah aids the Houthis because the latter are fighting against Riyadh, a leading rival of Tehran, and Houthi control of Red Sea shipping and the Bab el-Mandeb would weaken the Kingdom.

In [September 2019](#), Hezbollah launched attacks directly on the Israeli military, firing anti-tank missiles targeting an army base and vehicles near the border.

In [June 2020](#), Israel's Shin Bet security agency alleged that Hezbollah was seeking to recruit Arab citizens of Israel to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel.

In [July 2020](#), Israel reportedly repelled a Hezbollah attempted border infiltration with heavy shelling. Several days prior, Israel announced it had thwarted a [terrorist plot](#) masterminded by Hezbollah and Iran to abduct an Israeli soldier. The plot was to be carried out by a cell of the [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine](#) operating in the West Bank.

On October 8, 2023, one day after the Iran-backed Palestinian terrorist group Hamas conducted its deadliest terrorist attack against Israel in the state's history, the Iranian proxy group Hezbollah launched guided rockets and artillery strikes on Israel's Shebaa Farms "[in solidarity](#)" with the Palestinian terrorists.

On October 9, 2023, [several Hezbollah militants were killed](#) in a cross-border shelling by Israel following an incursion by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists from Israel's northern border with Lebanon. Hezbollah returned fire, launching a barrage of rockets into Israel.

Senior Israeli officials informed *The Times of Israel* that [Iran had directed Hezbollah to prepare to engage Israel](#). This would open a second front against Israel as it conducts war in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The threat of a multi-front terror attack against Israel has been at the heart of the Iranian regime's strategy and one they have consistently communicated before, during, and after the October 7 attacks.

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Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah [praised the Hamas attack in a statement that read](#), “[the Hamas operation] sends a message to the Arab and Islamic world, and the international community as a whole, especially those seeking normalization with this enemy, that the Palestinian cause is an everlasting one, alive until victory and liberation.” He [reportedly](#) played a role in the operational planning of the assault, alongside his Iranian patrons, over the course of [months](#), if not [more than a year](#), at meetings in Beirut.

## *Hezbollah in Lebanon: “Lebanonization” vs. Pragmatism*

In line with its adherence to Velayat-e Faqih, Hezbollah has aimed from its inception to replace the Lebanese Republic with an Iran-style Islamic state. Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah has adopted a pragmatic approach to Islamizing Lebanese governance, participating in and increasingly influencing Lebanese politics. Hezbollah’s purportedly moderate path has inspired two erroneous and alternative narratives. The first is that the group has fully integrated into the Lebanese system and shed its desire to replace it. The second narrative is that Hezbollah controls Lebanon entirely, rendering any distinction between the group and the Lebanese state meaningless and artificial—that in practice, Lebanon is Hezbollah. In fact, both views misunderstand Hezbollah’s place in Lebanese society and the group’s long-term goals.

In its early years, Hezbollah openly declared its revolutionary aims and refused to work within the Lebanese political system. But as Lebanon’s Civil War waned, Hezbollah recognized the limits of its own power and realized that a confrontational approach would isolate the group domestically and put it at odds with the new dominant power in Lebanon—[Syria](#).

The organization, therefore, changed course, seeking to achieve its Islamist goal by operating within the Lebanese system’s confines and thereby gaining popular support, instead of imposing an Islamic state by force. The roots of this pragmatic approach are in Hezbollah’s Open Letter, wherein the group prioritized public backing over territorial control. It called on the vast majority of Lebanese to [willingly](#) adopt an Iran-style Islamic republic. According to Hassan Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassem, this grassroots strategy remains in place [today](#).

Hezbollah also sought to grow its strength by focusing on issues of Lebanese popular consensus. Therefore, Hezbollah rebranded from the “Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” to the “Islamic Resistance in Lebanon,” centering its military activities on fighting Israel and ending the latter’s occupation of south Lebanon. By positioning itself as defending Lebanon against Israel, Hezbollah forced the Lebanese government to tolerate the group’s growing autonomous military strength until, by the time Israel withdrew from the south in 2000, the group was too powerful for Beirut to disarm or control.

Complementing its military strategy, Hezbollah likewise has cultivated a “host environment” to transform itself from an impermanent band of guerillas into a social movement and fixture of Lebanese society. Hezbollah set about filling the state’s void and neglect in caring for impoverished Lebanese Shiites, establishing schools, hospitals, and other social institutions. Large parts of the Shiite community repaid this debt by becoming the group’s political constituency, providing it with governmental representation and influence. Equally important, Hezbollah draws on Lebanese Shiites to fill its fighting ranks.

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At the same time, Hezbollah and Lebanon have not become one indistinguishable entity. The organization has never hesitated to harm Lebanon whenever Hezbollah's interests, or Iran's, are jeopardized. [Evidence implicates](#) Hezbollah in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, who threatened Hezbollah and Iran's position in the country by opposing their ally Damascus' hegemony over Beirut. Hezbollah also allegedly timed the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Israel—which devastated Lebanese infrastructure and civilians—to [distract international attention](#) from Iran's nuclear weapons program. In 2008, Hezbollah even turned its weapons on the Lebanese and invaded Beirut when the government attempted to shut down the group's telecommunications network and remove Beirut Airport's pro-Hezbollah [security chief](#). Hezbollah's subordination of Lebanon's interests is most evident by its entry into the Syrian civil war, where the group has fought to preserve the Assad regime and, consequently, Tehran's regional hegemony, despite the damage to Lebanon's standing in the Arab world.

According to the U.S. [Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2019](#), Hezbollah remained Iran's most powerful terrorist partner and the most capable terrorist organization in Lebanon, controlling areas across the country.

In 2013, the European Union branded Hezbollah's armed wing a terrorist organization but distinguished it from Hezbollah's political wing. Ahead of the designation, Europe's leaders were divided over the label out of fear of complicating their relationships with Lebanon. Though the EU distinguished between Hezbollah's political and armed wings, the terror group considers itself a singular organization, and its leadership has continued to pursue a terrorist agenda with Iranian aid. In early 2020, Germany joined the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in designating Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist group. Argentina, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Kosovo, Lithuania, Serbia and Colombia also designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2019 and 2020.

## *Hezbollah's "Resistance Economy"*

Hezbollah does not depend solely on Iran for financing. The group has established its own shadow economy in Lebanon that is semi-impervious to U.S. financial sanctions. Part of this economy takes the innocuous cover of legitimate businesses, religious and social charities, and the Islamic Resistance Support Association (IRSA). The IRSA, purportedly controlled by Hezbollah's "political wing," is Hezbollah's official domestic and international [fundraising](#) arm for its military activities, with funds going toward everything from purchasing military gear to weapons platforms to providing for the families of fallen fighters. The group also allegedly [derives income from](#) indirect involvement in transnational [criminal activities](#), including counterfeiting currencies, documents, and goods; credit card fraud; [money laundering](#); arms smuggling; and drug-trafficking—particularly of marijuana, cocaine, and Captagon.

## Houthis

The [Houthis](#), which belong to the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam, are an Iranian-backed and armed religious and political movement in [Yemen](#). The Houthis waged a series of bloody insurgencies against the Yemeni government for over a decade, leading to that regime's overthrow in 2015. The movement is known for its virulently anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric, including the group's [motto](#): "God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!"

Beginning in 2004, the Houthi rebels waged a low-level insurgency against the Sunni-dominated, internationally-recognized Yemeni central government, a key U.S. counterterrorism ally. Iran and [Hezbollah](#) offered limited assistance to the Houthis, whose ideology emulated [Khomeinism](#). Since at least 2009 assistance came in the form of arms and training, with the [IRGC's](#) Quds Force organizing crude Iranian small-arms shipments that were occasionally intercepted by [Yemeni and US naval patrols](#).

The Houthis made [significant territorial gains](#) in 2014 and 2015, including the capture of Yemen's capital, Sanaa, in September 2014, resulting in the [removal](#) of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi from power. [Qassem Soleimani](#), the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, remarked that the fall of Sana'a represented a "[golden opportunity](#)" for Iran. An allied Shi'a force now controlled the capital of a neighboring country to [Saudi Arabia](#), Iran's primary Middle Eastern geostrategic adversary. In conjunction with Hezbollah, the Quds Force set about remaking the Houthis in Hezbollah's image, building up their military capabilities, and dispatching senior Quds Force advisors to train them.

On October 2, 2015, the United Nations announced it would broker talks between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in Oman. At the time, government officials stated the Houthis were [merely maneuvering](#) tactically by showing their willingness to engage in talks. The Houthis have [refused to relinquish](#) territory they have occupied—a stipulation to end Yemen's civil war under United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 2216.

Iran's relationship with the Houthis plays into Iran's strategy of controlling key Arab waterways. Control of Yemen and its strategic ports affords control of vital commercial and energy shipping lanes that connect the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to Europe. Control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait poses a [strategic nuisance for Israel](#), enabling Iran to cut off its naval trade routes to Asia and opening up a new conduit for Iran to smuggle weapons to Hamas and other terrorist proxies. Iran has thus sought to gain a foothold in Yemen which would allow it, despite the weakness of its naval forces relative to others in the region, to sabotage international commerce and energy markets when its interests are threatened.

In December 2017, the Houthis [assassinated](#) former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, their erstwhile enemy and then ally, after he turned against them again and proposed reconciliation with the Saudi-led anti-Houthi coalition. Iranian leaders and regime-affiliated media outlets [celebrated](#) Saleh's killing and said the Houthis are inspired by Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and similar to Iranian-supported militant groups in [Syria](#), [Iraq](#), and [Lebanon](#).

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Iran's aid to its Houthi proxies has provided a low-risk, cost-effective avenue for it to increase its political and military influence in Yemen.

## *Organizational Structure*

The Houthi movement's organizational structure is unclear and likely continues to evolve. The movement [began as a grassroots religious organization](#) aimed at youth in the 1990s, but over time it has entered politics and developed military capabilities. Following the killing of movement founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi by Yemeni forces in 2004, the Houthis were led by Hussein's father, spiritual leader Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The movement's current leader is Hussein's younger brother, [Abdul Malik al-Houthi](#). In 2021, the U.S. Department of State [sanctioned](#) three of the Houthis leaders, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Likewise, the Houthi group was [designated](#) in its entirety as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The Biden administration later revoked these designations, citing humanitarian considerations.

In 2020, Iran [dispatched](#) a new ambassador to the Houthis in Yemen, Hassan Eyrλου. Eyrλου was reportedly an IRGC Quds Force officer, whom the U.S. Department of the Treasury [accused](#) of supporting "the group's operations throughout the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen" and also trained members of [Hezbollah](#) in Iran. Eyrλου's arrival was a significant development, with some observers believing Tehran was trying to establish a similar ambassadorship to the one it holds in Iraq, with an [IRGC](#) officer embedded as a diplomat to run Iranian operations in the country.

Eyrλου's tenure was marked by Houthi advances in Yemen and increasingly aggressive attacks against Saudi Arabia. He had an imperious posture while in Yemen, which reportedly resulted in tensions with the Houthis, [according](#) to *The Wall Street Journal*. In December 2021, reports began to emerge of these strains, and attempts to remove him from his post. But then Eyrλου [reportedly](#) died from coronavirus that same month after a last minute scramble to find an aircraft, which later transferred him to a Tehran hospital. Iran has yet to replace Eyrλου, but the Iranian Foreign Ministry has indicated of its intention to do so.

## *Iranian Material and Financial Support of The Houthis' Violent Activities*

Beginning in 2004, Shi'a Houthi rebels waged a low-level insurgency against the Sunni-dominated, internationally-recognized Yemeni central government, a key U.S. counterterrorism ally. Iran and Hezbollah offered limited assistance to the Houthis, whose ideology emulated [Khomeinism](#), since at least 2009 in the form of arms and training, with the Quds Force organizing crude Iranian small-arms shipments that were occasionally intercepted by [Yemeni and U.S. naval patrols](#). The Quds Force had also provided guidance to the Houthis to set up an affiliated political party, Ansar Allah, mimicking the Hezbollah model of fusing militant and political power.

Yemeni officials have long accused Iran's Shiite Islamist regime of providing political, financial, and logistical support to the Houthi rebels and other secessionist movements in Yemen. Despite a [2009 U.N. report](#) confirming such claims, both Iran and the Houthis have denied engaging in past cooperation.

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For instance, the Iranian ship Jihan I was seized in 2013, allegedly en route to [Yemen](#) with arms meant for the Houthis. The cache, as *Reuters* [reported](#) in December 2014, included “Katyusha rockets M-122, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles and ‘artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40km away,’” as well as “silencers, 2.66 tons of RDX explosives, C-4 explosives, ammunition, bullets and electrical transistors.”

Subsequent reports [confirmed](#) Iranian support for the Houthis, including a *Reuters* [article](#) in December of 2014. One source stated, “We think there is cash, some of which is channeled via Hezbollah and sacks of cash arriving at the airport.” Only in 2015 did Iran finally acknowledge providing “direct support” to the Houthis.

The Houthis have [historically trained](#) their fighters in Yemen’s mountainous north. The Quds Force of Iran’s IRGC has [trained](#) Houthis in Yemen and Iranian military leadership is also believed to be present in Yemen to provide strategic military advice. In March 2015, Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubair also [alleged](#) that Hezbollah operatives were advising the Houthis. In the same month, Syrian military officials [reportedly](#) were in Yemen assisting the Houthis as well. In early 2015, U.S. officials [reported](#) that the IRGC’s training of Houthi rebels covered the use of advanced weapons, which the Houthis seized from Yemeni military bases.

The Houthi takeover of northern Yemen and subsequent overthrow of the Hadi government created an opportunity for Iran to establish a foothold as the dominant influence in Yemen, and it responded by escalating its material and advisory support to the Houthis. The Quds Force stepped up illicit arms exports of increasingly sophisticated weaponry, including Sayyad 2C surface-to-air missile, guided anti-ship missiles, Qiam-1 ballistic missiles, kamikaze aerial drones, landmines, Kalashnikov variant rifles, RPG-7 and RPG-7v rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, precision rifles, and anti-tank missiles. In January 2019, the U.N.’s Panel of Experts on Yemen [reported](#) that they had “traced the supply to the Houthis of unmanned aerial vehicles and a mixing machine for rocket fuel and found that individuals and entities of Iranian origin have funded the purchase. The Quds Force’s support has helped the Houthis overcome some core deficiencies, including [strategic planning, political mobilization, and operating advanced weaponry](#).”

In addition to bolstering the Houthi forces, the Quds Force has also reportedly mobilized elements of its foreign legion of proxy militias, injecting Shi’a mercenary forces into the Yemen conflict, mirroring its strategy in Syria. According to a March 2017 *Reuters* report, “Iranian and regional sources said Tehran was providing Afghan and Shiite Arab specialists to train Houthi units and act as logistical advisers. These included Afghans who had fought in Syria under Quds Force commanders.”

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In March 2017, former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani reportedly convened a meeting of senior IRGC military officials to explore ways to further “[empower](#)” the Houthis. An official at the meeting noted that “Yemen is where the real proxy war is going on and winning the battle in Yemen will help define the balance of power in the Middle East.” Since that time, Iran has introduced increasingly complex weaponry into the Yemeni theater, and the Houthis have stepped up their aggression in accordance with Iranian foreign policy objectives.

## *Missile and Drone Attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates*

In a similar vein to Iran’s efforts to establish forward operating bases in [Syria](#) and [Lebanon](#) from which to encircle, threaten, and provoke Israel, Iran’s relationship with the Houthi rebels in Yemen offers Iran a staging ground to attack another key U.S. ally and Iranian adversary, Saudi Arabia.

Since 2015, the Houthis have used Yemeni territory under their control as launching pads to fire [more than 100 missiles](#) and drones at Iranian rival Saudi Arabia. Such strikes have landed on multiple cities, including Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Targeted locations include the king’s official residence, military bases and encampments, oil refineries, the Riyadh international airport, and shopping malls. Further, as the Congressional Research Service [notes](#), “Since 2016, the Houthis have periodically targeted commercial and military vessels transiting and patrolling the Red Sea using naval mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-ship missiles, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). Some of the weapons used reportedly have been supplied by Iran, including sea-skimming coastal defense cruise missiles.”

Evidence indicates that Iran is arming and, in some cases, directing the Houthis in their missile campaign, contrary to Tehran’s denials and in violation of an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015. An independent U.N. monitoring panel [stated](#) in November 2017 that remnants from four ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia likely came from the Iranian-made and designed Qiam-1 missile. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Pentagon officials [displayed](#) debris from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia, claiming that the markings on and designs of the missiles demonstrated that they were made by Iran. The U.N.’s finding of Iranian origins in the Houthis’ missiles continued well into 2018, with [panel](#) after [panel](#) confirming the Iranian connection. One U.N. [report](#) from January 2018 found that recently inspected missiles and drones “show characteristics similar to weapons systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and, therefore, the panel “continues to believe” that Tehran is giving missiles and other arms to the Houthis.

Drones have also played a significant role in the Houthi efforts to sow terror against coalition targets both inside Yemen and within Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In March 2019, U.S. CENTCOM Commander Joseph Votel [testified](#) before the House Armed Services Committee, “The ballistic missile threat and armed UASs (Unmanned Aerial Systems) emanating from Yemeni territory continue to pose a significant risk, as the Houthi’s consider civil infrastructure as legitimate military targets.” The group’s frequent usage of UAVs and demonstration of long-range drone suicide attack capabilities places them in league with Hezbollah as among the world’s most active and sophisticated non-state actors in the [drone](#) space.

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In May 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [sanctioned](#) five Iranian individuals affiliated with the IRGC and its Quds Force for their role providing [ballistic missiles](#) and related technical expertise to the Houthis.

Iran has recently bragged openly about their support for the Houthis, with an IRGC general [telling](#) IRGC-controlled media that the Guards had instructed the Houthis to attack two Saudi oil tankers in July 2018.

Iran reportedly also continues to provide other forms of arms to the Houthis. For example, an independent watchdog organization [claimed](#) in March 2018 that roadside bombs found in Yemen resemble ones used by Iranian proxies in [Lebanon](#), [Iraq](#), and [Bahrain](#).

Beginning in April 2019, following the U.S. Department of State's designation of the [IRGC](#) as a foreign terrorist organization, Iran initiated a campaign of escalating its [malign activities](#) and regional aggression. As a key Iranian proxy, the Houthis are heavily engaged in this campaign and have escalated their missile and drone attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure, airports, and military sites to unprecedented levels.

On [May 14, 2019](#), unmanned aircraft systems targeted two pumping stations on the East-West pipeline carrying crude oil from Dhahran to Yanbu. Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthi militants [claimed](#) responsibility. On June 12, 2019, Saudi-led coalition senior officials reported a cross-border cruise missiles attack at Abha International Airport, injuring 26 civilians. Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthi militants [claimed](#) responsibility for this attack. On August 17, 2019 Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi militants [struck](#) a natural gas liquids plant at Shaybah oilfield in the Kingdom's Empty Quarter with drones. The drone strike damaged the facility and caused a fire. No deaths or casualties were reported.

On [January 29, 2020](#), the Iran-backed Houthi's said it had fired rocket and drone strikes at Saudi targets including Aramco oil facilities.

On March 18, 2020, the Saudi-led Arab coalition [intercepted](#) and destroyed two explosive-laden boats that were launched by the Iranian-backed Houthi's from Yemen's Hodeidah province.

On June 23, 2020, Saudi Arabia [announced](#) that Houthi rebels had launched a simultaneous ballistic missile and explosives-laden drone attack on various targets throughout the Kingdom, including on the cities of Najran and Jizan. Saudi Arabia reportedly intercepted three missiles and eight drones, but it was unclear whether any drones made it to their targets. A coalition spokesman accused the Houthis of targeting civilians in the attack. The incident underscored the danger posed by simultaneous missile and drone barrages, a tactic the Houthis have apparently mastered and which can potentially overwhelm air defense systems.

On November 12, 2020, Saudi Arabia [reportedly](#) thwarted an attempted Houthi attack against an oil products terminal in the port city of Jizan. The Houthis used unmanned boats laden with explosives in the attempted attack, which Saudi forces intercepted and destroyed, but which still caused a small fire at the facility. The Saudi energy ministry released a statement on the attempted attack, declaring "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia strongly condemns the cowardly attack, adding that such criminal acts directed against vital facilities do not target the Kingdom alone, but they also target the security of oil exports,

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the stability of energy supplies to the world, the freedom of international trade, and the entire global economy.”

In 2021, after the Biden administration’s rescission of the Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist designations of the Houthis, the Houthis became more empowered on the ground in Yemen. They renewed an offensive to retake Marib, as well as engaged in repeated ballistic missile and drone-related attacks on civilian areas in Saudi Arabia as well as Aramco energy infrastructure. But at the same time, while the Houthis have claimed responsibility for targeting installations like the Ras Tanura port on March 7, there is evidence that some of these attacks may be originating from Iraq, with the Houthis covering for Iran’s proxy network there, by claiming they carried out the operation. An advisor to the Saudi royal court [told](#) the *Wall Street Journal* that “[a]ll indications point to Iran.” He said it wasn’t clear whether the origin for the March 7 attack was Iraq or Iran, but that it hadn’t come from the direction of Yemen.

This comes as the Biden administration held their [first](#) direct meeting with the Houthis on February 26, 2021. With the Houthi leadership divided, these attacks on Saudi Arabia could be indicative of an internal struggle over strategy.

In a particularly audacious attack, in January 2022, the Houthis used ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to launch an attack on the United Arab Emirates. This was a similar swarm attack configuration which was employed during the attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019. They targeted civilian areas – which resulted in the deaths of three civilians – while an international business conference was taking place in the Emirates as well as when South Korea’s president was on an official visit. [According to Reuters](#), the Houthis said they fired four Quds cruise missiles at an oil refinery in Musaffah district and the airport in Abu Dhabi, a Zulfiqar ballistic missile at Dubai airport and several drones at those and other sites. This happened while the Houthi chief negotiator was reportedly on a visit to Tehran, with some accounts in Axis of Resistance media indicating he actually met with [Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi](#) on the day of the attack.

This attack likely had to do with ongoing advances by the UAE-backed Giants Brigade, which has [retaken](#) Shabwa Province from the Houthis. It served as a warning shot by the Houthis about its red lines as well as from Iran over its leverage over the Gulf Arab states amid the Iran nuclear negotiations in Vienna.

## *Houthi Attacks against Israel*

On October 19, 2023, the Houthis launched cruise missiles and drones at Israel. The USS Carney, a U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer positioned in the north of the Red Sea, [intercepted](#) four cruise missiles and 14 drones heading in the direction of Israel. An air defense system in Saudi Arabia also [reportedly](#) engaged one of the cruise missiles fired towards Israel. On October 27, the Israeli Defense Forces [indicated](#) a missile that hit in Egypt likely was launched from Yemen.

On October 31, 2023, the Houthis for the first time [claimed](#) a missile and drone attack on Israel. Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree announced, “Our armed forces launched a large batch of ballistic missiles and a large number of drones at various targets of the Israeli enemy,” effectively

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declaring war on Israel. This time, Israeli fighter jets [shot down](#) several cruise missiles, and its “Arrow” missile defense system shot down a ballistic missile.

The Houthis have also targeted shipping vessels with links to Israel. For example, Ray Shipping is an Israeli company whose assets have been attacked on three occasions. On November 20, 2023, Houthi rebels rappelled from a helicopter and [hijacked](#) Galaxy Leader, a car carrier that is reportedly owned by Ray Shipping. The vessel was redirected into Yemeni waters, along with the 25 hostages on board. The Houthis claimed to have targeted the vessel because of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, and added that it would continue to launch attacks on Israel. Ray Shipping vessels were attacked twice in 2021; once in April, when the Iranian regime allegedly [fired missiles](#) at the Hyperion vessel; and once in February, when limpet mines [detonated](#) on the side of the Helios Ray vessel.

### *Houthi Attacks against the U.S.*

On November 8, 2023, the Houthis [shot down](#) a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone operating off the Yemeni coast. The same type of U.S. military drone, which is primarily used for surveillance purposes but also has combat functions, was [downed](#) by the Houthis on August 20, 2019. U.S. CENTCOM [said](#) the August incident occurred in “authorized airspace over Yemen.”

### *Hezbollah’s Assistance to the Houthis*

The Iranian proxy group [Hezbollah](#), a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon and elsewhere, also has longstanding ties to the Houthis, who are fellow Shiites. Working with Iran, Hezbollah reportedly operates on the ground in Yemen, arming, training, and even fighting for the Houthis. Analysts have [speculated](#) that the Houthis seek to replicate in Yemen Hezbollah’s Lebanese model of a “state within a state.”

Hezbollah operatives themselves have reportedly admitted that the group has a ground presence in Yemen and fights directly against the Saudi-led coalition. A Hezbollah commander told the [Financial Times](#) that the group began training with the Houthis in 2005. “They trained with us in Iran, then we trained them here and in Yemen,” he said. A Hezbollah commander [reportedly](#) told researchers in 2016, “After we are done with Syria, we will start with Yemen, Hezbollah is already there. Who do you think fires Tochka missiles into Saudi Arabia? It’s not the Houthis in their sandals, it’s us.” A Houthi militia leader [confessed](#) after surrendering to coalition forces in 2017 that Iran and Hezbollah operatives were operating covert training facilities in Yemen.

Coalition and United Nations officials have also claimed that Hezbollah is aiding the Houthis. Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi [claimed](#) in 2016 that Hezbollah [Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah](#) wrote to him that “Our fighters arrived in Yemen to teach the Yemeni people the essence of governing.” In June 2018, the anti-Houthi coalition [stated](#) that coalition forces had killed eight Hezbollah members in Yemen. That August, Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., [said](#) that not enough attention was paid to “not only the direct assistance the Al Houthi militia receives from the Iranian regime, but also the existence of Hezbollah commanders on the ground.” He added that a coalition raid on a Houthi site had “revealed a Hezbollah operative training, advising [the Houthis] on asymmetric warfare, and showed background portrait [sic] of Iran’s ‘Supreme Leader’ on militia’s computer [sic].”

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Ambassador bin Salman also [tweeted evidence](#) of ties between the two groups, including footage of a “Hezbollah operative in Yemen advising the Houthis to use deception tactics such as using water tanks to store weapons, and smuggling fighters through civilian vehicles; endangering the lives of Yemeni civilians.” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has [repeatedly accused](#) Iran and Hezbollah of being responsible for missile attacks targeting Saudi territory. In July 2018, a coalition spokesman [said](#) “Hezbollah is the Houthis’ greatest arms supplier” and said the coalition had evidence that Hezbollah experts were on the ground in Yemen, training the Houthis and giving them a military communications system. And in October 2018, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres [condemned](#) Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen.

In 2018, Nasrallah stepped up his group’s public support for the Houthis. On June 29, 2018, Nasrallah [paid tribute](#) to the Houthis in a public speech, even [saying](#), “I wish I could be one of your fighters and fight under the guidance of your brave and dear leaders.” In mid-August, Hezbollah used its annual commemoration of its 2006 war against Israel to display pro-Houthi propaganda—namely, as the National [reported](#), “a reconstruction of a bus hit by a Coalition airstrike which had killed a number of civilians and children in Saada province several days earlier that the Arab-led force later said had been a mistake. Organizers used the bus for journalists to photograph, complete with actors impersonating the victims, special effects smoke, red lighting and fake blood in an evocative image of the war.” And on August 19, 2018, Hezbollah [disclosed](#) that Nasrallah had met recently with a Houthi delegation in Beirut.

Houthi leader [Abdul-Malik al-Houthi](#) has [reciprocated](#), praising Iran and thanking Nasrallah for his “solidarity.” He also [promised](#) that Houthis would fight alongside Hezbollah or Palestinian militants in a future war against Israel.

In late 2018 and 2019, the Houthis self-reported that they had [fundraised roughly \\$500,000 for Lebanese Hezbollah](#) after the group called for donations to offset the effects of US sanctions. In a statement, the Houthi radio station said the funds would “support, aid and assist the resistance in Lebanon.” The Houthis defended their provenance of funds to Hezbollah despite widespread poverty, hunger, and disease in Yemen, stating, “This is what Yemeni donors prefer of their own will, despite the siege and the cutting-off of their salaries.” Critics of the Houthis allege, however, that the group has diverted donations thought to be for the local war effort and used pilfered funds from excessive taxation of populations under its control. The diversion of funds away from Yemen, suffering under a humanitarian crisis, to Lebanon demonstrates the subservience of the Houthis to Iran’s hegemonic regional project and underscores the group’s lack of concern for the welfare of its own subject population.

In December 2021, the Arab Coalition [released](#) a video detailing Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen, purportedly showing a Hezbollah commander meeting with the Houthis’ senior military commander Abu Ali Al-Hakim, whom the United States has sanctioned. The Hezbollah commander indicates on the tape that he spoke directly with [Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah](#), whom reportedly said that “he wishes he could come for (Jihad) himself in Yemen.” In the tape the Hezbollah commander also notes “the Syrian War is about to end, and most of the Mujahideen will come to Yemen.” This shows increasing coordination and interoperability within Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

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## *Designation As Terrorist Organization and Rewards for Justice*

In 2014, [Saudi Arabia](#) and the [United Arab Emirates](#) designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization. In July 2019, the Arab Parliament, the Arab League's legislative body, [designated](#) the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization and called upon the United Nations to follow suit. In 2021, the United States [designated](#) the Houthis as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The Biden Administration, however, has [reversed](#) these designations, while maintaining sanctions on Houthi leadership under Executive Order 13611. However, in January 2022, President Biden indicated his administration is considering redesignating the Houthis under counterterrorism authorities after its attacks on the United Arab Emirates. The Emiratis have reportedly requested that the Biden administration put the Houthis back on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. This is a move Saudi Arabia would likely support as well.

In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State [designated](#) Yemen's Houthi movement as an "Entity of Particular Concern" for violations against religious freedom based on [recommendations](#) by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). The USCIRF had previously [raised alarms](#) over acts of persecution by the Houthis against Yemen's Bahai minority, blaming Iran for exporting religious intolerance to the Houthis. The designation would open the door for the U.S. to impose human rights sanctions targeting the Houthis and its leadership.

Likewise, in December 2019, the U.S. Department of State [offered](#) a \$15 million reward for information leading to [Abdul Reza Shahlai](#), an IRGC Quds Force operative based in Yemen. U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook [said](#): "[w]e remain gravely concerned by his presence in Yemen and potential role in providing advanced weaponry of the kind that we have interdicted to the Houthis." The next month, in January 2020, the Trump Administration attempted to [strike](#) Shahlai, given his destabilizing role in Yemen. Reports indicate this mission was unsuccessful.

As noted above, in February 2021, the Biden Administration [rescinded](#) the Trump Administration's designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Despite the Houthis' attacks against the state of Israel, U.S. assets in the Red Sea, and international shipping, the Biden Administration has not re-designated the Houthis, nor has it retaliated against the Houthis.

An April 2022 [U.N.-brokered ceasefire](#) between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition was followed by a decline in cross-border missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. Although the ceasefire did not end hostilities between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed and internationally recognized government in Yemen, the Houthis have refrained from escalating attacks against the Saudi homeland. The ceasefire, which was [extended](#) in June 2022, lapsed and was not extended in October 2022, but the Houthis still have not restarted their cross-border attacks.

In April 2023, Saudi Arabia [reportedly](#) convinced key players in the Saudi-backed Yemeni coalition government to accede to an eight-month-long ceasefire and met with Houthi officials for the first time in public to discuss the ceasefire. The ceasefire has not yet been agreed to by both warring sides, with a Houthi spokesperson saying, "Saudi Arabia is not a mediator but a party to the conflict, and we are not ready to negotiate with it." But intense diplomacy is likely going on behind the scenes, not only involving

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the U.S., whose Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking [was in Saudi Arabia for Yemen peace talks](#) on June 13, 2023 but also involving China. As part of the March 2023 China-brokered normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran agreed to halt its attacks against Saudi Arabia via the Houthis and [stop arming](#) the terrorist group.

A ceasefire and eventual winding down of the war appears to be in Saudi Arabia's interest. It now depends partly on China's willingness and ability to hold Iran to the terms of the deal it brokered. China has a track record of failing to use its economic leverage over Tehran to deter its malign behavior, so it remains to be seen whether Iran will de-escalate or continue to arm and direct the Houthis. It is clear that as the U.S. has signaled its intention to "pivot" toward Asia, China has begun to insert itself in the region's geopolitics.

## IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is [a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization](#) (FTO) that seeks to fulfill Tehran's ambition to become the Middle East's dominant political and military power. First, this resource highlights a few events that shaped the IRGC's transformation from a hastily-organized militia into the Islamic Republic's dominant military institution. After that, it briefly describes the IRGC's organizational structure and leadership. Then, it considers how each of its six core branches—the Basij, the Ground Force, the Navy Force, the Aerospace Force, the Intelligence Organization, and the Quds Force—advances Tehran's internal security and foreign policy priorities. There is a section for each branch that provides an account of its commander, historical background, domestic activities (if any), role in national defense, and foreign deployments. Finally, it looks at Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, an economic conglomerate and a main source of funding for the IRGC.

- **Type of Organization:** Military, terrorist, transnational, violent
- **Ideologies and Affiliations:** Islamist, Khomeinist, Shiite, state actor
- **Place of Origin:** Iran
- **Year of Origin:** 1979
- **Founder(s):** Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
- **Places of Operation:** Global, concentrated in the Middle East

### *Historical Background*

On May 5, 1979, the founder of the Islamic Republic, [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini](#), ordered the formation of the IRGC (Sepah-e Pasdaran in Persian) out of approximately 700 revolutionaries that were trained in Lebanon. From the early years of the Islamic Republic, these revolutionaries acted in accordance with their mission as stated in the preamble to the 1979 constitution. Forming an "[ideological army](#)," they first defended the country's frontiers and grew into an aggressive military institution devoted to "the ideological mission of jihad in God's way."

The newly-formed paramilitary was intended to serve as a check against a potential *coup d'état* attempt by the Army, which Supreme Leader Khomeini and his loyalists viewed with deep suspicion due to its ties to the former Pahlavi monarchy. The IRGC also suppressed violent counterrevolutionary groups,

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such as the People's Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK). And it asserted Tehran's control over the country's borders, conducting a brutal counterinsurgency [against Kurdish separatist groups](#) in 1979-1980. Then, the IRGC defended Iran against an invading Iraqi army. The Iran-Iraq War, known to IRGC commanders as the "Sacred Defense," transformed the IRGC into a more classical military institution, and appeared to prove the mettle of the IRGC's pious and revolutionary values, as Saddam's army was repelled, and the IRGC began a counteroffensive against [Iraq](#) in 1982. The brutal eight-year war ended in 1988.

After the war, battle-tested IRGC officers [ascended to](#) the top military and security posts in the Islamic Republic and increased their hold over the economy. This process continued after the [Assembly of Experts](#) selected Ayatollah [Ali Khamenei](#) as the supreme leader in June 1989. From these key positions, the IRGC swayed political decision-making in the other branches of the elected government. On one occasion, senior IRGC commanders threatened a *coup d'état* if then President Mohammad Khatami did not take a more forceful stance against student protesters in 1999. The IRGC also became an economic powerhouse, acquiring extensive financial stakes in all major sectors of Iran's economy, in part because of its political clout. During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the IRGC [received a succession](#) of huge no-bid government contracts, leading to a rapid expansion of its economic portfolio. In social contexts, the [Basij](#), a paramilitary force, promoted and enforced the Islamic Republic's severe and dogmatic interpretation of the Quran throughout Iranian society using violence and intimidation. The IRGC thus became a dominant political, economic, and social institution, indispensable to protecting and extending the Islamic Revolution and preserving Khamenei's supreme leadership.

## *Organizational Structure*

The Iranian military structure remains bifurcated to this day, with the IRGC continuing to receive preferential treatment from the supreme leader. The IRGC today exercises influence that dwarfs the Army ([Artesh](#) in Persian). However, it does not answer to the president. It answers directly to Iran's [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei](#), the commander-in-chief. He has final authority on all matters of religion and state, according to the Islamic Republic's foundational doctrine: *velayat-e faqih*. The supreme leader appoints the overall IRGC commander and installs clerical representatives in its branches to ensure their revolutionary character, while the [Armed Forces General Staff](#), dominated by IRGC commanders, administers the IRGC, Army, and national police.

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Top IRGC Commander Hossein Salami

The top commander of the IRGC, Major General [Hossein Salami](#), and his six branch commanders oversee the implementation of the IRGC's mandate. According to Iranian law, the IRGC's purpose is "to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its accomplishments, while striving continuously...to spread the sovereignty of God's law." To these ends, the IRGC combines conventional and unconventional military roles with a relentless effort to pursue and punish domestic dissenters. Salami believes violence is justified as an instrument to impose conservative Islamic dictates and suppress opposition movements. He [claims](#) that the U.S. should be evicted from the Middle East, and the "Zionist regime" wiped off the map. The other IRGC commanders parrot similar statements, reflecting the goals that drive this hyperaggressive institution.

The U.S. government [designated Salami](#) as a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferator while he was in charge of the IRGC's missile program as commander of the IRGC's Air Force (later renamed Aerospace Force). Salami [replaced Mohammad Jafari](#) in 2019 as the overall commander, two weeks after the U.S. designated the IRGC as an FTO. The U.S., however, has not designated Salami based on his human rights crimes, despite the Basij's and ground force's killing of protesters while he was in office in November 2019. The E.U. [designated him](#) for human rights abuses in 2021, citing his responsibility for this use of lethal force. In November 2022, the E.U. [levied additional sanctions](#) against Salami for overseeing the provision of [Iran-made unmanned aerial vehicles \(UAVs\)](#) to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine. Before becoming commander-in-chief of the IRGC, Salami served as deputy commander-in-chief, and prior to that, commander of the IRGC's Aerospace Force.

*Iranian Military Structure and Size Estimates*

1805-17887

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)		Regular Forces (Artesh)	
IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF)	150,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF)	350,000
IRGC Navy (IRGCN)	20,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)	18,000
IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)	15,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)	37,000
IRGC Gods Force (IRGC-QF)	5,000	Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)	15,000
Basij (Reserves)	450,000	<b>Total:</b>	<b>420,000</b>
<b>Total (excl. Basij)</b>	<b>190,000</b>		
<b>Total (incl. Basij)</b>	<b>640,000</b>		
<b>Total Military (Active): 610,000</b>			
<b>Total Military (incl. Reserves): 1,060,000</b>			

Source: 2019 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Report: "[Iran Military Power](#)"

*The Basij*



The Basij Seal

The office of the commander of the [Basij](#) oversees and deploys one of the regime’s most important resources: an abundant, loyal youth following. The first part of this section introduces the Basij commander. The second part discusses the Basij’s first major role in the history of the Islamic Republic, namely defending the country’s frontiers in the Iran-Iraq War. The final section covers the Basij’s recruitment, training, law enforcement, and business operations; and its role in national defense and foreign military operations.

*The Basij Commander: A Dedicated Human Rights Abuser*



Basij Commander Gholamreza Soleimani

[Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani](#)—a U.S.- and E.U.-designated human rights abuser [in charge of](#) the Basij when it massacred peaceful Iranians protesting abrupt gas price increases, repression and [corruption](#) in November 2019—commands the volunteer paramilitary. Previously, he [served](#) as commander of the Saheb-Al-Zaman Provincial Corps in Esfahan Province. While there, he hailed the need for the formation of a resistance economy for development and lashed out against the then-[Rouhani](#) government. Like most other IRGC commanders, Soleimani assumed his post with a commitment to the regime’s hegemonic aspirations. However, his branch focuses on maintaining internal security, more than promoting outward expansion. He [professes](#) that Iran’s unique democratic system of government with spiritual elements should serve as a model of governance for other countries. The pursuit of hegemony, in other

words, is not achieved only by way of force, but also by the persuasiveness of Islam as interpreted by the supreme leader and incorporated in the Islamic Republic’s system of government.

*Historical Background: The Great Sacrifice for “Sacred Defense”*

The charismatic Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini created the Basij in November 1979 as a militia made up of his pious youth followers—some of whom had fought against the Shah—to [help manage property](#) confiscated from the former elite and royal family. Much of the wealth seized in the revolution was supposed to be redistributed to lower-class families, but the Basij soon found itself in another role when Saddam Hussein’s army invaded, attempting to seize territory amid the post-revolution instability. The supreme leader’s call for the creation of a “twenty-million-man-army,” though never realized, did foretell an effective mass mobilization effort in response to the invasion.

The ranks of the Basij swelled as hundreds of thousands of Iranians volunteered to fight in the Iran-Iraq War in the name of the nascent revolutionary government and its supreme leader. Of the [300,000 Iranians](#) killed in action, loyal Basijis—as members of the Basij are called—died at staggering rates. Often undertrained, if trained at all, Basijis were “martyred” in so-called human-wave offensives in which they swept minefields with their bodies and sought to overwhelm enemy forces by rushing into machine gun fire and artillery without support. Infamously, young children were sent to die in these ways.

The Basij’s great sacrifice in the war contributed to its leadership’s belief that they deserved to assume key military and security posts in the Islamic Republic. Notwithstanding ambitions to operate the paramilitary organization autonomously, the Basij was [brought under the command](#) of the IRGC chief in 2007, and then incorporated into the IRGC’s Ground Force in 2009 after its poor performance in

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suppressing the “Green Movement,” a protest movement opposed to electoral manipulation in the reelection of hardline conservative figure Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013) led to the empowerment of the Basij and an expansion of its domestic mandate; the Basij was called upon to exert greater social and moral control over society. Basijis were elevated to key government and security posts during this period, and the Basij’s budget increased drastically. President Ahmadinejad, a former member of the Professor Basij Organization, [allocated many](#) cabinet seats to professors from this organization. They subsequently purged university leadership and installed more conservative figures, who were deeply opposed to western academic influences and culture.

As the Basij enforced religious precepts more strictly, it became increasingly viewed as a partisan actor, part of the fraudulent reelection of Ahmadinejad, and responsible for the implementation of his policies. The Basijis were also correctly seen as brutal enforcers deployed against the “Green Movement.” What was once a disorganized group of young fighters serving as cannon fodder had become a [vigilante terror squad](#) known for using iron bars, clubs, truncheons, chains, and firearms, against protesters.

But for all its zeal, the Basij did not effectively quell the “Green Movement.” Notably, in some cases, local Basijis [failed to attack](#) their fellow citizens, particularly if they saw them expressing their piety with loud proclamations that “God is great.” Nevertheless, the attacks on dissidents continued. Wikileaks [reported in 2010](#) on an eyewitness account from inside a Basij camp of the use of sadistic forms of torture against dissidents, including crushing people to death and disembowelment. Amid the overall failure to suppress the movement, then-Basij commander, [Hossein Taeb](#), was removed from his post. He was later made the head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization.

### *The Basij’s Functions: Internal Security and National Defense*

The Basij fulfills several internal security and national defense functions. The first, and arguably most important is recruitment for public service. The Basij oversees a vast recruitment network that penetrates all segments of society. Typically, rural, poor, uneducated, and young Persian devout Shia—sometimes as young as 12 years old—are targeted in this campaign with promises of upward mobility. They [are enticed](#) by a small stipend, loans, housing, welfare, and pilgrimages. The Basij are allowed to bypass mandatory conscription; provided preferential university placement; and sometimes promoted to military and security posts, including potential officer commissions. The Basij also offers technical training, which is appealing in rural, underdeveloped areas.

Basij members [run clubs](#), known as Paygahs, at virtually every mosque across the country, and use religious studies and recreational activities such as sports and field trips to lure potential recruits. The underlying aim of these programs is to build a loyal political constituency, whose average age and strong religious beliefs are meant to guarantee the longevity of the Islamic Republic.

Today, there are approximately [450,000 active reservists](#) in the Basij, and hundreds of thousands more who are inactive but mobilizable. Estimates of the total number of active members run as high as [three million](#), with an average age between 15 and 30 years old.

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Once recruited, Basij members are trained in ideology. Manufacturing an enemy whose very existence represents a threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic is central to indoctrination. The existence of an external threat is essential to any revolutionary regime because it provides legitimacy and a higher purpose for existing. That enemy, of course, is the United States, also known as the “Great Satan,” and its partner Israel, known to the IRGC as “Little Satan.”

Domestically, the Basij carries out a grassroots campaign to counter influences opposing the regime. This insidious campaign depends not only on brute force, but also Basij [presence in all areas of society](#); its members are well-organized and represented at schools, workplaces, factories, mosques, and every major public institution. They work as recruiters and proselytizers and spy on and harass critics, dissidents, intellectuals, bloggers, and activists. On university campuses, [they organize](#) against leftists, reformists, traditional (less radical) conservative groups, and student unions. At workplaces, they bust strikes, with branches devoted to countering unions and professional organizations.

The Basij also operates as an auxiliary law enforcement unit deployed—sometimes alongside the IRGC’s Ground Force—to support the [Law Enforcement Force \(LEF\)](#) in times of acute crisis at home, entrusted to employ violence against fellow citizens. They shot and killed hundreds of protesters in 2019 and have deployed to suppress the Mahsa Amini protests, armed with anti-riot weapons such as tear gas, pellet-loaded shotguns (“Birdshot”), and paintball guns, riding on motorcycles and pickup trucks and stuffing regime opponents into vans. Basijis often carry out their abuses and destroy vehicles and property without showing any government identification, reportedly to afford the regime some degree of plausible deniability.

As an auxiliary law enforcement unit, Basijis also serve alongside the so-called “[Morality Police](#),” a unit under the LEF that pursues and punishes women and men for transgressions against conservative Islamic dictates. Like the “Morality Police,” which was responsible for beating Mahsa Amini to death, the Basij often target and brutalize women for removing the compulsory hijab. To the regime, the hijab and mandatory gender segregation in public places, [are a bulwark](#) against decadence, corruption, and promiscuity associated with Western infidels. The Basij polices relationships, opposing same-sex behavior and certain dating practices, and enforces bans on some types of music, movies, and art—especially those with Western influences. Alcohol and drug use, theft, and other criminal activity, including the use of satellite antennae, also fall under its purview.

Though some are motivated by materialistic interests, Basijis tend to be true believers in the severe view of Islam that they are tasked with enforcing. They are the ones who, like the ruling party of an authoritarian government, amplify pro-regime propaganda and organize pro-regime rallies and religious ceremonies. In 2009, for example, Ansar-e Hezbollah, another suppression entity that has collaborated with the Basij, [countermobilized against](#) the “Green Movement,” advocating for the punishment of peaceful protesters perceived to be seditious rioters and conspirators. By supporting the Islamic Republic, they contribute to the perception—however deceiving—of regime legitimacy. The Basij and the IRGC comprise the Islamic Republic’s core constituencies and political power base.

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Less ideologically-driven Basijis also achieve their aims because the regime funnels wealth, power, and prestige into their ranks. The Basij conducts its economic activities through the foundation [Bonyad Taavon Basij](#) (“Basij Cooperative Foundation”), which receives preferential loan and tax treatment and government subsidies.

In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated a vast financial network supporting the volunteer paramilitary, and [assessed](#) that the Basij held multiple billions of dollars-worth of assets in a network of shell companies in major industries, such as metals, minerals, automotive, and banking. The Basij owns at least 20 corporations and financial institutions, including Mehr Eqtesad Bank, which is a financial offshoot of Bonyad Taavon Basij, that pays dividends and provides hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of interest-free lines of credit for Basij members, helping them to develop businesses. As the Basij became more wealthy and powerful, its brutality and oppression have generated a strong public backlash against its activities. The anger and resentment targeting the regime and its enforcers in response to Mahsa Amini’s death is only the most recent manifestation.

Another function served by the Basij is national defense. In the event of an invasion by a military power capable of quickly destroying communications and the command-and-control structure inside Iran, the Basij [would be called upon](#) to conduct asymmetrical warfare throughout the country. These operations would have the potential to thwart an occupation and repel the foreign power through attrition. If the Basij mounted an effective mobilization effort and its units dispersed throughout the country remained loyal to the Islamic Republic, a modern war in Iran, unlike the Iran-Iraq War fought in the trenches, would more likely resemble the 2003 Iraq War in which the U.S. and coalition forces struggled to subdue a domestic insurgency and establish a democratic form of government.

Since the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the Basij has tended to serve domestic interests. But in the context of the Syrian Civil War and Iran’s involvement in the fight against the [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria \(ISIS\)](#), the Basij also supported foreign military operations. In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [noted](#) that the Basij had recruited child soldiers who later deployed to the Syrian battlefield. The Basij’s Imam Hossein Battalion—a light infantry unit trained in counterinsurgency tactics—[offered support](#) to the IRGC’s Ground Force in Syria at the height of the civil war. The Basij and IRGC officers also deployed to Iraq to coordinate the fight against ISIS, gather intelligence, and sometimes fight themselves.

Finally, it is notable that the Basij serves as a model for foreign militias, such as Lebanese [Hezbollah](#), Iraqi militias, and the pro-Assad National Defense Forces (NDF) in Syria, in that it doubles as a social welfare provider and organizes cultural and religious events. The Basij uses social welfare to build a patronage network. In one such instance, the Basij [sent medical practitioners](#) to rural areas to provide care to sick people unable to afford treatment. The export of this model—more commonly known as the “Hezbollah model”—helps Tehran create spheres of influence. Iran-backed militias gain influence not only through the use of violence, but by organizing formidable constituencies and fielding candidates for government posts.

THE GROUND FORCE



The IRGC's Ground Force Seal

This section begins with a brief account of the U.S. and European perspectives on the current commander of the Ground Force, Brigadier General [Mohammad Pakpour](#). The second part includes a historical account of the Ground Force's national defense doctrine, which is based on assumptions similar to those of the Basij. The third part covers the Ground Force's role in internal security, national defense, and foreign military operations.

*The Ground Force Commander: An Unpopular Regime's Muscle*



IRGC's Ground Force Commander Mohammad Pakpour

[Mohammad Pakpour](#) is the commander of the IRGC's Ground Force; former IRGC top commander [Mohammad Ali Jafari](#) promoted him to the post in 2009. The 2015 [nuclear deal](#), formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), lifted U.S. sanctions against him. However, the Trump Administration [designated Pakpour](#) in 2019 under counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, noting that the Ground Force deployed to Syria to support the Quds Force under his command—a mission that Pakpour publicly admitted to in 2017. The U.S., however, has not sanctioned Pakpour under human rights authorities, even though he commanded the Ground Force when it indiscriminately gunned down hundreds of peaceful

protesters in November 2019. The E.U., on the other hand, [sanctioned Pakpour](#) as a human rights violator in 2021, citing his command role during that slaughter. Before heading the IRGC's Ground Force, Pakpour served as the deputy for coordination of the IRGC's Ground Force, commander of the IRGC's 8<sup>th</sup> Najaf Division, and commander of the IRGC's 31<sup>st</sup> Ashoura Division.

*Historical Background: "The Mosaic Doctrine"*

Four years after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, [Mohammad Jafari](#) took the helm of the IRGC. He implemented a plan, the "Mosaic Doctrine," that originated as a response to the U.S.'s

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lightning-speed toppling of Saddam Hussein. The “Mosaic Doctrine,” assumed that if Iran was invaded next, the invading forces would have technology and conventional capabilities that far surpassed Iran’s. The “Mosaic Doctrine” is an asymmetric warfare concept that envisages a protracted and dispersed insurgency to compensate for Iran’s weaknesses. To that end, in 2007, the year in which the Basij was brought under the command of the IRGC, the Ground Force [was divided into](#) 31 provincial units plus one for Tehran, in addition to its operational combat units that include infantry, artillery, engineering, airborne, and special operations. The decentralization was [intended to improve](#) unit cohesion at the local level and command-and-control in the event of a devastating air campaign against operational centers and to enable the Ground Force to rapidly deploy to hotspots in urban areas in times of unrest.

## The Ground Force’s Functions: A Foreign Fighting Force?

Like the Basij, the IRGC’s Ground Force preserves internal security, protects the nation from foreign invasion, and participates in military operations abroad. The Ground Force, with its 100,000 to [150,000 active personnel](#), split between provincial and operational units, can implement larger operations at home than the LEF and Basij and larger operations abroad than the Quds Force.

The Ground Force’s internal security focus involves protest suppression through the use of excessive force. It has deployed tanks, armored vehicles, and military-grade weaponry against protesters. It also conducts counterinsurgency campaigns against Kurdish militant separatists in northwest Iran and Baluchi separatists in the southeast. The Ground Force’s special operations unit, known as the Saber, [often takes the lead](#) on such operations, and has been [deployed](#) in discrete areas against protestors in the aftermath of the death of Mahsa Amini.

The Saber’s skills blend well into the irregular warfare approach to national defense called for in the “Mosaic Doctrine.” It specializes in airborne operations, which could assist attacks on the enemy’s rear area supply-lines and communications. This unit is also skilled in explosives, a low-cost and effective means of targeting enemy convoys with roadside bombings, and demolition, which enables it to destroy roads and bridges needed by the enemy for supplying its troops. Furthermore, the Saber is trained in mountain warfare, an advantage in Iran’s mountainous terrain.

The Ground Force appeared to deviate from its fighting doctrine in deploying to Syria to rejuvenate a faltering ground campaign against anti-Assad rebels. Its forces fought alongside the [Artesh](#), the Basij, the Quds Force, its proxies, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s army and pro-Assad militias in key operations such as “Dawn of Victory,” which led to the fall of Aleppo in 2016. The Syrian Civil War, therefore, motivated the IRGC’s Ground Force to adopt expeditionary and conventional power projection roles. Some Ground Force soldiers remain in the country at permanent bases run by the IRGC.

*The Navy Force*



The IRGC's Navy Seal

The IRGC's Navy Force, under the leadership of Rear Admiral [Alireza Tangsiri](#), is a threat to international maritime security. First, this section highlights Tangsiri's aggressive disposition, which has endeared him to the supreme leader. Then, it identifies a potential role that this branch could play in the event of a military escalation. Finally, it points out some of the operations the IRGC's Navy Force conducts to intimidate and retaliate against its enemies and deter military action against Iran.

*The Navy Force's Commander: Khamenei's Favorite*



IRGC's Navy Force Commander Alireza Tangsiri

The Navy Force Commander [Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri](#) was appointed to lead the branch of approximately [20,000 active personnel](#) in 2018. He is known to be one of [Supreme Leader Khamenei's](#) favorite commanders, which is not surprising given his antipathy toward the U.S. He sometimes boasts that Iran is willing and able to retaliate at sea for what he perceives as acts of aggression against his country. The U.S. Department of the Treasury [designated](#) Tangsiri under E.O. 13224 in 2019, noting his threats to block the Strait of Hormuz—a strategic channel through which 30 percent of total global oil consumption flows. He directs the branch's sabotage of commercial vessels traversing international waters and [occasionally echoes](#) Khamenei in asserting ownership over the Persian Gulf.

He disdains world order, once saying that the “law of the world is the law of the jungle,” an implicit affront directed toward U.S. global leadership. Before becoming commander of the IRGC's Navy, Tangsiri served as Navy deputy commander and commander of the IRGC's 1<sup>st</sup> Naval District.

*The Navy Force's Function: A Threat to Maritime Security*

The IRGC's Navy has developed anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including the use of airborne, [coastal](#), undersea, and surface warfare assets, to prevent enemy vessels from operating in the strategic Persian Gulf. In 2019, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's report on Iran's military power [listed some of these assets](#). The IRGC's Navy has contact and influence mines; an arsenal of drones, or

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unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); unmanned sea vessels (USVs), including unmanned submarines; fast attack crafts (FACs) and fast inshore attack crafts (FIACs); and shore-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), anti-ship ballistic missiles, and anti-radiation missiles. It operates out of [several bases](#), including Bandar-e Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz.

In the event of military escalation, the IRGC's Navy could conduct asymmetric attacks against a superior navy, for example, using FACs [equipped with](#) machine guns, unguided rockets, torpedoes, and ASCMs. Many of these speedy vessels, [seeking to avoid](#) direct or sustained confrontations, could ambush and overwhelm large enemy vessels, the mainstay of an advanced navy. Moreover, large vessels cannot maneuver well in the Strait of Hormuz, a 30-mile-wide choke-point. Iran could deploy its A2/AD capabilities to try to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, but doing so could inflict major costs on its oil-dependent economy. It could also target its adversaries' naval assets, such as ports, oil installations, and desalination facilities. Tehran's asymmetrical capabilities at sea, and its potential to obstruct key shipping lanes, add to its naval deterrent.

Tehran continues to signal that it remains a threat to maritime security by [conducting attacks](#) against commercial vessels in international waters. The IRGC's Navy frequently seizes foreign vessels that it claims are freighting smuggled oil, and [attempts to intimidate](#) the U.S. Navy. Moreover, it seizes vessels to retaliate and seek leverage against governments worldwide. In 2021, for example, the IRGC's Navy [boarded and took control](#) of a South Korean vessel as tensions flared over frozen Iranian assets held in South Korean banks. In May 2022, [it seized](#) two Greek vessels in the Persian Gulf a month after Athens impounded an Iran-flagged, Russian-operated tanker in the Aegean Sea that the U.S. had designated for its ties to a Russian bank. Greece later handed over the vessel to the U.S., which confiscated the Iranian oil onboard.

## *The Aerospace Force*



The IRGC's Aerospace Force Seal

This section opens with an account of the Aerospace Force commander's ascent through the ranks of the IRGC. The remainder is organized around the Aerospace Force's core capabilities—missiles, air defense systems, and drones. These capabilities are discussed in terms of establishing deterrence against Iran's enemies and setting up the option for an unprovoked strike.

## *Amir Ali Hajizadeh: The Next Soleimani?*

Since 2009, [Amir Ali Hajizadeh](#) has commanded the IRGC's Aerospace Force. He began his military career in the Iran-Iraq War as a "special unit" sniper, but he was closely associated with an artillery division. With the backing of Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the renowned "godfather" of Iran's missile program,

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IRGC's Aerospace Commander Amir Hajizadeh

Hajizadeh [ascended](#) the ranks of the IRGC, and soon became commander of a missile unit in the war. In 2003, he was elevated to command Iran's air defense systems.

In the years since becoming the Aerospace Force commander, Israeli security officials [have begun to question](#) whether Hajizadeh is taking on the role formerly played by the revered former Quds Force commander [Qassem Soleimani](#). Hajizadeh is responsible for drone strikes against Israeli-linked vessels in international waters—attacks which the former Quds Force general may have likely assigned to proxies. His close relationship with

the supreme leader, indicated by his longevity at the helm of the Aerospace Force, has increased his stature at home.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury [designated](#) Hajizadeh in 2019, explaining in a press release his role in overseeing Tehran's missile program and his responsibility for the [shooting down](#) of civilian airliner MH17 on July 17, 2014 with a surface-to-air missile, which caused the death of 300 people. Three years later, [the E.U. designated](#) Hajizadeh, citing his role in UAV-related defense cooperation, including the supply of Iranian-made drones to Russia. Iran's drones are, therefore, a threat to European security and regional security. Iran's [ballistic missile](#) arsenal—the largest and most diverse in the region—poses a major challenge to regional security as well, especially as the regime improves the range, accuracy, and lethality of these munitions. Hajizadeh [once said](#), "the reason we designed our missiles with a range of 2,000 km is to be able to hit our enemy the Zionist regime from a safe distance."

### *The Aerospace Force's Function: Deterrence?*

Hajizadeh's appointment to lead the Aerospace Force [coincided with an expansion](#) of the branch's scope to include Iran's missile and space programs, the latter which is dedicated, in part, to testing missile systems and technologies. Iran is seeking to improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles to enhance the credibility of a long-range strike against targets in Israel [from secure positions](#) inside Iran. This capability would help compensate for the weakness of its air force, which has degraded over time because Iran cannot easily import the materials it needs to upgrade its planes. Iran's missiles have already proven accurate enough to strike U.S. targets in the region. For example, in January 2020, Iran [hit an Iraqi military base](#) housing U.S. troops in retaliation for the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. The Aerospace Force's ballistic missile arsenal expands Iran's options for retaliation or an unprovoked strike against targets in the region.

Operational control of Iran's [ballistic missile](#) arsenal is delegated to the Aerospace Force's Al-Ghadir Missile Command, first designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in June 2010 under E.O. 13382, intended to block the property of persons and their support networks engaged in the

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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This element within the IRGC Aerospace Force [has been involved](#) in medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launches since at least 2008. And it reportedly works with Iranian entities that develop and produce ballistic missiles, such as Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. It [has participated](#) in SBIG’s Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile and its Ashura medium-range ballistic missile projects. The Al-Ghadir Missile Command is currently under the direction of Mahmud Bagheri Kazemabad, whom the U.S. Department of State [identified as](#) a WMD proliferator in March 2022. Most of Iran’s missiles [are known to be nuclear-capable](#). Were Iran to produce a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, its deployment and management would likely fall to this element in the Aerospace Force.

Iran’s air defense systems are deployed to increase the potential costs of aerial incursions or strikes on the homeland. In 2019, Iran [fired surface-to-air missiles](#) and struck a \$100 million U.S. Navy RQ-4A Global Hawk reconnaissance drone allegedly infringing on Iran’s airspace. The U.S. claimed the drone was flying over the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway. Iran’s air defense systems also protect military assets, such as nuclear installations, which Iran already goes to great lengths to shield by building underground and [deep within mountainsides](#). These systems also protect missile silos, which are sometimes called “[missile cities](#)” due to their proximity to population centers. In recent years, the Aerospace Force has displayed advanced air defense capabilities. In October 2021, for example, in the Velayat Sky 1400 air defense drill, Iran [showcased several](#) surface-to-air missile systems, along with upgraded radar, surveillance, communications, and electronic warfare systems.

Iran’s [UAVs](#) serve a function similar to its missiles; allowing Iran to strike distant targets in the region. Iran launched the Shahed-136 drone—the same type being shipped to Russia—at the Israeli-linked oil tanker Mercer Street in the Gulf of Oman in 2021, [killing two Europeans](#) and denying that it played a part. This attack is what led one analyst [to surmise](#) that “the balance of power” within the IRGC had shifted toward the Aerospace Force’s preference for overt retaliatory strikes, as opposed to proxy wars. Again, in a separate incident in November 2022, a U.S. Navy forensic investigation revealed that the Shahed-136 [was used to attack](#) an Israeli-linked tanker. Some analysts [believe the attack](#) may have been retaliation for an Israeli strike on a convoy at the Iraq-Syria border a week prior. If viewed as retaliation, these attacks might be understood as an effort to deter Israel from future strikes. However, Iran’s true intentions are seldom clear; its attacks could also be intended to seek leverage or for intimidation.

Iran’s ballistic missiles and UAVs have also been deployed in offensive operations. In 2017, Iran used ballistic missiles [to strike ISIS positions](#) in support of ground operations against the terrorist group. Since the Mahsa Amini protest movement began, Iran [has launched several rounds](#) of missiles and drones at Kurdish groups in Iraq in an attempt to divert blame for the ongoing unrest in Iran.

## *The Intelligence Organization*

This section begins by pointing out the recent leadership transition in the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. Then, it mentions the impetus behind Supreme Leader Khamenei’s decision to rename and expand the scope of the IRGC’s Intelligence Branch in 2009. Finally, it indicates the entity’s roles at home and abroad.

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


The IRGC's Intelligence Organization Seal

The IRGC's [Intelligence Organization](#) is led by Mohammad Kazemi, who [replaced Hossein Taeb](#) in June 2022 after a series of intelligence failures, including the high-profile assassination of Quds Force Unit 840's deputy commander [Hassan Sayyad Khodaei](#) that Iran blamed on Israel. Kazemi was previously the head of the IRGC's Intelligence Protection Organization, which is responsible for counterintelligence and is separate from the Intelligence Organization. In June 2009, shortly after the reelection of Ahmadinejad, Supreme Leader Khamenei [established](#) the IRGC's Intelligence Organization, expanding the scope of the former IRGC Intelligence Branch, and putting it in charge of suppressing the rapidly growing

“Green Movement.” The new intelligence and security organization, brought under the leadership of Taeb after he was removed from his post as the head of the Basij, [incorporated](#) seven separate divisions, including Khamenei's personal intelligence body known as Department 101, a Basij volunteer unit, a cybersecurity unit, and a directorate in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Domestically, the IRGC's Intelligence Organization pursues, arrests, interrogates, and tortures dissidents, even running its own section at the notorious Evin Prison. Abroad, [it provides](#) material, logistical, technical, and operational support to the Quds Force, which takes the lead on external military operations. The IRGC's Intelligence Organization also conducts counterintelligence operations, [the primary goal of which](#) is to protect IRGC personnel, operations, and facilities from infiltration, espionage, and information leaks.

In June 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed [sanctions](#) on Rouhallah Bazghandi, the former IRGC-IO Counterespionage Department Chief, for planning and overseeing operations in Iraq and Syria, and targeting Israeli nationals. Additionally, Reza Seraj, the IRGC-IO Foreign Intelligence Chief, was sanctioned for his role in unsuccessful intelligence operations in Asia, as well as targeting U.S. and Israeli nationals. Both individuals have been designated under the counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224.



IRGC's Intelligence Organization Chief Mohammad Kazemi

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## *The Quds Force*



The IRGC's Quds Force Seal

[The Quds Force](#) is the IRGC wing responsible for external operations. Thus, this section focuses on foreign activities, and does not offer insights into the Quds Force's role in national defense. It should be noted, though, that its skills would lend well to the "Mosaic Doctrine," which, as described above, emphasizes unconventional tactics. The first part briefly describes [Esmail Qaani](#), the current Quds Force commander, in relation to the former Quds Force commander, [Qassem Soleimani](#). The second part discusses the IRGC's unconventional tactics; and its focus on proxy wars, the primary way in which Tehran advances its foreign policy interests in the region. The third part looks at Quds Force operations in the strategic countries of [Iraq](#), [Syria](#), [Lebanon](#), and [Yemen](#).

## *The Quds Force Commander: Searching for Soleimani*



IRGC's Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani

[Esmail Qaani](#) commands the Quds Force, the expeditionary wing of the IRGC made up of between [5,000](#) and 10,000 special operations personnel. Its operatives typically keep a low profile to afford Tehran plausible deniability when operations fail or have the potential to escalate hostilities. Qaani ascended to this position in January 2020 after a U.S. Reaper drone struck and killed then commander [Qassem Soleimani](#) at Baghdad International Airport while he was [allegedly plotting](#) to kill Americans. Upon assuming this post, Qaani became the commander not only of the Quds Force but of the proxy forces stood up by Soleimani.

Qaani lacks several of the characteristics that made Soleimani effective in the Levant. First, he does not have extensive experience in the Arab world, as he was [earlier in his career](#) a member of the Quds Force's Ansar Corps, which operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Soleimani, on the other hand, had longstanding

relationships with militia leaders in [Iraq](#), some of whom had roots in Tehran's support for rebels fighting against Saddam Hussein dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. Qaani also does not speak Arabic, the

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language used by militia leaders, as well as Soleimani did. Moreover, Qaani, Soleimani's longtime deputy commander, [is known to be](#) more bureaucratic than his former boss, whose charisma [made him a symbol](#) of "resistance" against Western powers and Israel.

Still, the Quds Force is a global enterprise with directorates and cells in every region of the world. The U.S. government and its allies [have uncovered and disrupted](#) plots in Africa, Germany, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Kenya, Bahrain, and Turkey. But the Quds Force, sometimes working in coordination with terrorist groups such as [Hezbollah](#), criminal organizations, or drug cartels to mask its activities, has been implicated in [many other violent activities](#) worldwide. Soleimani's death was a major blow to the effectiveness of the IRGC's proxy operations in the Levant. However, the Quds Force will continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security for the foreseeable future.

## *Unconventional Warfare Operations*

Using subversion, kidnapping, assassination, bombings, sabotage, and proxy wars, the Quds Force continues to target dissidents and journalists in foreign countries; Jewish, Israeli, American, and Western targets; and regional adversary governments, particularly those bordering the Persian Gulf. Tehran's subversion of foreign adversary governments typically relies on terrorist organizations. This is the case in [Bahrain](#) and [Saudi Arabia](#), for instance, where Tehran sponsors violent groups that oppose the ruling monarchies. These groups are known to carry out attacks on civilians and government officials alike, often [using weapons](#) and training provided by the Quds Force.

Kidnapping and assassination plots against Western targets are [often thought to be](#) the responsibility of Quds Force Unit 840, though personnel from the IRGC's Intelligence Organization also assist in these operations. On several occasions, kidnapping plots have targeted American journalists but were uncovered and disrupted by U.S. law enforcement agencies. In August 2022, for instance, a man armed with an AK-47 [showed up at the home](#) of an outspoken Iranian-American activist and journalist named Masih Alinejad, allegedly to abduct or kill her. More recently, the IRGC has [targeted](#) London-based journalists working at Iran International and BBC Persia for their coverage of the Mahsa Amini protest movement. The Islamic Republic has no qualms about killing activists or journalists who expose [its malign domestic and foreign activities](#).

In April 2022, a Quds Force operative from Unit 840, held at an unspecified location in Europe, [admitted to plotting](#) attacks against an Israeli national working at the Israeli consulate in Istanbul, an American general in Germany, and a French journalist. He claimed he was offered \$150,000 for organizing the assassinations and \$1 million if they were carried out successfully. A month later, [Colonel Hassan Sayyad Khodaei](#)—believed to be Unit 840's deputy commander tasked with planning antisemitic attacks around the world—[was assassinated](#) in Tehran. Shortly after his assassination, the Mossad [foiled three Iranian plots](#) to use terrorist cells in Turkey to attack Israeli citizens there, possibly in retaliation for the assassination of Khodaei.

More recently, the U.S. Justice Department revealed that the Quds Force [had tried to kill](#) former National Security Advisor John Bolton in a murder-for-hire scheme, an act of war interpreted as retaliation for the Soleimani assassination. In early June 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury

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[designated](#) Mohammad Reza Ansari, a member of a Quds Force external operations unit, as an accomplice in the assassination plot. Ansari's involvement in intelligence gathering, as well as planning and executing of lethal operations against Iranian dissidents and non-Iranian nationals in the U.S., the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, was also highlighted. Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury designated Hossein Hafez Amini, an IRGC affiliate in Turkey, for providing material assistance to Quds Force operations in Turkey through his connections in the airline industry.

Proxy war, however, is Iran's favored means of achieving its foreign policy interests. Its proxy network, sometimes referred to as the Iranian Threat Network (ITN), or "Axis of Resistance," comprises between 80,000 and [200,000](#) radicalized individuals, many who adhere to the Shia sect of Islam and are dispersed throughout the strategic countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The main groups in the Quds Force-led proxy network are Lebanese [Hezbollah](#), Iraqi Shia militias, the [Houthis](#) in Yemen, the [Fatemiyoun Brigade](#), the Zainabiyoun Brigade, and Palestinian terrorist groups [Hamass](#) and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad \(PIJ\)](#). These groups loyally conduct operations at the behest of Tehran, but some operate independently—even at times against Tehran's interests. These trends have become exacerbated in the aftermath of Soleimani's death and Qaani's difficulty in managing the sprawling terror enterprise.

The Quds Force recruits from mosques, cultural centers, shrines, and universities. For example, the Quds Force is [believed to recruit](#) foreigners in Qom, one of the holiest Shia locations in Iran. Recruits are identified at religious seminaries and transferred to Quds Force training centers, such as the Manzariyah training center near Qom. Foreigners from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, [Afghanistan](#), Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria frequently travel to Iran on religious pilgrimages and sometimes find themselves motivated to join the ITN. Iran's [Al-Mustafa University](#) also doubles as a recruitment site. In December 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury [designated](#) the university, which has branches in more than 50 countries, because Afghan and Pakistani students were recruited for intelligence purposes and for brigades deployed to Syria. The Quds Force's ability to implement violence worldwide depends on effective outreach to grow the numbers of loyal, radicalized individuals. It also depends on the propaganda campaigns of its proxies, which the Quds Force manages and coordinates through its [Iranian Islamic Radio and Television Union \(IRTVU\)](#).

As with Basij recruits, however, Quds Force recruits are not all equally loyal to Tehran. Materialistic motives compete with [ideological motives](#), the latter which can be more powerful in promoting subservience to Tehran's interests. Therefore, the Quds Force's training regimen relies heavily on inculcating recruits with the Islamic Republic's unique brand of antisemitism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism—concepts often cloaked in the rhetoric of anti-colonialism and anti-Muslim oppression.

Iran vows to support the *muqawama* ("resistance") movement, opposed to what it perceives as imperial powers present primarily in the Middle East. However, the notion also aligns with anti-capitalist, anti-American leftist groups in the Western hemisphere. To intensify the commitment to "resistance" and thus grow the propensity for violence, the IRGC also perverts the commonly-held Shia belief in the eventual return of the Twelfth ("Hidden") Imam from occultation, transforming it into an apocalyptic fantasy in which Imam Mahdi [returns and leads an army](#) of good to triumph over evil. This framework

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can convince members of the IRGC and its proxy network that violence against the U.S. and Israel is justified as part of Mahdi's crusade. Finally, the religious and ideological training regimen likely incorporates *velayat-e faqih*, the Islamic Republic's foundational doctrine, which contends that Iran's supreme leader is the preeminent Shia religious authority, deserving to be emulated and followed by all Muslims.

These are some of the many aspects of Iran's radicalization campaign, focused on creating hatred against Iran's adversaries; they drive Tehran's long-standing policy of "exporting the revolution." However, it should also be noted that the Quds Force extends its outreach to Sunnis, such as the Palestinian terrorist groups, as well as Kurds. Tehran seeks legitimacy through pan-Islamism, calling for the unification of the *ummah* ("the Muslim community") and opposing nationalism. These pan-Islamic appeals broaden the pool of potential candidates for recruitment.

The Quds Force carries out military training as well. Basic weapons training typically lasts [20 to 45 days](#), but some recruits are introduced to more advanced weaponry, including explosives, mortars, and drones; logistics and support; and strategy. The Imam Ali training complex, west of Tehran, [features](#) a firing range for rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other weapons; and driver and combat training courses, which include simulations of cityscapes and mountainous terrain. Facilities in Esfahan provide [demolition and sabotage training](#). The Quds Force also trains its trusted proxies to facilitate training courses. Lebanese Hezbollah has become an ideal recruiter, trainer, and commander, given its ability to communicate in Arabic, like most potential Iraqi, Syrian, Palestinian, and Yemeni recruits; its religious and ideological ties to the Islamic Republic; and its guerilla, UAV, [cyber](#), and propaganda capabilities.

Furthermore, the Quds Force arms and equips its proxies and partners. Quds Force Unit 190 is believed to be tasked with weapons transfers, according to a Fox News [report](#) from 2017. To deceive foreign intelligence services, it has used [front shipping companies](#) to smuggle weapons and equipment, [oil tanker convoys](#), and even [heavily-guarded pilgrim convoys](#) that cross into Syria ostensibly to visit religious shrines—some of which Iran built. Among the weapons it provides are UAVs; USVs; rockets; cruise, ballistic, and anti-tank guided missile systems; small arms ranging from machine guns to sniper rifles; land and limpet mines; improvised explosive devices (IEDs); explosively formed penetrators (EFPs); explosive materials; mortars and artillery systems; RPGs; claymores; man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs); and radars, night vision goggles, and armored personnel carriers.

In addition to Quds Force Unit 190, Israeli media [reported](#) in June 2023 on a separate unit responsible for weapons smuggling and logistical operations, known as Unit 700. The newly-identified unit, headed by Gal Farsat, who is known to have extensive connections to senior officials in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, is believed to be responsible for transferring military equipment to Iran-aligned militias, particularly in Syria and Lebanon. These responsibilities appear to overlap and could conflict with those of Unit 190.

The Quds Force's mission to build up its proxies and partners' military capabilities is a low-cost way to project power, but Tehran takes a risk that these entities, once empowered, will pursue divergent interests. The following part of this section looks in more detail at how the Quds Force accomplishes its aims in major theaters of operation. It offers a historical account of the Quds Force operations in Iraq

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during the U.S. occupation and a description of the challenges facing the proxy leadership structure in Iraq. Then, it turns to Syria, with an account of the Quds Force's role in the Syrian Civil War and a view of the assets, capabilities, and personnel under its management in Syria. Finally, it touches upon Quds Force activities in Lebanon and Yemen.

## [Iraq: Pulling Baghdad into Tehran's Sphere of Influence](#)

While U.S. and coalition forces occupied Iraq in 2003, the Quds Force under Soleimani's leadership was transferring weapons, including the IEDs frequently used as roadside bombs against the U.S. and later the even deadlier EFPs, to insurgent militias. In overseeing the transfer of these weapons, Soleimani was responsible for the deaths of an estimated [600 U.S. servicemen and women](#), a staggering 17 percent of all U.S. deaths in the war. Iraqi militias [were also trained in Iran](#) in guerrilla tactics, light arms, IEDs, marksmanship, and anti-aircraft missiles to bolster the insurgency against U.S. and coalition forces.

A powerful Iran-backed militia during the Iraq War, Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, was responsible not only for the death of many Americans but thousands of Iraqis in a bloody two-year sectarian civil war that began in 2006 after Shia militants [retaliated against Sunni civilians](#) for an al-Qaeda attack on the al-Askari shrine, considered to be one of the holiest Shia sites. Today, unlike most Iran-backed militias, the Mahdi Army, rebranded as the Peace Brigades, opposes Iranian meddling in the Iraqi political system and society.

The U.S. completed the withdrawal of most of its troops in 2011. Three years later, Mosul fell to [ISIS](#), a Sunni extremist offshoot that emerged from the remnants of [Abu al-Zargawi's](#) al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). After the U.S. withdrawal, ISIS eventually took control of one-third of the country. In response to this metastasizing terrorist group, then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki [established the Popular Mobilization Forces](#) in 2014. The PMF was dominated by Iran-backed militias, some of which were loyal to Iran's supreme leader; others were loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Shia youth responding to Grand Ayatollah Sistani's *fatwa* calling for young men to join the fight against ISIS also joined the ranks but retained their loyalty to Sistani.

Therefore, the PMF groups were united in their opposition to ISIS but not in their allegiances. Both the U.S. and the PMF fought against ISIS separately, and it was largely defeated in 2017, but the PMF remained divided regarding its loyalties to these three powerful Shia figures. Today, despite divergent loyalties, the PMF is a government-funded state institution, nominally under the command of the Iraqi prime minister. At the same time, the pro-Tehran militias in the PMF, such as the [Badr Organization](#), [Asaib Ahl al-Haq \(AAH\)](#), and [Kataib Hezbollah \(KH\)](#), often act in Tehran's foreign policy interests, undermining Iraqi independence and sovereignty.

These militias rank among the most powerful of Iran's proxies. Their management remains the Quds Force's responsibility. [Supreme Leader Khamenei](#), Iran's [Ministry of Intelligence and Security](#) (MOIS), and the IRGC's Intelligence Organization each [recognize](#) the Quds Force's primacy in Iraq. A Quds Force unified command structure, the Ramazan Corps, [manages](#) military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations in Iraq. Qaani implements policy in Iraq and is probably more powerful than the current Iranian ambassador. With that said, it should be noted that

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diplomatic posts are often appointed to members of the IRGC, rather than the foreign ministry. A former ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, was, prior to his ambassadorship, a Quds Force operative and confidant to Soleimani. Iran's current ambassador to Iraq, [Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq](#), was also close with Soleimani. He served in several positions in the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, at one point a member of the board of directors of an association which honors IRGC martyrs, particularly those who have served in its Intelligence Organization.

Qaani manages the Iraq file in a way similar to Soleimani, paying attention to the religious, political, and military dimensions of Tehran's interests in Iraq. For example, [he meets with](#) Iraqi clergy in Najaf; influential politicians and PMF commanders in Baghdad; militia commanders in Samarra; and Kurdish leaders in Erbil. However, though he is in charge of Iraq's proxy and partner network, other senior Quds Force commanders [have likely stepped into](#) the void created by Soleimani's death. This is not to mention that other Iranian entities like the IRGC's Intelligence Organization and the Ministry of Intelligence are also playing a role in managing the Iraq file. Qaani cannot command the many roles that Soleimani played, so a sort of committee may emerge atop the proxy leadership structure in Iraq.

The leadership vacuum in the proxy network in Iraq resulted not only from the death of Soleimani but also from the death of the PMF's former de facto commander, the Persian-speaking KH commander [Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis](#), in the same January 2020 U.S. drone strike in Baghdad. Muhandis [administered](#) personnel, coordinated logistics, and set and implemented policy within the PMF. The absence of Muhandis and Soleimani—who together mediated between militia leaders inclined to compete for state resources, prestige, and rank in the PMF—inflamed divisions in the Iraqi proxy network. Competition between KH and AAH has [occasionally devolved](#) into internecine turf wars and assassinations. The Iraqi militias became less cohesive in the absence of these two individuals.

They also became more disobedient. The PMF militias have an interest in remaining on good terms with their benefactor Iran. However, they also face internal pressures to conduct attacks that may not be in Tehran's interest. The regular attacks against Iraqi government assets and U.S. diplomatic and military personnel could be a response to demands from the groups' radicalized elements. They could also have been directed by the IRGC. The Iraqi government remains a target of KH and AAH, [despite Qaani's efforts](#) to rein them in. Throughout the Biden Administration's nuclear negotiations with Tehran, Iraqi proxies [picked up the tempo](#) of missile and drone strikes against the U.S. military—which remains in Iraq to advise, assist and train its partners in preventing the resurgence of terrorist groups. The increased frequency of attacks demonstrates a lack of deterrence, likely resulting from the Biden Administration's reticence to use force in response.

Therefore, Iran's interests may have shifted, but that does not mean the militia members will adjust their religious and ideological motivations. With the obedience of the militias in question, the Quds Force [adopted a new approach](#). Beginning after the death of Soleimani and Muhandis, the Quds Force began to identify its most ardent loyalists from the larger groups and re-form them into smaller, elite units that report directly to the Quds Force. The recruits are often sent to Quds Force or Lebanese Hezbollah-run training camps and receive instruction in core capabilities, such as drone and information

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warfare. The newly-formed groups are sometimes mistakenly identified as KH front groups, but they are often in fact separate entities.

Despite its occasional disobedience, KH remains one of Iran's most trusted Iraqi proxy groups. The Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point [reported in late 2021](#) that KH and groups linked to it coordinate logistics in Iraq with the support of the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah. PMF Brigade 17's commander Hassan al-Sari, aka Saraya al-Jihad, is a key logistician for KH in southern Iraq. He [oversaw missile systems](#) deployed in Iraq's Maysan governorate, near its southeast border with Iran, as of October 2020, along with then Quds Force commander of operations in southern Iraq, Brigadier General Ahmad Forouzandeh. The Quds Force trusts KH to help manage the weaponry it deployed in Iraq.

The CTC [reported](#) that rockets and missiles are brought into Iraq in their constituent parts—body, engine, and warhead—and then reassembled, probably with the help of Quds Force engineers and technicians. By transporting them in parts, they are easier to conceal. The weapons deployed to Iraq—particularly missiles, rockets, and drones—severely undermine internal security and stability. Iraqi officials accused KH and AAH of [ordering a drone strike](#) on former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi's residence, weeks after pro-Iranian groups were routed in national elections in late 2021, to demonstrate their willingness to resort to violence if political outcomes are unfavorable. The officials added that Tehran probably did not direct the attack, given that it wishes to avoid an escalation of hostilities between Shia groups in Iraq. However, it is seldom clear where orders originate, allowing Tehran to disavow any knowledge of them.

Pro-Tehran political figures—often from Shia militias—hold high-ranking posts in the government that they are willing to defend with violence. From these posts, the militias can advance Tehran's security interests. On one such occasion, the Obama Administration could not convince Iraq's prime minister to close down its air space to Iranian planes flying supplies to the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War, as then-Minister of Transport Hadi al-Amiri [came from](#) the powerful Iran-backed Badr Organization.

Up to 70 percent of personnel in the Interior Ministry, which controls the Iraqi police force, [reportedly owe their loyalty](#) to Iran-backed militias. In 2014, the ministry [came under the effective control](#) of Badr Organization commander [Hadi al-Amiri](#). Given the Interior Ministry's personnel composition, the police force tends to permit the militias to operate freely in strategic areas of Iraq. This helps them secure the "land corridor" through Iraq for the transshipment of weapons and equipment to Syria and Lebanon. According to a U.S. Department of Defense [report](#), Iraq's police and emergency response division, both subunits of the Interior Ministry, as well as the Iraq Army's Fifth and Eighth Divisions, "are the units thought to have the greatest Iranian influence." However, the report notes, "officers sympathetic to Iranian or militia interests are scattered throughout the security services."

## [Syria: Assets, Capabilities, and Personnel](#)

Syria is another major theater that demonstrates how the Quds Force thrives in an environment of instability and weak central governance. Just as Tehran's influence in Iraq rapidly grew out of the chaos it fueled and promoted after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Arab Spring-inspired uprising against Assad

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provided a ripe opportunity for Iran to expand its presence in Syria. The Arab Spring hit Syria in 2011—the same year the U.S. withdrew most of its troops from Iraq.

The IRGC quickly came to the defense of its longstanding ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. At first, the Quds Force advised, assisted, and trained the Syrian army and pro-regime militias, but as the rebels gained the upper hand, the IRGC increased its presence in Syria. In 2015, Soleimani was dispatched to Russia to request its air support. Russia obliged, then began dropping barrel bombs—often on civilian populations—in support of Iran-backed proxy groups and Assad’s army. The IRGC supplied its proxies with weapons and heavy-equipment and [provided](#) artillery support.

In 2016, the IRGC’s Ground Force, the Basij, and the Artesh, participated in operations that led to the fall of Aleppo, turning the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. Quds Force operatives then transformed Syria into a forward operating base to threaten Israel. In 2018, more than 2,000 Quds Force operatives and tens of thousands of proxy fighters [remained](#) in Syria. Their mission evolved from being covert and plausibly deniable to overt military entrenchment.

The Quds Force set up assets and capabilities in Syria that give Iran strategic depth, or the ability to fight a war closer to enemy territory. A [study published](#) by the Jusoor Center at the end of 2021 identified an IRGC presence at more than 180 sites in Syria, including military, security, and operational bases, and logistics hubs and outposts. The study shows a heavy concentration in the Damascus countryside, Aleppo, and the western banks of the Euphrates River in Deir Ezzor province.

The Quds Force oversees the IRGC’s construction of permanent basing, and then often runs the facilities. Among the most significant bases in Syria is the Imam Ali compound in Deir Ezzor province, near the strategic Al-Qaim-Abu Kamal border crossing with Iraq. On September 3, 2019, Western intelligence [sources revealed](#) that the compound, then under construction, would soon become operational. Six days after this report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) [struck the base](#), reportedly causing severe damage, and again in March 2020 strikes were carried out against the base. A human rights organization on the ground [claimed that](#) the U.S.-coalition conducted the latter strikes, but the U.S. denied the allegation.

An October 2022 Alma Center [report](#) notes that the base remains “very significant in bringing weapons [including ballistic missiles] into Syria.” The Imam Ali compound is [the largest IRGC base](#) in Syria, with the capacity to house thousands of personnel and store missiles underground. After the IDF struck the base in 2019, the IRGC reportedly began expanding the base’s underground storage facilities. The base [is equipped](#) with missile launch platforms and air defense systems.

Also strategically positioned in Deir Ezzor, the Al-Kum (“T-2”) base [was assessed](#) to hold high-value to the IRGC as recently as February 2022. The Tiyas (“T-4”) airbase—positioned 60 km west of the historic desert city of Palmyra, where [another key IRGC compound](#) is located—[serves as](#) a drone operations center. It was equipped with a Khordad air defense system in 2018, the same year in which the Israeli Air Force [bombed](#) the facility on two separate occasions. The Imam Ali compound, the T-2, and the T-4 bases [are positioned](#) along a straight line running through Syria from the border with Iraq to Homs. The network also crosses through Palmyra.

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Iran's forward deployment of air defense systems is the responsibility of the Quds Force and the Aerospace Force working together. Soleimani [reportedly](#) led efforts to coordinate their shipment, but the Aerospace Force's deputy coordinator, Brigadier General Fereydoun Mohammadi Saghaei, [took the lead](#) on deploying them and possibly managing them, with the assistance of Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel [insists](#) that Iran withdraw these systems, along with its long-range missiles, as they impede its freedom of action and pose a threat to Israel's homeland.

The Quds Force's central command headquarters in Syria, known as Beit al Zajaja ("the Glass House"), [was operational](#) as of 2020, despite being struck by the IDF in late 2019. Located near the Damascus International Airport, militia commanders and government officials are believed to convene at the Glass House to plan, coordinate, and conduct military operations across the country. Additionally, field communications are received, and intelligence is aggregated here. There are also [departments dedicated](#) to military intelligence, counterintelligence, logistics, propaganda, communications, and operational command and control. Israel has struck Damascus International Airport on multiple occasions since 2019 to prevent its use as a transshipment hub, though public damage assessments have not indicated the command headquarters' condition. On January 3, 2023, Israel [fired missiles](#) at the international airport, putting it out of service and causing material damage in nearby areas.

In addition to permanent basing, the Quds Force operates a network of research and manufacturing facilities in Syria. The Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah [continue to implement](#) Qassem Soleimani's plan, dubbed the "Precision Project," to assert control over the weapons facilities in Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (CER). Iranian mechanical engineers in the past [led efforts to develop](#) Scud missiles with North Korea in a project known as "Project 99" at CER's Institute 4000, located in Masyaf, Syria. Critical operations were moved there during the civil war.

The IRGC was tasked with rebuilding Institute 4000 after [Israel bombed it](#) in August 2022. A month later, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz revealed the location of [ten production facilities](#) used for "mid- and long-range, precision missiles and weapons," four of which were located outside the city of Masyaf, near the Lebanon-Syria border in northern Lebanon. These sites intend to secure the transfer of advanced weaponry. They enable engineers to reassemble missile, rocket, and drone components shipped from Iran, and upgrade existing arsenals with precision technologies. Quds Force Unit 340 oversees tech transfers, its proxies' missile development, and the export of production capabilities.

The Quds Force, furthermore, operates a complex network of hubs and warehouses woven throughout Syria that allow it to ship weapons westward, toward the Israeli front. This logistics network, known as the "land corridor," was a core interest motivating Iran's intervention in the Syrian Civil War. The network has been used to move weapons to Assad, IRGC bases, and Lebanese Hezbollah, further enhancing the credibility of a threat to Israel's homeland.

The IRGC coordinates logistics in Syria via an [operations center, known as Unit 2250](#), located in Damascus, with satellite offices throughout the country. The Quds Force's extensive involvement in logistics was revealed by the targets struck in a massive IDF missile and aerial campaign launched in 2018, after Israel's air defense batteries [intercepted](#) 122-mm Grad rockets and 333-mm Fajr-5 rockets

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launched by the Quds Force at Israeli assets in the Golan Heights. In response to this unprecedented Quds Force rocket attack, the IDF [hit 50 Quds Force targets](#), including a logistics complex in the Damascus countryside, and a weapons storage facility at Damascus International Airport.

The Iraqi Heyadrioun Division, stood up in 2015, supports Quds Force logistics operations in Syria. This division was [trained to specialize](#) in moving personnel and military cargo across borders en route westward from Iran and through depots at major Syrian airports; it is also responsible for escorting officials in Syria. Additionally, the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun, largely made up of Afghans and Pakistanis respectively, [facilitate cross-border weapons transfers](#) from the “Afghani security square,” near Abu Kamal’s city center in Deir Ezzor.

Senior Quds Force operatives embed in these units in a command role. They aim to create a cohesive proxy army out of an amalgam of languages, cultures, ethnicities, religions, and nationalities. Like its ballistic missiles, its proxy network in Syria allows Tehran to more credibly target Israel’s homeland in lieu of a modern air force. The proxies add to the asymmetric deterrent Iran seeks to establish through the use of terrorist organizations in Lebanon and Gaza.

### *Lebanon: Reinforcing the Southern Front with Israel*

In June 1982, the same year the IRGC transitioned to offensive operations against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC [dispatched hundreds of its personnel](#) to organize a guerilla resistance against Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. The IRGC trained Shia groups in political and religious indoctrination and military and terrorist tactics. Those groups became [Hezbollah](#), a dominant political party and military power in Lebanon today, and Iran’s most trusted partner. Hezbollah is the main beneficiary of Tehran’s largess, receiving [up to \\$700 million each year](#). However, the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the reimposition of sanctions on Iran drained the budget of Hezbollah (and the IRGC), forcing it to close offices and furlough fighters.

Over the years, Iran transformed Hezbollah into a formidable military force [armed with](#) a diverse range of rockets, missiles, and UAVs. With Quds Force support, Hezbollah [is setting up](#) underground, industrial-scale facilities to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and rockets. Iran [funds](#) the “Precision Project” in Lebanon, directs the construction of these secret facilities, provides technical know-how, and transfers equipment [banned under](#) U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. A key facility [is located](#) in the Beqaa Valley, eastern Lebanon. These operations help establish deterrence against Israel, while diminishing the Mossad and the IDF’s ability to prevent weapons transfers. By extending the range, enhancing the accuracy, and increasing the lethality of Hezbollah’s munitions, Iran has a partner that can credibly strike high-value targets inside Israel in the event of military escalation.

### *Yemen: A Geostrategic Threat*

Yemen is strategically positioned beside the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, an international waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and borders Tehran’s adversary Saudi Arabia. The [Yemeni Houthis](#) threaten international trade traversing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. They [possess](#) Iran-supplied mines, USVs, anti-ship cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, [as well as](#) anti-tank guided missiles, UAVs, Katyusha rockets, man-portable air defense systems, and RDX high explosives. Their A2/AD capabilities

can be deployed to obstruct shipping in the Red Sea. Iran’s ability to direct such actions is another potent deterrent against its enemies. Furthermore, the Houthis menace Saudi Arabia—whose Aramco oil facilities [were struck](#) in a sophisticated cross-border drone and missile attack in March 2022—and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). That the Houthis have forced Saudi Arabia to wage an expensive air campaign to protect its national security benefits Iran, because that campaign steals resources that could otherwise be directed toward building its capabilities.

*Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters*



The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters Seal

The [Khatam al-Anbiya](#) (“Seal of the Prophet”) Construction Headquarters is the IRGC’s engineering and construction branch. Under the command of an IRGC general, the economic conglomerate is one of the IRGC’s main sources of revenue. First, this section introduces the commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (herein referred to as Khatam al-Anbiya), Brigadier General Hossein Hoosh al-Sadat. After that, it briefly describes how the former military engineering corps amassed such wealth. Finally, it turns to the core function of Khatam al-Anbiya: funding the IRGC operations discussed throughout this resource.

IRGC commander [Hossein Salami](#) appointed Hossein Hoosh al-Sadat to the helm of Khatam al-Anbiya in March 2021 after its former commander, [Saeed Mohammad](#), left the post amid his

plans to run for president of Iran. As commander of Khatam al-Anbiya, Hossein Hoosh al-Sadat likely views his role in the IRGC as integral to reaching the supreme leader’s vision of a “resistance economy,” one which is impervious to international sanctions. In December 2021, [he vocalized](#) this view, saying that Khatam al-Anbiya had been vital to sustaining major projects, such as the South Pars oil field, despite the withdrawal of international companies after the Trump Administration reimposed sanctions in 2018. He defended the construction headquarters’ extensive role in that project, arguing that the oil field’s production would have ceased if a larger share of the contracts had gone to foreign investors. Previous Khatam al-Anbiya commanders include such high-profile figures as Rostam Ghasemi, who became an oil minister in the latter years of the Ahmadinejad Administration. The current Speaker of Parliament [Mohammad Ghalibaf](#), a former mayor of Tehran, also served in this role.

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Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters  
Commander Hossein Hoosh al-Sadat

After the Iran-Iraq War, Supreme Leader Khamenei formally established Khatam al-Anbiya. Through this new branch, the IRGC took the lead on industrial and development projects, which helped sustain its revenue amid government budget cuts, secure a role for troops in the post-war economy, and also rebuild the country's damaged infrastructure. Khatam al-Anbiya's economic portfolio—and that of the IRGC's more broadly—expanded after the war with the support of then-President Rafsanjani, despite tensions between him and IRGC commanders arising from his efforts to marginalize the IRGC politically and his insistence that the IRGC be combined with the Artesh. An effort to “privatize” government industries [essentially meant the transfer](#) of public property and government resources and organizations to regime insiders.

In the 2000s, a succession of no-bid government contracts offered to the IRGC during the Ahmadinejad presidency accelerated the growth of its financial interests, and further enriched regime loyalists. In one contract, Iran's oil ministry [awarded](#) Khatam al-Anbiya a \$1.3 billion no-bid contract to build a 900-km gas pipeline from the Bushehr province to the Sistan and Baluchestan provinces. Khatam al-Anbiya signed a \$2.5 billion government contract to finish phases 15 and 16 of the South Pars oil field without a bidding process; the IRGC also dominated later phases of construction. As of 2009, the year of Ahmadinejad's fraudulent reelection, Khatam al-Anbiya [had been awarded](#) 750 construction contracts for dam projects, water diversion systems, highways, tunnels, buildings, heavy-duty structures, trusses, off-shore construction projects, and water, gas, and oil pipelines.

Khatam al-Anbiya controls a large share of the IRGC's financial assets, [estimated to be](#) worth tens of billions of dollars, or between one-third and two-thirds of Iran's total gross domestic product (GDP). This estimate's broad range indicates the difficulty of knowing who owns what in the Iranian economy. In some cases, the construction headquarters may not technically own an entity, but still exercises control over it. Such influence might be rooted in direct personal links to IRGC officials, or other forms of corruption in which an individual owner is rendered beholden to the IRGC. For example, Etemad-e Mobin, a consortium [reported to have bought](#) a 51 percent share in Iran's telecommunications business in 2010 minutes after it was privatized and the main competitor was disqualified for “security” reasons, is known to have close ties to the IRGC. These ties give the IRGC potential access to every phone conversation in the country. As of 2010, Khatam al-Anbiya [had control of more than](#) 812 registered companies inside or outside Iran, and had been the recipient of 1,700 government contracts. Thus, between 2009 and 2010, the number of Khatam al-Anbiya's government contracts appears to have increased substantially not only in the construction sector, where it already had 750 contracts, but also in other sectors of the economy.

Approximately 40,000 people [were estimated](#) to work for Khatam al-Anbiya as of 2015, not all of whom are members of the IRGC. A large share of this workforce is made up of civilian contractors. Like most

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other branches of the IRGC, Khatam al-Anbiya plays domestic and foreign roles. In sum, it is a vital funding mechanism that directs state resources to IRGC coffers via contracts with government ministries, including its main clients the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Roads and Transportation, and Ministry of Defense. Khatam al-Anbiya monopolizes strategic sectors of the economy, displacing private sector competitors in the process. Khatam al-Anbiya has [acquired monopoly power](#) in the agriculture, construction, mining, transportation, and energy sectors, because of a flawed government contract bidding process that favors the IRGC. The scale of Khatam al-Anbiya allows it to underbid private sector competitors and its connections with public banks give it greater access to capital. Its reported tax exemptions widen its advantage over the private sector.

Khatam al-Anbiya's accounting practices receive no oversight from independent firms, allowing officials to embezzle state resources. The firm that audits Khatam al-Anbiya [is owned by](#) Khatam al-Anbiya. The IRGC's Intelligence Protection Unit [is believed to be](#) the only entity that oversees Khatam al-Anbiya. But Khatam al-Anbiya's wealth is not only squandered, it is also used to fund IRGC operations, including terrorism, and the Islamic Republic's ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Furthermore, [it plays a role in](#) poverty alleviation, building mosques, schools, housing, clinics, transportation infrastructure, and sports centers in underdeveloped areas often in cooperation with the Basij, to advance the IRGC's political interests. And it implements research programs geared toward technological development and economic self-sufficiency. Abroad, it works to [project soft-power](#) by funding and carrying out development projects.

Khatam al-Anbiya has thrived in both hardline and more pragmatic Iranian administrations. As noted, its economic portfolio rapidly expanded as the Ahmadinejad Administration handed over lucrative government contracts and privatized government entities, but that process did not slow down when former President [Hassan Rouhani](#) came into office in 2013. Contrary to the commonly-held belief of some Western audiences that Rouhani's reform program would disempower the IRGC, he continued to enable and fuel its growth, while boxing out private investors and robbing resources from the Iranian people. Today, the IRGC is poised to continue to grow under the current hardline administration of President [Ebrahim Raisi](#).

Often-quoted, Rouhani once referred to the IRGC as "[a state with a gun](#)," insinuating that it uses coercion and intimidation as a business practice. This statement encouraged the Western view of Rouhani as a relatively moderate reformer. But that view must be reexamined in light of government contracts awarded to the IRGC by his ministries. As just one example, in 2018, the Ministry of Petroleum [awarded Khatam al-Anbiya](#) 10 projects in the oil and petrochemical industries valued at \$22 billion, four times the official budget of the IRGC. It is noteworthy that foreign firms did enter the Iranian market while Rouhani was president. However, the notion that poor economic performance can be blamed on sanctions does not hold up under close scrutiny, as it becomes apparent that [corruption](#), [mismanagement](#), and structural problems are to blame. The IRGC's efforts to steal wealth from the Iranian people and amass power is the group's modus operandi.

U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions reduce Khatam al-Anbiya's revenues, and thus hinder the IRGC's activities. The U.S. Treasury Department [first designated](#) the holding company in 2007, and has since occasionally

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designated its leadership and some of its subsidiaries; however, many still operate free of sanctions. During nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in Vienna in June 2022, the Islamic Republic [reportedly demanded](#) that U.S. sanctions against the construction headquarters be lifted as a condition of reviving the 2015 nuclear pact. Such a decision would neuter the panoply of sanctions Khatam al-Anbiya is under pursuant to U.S. law, and would resource the IRGC's efforts to sow fear, death, and destruction at home and abroad in the furtherance of its ideological mandates.

The E.U. [first levied sanctions](#) against Khatam al-Anbiya in 2008, noting that it was linked to Iran's nuclear proliferation activities and its production of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. The U.N. maintained its sanctions from 2010 until after the implementation of the JCPOA in 2015. Its [sanctions list contends](#) that Khatam al-Anbiya "undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects," and that its subsidiaries were heavily involved in the Fordow nuclear enrichment site. If the JCPOA is revived, E.U. WMD-related sanctions on Khatam al-Anbiya would be lifted in October 2023.

## *Recommendations*

In the last two years of the Trump Administration, the U.S. government issued several rounds of sanctions against the IRGC, targeting its revenue sources. As noted earlier, the Treasury Department [sanctioned Bonyad Taavon Basij](#), a network of businesses and financial institutions supporting the Basij, under E.O. 13224 in October 2018. But perhaps the most significant designation—and the most detrimental to the IRGC's reputation and its ability to procure financial resources through business activities around the world—came in April 2019, when the U.S. State Department [designated the IRGC in its entirety](#) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The IRGC thus joined a group that includes ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah. In September 2019, the State Department's "Reward for Justice" program announced [a \\$15 million reward](#) for information leading to the disruption of the IRGC's financial mechanisms. The next month, the State Department [sanctioned](#) Iran's construction sector, which is dominated by the IRGC's Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

Though the U.S. government has long viewed Tehran as a "state sponsor of terrorism," the FTO designation was unprecedented; it was the first time the U.S. government designated an entire branch of a foreign government as an FTO. As a result of this designation, those who provide material support to the IRGC [are criminally liable](#). The Treasury Department was empowered to block the IRGC's assets; and IRGC members were prohibited from entering the U.S. This initiative, along with the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions on key sectors in Iran's economy, [severely dented](#) the IRGC's revenue, and weakened its proxies, which received less funding. Sanctions enforcement undermines the Islamic Republic of Iran's power, as the government is deprived of the resources to sustain its patronage network reaching into the IRGC.

The Biden Administration should heed the advice of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley. In April 2022, [he said](#), "I believe the IRGC-Quds Force to be a terrorist organization, and I do not support them being delisted from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list." Efforts to reverse the sanctions imposed on the IRGC, or a failure to target the individuals and entities enabling it, will resource the very entity that is brutally repressing its own people and undermining regional security,

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U.S. regional interests, and European security. The IRGC may further challenge European security in the coming months by transferring surface-to-surface missiles to Russia in addition to the attack drones it has already sent. The E.U., however, has not yet followed suit in designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization. On January 3, 2023, reports revealed that the U.K. government [intends to proscribe](#) the IRGC as a terrorist organization, which will make belonging to the group or supporting it a criminal offense in the U.K.

Other non-kinetic options are available to the U.S., including building up the capabilities of our allies and partners in the region and promoting cooperation between them. The role of U.S. intelligence in the assassinations of IRGC operatives or Israel's precision strikes is seldom clear. Increasing U.S. intelligence support to Israel, however, can only improve the effectiveness of Israel's "war-between-war" aerial campaign in Syria—which the IDF optimistically reported had taken out [90% of Tehran's assets](#) in the war-torn country—and its ability to target individuals and disrupt the operations undermining regional security. Deepening regional networks will only improve the ability to identify and strike land-based weapons, supply-lines and convoys. Additionally, weapons transfers to Israel—such as the massive ordinance penetrator capable of destroying hardened Iranian assets—and to the Gulf states, can further deter Iran from its forceful pursuit of regional hegemony. The Abraham Accords should also serve as a foundation for diplomacy and military cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.

There are also kinetic options that may be implemented in a measured way to retaliate against Iran's proxies for their attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military personnel. Currently, U.S. deterrence in response to such attacks appears to be weak. Retaliatory strikes [have seldom been carried out](#) against these proxies, despite the rapid increase in their attacks on U.S. interests since President Joe Biden took office. Such strikes should be contemplated to increase the costs for the Iranian system as it weighs the benefits of mounting aggressive operations against U.S. and allied interests, particularly during periods of internal unrest.

## *Conclusion*

Since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the IRGC has faithfully executed its duty to protect the revolution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The IRGC is a core constituency in the regime's support base that can be relied upon to use repressive violence to maintain stability in times of unrest. The IRGC is also the vehicle through which Tehran exports the revolution, deters its enemies, and pursues regional hegemony. While not the only motivation driving these aims, an ideology rooted in fear and hatred of free, Western nations ranks among the most powerful. The Islamic Republic of Iran's *raison d'être* depends on a perpetual external threat, namely the U.S. and Israel, endangering its subjects' way of life, and deeply-held religious beliefs. As soon as those people lose trust in that invention, a pillar of the regime will begin to crack.

The military objectives pursued by the IRGC demonstrate that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not merely implement a defensive doctrine, though defense and deterrence are undoubtedly important goals. Iran attempts to establish a forward presence and a long-range strike capability to increase the costs Israel and the U.S. would pay in the event of military escalation. Its asymmetric naval capabilities

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discourage a sea conflict. A partisan paramilitary organ at home and the mountainous terrain along Iran's borders deter a ground invasion. Its ballistic missiles could be used against countries perceived as supporting its enemies in the event of a conflict, potentially inflicting a psychological toll. However, Iran's malign and destabilizing activities show that its concept of regime survival is inextricably linked to aggression. Its continuous unconventional warfare operations debunk the claim that Iran merely pursues deterrence. Tehran wants to become the dominant regional force and, consistent with that goal, is intent upon the expulsion of the foreign powers it has defined as enemies, despite the growing unpopularity of those portrayals at home.

## Kata'ib Hezbollah

Iran has reportedly [financed, trained, and founded](#) Kata'ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi militia which is [sanction-designated](#) by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

- **Type of Organization:** Militia, religious, terrorist, transnational, violent
- **Ideologies and Affiliations:** Iranian-sponsored, Islamist, jihadist, Khomeinist, Shiite
- **Place of Origin:** Iraq
- **Year of Origin:** 2006–2007
- **Founder(s):** Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
- **Places of Operation:** Iraq, Syria

*Kata'ib Hezbollah: A Sanctioned Terrorist Group Sponsored by Iran*

[Kata'ib Hezbollah \(KH\)](#) is an [Iranian-sponsored, anti-American Shiite militia](#) operating in Iraq with [ancillary operations in Syria](#). During the U.S.-led war in [Iraq](#) that began in 2003, KH [earned a reputation for planting deadly roadside bombs](#) and using improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs) to attack U.S. and coalition forces. According to U.S. diplomat Ali Khedery, KH is responsible for "[some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. and coalition forces](#) throughout the [U.S.-led war in Iraq]." In August 2019, *Washington Institute for Near East Policy* fellow Michael Knights [assessed](#) that KH posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the country. The group's former leader, [Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes](#), is the alleged [mastermind behind](#) the U.S. and French embassy bombings in [Kuwait](#) in 1983 and the assassination attempt on Kuwait's emir in 1985.

After the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, [KH sent fighters to defend the Assad regime in Syria, allegedly at the behest of Qassem Soleimani](#), then head of the Quds Force of Iran's [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \(IRGC\)](#). As KH [switched from fighting U.S. forces in Iraq to combating Sunni rebels](#) and extremists in Iraq and [Syria](#), KH continued to prioritize its anti-American agenda, [repeatedly boycotting battles](#) against [ISIS](#) in which the U.S. participated.

KH is [sanction-designated](#) by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It is also reportedly the "[most secretive](#)" and [elite](#) of Iraq's predominantly Shiite militias. KH has [long-standing ties to Iran's external military branch, the IRGC-Quds Force](#), as well as to Iran's proxy in Lebanon, [Hezbollah](#).

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KH is suspected of involvement in [extrajudicial killings and abductions](#) in Iraq's Anbar province, including the May 27, 2016 abduction of more than 70 Sunni boys and men from al-Sijir, and the murder of 49 men from Saqlawiyah. Moreover, the group has [gained exclusive control over the Jurf as-Sakr area](#) west of Baghdad where it prevents displaced Sunni residents from returning, operates private prisons, and [produces, tests, and stores](#) rockets and other explosives. This area, located in Babil province, near the holy Shi'a city of Karbala, which the group claims to protect against ISIS, "touches on numerous military industrial sites," [wrote](#) one expert at *the Washington Institute*.

Since the Trump administration withdrew from the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#) in May 2018 and implemented a "maximum pressure" campaign imposing economic hardship on Iran, Iran has pursued a strategy of gradually escalating hostilities against U.S. economic and military interests and its allies, taking care not to cross red lines that would trigger devastating reprisals. In April 2019, according to intelligence reports, [then-IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani](#) met with Iraqi Shi'a militia leaders and told them to prepare for a [proxy war](#) against the U.S. KH has been at the forefront of Iran's ongoing campaign of provocations, initiating hostilities and then exercising strategic restraint.

In March 2021, KH is [believed to have](#) attacked U.S. forces stationed at Ayn al-Asad air base in the western Anbar province. In May 2021, the base was [attacked](#) again; this time with drones. [U.S. airstrikes in June](#) of that year, which the Pentagon said targeted KH facilities at the border of Iraq and Syria, may have been retaliation for these attacks.

On May 14, 2019, explosives-laden drones attacked two Saudi oil-pumping facilities. The attacks were originally thought to be carried out by the [Houthis](#) from [Yemen](#), but U.S. intelligence later revised this assessment and found the attacks [emanated from KH's Jurf as-Sakr base](#) on the outskirts of Baghdad, implicating the group in the attacks. A few days later, on May 19, a missile was launched from Amana Bridge in Baghdad, reportedly aimed at the American embassy but landing in an empty field near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. According to a senior official in the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Services (CTS) the rocket [was launched by KH](#).

A KH front group known as Alwiyyat al-Waad al-Haq [claimed a drone strike](#) on Riyadh on January 23, 2021. This attack revealed the increasing sophistication of KH drones, as it took place over a range of nearly 650 miles. KH [houses most of its drones](#) at Camp Speicher, an Iraqi Air Force academy and former U.S. military base outside of Tikrit. *The Washington Institute's* analysis of [satellite imagery](#) from a wrecked drone in Erbil shows that the Iraqi militias have begun using drones with twelve-foot wingspans that are similar to Iranian-designed models used by the Houthis and Lebanese [Hezbollah](#).

KH's anger with the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen, as well as the Abraham Accords, was directed at the UAE in [a social media statement by Musawi](#): "After a series of continuous assaults [against the Houthis] by those who made the Zionist dream come true... we will launch a big campaign to gather money for the Yemeni people to buy drones... to punish al-Salul and the House of Zayed [the UAE ruling family]." In January 2022, KH [implemented a mostly-ineffective fundraising campaign](#) that purported to help Yemeni youth when in actuality it was designed to raise money for drones for the Houthis to attack the UAE.

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KH does Iran's bidding in Iraq in many ways, but it has continued launching attacks outside of Iraq to advance Iranian regional interests. In February 2022, Alwiya al-Waad al-Haq allegedly [launched a drone from Iraq](#) into the UAE. KH asserts that the UAE, along with the US and Saudi Arabia, is responsible for the growth of ISIS, its enemy. KH's [possession of drones](#) in Iraq is a growing concern throughout the region.

Between October and December 2019, against the backdrop of an Iraqi protest movement whose grievances largely centered on Iran's continued meddling in the country's political affairs and the unchecked influence of Iran-backed militias, the Iran-backed militias [undertook a concerted campaign of rocket attacks targeting U.S. military targets](#) in the country. According to a U.S. military official, forensic analysis of the rockets and launchers used during the spate of at least ten attacks indicated the involvement of Shi'a militias, most notably [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) and Katai'b Hezbollah. The attacks placed the U.S. on a collision course with the Iran-backed militias.

KH's involvement, along with the Iraqi security forces, in the suppression of the popular [anti-government protests](#) starting in October 2019 did not help its public image. Members of KH are also believed to be involved in targeted assassinations of political activists who participated in the protests. Within two months, the death toll from the protests was over 600, with allegations of mass arrests and torture. Former IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani [reportedly facilitated the transfer](#) of Katyusha rocket launchers and shoulder-fired missiles to KH to be used to provoke a U.S. attack and redirect the anger of the people toward American interests.

The situation reached a boil in late December 2019 and early January 2020. On December 27, 2019, more than 30 missiles were fired at an Iraqi military base near Kirkuk, killing a U.S. contractor and wounding four U.S. troops as well as two members of the Iraqi security forces. The U.S. [accused](#) KH of being responsible for the attack, and retaliated by launching strikes against 5 KH targets in [Iraq](#) and [Syria](#) including weapons depots and command and control centers. The U.S. strikes reportedly [killed](#) at least 25 KH militants.

On December 31, 2019, protesters, including members and supporters of KH, attempted to [storm the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad](#). Demonstrators threw stones and torched a security post, prompting embassy guards to respond with stun grenades and tear gas. The militia supporters withdrew from the embassy after prominent commanders reportedly spoke to them. On January 1, 2020, following orders from Mohammed Mohyee, KH's political spokesman, thousands of protestors [dispersed](#) from the American Embassy in Baghdad. The withdrawal was reportedly agreed to upon the condition that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, will move ahead with legislation to force American troops out of Iraq. KH leadership vowed to return if the group was unsuccessful in forcing a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq through the political process. In response to the attack on the embassy, former President Trump [issued a statement](#) that his administration would consider attacks by Iran-backed militias as attacks by Iran.

On February 26, 2020, as a result of the numerous terrorist attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations, the

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U.S. [designated Ahmad al-Hamidawi](#), the Secretary General of KH, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

On March 11, 2020, Iran-backed Shiite militias attacked Camp Taji in Iraq, killing two American and one British servicemembers, and wounding 14 others. The next day, KH released a [statement saying](#), we “ask Allah to bless those who carried out the jihadi operation that targeted U.S. occupation forces at Taji Base in Baghdad...We assure them that we will defend them and deter anyone from targeting them.” In response to this aggression, on the evening of March 12, U.S. forces conducted a defensive precision strike against KH facilities throughout Iraq, specifically five weapon storage facilities, which contained arms that have been used against coalition forces.

In August 2021, the U.S. [placed additional sanctions](#) on the Iran-backed militia for violating a U.S. law that restricts weapons transfers from Iran.

## *Controlling the Border with Syria*

KH has had a prominent role, alongside Lebanese [Hezbollah](#), in maintaining control over the al-Qaim border crossing between [Iraq](#) and [Syria](#), after the group helped oust ISIS from the area in late 2017. While KH controls the road between al-Qaim and Akashat to the southwest, it is not the only actor on the Iraqi side of the border. According to a *Carnegie Endowment* [report](#) from 2020, “the Iraqi Army’s 7th and 8th Divisions, border guard units, a counterterrorism force, federal police, various militias operating under the auspices of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and a local tribal force” are all present here. [ISIS](#) has also [sought to expand](#) its insurgency into Anbar province.

Located in the western Anbar desert of Iraq, al-Qaim is a strategically important location for Iran and difficult for the Iraqi government security forces to monitor. This crossing is a critical transit hub for weapons and supplies from Iran into Syria and the Levant. Kataib Hezbollah is also present on the Syrian side of the border in Abu Kamal.

The group finances its activities, in part, through illegal cross-border smuggling operations, which include drug smuggling. The smuggling of Captagon pills [flourishes](#) in the areas under KH control, between al-Qaim and Rutbah. ISIS also [takes advantage of the drug trade](#) in this region. According to one resident in al-Qaim, Iran-backed militias “[control all access points.](#)” KH’s control of the border also allows it to ensure that weapons and other illegal shipments are not stopped by customs.

KH derives its legitimacy from the fact that it helped to liberate Iraqi cities and towns from ISIS. It frequently issues warnings that ISIS is still poised to carry out terrorist attacks so that they are still seen as being necessary. They also seek popular support for their mission against the U.S. military. A KH military spokesperson [said](#) in February 2022: “We have information about IS’s intentions to enter the Karma district,” and “America is facilitating the movement of terrorists on the border.”

The Iraqi people, including those in Anbar province, are [becoming increasingly fed up](#) with the activities of the Iran-backed militias. KH brigade movements [reportedly sparked an outcry](#) in the province, which has become increasingly Shiite since KH took control there. KH reportedly [took farm land from locals](#) for “[security reasons](#)” and stopped Sunnis displaced from the war against ISIS from [reentering the province](#).

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A local security officer [told Al-Monitor](#) “All foreigners—except the Lebanese and Iranians—are enemies [to the PMF]. They [the PMF] are the same as IS.” KH’s harsh sectarian policies could fuel a resurgence of Sunni radicalism and ISIS, which already has a presence in the region. KH is [known for its sectarianism](#), even more so than other Iran-backed militias.

## *Iraqi Politics: Countering Militia Influence*

On July 1, 2019, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Mahdi [decreed](#) that the PMF forces, including KH, must fully integrate within the Iraqi armed forces chain of command or disarm. *The Counter Extremism Project* notes that the policy may have been adopted under pressure from the U.S. and [Saudi Arabia](#), given the above-mentioned KH drone attack on Saudi oil facilities in May 2019.

His predecessor, Prime Minister Kadhimi, also sought to limit the power of the militias, whom he referred to as “[outlaws](#),” and establish the state’s monopoly on violence. KH [stands in the way](#) of these efforts, as one of the most dangerous and powerful Iran-backed militia in Iraq. KH is [officially part of the Iraqi state](#), and as such receives government funding, however it frequently disregards the Iraqi chain of command; its loyalty rests with Iran and the [IRGC](#). Coordinating with other PMF militia leaders, KH’s Abu al-Askari claimed that Kadhimi won the premiership through “[fraud](#)” and that he was [trying to postpone the elections](#) by promoting tension between demonstrators and Iran-backed militias.

In an effort to combat the Iran-backed militias, Kadhimi [launched a campaign](#) to fight corruption at the borders and re-establish state control. In the west, the borders with Jordan and Syria are largely desert and difficult to secure. On the eastern border with Iran, the Zerbatiya crossing in the Hamrin mountains is known to be a safe-haven for insurgents. The Port Authority’s efforts resulted in government revenue, but many of the border crossings are still believed to be under the control of Iran-backed militias.

Kadhimi’s policies to counter the PMF militias may have provoked the failed drone assassination attempt on his residence, which some [Iraqi officials blamed on KH and AAH](#). After all, KH threaten violence if parliament approved him as prime minister, threats for which a senior leader of the militia, Abu al-Askari, was later [issued an arrest warrant](#). The leader of KH [denied the groups involvement](#) in the attacks, saying “no one in Iraq has the desire to waste a drone on the house of a former prime minister.”

A prominent political figure, Muqtada al-Sadr, appears to support Kadhimi’s approach to the militias, even though he used to command one of the most powerful Iran-backed militias in Iraq, known as the Mahdi Army (JAM). Sadr has claimed in the past to have disbanded his units in the PMF and echoed former Iraqi Prime Minister Mahdi’s policy of militia integration in the Iraqi chain of command; he [explained](#) that if the militias wanted to be a part of his government, they must disband. In response to this message from “a friendly party,” a senior KH official, in November 2021, [said](#) on Telegram that Saraya al-Difa al-Shaabi, a KH unit, was ordered to “stop all its activities and close its headquarters.”

## *KH Ideology: Hostile to America, Loyal to Iran*

According to the U.S. Department of State, KH is “[a radical Shi’a Islamist group with an anti-Western establishment and jihadist ideology](#).” The group is virulently anti-American and ideologically loyal to the Iranian regime.

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**Anti-American:** During the U.S.-led war in Iraq, KH built its reputation by targeting U.S. personnel and interests and killing numerous U.S. soldiers in terrorist attacks. Since the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, KH has retained its anti-American ideology. In KH's efforts to fight ISIS in Iraq, KH remains opposed to any cooperation with the United States.

In September 2014, for example, KH released a statement saying, "We will not fight alongside the American troops under any kind of conditions whatsoever. [Our only contact with Americans will be] if we fight each other." In March 2015, KH's military spokesman reaffirmed the group's anti-American position, saying, "It is not possible for Kata'ib Hezbollah or any of the resistance factions to be in the same trench as the Americans." In March 2018, KH supported the Iraqi parliament's decision to implement a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. KH had previously warned it was prepared to confront the U.S. military "at any moment" if it was preparing a long-term presence in Iraq.

In October 2020, KH [agreed to a conditional ceasefire](#) with the U.S. The PMUs made assurances that while the U.S. and Iraqi governments negotiated a timetable for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, they would abstain from attacking U.S. forces. The total drawdown of U.S. troops from [Iraq](#) is a central objective of the Iranian proxy. According to the KH website, "waging jihad against the occupation until the last American is expelled from Iraq" sits among the group's top "jihadi pillars."

But the group was not satisfied with the progress of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue, and thus resumed its attacks. "The equation has changed. Political mediation will not work... This is a new transformation in confronting [the enemy]," [said](#) KH-controlled Unit 10,000, a propaganda channel. A spokesperson for the group also claimed that the talks were "[coercive](#)." After the ceasefire broke down, KH [turned to attacking Iraqi supply trucks](#) in order to prevent the transfer of material to Iraqi security forces at the border with Syria, while at least initially avoiding redlines that could provoke U.S. retaliation.

In January 2022, there was an [unclaimed rocket attack](#) on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. In July 2021, KH leader, Abu al-Askari, [posted a statement](#) to Telegram that said "The decision of the Iraqi resistance is not to attack even the camp of the evil U.S. Embassy in Baghdad." Of course, this does not rule him and his group out as culprits of this recent attack, but it could show that the group does not want the embassy to be shut down in the same way that it wants U.S. troops out of the country.

**Pro-Iranian:** KH's [loyalty to Iran](#) is key to the group's ideology. A *RAND Corporation* [report](#) claims that "Kata'ib Hezbollah, like Lebanese Hezbollah, is used as a tool to 'export the Islamic revolution' as practiced in Tehran." KH [openly accepts](#) Iran's vision of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurists), a strain of political theology that entrusts Iran's Supreme Leader with unique authority in the Shi'a faith. Members of KH swear an oath of loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#), and accept him as their own spiritual leader. Indeed, KH has actively projected Iranian power throughout the region – in June 2018, Israel targeted KH in a strike on a villa on the border of Iraq and Syria. According to [The Wall Street Journal](#), KH was embedded there with the [IRGC](#) to transfer Iranian weapons to Syria. *The Congressional Research Service* also indicated in an October 2018 [report](#) that "Iran had transferred short range ballistic missiles to Iran-backed militias in Iraq, reportedly including Kata'ib Hezbollah."

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## *KH's Organizational Structure: the "Most Secretive" Militia in Iraq*

Many analysts consider KH the [most secretive](#) Shi'a militia operating in Iraq. [Abu Madhi al-Mohandes](#) was the leader of KH. He was [killed](#) in January 3, 2020, in an airstrike on Iraq's Baghdad International Airport that also killed [Qasem Soleimani](#), then head of Iran's Quds Force. Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes is [the nom de guerre](#) of [former Iraqi MP Jamal al-Ibrahimi](#). Al-Mohandes also served as Iraq's deputy national security advisor and the deputy commander of the Haashid Shaabi (also called the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF), Iraq's umbrella group of anti-ISIS Shiite militias. In the fight against [ISIS](#), the PMF has coordinated military strategy among KH, [Asaib Ahl al-Haq \(AAH\)](#), [the Badr Organization](#), and other predominantly Shiite and Iranian-sponsored militias.

## *KH: Financed by Iran*

As of 2008, Iran's IRGC Quds Force [has been funding KH](#), according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Though little is publicly known about Iran's financing of KH since then, it is widely believed that Iran continues to finance KH's operations.

In November 2014, wounded U.S. military veterans and family members of deceased U.S. soldiers [filed a lawsuit](#) against European banks for processing money from Tehran that bankrolled terrorist attacks in Iraq. According to the lawsuit, KH allegedly received money from Iran to finance terrorist attacks against U.S. soldiers.

Another way that the group finances itself is through extortion. Qatari officials [reportedly](#) paid \$25 million out of a \$150 million ransom to KH after it was discovered that the group had kidnapped a member of the royal family.

## *KH Recruitment: Do You Hate Uncle Sam (but Love Assad)?*

KH has sought to lure recruits by advertising its fight against U.S. forces in Iraq. Following the start of the Syrian civil war, the group also advertised its efforts to support Assad forces in neighboring [Syria](#).

During the U.S.-led war in Iraq, KH [filmed attacks against U.S. and Coalition targets](#), publishing the films online for propaganda and recruitment purposes. During the Arab Spring, KH and fellow Shiite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) also [attempted to attract recruits to fight anti-Assad rebels in Syria](#) by advertising their involvement there. They did so by holding public funerals for fighters in Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad, and by posting updates on the groups' Facebook pages. The two groups also posted phone numbers around Baghdad to attract potential recruits.

KH promotes itself through the prolific use of social media and puts a large quantity of resources into internet propaganda. A *Telegraph* report [revealed](#) in 2020 that Facebook received millions of dollars in advertising revenue from KH. Furthermore, the report said that KH deploys "electronic armies" to publish droves of fake news stories on the platform.

Up until 2020, KH maintained its [own website](#). The U.S. [seized this website](#), along with one other being used by KH to recruit new members and promote extremist propaganda.

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## *Training from Iran and Hezbollah*

In the past, KH members have [received training](#) from Iran's external military wing, [the Quds Force](#), as well as from Lebanese Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy. By 2008, the Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah were [running training camps](#) in four locations in Iraq (Tehran, Qom, Ahvaz, and Mashhad). There, KH and Iran's other Shiite militias were trained in the use of small arms and explosives.

Lebanese Hezbollah also [ran training camps](#) in southern Iraq until the group was forced to relocate the camps to Iran in April 2008. By 2010, [training camps in Iran](#) continued to provide KH with training related to small arms, surveillance, small unit tactics, and communications. By November 2013, KH members trained in either Iran or Lebanon and then flew to Syria to fight alongside Assad regime forces. By 2015, some KH members [trained](#) near the city of Samarra in northern Iraq.

KH has [developed especially close ties with Unit 3800](#), the Lebanese Hezbollah wing devoted to arming and training Iraqi Shiite militias.

## Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a Palestinian Islamist terrorist group sponsored by Iran and Syria. Founded in 1979 as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, PIJ is the second-largest terrorist group in [Gaza](#) today (after [Hamas](#)). PIJ is dedicated to eradicating Israel and establishing an autonomous Islamic Palestinian state in the lands currently comprising Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. PIJ believes that the land of Palestine is consecrated for Islam, that Israel usurped Palestine, and, therefore, that Israel is an affront to God and Islam, and that Palestine’s re-conquest is a holy task. PIJ’s primary sponsor is Iran, which has provided the group with millions of dollars in direct funding, as well as training and weapons. PIJ has partnered with Iranian- and Syrian-sponsored [Hezbollah](#) in carrying out joint operations.

### *Ideology and Activities*

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a Palestinian Islamist group founded in 1979 as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. PIJ is the second-largest terrorist group in the Gaza Strip, after Hamas. The United States Department of State designated PIJ as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on [October 8, 1997](#).

PIJ [seeks](#) to establish a religiously-governed Palestinian state comprising all of historical Palestine, and views its clash with Israel as a primarily religious war, [rather](#) than a mere territorial dispute. According to the “[Manifesto of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine](#),” a document discovered by federal authorities investigating a Florida man with suspected PIJ ties, the group rejects any peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, believing only violence can liberate Palestine.

Two of PIJ’s founders, Fathi al-Shqaqi and Abdelaziz Odeh, initially drew [inspiration](#) from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, in the late 1970s, they became disillusioned with the Brotherhood over what they perceived as the latter’s moderation and lack of focus on Palestine. They soon became [inspired](#) by [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s](#) Islamic Revolution in Iran, and founded PIJ on [Khomeinist principles](#), aiming to establish an Islamic state in Palestine.

Unlike [Hamas](#), PIJ generally does not provide social services; it focuses primarily on violent attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians alike. However, as tensions mounted between Iran and Hamas in the early 2010s over the Syrian Civil War, Iran used PIJ to try to undermine Hamas—or at least intimidate Hamas into getting back in line behind Iran by undercutting the group’s popular support. Tehran tasked PIJ with carrying out Iranian-funded discrete charitable and social-welfare activities that traditionally came under the purview of Hamas and its large social-services apparatus. For example, PIJ [distributed](#) \$2 million in food aid in Gaza from the [Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation](#), an Iranian-regime-controlled charity.

On February 19, 2020, a PIJ sniper team [fired](#) on a group of Israeli soldiers and police officers along the Gaza-Israel border. On February 23, Israeli forces kill a PIJ member attempting to plant explosives along the Gaza-Israel border fence. PIJ launched more than 21 rockets into Israel from Gaza in retaliation. In response to the rocket fire, Israeli forces strike multiple PIJ targets in [Syria](#), killing at least two PIJ members. On February 24, PIJ continued to launch dozens of rockets toward Israel’s southern

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communities in response. Israel's defense systems intercept most of the rockets but reported damage to homes and minor injuries.

PIJ has become adept at transforming seemingly mundane items into armaments that were used to attack Israel in the 2021 conflict between Israel and the two Iran-backed militant organizations in the Gaza Strip, namely PIJ and Hamas. As the conflict drew to a close, PIJ leader, [Ziyad al-Nakhala](#), [boasted about the weapons](#) that were created from construction materials, like metal pipes, and effectively deployed. "The silent world should know that our weapons, by which we face the most advanced arsenal produced by American industry, are water pipes that engineers of the resistance turned into the rockets that you see," he said. As foreign countries provide economic assistance for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, it will be difficult to avoid inadvertently supplying the materials that are needed for weapons.

According to one expert at *the United States Institute for Peace*, PIJ exhibited an unprecedented ability to "stress" Israel's missile defense system, known as "the Iron Dome," through launching larger quantities of rockets and at a faster pace than in the past. Specialist Fabian Hinz [determined that most of the rockets](#) were built in Gaza; nevertheless, some of them were able to reach Tel Aviv, approximately 45 miles away.

PIJ's weapon of choice in this conflict was the unsophisticated Badr 3 rocket, which is believed to have been designed in Iran for the purpose of transferring the technical know-how to [proxies and partners](#) throughout the region. This know-how would allow Iran's militia network to construct their own rockets, where they cannot rely on transfers, as tends to be the case in Gaza under the Israeli blockade.

The Badr 3 rocket [carries a warhead](#) that weighs between 661 and 882 pounds. It is heavier than most Palestinian rockets, and thus results in a larger explosion; however, its range is limited. PIJ did not deploy precision-guided rockets in the recent conflict, but they did use other forms of precision-guided munitions, including the Hamas Shehab suicide drone.

The group rejects any diplomatic approach to resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict; it won't even engage in talks with Israel. In November 2021, PIJ Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhlah blasted Hamas for accepting aid that was approved by Israel. In an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated news network *al-Mayadeen*, he [announced](#) that Israel only approved the economic assistance provided by Egypt because it would "tame Gaza" through incentives. PIJ did participate in the ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt that brought an end to the 2021 conflict.

## *PIJ and Hamas*

Although Hamas and PIJ have competed for influence and resources in the past, the groups' two leaders made [an agreement to coordinate](#) between their military wings, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassem Brigades and the al-Quds Brigades, respectively, and increase terror attacks in Israel, especially in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The agreement to coordinate military activities was reached during a meeting between the leaders of Hamas and PIJ in [Lebanon](#) and the [Gaza Strip](#) in December 2021.

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On other occasions, Hamas and the PIJ are at odds in terms of the approach to take, with the former sometimes advocating for restraint and the latter typically taking the more violent route. This happened in April 2022, when Hamas [prevented PIJ from firing rockets](#) at Israel, knowing that it would be drawn into any escalation between PIJ and Israel. PIJ reportedly wanted to escalate after three of its members, on their way to commit a terrorist act, were killed by Israeli security forces, and Hamas made it clear that it does not want another conflict with Israel at this time.

A few weeks after Hamas prevented PIJ from firing rockets into Israel, high tensions surrounding the overlap of Jewish and Muslim religious holidays finally boiled over into overt conflict. Several media outlets suspected PIJ of leading the initiative, though the group did not claim responsibility for the rockets launched on multiple occasions on [April 18<sup>th</sup>](#), [April 20<sup>th</sup>](#), and [April 22<sup>nd</sup>](#). Hamas' involvement was also not clear. However, senior members of both groups were in contact with Iran from the start of the attacks. Hamas' political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh and the Secretary-General of PIJ [spoke by phone](#) with Iran's supreme leader's foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati.

A key difference between the two Palestinian terrorist groups is that Hamas governs Palestinian territory, whereas PIJ does not. In 2007, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, and thus inherited the responsibility of looking after the interests of the Palestinians in Gaza. PIJ, on the other hand, does not have governance responsibilities. Where Hamas has to manage various interests, including those of Qatar, another one of its patrons, and daily life of people in the Gaza Strip, PIJ is more subservient to Iran's interests. Tehran [gives millions of dollars a year](#) to its proxy PIJ, while promoting its attacks against Israel. Since Hamas is held responsible for Gaza's economy, the group is more risk-averse, given the devastating consequences that it usually elicits from the Israeli Defense Forces. Moreover, military escalation could hurt the terrorist group politically, as the people blame it for civilian casualties.

In early August 2022, PIJ launched a barrage of approximately 100 long-range rockets deep into Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip, [setting off alarms](#) in several suburbs south of Tel Aviv, but causing no injuries. Unlike the May 2021 conflict, in which [both Palestinian terrorist groups Hamas and PIJ launched rockets](#) into Israel, Hamas did not join PIJ in the August 2022 terrorist attacks on Israel, nor was the group targeted in Israel's military response. Hamas has [repeatedly indicated](#) that it does not want military escalation in the Gaza Strip. Gaza is still recovering from the May 2021 conflict, which saw intense Israeli airstrikes. Military escalation involving Hamas could also result in the revocation of permits for people from the Gaza Strip to work in Israel, a major boon to the Gaza Strip's blockaded economy.

On August 2<sup>nd</sup>, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) [arrested Bassem al-Saadi](#), the head of PIJ in the West Bank who had been arrested on multiple prior occasions and released. His arrest in the northern West Bank city of Jenin was part of a series of arrests that occurred under an Israeli operation dubbed "Break the Wave," targeting militants throughout the Palestinian territories in response to [a wave of Palestinian violence](#) in which 19 Israelis had been killed. Jenin is known as a hotbed for terrorist activity, and according to the Shin Bet, Saadi was in the process of [building up PIJ fighters](#) in the area in preparation to attack Israel when he was arrested. He is also viewed as being responsible for the radicalization of the organization's operatives.

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Prior to the PIJ rocket attack, Israel had already begun to implement defensive measures against the terrorist threat, which had become more imminent after the arrest of PIJ's leader in the West Bank. Anticipating a terrorist attack, Israel [shut down roads](#) at the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel. When [militant forces and equipment](#), including anti-tank units, began to move toward the Israeli border, Israel carried out preemptive air strikes against militant positions in the Gaza Strip, killing [Tayseer al-Jabari](#), a top PIJ commander who was [responsible for planning terrorist attacks](#) against Israeli citizens.

While the strikes were occurring, PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah traveled to Tehran and met with [Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi](#), who signaled his support for the Axis of Resistance and the PIJ's rocket attack against Israel, [saying](#) "today, resistance is both defensible as an idea and has yielded results in the field of action." Nakhalah also met with the commander-in-chief of the [IRGC](#) while in Tehran. In a letter to Nakhalah, [Supreme Leader Khamenei](#) described PIJ's rocket attacks on Israel as "[courageous](#)" and stressed the importance of connecting the resistance in the West Bank to Gaza. Behind closed doors, Tehran likely encouraged the PIJ to escalate hostilities against Israel. Indeed, PIJ began launching more rockets into Israel, as the PIJ's leader was in Tehran. But Egyptian mediation, coupled with  [Hamas'](#) lack of entry into the fighting, likely shifted the balance in accepting a ceasefire.

PIJ and Hamas both praised the spate of terror attacks in Israel that occurred in late March 2022 and early April. PIJ commended attacks in Beersheba and Hadera, even though they were claimed by ISIS, a Sunni radical group which often clashes with PIJ's patron, Tehran. PIJ's Khalid al-Batsh [said](#) "the self-sacrificing Hadera operation came in response to the summit of humiliation and shame in the occupied Negev," referring to the Negev Summit, which [brought together](#) the foreign ministers of Egypt, Israel, the UAE, Morocco and the US in southern Israel to discuss concerns over Iran's regional expansionism and its nuclear program. On the heel of these terror attacks, [Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah](#) and [PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah](#) met in Lebanon to discuss Palestinian "[jihadist operations](#)."

## *PIJ in the West Bank*

In January 2022, the PA stepped up its repression of its political opposition, even [attempting to bar](#) Hamas and PIJ supporters from holding public celebrations for the release of prisoners affiliated with their groups. One political analyst, Hani al-Masry, [believes](#) that this new trend owes to the PA's decline in popularity among Palestinians, who have placed their confidence in the PA to form a state for them. Al-Masry told *Al Jazeera* that the "PA fears the growth of other factions, as well as the decline in its standing, and [potential] collapse." According to one poll, a staggering [73 percent of Palestinians](#) want Abbas to step down. Their support for more radical approaches could grow, which would augur the success of Abbas's political opponents.

The PIJ, operating primarily in the Gaza Strip, constitutes one of those political factions. Its advocacy for an alternative approach to dealing with the Israelis—one which centers on violence rather than diplomacy—could find traction among stateless Palestinians.

On some occasions, the PA,  [Hamas](#), and PIJ convey the same or similar messages to their followers. For example, with the convergence of Pass Over, Easter and Ramadan in April, religious tensions run high, and the three Palestinian groups [each warned](#), according to the *Jerusalem Post*, that Jews are planning

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to “storm” al-Aqsa Mosque, also known as Temple Mount, during the upcoming holidays. They further exhorted Muslim worshippers to establish their presence at the mosque and “thwart” the coming “incursions.”

The Jordanian foreign ministry even chimed in, [calling](#) recent Jewish events at the temple, including religious rituals performed, “provocations” and “extremist.” As it regularly does, the PIJ also used this occasion to make a more radical appeal than the PA, [issuing a statement](#) that said it had discussed with Hamas “the need to confront the Israeli aggression in in Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” This rhetoric could contribute to increased tensions surrounding holy sites and cities in Israel.

In February 2022, Israeli forces killed three members of PIJ in a West Bank raid near the city of Jenin. The suspected terrorists opened fire on Israeli troops as they moved in to arrest them, wounding four soldiers. As a result of this operation, Israeli police said that they thwarted a terrorist attack. Intelligence showed that the “terrorist cell [was] on its way to an attack,” and the Israeli troops “stopped the car in which they were traveling between Jenin and Tulkarem,” according to [an official statement](#).

Also in the West Bank, a senior leader of the PIJ, Khader Adnan, survived an assassination attempt on February 26, 2022. Adnan is said to be the most prominent PIJ leader in the West Bank. The PIJ in Gaza [subsequently blamed](#) the PA for the attack and called for an investigation.

## *Structure*

A leadership council governs PIJ. [Ramadan al-Shalah](#), a former University of South Florida professor, assumed the title [of Secretary General](#) in 1995 after Israel assassinated cofounder Fathi al-Shqaqi. In 2018, Ziad al-Nakhlah [replaced](#) al-Shalah as PIJ’s leader.

PIJ’s leadership has operated from Syria since 1989, when they relocated from Lebanon after Israel expelled them a year earlier. Official representatives of the group are also [stationed elsewhere in the Middle East, including Iran](#). In 2012, rumors circulated that the group’s leadership had relocated to Iran, (despite continued good ties with the Syrian regime), but a PIJ official denied that.

PIJ’s militia is called Saraya al-Quds (the Jerusalem Brigades). According to the [U.S. Department of State](#), PIJ possesses an armed strength of about 1,000 members, though the group has [claimed](#) it commands 8,000 fighters. Saraya al-Quds’ cadres are divided into several [regional staff commands](#), which oversee different cells.

## *Iranian Support of PIJ’s Violent Activities*

Iran first established direct ties with PIJ in 1987, when Israel exiled Fathi al-Shqaqi from Gaza to Lebanon. There, the IRGC’s intelligence branch contacted him and began training the group. PIJ also established [ties](#) with Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanon-based extension, during this time.

Tehran has [financed](#) PIJ since, increasing its funding from [\\$2 million annually](#) in 1998 to \$3 million a month in late 2013, according to [PIJ sources](#). However, in 2014, a study [claimed](#) Iran provided PIJ with \$100-\$150 million annually. In February 2019, PIJ spokesman Abu Hamza [told](#) Iran’s *Al-Alam TV* that “since the day of its establishment, the Islamic Republic [of Iran] has been supporting the Palestinian fighters financially, militarily, in training, and in all aspects.”

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Iran's tensions with Hamas as a result of the Syrian Civil War could account for Tehran's [increased](#) funding to the rival PIJ, which, despite maintaining official neutrality on that conflict, remained friendly with Syria's Assad regime. However, Iran appears to have scaled back funding to PIJ beginning in 2015, when a senior leader claimed the group was suffering from its worst financial crisis ever. Some within PIJ attributed this cash crunch to Egypt's closure of smuggling tunnels along the Gaza-Egypt border. However, [others said](#) Iran had slashed PIJ's financing by as much as 90 percent as of January 2016 because the group [refused](#) to officially condemn Saudi-led anti-Iran war efforts in Yemen.

Nonetheless, Iran and PIJ still claim to enjoy [good relations](#). PIJ Secretary General al-Nakhala [disclosed](#) that former head of the [IRGC Quds Force Qassem Soleimani](#) "personally" managed an operation to send weapons to Gaza, traveling to different countries to supply weapons to the Palestinians. In late 2018, PIJ's elected Secretary General Ziad al-Nakhala visited Iran and met with [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei](#) and senior Iranian officials—including Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and [Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani](#)—who [pledged](#) continued support for the Palestinian Cause.

In a November 2019 [video](#), PIJ's Al-Quds Brigade introduced a new rocket to its arsenal and thanked Iran for its support. Intelligence and Israeli military officials [told the Wall Street Journal](#) in May 2019 that Iran provides Hamas and PIJ \$60 million annually, but that Hamas has more autonomy than PIJ in its decision-making in Gaza. During this time, [reports](#) emerged that PIJ was provoking a conflict with Israel that Hamas did not want. Officials also [told the Wall Street Journal](#) that PIJ controls more of the 10,000 rockets in Gaza than Hamas does. After a barrage of missile attacks in 2019, Israel launched a [targeted killing](#) against one of PIJ's top operatives, [Baha Abu Al-Ata](#), whom Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [described](#) as a "ticking time bomb." In a separate strike, Israel also [targeted](#) another PIJ operative Akram al-Ajouri in [Syria](#), whom Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel's National Security Council, described as the "real direct connection between Islamic Jihad and Iran."

The nexus between Iran and PIJ was made clear in [a May 2021 interview](#) with a PIJ official named Ramez al-Halabi: "The *mujahideen* in Gaza and in Lebanon use Iranian weapons to strike the Zionists. We buy our weapons with Iranian money. An important part of our activity is under the supervision of Iranian experts. The contours of the victories in Palestine as of late were outlined with the blood of Qassem Soleimani, Iranian blood. Today, the patronage of the axis of resistance has begun to prevail in the region, thanks to Allah and to the blood of the martyrs, and it has begun to make an impact, and what an impact!"

A minor discrepancy in messaging between the PIJ and the Iranian regime occurred in September 2021, when [the Iranian armed forces suggested](#) that the Palestinian militant group would protect Tehran. The PIJ responded that it exists to fight against Israel and works with Tehran to that end. "All resistance forces, including Iran, stand in one front against the Zionist enemy and its allies," PIJ urged.

Despite the insistence that PIJ is focused on Israel, its supporters [gathered in a massive pro-Iran rally](#), chanting such slogans as "America is the Great Satan" and "Death to the House of Saud." These demonstrations are motivated, in part, through an effective propaganda machine, [taught to the PIJ](#) by its Iranian and Hezbollah mentors.

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Qatar is also known to be a supporter of PIJ and the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not sit well with the Emiratis, who view political Islam as a threat to their rule. In June 2020, [a lawsuit alleged](#) that Qatar sought to “evade U.S. sanctions by channeling its funds through three entities,” namely Qatar Charity and two banks controlled by the royal family, Masraf al-Rayan and Qatar National Bank. By extension, the Qataris involved in financing these terrorist groups may be liable for the violence that these groups carry out and required by court order to pay compensation to the victims.

Iranian support to PIJ is extensive and ongoing, proving essential to the terrorist group’s ability to cultivate influence in the Gaza Strip and acquire the arms needed to attack Israel. In November 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury in coordination with the United Kingdom (U.K.) [took action](#) to stifle Iranian financing to the group, targeting key PIJ officials, including the group’s representative to Tehran, and a Gaza-based firm used to distribute Iranian largess to, among other things, the families of PIJ fighters and prisoners. Hamas also facilitates the transfer of laundered money to the firm, Muhjat Al-Quds Foundation. The U.S. Department of State also [designated](#) PIJ’s Deputy Secretary General Akram al-Ajouri, who is the Damascus-based leader of the group’s militant wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. According to the Treasury Department, “Ajouri coordinated the militant training and recruitment operations for PIJ in Gaza, Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Yemen.” The IRGC is primarily responsible for the transfer of funds to such PIJ-run operations as Muhjat Al-Quds Foundation, and providing such assistance as weapons transfers and operational training.

## *Violent Attacks Against Israel*

On May 2, 2023, tensions escalated between Israel and PIJ after a hunger striker from the terrorist group died in Israeli custody. PIJ and Hamas then fired [at least 30 rockets](#) into Israel, causing three casualties and inviting reprisals by Israel. Later that night, reports indicated that the number of rockets fired at Israel was [closer to 100](#). Israel soon after carried out airstrikes against tunnels, arms production sites, and military installations belonging to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Later in May 2023, PIJ escalated its attacks without being joined by Hamas after Israel [killed three of its commanders](#) in targeted airstrikes. This time the rocket salvo caused eight casualties, including one death, and was tied directly back to Iran. A PIJ source [told i24 News](#) that the Boraq 85, responsible for killing the Israeli citizen, was an Iranian-made system. Furthermore, the escalation in attacks may be connected to the Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani’s [meeting](#) with PIJ leadership and leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon in April 2023. Though the details of the meeting are not publicly known, it is believed that he directed Hamas to launch rockets from Lebanon, which soon turned into a multifront attack from Syria and the Gaza Strip, targeting Israel. It was not clear based on [public reporting](#) whether PIJ took part in the rocket fire from the Gaza Strip on April 7, 2023, which occurred while Israel carried out reprisals against Hamas targets in retaliation for the Hamas rocket fire from Lebanon on the prior day.

On October 7, 2023, PIJ joined [Hamas](#) militants in assaulting Israel. PIJ participated in the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants and took hostages. PIJ chief Ziad Nakhalah claimed that his group is holding over 30 hostages who were abducted from Israel. He [stated](#), they would not be released until all Palestinian terrorist operatives held in Israeli prisons were released. On October 9, PIJ [claimed responsibility for a cross-border raid into Israel from Lebanon](#), stating that it had injured seven Israeli

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soldiers. On the same day, Israel reported that it had killed several terrorists attempting to infiltrate the border.