Iran Risk Matrix

UANI Top 10 Iran Sanctions Targets (February 2024)

Jason Brodsky and Kasra Aarabi — Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:49:00 +0000

The “UANI Top 10 Iran Sanctions Targets” is a new monthly product that seeks to expose and restrict the nefarious activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both inside and outside of the country. Using primary data and intelligence, UANI experts identify and publish a list of 10 individuals and entities for the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and other Western allies to target with sanctions. Many of these persons and organizations fly below the radar of public scrutiny. UANI aims to increase awareness of their roles.

Individuals:

NAME:	DESCRIPTION:
Masoud Khamenei, Son of Iran’s Supreme Leader	Masoud Khamenei is a son of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. According to public reporting, Masoud had significant wealth in overseas banks and, at one point, held a monopoly in selling products for the French car company Renault in Iran. U.S. and European authorities should sanction Masoud Khamenei, alongside his brother Mojtaba, under Magnitsky Act authorities, targeting corruption and human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament	Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament and an IRGC commander. Ghalibaf has been implicated in significant corruption scandals – including embezzlement during the time he served as mayor of Tehran – and gross human rights violations, such as obtaining the permit to shoot at unarmed student protestors in 1999. Before becoming speaker of parliament and earlier mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf was head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, and commander of the IRGC’s Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which are all sanctioned institutions. U.S. and European authorities should sanction Ghalibaf under the Magnitsky Act authorities, targeting corruption and human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic.
Eshagh Ghalibaf, Son of Iran’s Speaker of Parliament	Eshagh Ghalibaf, the son of the speaker of the Iranian parliament and IRGC commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has recently been caught in a corruption scandal that has exposed he has hundreds of thousands of dollars in Iranian and Western banks, including National Australia Bank (NAB) and Australia and New Zealand Bank. In 2017, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was running for president, claimed Eshagh, his only dependent at the time, had a total of $250 in four savings banks. However, documents filed for immigration to Canada in 2018 reveal Eshagh – whose living expenses were covered by his father at the time – was able to increase his savings by 600 times in just a year. These documents also reveal Eshagh purchased and rented two apartment units in Australia in the same time period. Eshagh’s father, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has earned the title of the “IRGC’s most corrupt commander,” has been in successive corruption scandals involving millions of dollars, relating to embezzlement and money laundering. Despite the clear incriminating evidence relating to Eshagh’s assets abroad and his inseparable affiliation with the regime, he is yet to be sanctioned. Alongside his father, the U.S. government and its allies should impose Magnitsky Act sanctions on Eshagh Ghalibaf, targeting corruption and human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic.
Saeed Ghasemi, IRGC Plain Clothes Senior Commander	Saeed Ghasemi is a senior commander of the IRGC’s plain clothes unit (lebas shakhsees), which is responsible for gross human rights violations. Ghasemi has played a leading role in commanding the violent suppression of Iranian civilians in successive protests, including the 1999 student protests, the 2009 Green Movement, and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests – something he has personally confirmed. As a senior member of the IRGC’s Quds Force, he helped train Al-Qaeda terrorists in Europe during the Bosnian War. He is a member of the so-called “Habib Circle” – one of the regime’s highest informal security-intelligence networks – which has committed human rights violations and is involved in terrorist activities. He is simultaneously a leading IRGC recruiter and indoctrinator. Evidence obtained and exposed by UANI revealed that Ghasemi engaged in radicalization activities in the United Kingdom and across Europe.
Hossein Yekta, IRGC Plain Clothes Senior Commander	Yekta is a senior commander of the IRGC’s plain clothes unit and operates as a key IRGC recruiter and indoctrinator. He has played a critical role in commanding and training the regime’s suppressive machinery, including during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Yekta has overseen the regime’s money laundering activities to finance the IRGC’s activities: from supporting terrorist groups abroad to suppression in Iran. He is a member of the so-called “Habib Circle,” the highest informal security-intelligence network that Mojtaba Khamenei heads. Yekta is also a key IRGC recruiter and indoctrinator, having headed numerous entities and initiatives designed for this purpose, including Khatam al-Owsieh Cultural Headquarters, Rahian Noor, and the Ammar Cultural Headquarters. Evidence obtained and exposed by UANI revealed that Yekta engaged in radicalization activities in the United Kingdom.
Seyyed Abdolhassan Navab, President of the University of Religions and Denominations (URD) and Senior IRGC Member	Navab serves as the president of URD, which, as UANI’s investigation revealed, is extensively affiliated with the IRGC and Hezbollah. Navab has held multiple senior roles in the IRGC. This includes holding the position of “Representative of the Supreme Leader for Logistics in the IRGC” and “Head of Affairs for the Clergy in the IRGC.” Navab has also served as one of the heads of the IRGC’s Ideological-Political Organization (“IRGC IPO”). The IRGC’s IPO oversees the official program of indoctrination in the IRGC, which is designed to radicalize all IRGC members and their families in a violent, Islamist extremist and antisemitic ideology. In his official capacity as URD president, Navab remains in constant communication and contact with the most senior levels of the IRGC, IRGC Quds Force, and Hezbollah – all of which are subject to terrorism sanctions. Despite his affiliation with the IRGC and its Quds Force, Navab frequently travels to and from Europe.
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, Member of the Guardian Council and Head of the Board of Trustees of Al Mustafa International University	Arafi is affiliated with the IRGC and has close ties with Hezbollah and its terror chief, Hassan Nasrallah. As part of the multiple senior positions he has held at Al Mustafa University, including serving as its head, Arafi has played an instrumental role in the recruitment and radicalization of foreign students for IRGC Quds Force’s militias and cells. Al Mustafa University was sanctioned by the United States in 2020 for this reason. He is also a founding board member of the IRGC and Hezbollah-affiliated University of Religions and Denominations. Despite his ties to the IRGC and Hezbollah, Arafi regularly travels to and from Europe. This includes a trip to Germany in 2022, where he delivered a speech at the Iranian regime-affiliated Islamic Center of Hamburg, which was declared as an “extremist Islamic organization” by the German Federal Administrative Court in 2023. In his role as a member of the Guardian Council, Arafi has also played a direct role in election engineering and subversion in the Islamic Republic.
Hossein Shamkhani, CEO of Admiral Group Shipping Company	Hossein Shamkhani, the son of IRGC commander Ali Shamkhani who is a former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), is the CEO of Admiral Group Shipping Company. Recent evidence has exposed Shamkhani as a leading figure in the Islamic Republic’s efforts to evade oil and gas sanctions, which provide a critical source of funding for the IRGC and its terrorist activities. Admiral Group Shipping Company is involved in illicit oil, gas, and petrochemical sales. Reports have indicated that the SNSC’s Committee for Resisting Sanctions has allocated the illicit sale of 300,000 barrels of oil per day to Shamkhani’s Admiral Group Shipping Company. Through illicit oil sales, Hossein Shamkhani is reportedly earning $400 million annually. Leaked documents have also revealed he is also making $2.5 million through illicit petrochemical sales. Despite his key role in sanctions evasion and illicit oil and gas sales – which provide funding for IRGC activities – and money laundering, Hossein Shamkhani has yet to be sanctioned.

Entities:

NAME:	DESCRIPTION:
Islamic Students Association (ISA)	ISA formally operates under the arm of the Office of Supreme Leader and has actively been involved in IRGC-linked radicalization activities in Europe, with more than 40 sub-branches in the continent. Evidence obtained and exposed by UANI has revealed ISA Europe and ISA Britain, both of which operate from London, have facilitated online IRGC radicalization activities in the United Kingdom through the hosting of eight senior IRGC officials, including sanctioned commanders such as Ali Fazli, the deputy coordinator of the IRGC. These talks glorified IRGC terrorism, propagated extreme antisemitism, and called on British students to join an apocalyptic army that would “end the lives of Jews across the world.” ISA Europe and ISA Britain have also hosted, and been in communication with, key commanders belonging to the so-called “Habib Circle” – the regime’s highest informal security-intelligence network, which has committed human rights violations and is involved in terrorist activities
Admiral Group Shipping Company	This company is managed by Hossein and Hassan Shamkhani, sons of Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s supreme leader, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and a former commander of the IRGC’s Navy. There have been charges of corruption in the Shamkhani family, which has mixed business and state affairs. There have been public reports that the IRGC used Admiral Group Shipping Company to send arms to Yemen. A cargo ship owned by Admiral Group Shipping Company was impounded in India, after it was found possessing fake documents and flying a false flag. Leaked documents and reports have revealed Admiral Group Shipping Company is involved in sanctions evasions for the Islamic Republic, not least in relation to oil, gas, and petrochemical sales.

For further information – including private briefings and further sourcing material – please contact Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and Kasra Aarabi, director for IRGC research at UANI, at [email protected]" style="color:#0563c1; text-decoration:underline">[email protected]. They are also on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky and @KasraAarabi.

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Iranian Politics

UANI Top 10 Iran Sanctions Targets

Jason Brodsky and Kasra Aarabi — Mon, 22 Jan 2024 19:06:34 +0000

Today, UANI launches the “UANI Top 10 Iran Sanctions Targets,” a new monthly product that seeks to expose and restrict the nefarious activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both inside and outside of the country. Using primary data and intelligence, UANI experts will identify and publish a list of 10 individuals and entities for the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and other Western allies to target with sanctions. Many of these persons and organizations fly below the radar of public scrutiny. UANI aims to increase awareness of their roles.

Individuals:

NAME:	DESCRIPTION:
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander	Fallahzadeh plays a direct role in coordinating IRGC Quds Force-led terrorist operations against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Syria, as well as arming and supporting Iran-backed terrorist militias, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. He is involved in proliferation of Iranian regime advanced missiles and drones.
Brigadier General Asghar Sabouri, Former IRGC Quds Force Deputy Coordinator	Sabouri has played a direct role in arming and expanding military and logistic capabilities of Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, he has commanded IRGC’s Quds Force’s terrorist and suppressive operations in Iraq and Syria.
Brigadier General Majid Mousavi, IRGC Aerospace Force Deputy Commander	Mousavi functions as the deputy to Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, who is under sanctions. The IRGC Aerospace Force has been responsible for lethal operations against European nationals, including the attack on the Mercer Street vessel which killed two Europeans in 2021. Mousavi has also been heavily involved in the advancement of the IRGC’s missile program, including satellite launch vehicles which employ technology used in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Abdolfatah Ahvazian, IRGC Advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander	Ahvazian, an IRGC commander, functions as an advisor to IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani who is under sanctions. He is actively involved in IRGC Quds Force support for Palestinian terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Ahvazian has disclosed he had foreknowledge of Hamas preparations for the October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel when, on November 23, he revealed the Palestinian terror group had “prepared 8,000 people over the course of one year for this [Al-Aqsa Storm] operation.” He has also played an active role in plotting IRGC-led terrorist operations inside Israel. Ahvazian has likewise assumed a direct role in providing and coordinating IRGC material support to Hamas, including for the construction of the Hamas tunnel network in Gaza. He has sought to exploit U.N. and U.N.-linked NGO channels to deliver such IRGC material support to Gaza. Ahvazian previously served as an advisor to Qassem Soleimani, the former IRGC Quds Force commander.
Seyed Ahmad Ali Ghodsi (a.k.a. Ahmad Ali Moghadesi), Senior Advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander	Ghodsi, an IRGC commander, functions as a senior advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani, who is under sanctions. In this position, Ghodsi plays a direct role in coordinating material and logistical support for IRGC Quds Force terrorist operations in Iraq and Syria, as well as providing broader support to the IRGC Quds Force network of terrorist militias, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. Ghodsi previously served as an advisor to Qassem Soleimani, the former IRGC Quds Force commander, and played a direct role in IRGC Quds Force terrorist operations in Iraq and Syria, as well as supporting illicit IRGC economic activity in Iraq.
Javad Ghaffari, head of IRGC’s Intelligence Organization’s Special Operations Division	In 2021, Ghaffari was ousted from his role as the IRGC Quds Force commander in Syria over a “major breach of Syrian sovereignty at all levels.” In Syria, he was stationed first in Damascus and then later as commander of Iranian regime forces in Aleppo, where he was named the “Butcher of Aleppo.” Since then, Ghaffari has served as the head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization’s Special Operations Division (Unit 4000). He has been behind a series of failed plots to harm Israelis, including in Turkey.
Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Navy (IRIN)	Irani has commanded IRIN as it hijacked commercial vessels like the ST NIKOLAS (f.k.a. SUEZ RAJAN), which was under the supervision of the U.S. Justice Department after cooperating with the U.S. government in seizing oil violating American sanctions that would fund the lethal operations of the IRGC. Irani was also IRIN commander when it hijacked another tanker, ADVANTAGE SWEET, that was chartered by Chevron.
Mojtaba Khamenei, Son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Leading Figure in the Office of Supreme Leader	Mojtaba Khamenei is already under U.S. sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13876. However, the American and European governments should also designate him under their respective Magnitsky Act authorities. Mojtaba Khamenei has been implicated in corruption scandals and human rights abuses. Mojtaba has been implicated in a corruption scandal involving Yas Holding and Tehran municipality. He also controls significant state assets. Mojtaba has played a key commanding role over IRGC and Basij forces in the violent suppression of Iranian civilians, including during the 2009 and 2022 anti-regime protests. Likewise, he has significant influence over the IRGC’s Basij and Intelligence Organization, which have both been implicated in human rights abuses. Mojtaba heads the so-called “Habib Circle” – one of the regime’s highest informal security-intelligence networks – which has committed human rights violations and is involved in terrorist activities.

Entities:

NAME:	DESCRIPTION:
University of Religions and Denominations (URD)	URD has an extensive affiliation with proscribed terrorist entities including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It engages in frequent communication and coordination with designated terrorists, including the IRGC’s Quds Force’s commanders – such as Esmail Qaani – as well as Hezbollah’s leadership, including Naim Qassem, its deputy secretary-general. URD’s Board includes senior IRGC members implicated in human rights violations. URD has officially endorsed and advocated for terrorist attacks on Israel and supported the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks. In the past, URD has partnered with European universities, as UANI has exposed.
Professors Basij Organization (PBO)	The PBO operates as a key arm of the IRGC’s suppressive apparatus across Iranian universities and academic institutions. It is involved in conducting surveillance and active repression – such as forceful “morality policing” – of Iranian academics and students. It seeks to procure sensitive research and technology for the IRGC’s military programs using academic collaborations with foreign universities as cover. The PBO is also the key IRGC entity leading the ongoing purge against Iranian academics and students, resulting in mass suspensions, expulsions, and detainments.

For further information – including private briefings and further sourcing material – please contact Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and Kasra Aarabi, director for IRGC research at UANI, at [email protected]" style="color:#0563c1; text-decoration:underline">[email protected]. They are also on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky and @KasraAarabi.

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Iranian Politics

Implications from the Death of Hamas’ Saleh al-Arouri

Jason Brodsky — Wed, 03 Jan 2024 14:12:32 +0000

Just as the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared to mark the fourth anniversary of the death of the late Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force Qasem Soleimani, news broke that Israel launched an operation that killed Hamas’ deputy politburo head Saleh al-Arouri. Arouri was a high-value target for both Israel and the United States. His demise will shake the IRGC’s Axis of Resistance.

Hamas Deputy Politburo Leader Saleh Al-Arouri

Who is Saleh al-Arouri?

Arouri was born in 1966 near Ramallah. He was one of the founders of the military wing of Hamas—the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The U.S. government sanctioned Arouri as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2015 when he was a member of the Hamas politburo who financed and organized military operations in the West Bank against Israel. He was also subject to a U.S. Rewards for Justice for up to $5 million. The notice cited his complicity in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014, including Naftali Fraenkel, who held American citizenship. The United States also indicted Arouri as a co-conspirator in a Hamas financing racketeering scheme in 2004.

In 2017, Arouri became the deputy leader of Hamas’ politburo. In that same year, Qatar expelled him and Arouri decamped to locations like Lebanon.

Arouri was responsible for drawing Hamas closer to Iran, and spearheaded closer coordination among Hamas, Hezbollah, and the IRGC. Arouri first met Soleimani, then the Quds Force commander, in Syria. As he recounted to an interviewer in 2020, “I met Hajj Qasem for the first time in Damascus. It was in the presence of Abu Walid [Khaled Meshaal], the head of the movement back then. I had heard about Soleimani but had never met him before. So, I met him for the first time in 2010 or 2011. Then the relations grew stronger and there were multiple meetings with Hajj Qasem, recently and when I left for Beirut…I also travelled to Tehran multiple times.”

As Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations said in 2019, “with the help of Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas’ deputy political chief, and Saeed Izadi, the head of the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Quds Force, Iran is trying to turn Judea and Samaria into a fourth military front against Israel.” Arouri played an integral role in the establishment of joint operations rooms consisting of the IRGC, Hamas, and Hezbollah during successive rounds of fighting with Israel, including in April 2023. The IRGC’s Quds Force’s Commander Esmail Ghaani participated in these consultations in Beirut. Additionally, The Wall Street Journal reported that Arouri participated in some of the biweekly meetings held among the IRGC, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since August 2023 in the leadup to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Arouri’s foreknowledge of the events to come on October 7 can be seen in public remarks he made in August 2023 warning that “we are preparing for an all-out war. We are closely discussing the prospects of this war with all relevant parties.” Such comments coinciding with the allegations of biweekly planning discussions among Iran’s broader Axis of Resistance remain significant.

Photo of the Commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force Esmail Ghaani and Hamas Leadership

Iran’s supreme leader will also feel Arouri’s death. Arouri met with Khamenei personally over the years as a Hamas representative, including in 2019. Arouri in that same 2020 interview recalled that during one of those discussions, “the supreme leader said to Hajj Qasem: ‘It is our duty to provide anything the resistance in Palestine and Hamas need.’ Hajj Qasem answered him: ‘I will take care of this.’ Then we had a private meeting. As I’ve told you, he would come up with ideas how to support the resistance with everything it needs.”

L to R: Hamas Deputy Politburo Leader Saleh Al-Arouri and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2019

Next Steps

Arouri’s death sets up a test for Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. He warned Israel in August 2023 that “any assassination on Lebanese soil against a Lebanese, Syrian, Iranian, or Palestinian will be met with a decisive response. We will not tolerate this, and we will not allow Lebanon to become a new killing field for Israel.” Thus far in the post-October 7 context, there were already tensions between Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, with resentments from some Hamas officials that Hezbollah had not escalated in a significant way in support of their organization. But in the end, Nasrallah, in coordination with the Iranian leadership, will weigh multiple equities, including Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon and the balance of deterrence against Israel in deciding on a response. He may escalate, but it will likely be carefully calibrated.

Arouri’s death will also impact Hamas’ future. Reporting surfaced in recent weeks of the division in Hamas leadership between the “Qatari camp”—like Khaled Meshaal and Moussa Abu Marzouk—and the “Iranian camp,” comprised of Arouri and Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar. Both allegedly differ over whether to join the Palestinian Liberation Organization in a new governing structure for Gaza. The demise of Arouri, having been a strong pro-Iran voice in the organization, will influence those deliberations.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.

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Implications of the Death of the IRGC’s Quds Force’s Unit 2250 Commander Razi Mousavi

Jason Brodsky — Thu, 28 Dec 2023 19:22:59 +0000

On December 25, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force’s Unit 2250 in Syria Razi Mousavi was killed in a targeted airstrike near Damascus. Mousavi was an experienced commander, and the grandness of his funeral was a signal as to how important he was to the Iranian system. But the infrastructure that he constructed and operated will remain.

Who was Razi Mousavi?

Mousavi was born in 1964. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served in Zanjan for the IRGC. Accounts indicate Mousavi had been commuting to Lebanon and Syria since the 1980s. Iranian media portrayed Mousavi as part of the late Qasem Soleimani’s inner circle in Syria. Mousavi headed Unit 2250 in Syria, which is responsible for logistics, particularly overseeing weapons shipments and supporting Hezbollah. It also provides escort services to senior IRGC officials and their families in Syria. As head of Unit 2250, Mousavi presided over an enterprise, which included lieutenants Abdollah Ebadi and Meysam Katbi.

This is not the first time Israel has targeted Unit 2250, with an airstrike in September 2022 as one example. The Iranian press has also indicated Mousavi survived multiple assassination attempts. The U.S. government sanctioned Mousavi in 2010 using counterterrorism authorities under Executive Order 13224, calling him a “Syria-based Iranian official who is a key conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah. He provides crucial support to Hezbollah, including financial and material support to the Lebanon-based terrorist group.”

Courtesy of Iran International TV, L:R IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi; Abdollah Ebadi; and Meysam Katbi of IRGC’s Quds Force’s Unit 2250

Amwaj Media also reported Mousavi spearheaded coordination between Assad’s regime and the Quds Force, and was responsible for the supply of the Fateh surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Hezbollah. His stature appeared to increase after the death of Soleimani in January 2020. As the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC Hossein Salami said at his funeral, “he [Mousavi] remained steadfast after [the assassination of] Haj Qasem and accompanied [Commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force Esmail] Ghaani. The enemy knew him better than us because it had received severe blows from him. The enemy knew what role and influence he had on the endless chain of power.” This signaled Mousavi’s integral role in filling the void in Quds Force operations that Soleimani’s departure left. Soleimani was a major general, and outranked Ghaani, Mousavi, Mohammad Reza Zahedi (head of the Quds Force’s Levant operations), and others who were all brigadier generals. Given the singularity and longevity of his tenure, this resulted in a diffusion of power within the Quds Force among the existing cohort of brigadier generals, empowering them in their respective regional assignments, with Soleimani no longer on the scene.

IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi and Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani

A Cog in the IRGC Wheel

Unit 2250 is a subunit of Department 2000 of the IRGC’s Quds Force, which oversees operations in the Levant and is the crown jewel of the Quds Force’s regional departments. It is also known as the Lebanon Corps. IntelliTimes has extensively reported on this Quds Force structure. Unit 2000 is headed by Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Zahedi is a former commander of the IRGC’s Ground Force and Air Force, and previously served as deputy commander of the Quds Force. He was sanctioned by the United States in 2010, in the same tranche as Mousavi.

IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi

With Mousavi being taken off the field, Zahedi overseeing a transition to a replacement for Mousavi will be critical to maintaining the integrity of the Iranian logistics pipeline. Mousavi, whom some accounts place as Unit 2250’s Tehran office’s representative before transitioning to Syria, worked with Mojtaba Abdus, who is the current head of Unit 2250 in the Iranian capital, according to IntelliTimes. Mousavi also likely worked with Reza Safieddine, who is Soleimani’s son-in-law and the son of Hashem Safieddine, the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council. Reza Safieddine manages weapons shipments from Iran to Syria and then to Lebanon using civilian airliners.

Mousavi’s Legacy and Next Targets

The scale of Mousavi’s funeral was reminiscent of Soleimani’s. Iran’s supreme leader played a role on both occasions. Senior IRGC commanders spoke and wept. Soleimani’s daughter Zeinab was among the speakers, with a nod to Mousavi’s close partnership with her husband Reza Safieddine. His likeness has already been adorned on government billboards across Iran, with one billboard placing Mousavi on equal footing with the martyrdoms of Hassan Eyrlou, the former Iranian ambassador to the Houthis in Yemen, Mohammad Hejazi, a senior IRGC commander who served in Lebanon and at one point as its deputy commander-in-chief, Soleimani, and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the father of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

This treatment may seem unusual for someone like Mousavi who commanded a Quds Force unit in Syria. But it was a nod to the importance of Syria in maintaining the flow of arms in Iran’s Axis of Resistance as well as the logistics networks and expertise that Mousavi constructed over the years. While this Quds Force architecture is likely durable enough to absorb the blow of the loss of one of its senior commanders, that does not necessarily mean Mousavi’s death will not be felt. It will reinforce to the Iranians that IRGC officers themselves are in danger of being targeted amid continued attacks on Israel and U.S. forces. It may also instill paranoia in the ranks. There were unconfirmed reports from the Syrian opposition that Mousavi was killed alongside a young woman named Ra’d Dib, which raised suspicions he was engaged in a romantic affair. This, if true, is reminiscent of some reporting on the demise of Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, whose own interludes with a mistress and family issues made him more vulnerable for targeting by foreign intelligence organizations.

In the end, Mousavi is replaceable, particularly with figures like Ebadi and Katbi spending years in Unit 2250 and who remain on the scene. That’s not to mention Abdus as head of Unit 2250’s Tehran office, and there is precedent after Mousavi of transfers from Tehran to Damascus within 2250. U.S. and Israeli intelligence will continue to keep a watchful eye over figures like Zahedi, Saeed Izadi, who operates under Zahedi and leads the IRGC’s Quds Force’s Palestinian Office in Lebanon, and other figures in this orbit as Iran considers its response. There will likely be some form of retaliation, but it will be one in which Tehran carefully calibrates the escalation to avoid a reprisal attack on Iranian soil.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.

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Iranian Politics

Policy Brief on U.S. Diplomacy with Iran

Jason Brodsky — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 20:51:36 +0000

News reports are proliferating about ongoing indirect talks between the United States and Iran, brokered by American partners in the Middle East, such as Oman. The diplomatic arrangement being contemplated would, importantly, not be a revived Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015. Attempts to resuscitate that accord failed after nearly two years of negotiations, while Iran continued the relentless escalation of its nuclear program.

This paper analyzes the current state of play in these indirect discussions, while identifying the weaknesses of the process and the potential pitfalls ahead.

What Product Is Being Negotiated? What Are Its Risks?

Hostages and Iraqi Debts

The broad contours of the diplomacy underway involves a release of the U.S. hostages in Iran, in exchange for Washington greenlighting the release of $7 billion in Iranian assets trapped in South Korean banks and releasing an unknown number of Iranians in U.S. prisons. Three American citizens are currently in prison in Iran: Emad Sharghi, Siamak Namazi, and Morad Tahbaz. A fourth U.S. permanent resident, Shahab Dalili, is also being held. Considering the demands of the Iranian establishment, U.S. negotiators would be wise to insist that all four men be released. Then there is the need to free European nationals as well. According to some estimates by European officials, more than 30 European citizens continue to languish in Iranian jails.

Iranian assets released by Korean banks would reportedly be reserved for humanitarian purposes only. According to the Washington Post, that would be structured via “an arrangement initially authorized by the Trump administration that allowed for purchases of Iranian oil, as long as payments were deposited in banks to which Iran had no access.” The potential transactions could utilize the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement.

Such a mechanism is likely being contemplated due to the precedent established in 2016, when American hostages were released from Tehran and $400 million in cash was flown to their Iranian captors, the first installment of a $1.7 billion settlement the Obama Administration reached with Iran over a payment for military parts dating back to the Pahlavi monarchy. The U.S. government is also likely eyeing the deal Iran reached with Britain over the release of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori, which conditioned repayment of the IMS debt (one over arms to pre-revolutionary Iran) as long as it was “ring-fenced solely for the purchase of humanitarian goods.”

The Biden administration will argue that the deal will deter Iran from taking more hostages. Earmarking the funds solely for humanitarian purposes will prevent the Iranian security establishment from profiting—differentiating it from the 2016 deal. However, questions remain over the safeguards necessary to prevent Iranian diversion, not to mention the impression this type of exchange makes on Tehran. In 2016, the Islamic Republic released four Americans in exchange for a $1.7 billion debt settlement, with a fifth American separately freed. Fast forward to 2023, and Iran would be poised to release three Americans—and potentially four if Dalili or another unknown hostage is included—in exchange for $7 billion in unfrozen assets. The amount of money being released represents a huge increase in the demands made by Iran for the freedom of American hostages, irrespective of the humanitarian conditions attached. That risks emboldening Tehran to take more U.S. hostages. There is a precedent for releasing U.S. hostages from Iran without releasing Iranian funds. That happened during the Trump administration when Xiyue Wang and Michael White were freed from Iran as a part of a prisoner swap.

As a part of this process, there has already been a generous U.S. sanctions waiver issued to allow Iraq, to pay $2.7 billion for Iranian electricity and gas. It is true that the U.S. government has issued such waivers over the course of Democratic and Republican administrations and that the money is technically reserved for basic goods, Haj pilgrims, and partially for repayment of a debt to Turkmenistan. However, the most recent waiver had unusual features, including being paid in Euros, not local currencies as was the case in the past. Also, the amount transferred was much larger than previous iterations. For example, in March 2023, the sanctions waiver was worth $500 million. Additionally, entities that may be involved in the sanctions waivers have checkered histories and links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), like the Commercial Bank of Iraq. That is why understanding whether the Biden administration, before issuing the sanctions waiver, conducted an interagency examination as to the risk of diversion of such debts to the IRGC is important.

Nuclear and Non-Nuclear

The U.S. government likely views the release of American hostages as an opening gambit for further “de-escalation.” The leaks from the indirect negotiations outline an arrangement where Iran would cap its nuclear enrichment at 60 percent purity, which would then be down-blended to at least 20 percent purity to prevent any accumulation; halt any further installation and operation of advanced centrifuges; enhance cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); pause lethal attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria; and agree not to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia, although some reports indicate the arrangement includes drones as well.

In return, Iran expects the unfreezing of billions more dollars of Iranian assets, which would be officially ring-fenced for humanitarian purposes; Washington to refrain from tightening sanctions and seizing oil tankers; and not pursuing nuclear-related resolutions against the Islamic Republic at the United Nations and the IAEA.

It is important to underscore that this understanding is not the JCPOA. It appears to incorporate some lessons learned from that failed diplomatic endeavor and notably includes both nuclear and non-nuclear elements. For years, the central thesis of U.S. negotiators was that putting Iran’s nuclear program in a box would make it easier to tackle the panoply of non-nuclear threats the Islamic Republic posed to the international community. The fact that the current negotiation is not strictly focused on the nuclear file is an admission that it is impossible to have a durable diplomatic agreement with Iran without addressing non-nuclear concerns—hence the inclusion of issues like Iran’s arming of Russia and strikes on American forces in the Middle East. United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has been preaching this reality for years and, if the negotiations reporting is accurate, it represents a paradigm shift in U.S. diplomatic strategy.

Nevertheless, the terms raise many concerns. First, Iranian decision-makers have witnessed the slow-motion collapse of the international negotiating position on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Before 2013, U.S. and Europe insisted on zero enrichment. In fact, it was enshrined in U.N. Security Council resolutions. Specifically, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006) “demands…that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” Fast forward to 2023, and U.S. diplomats are considering an agreement that risks legitimizing 60 percent enrichment, despite Iran having no credible civilian need for enrichment at this level. The E3 has called it “unprecedented and extremely grave.” But there is a risk that Tehran interprets these warnings as hollow, thus undermining deterrence and the non-proliferation regime.

Second, questions also surround the non-nuclear elements of this understanding. For example, what happens if the Islamic Republic disclaims responsibility for an attack by one of its proxies or partners on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria? Also, will attacks on U.S. persons be deemed acceptable in countries other than Iraq and Syria? What about the attempted assassinations of American citizens on U.S. soil? Moreover, is the U.S. government confident that diplomacy with Iran’s deputy foreign minister in Oman, who has no authority over Tehran’s regional policies, will be binding on the IRGC and has the supreme leader assented to this provision? How will it be policed? Lastly, how will Iran’s arms transfers to Moscow be monitored, and is it only limited to missiles or drones as well? What about the ammunition and technical expertise Tehran has been providing Moscow?

Some observers may argue that the sultan of Oman’s visit to Tehran, where he met with the supreme leader, indicates that these diplomatic elements have his blessing. However, this assumption is made without the IRGC playing a visible role in these discussions. Tehran will certainly continue to escalate and push the envelope in other theaters not nominally covered by any understanding, while Washington appears anxious to de-escalate. This dynamic could be seen when the Islamic Republic’s naval forces recently attempted to seize two tankers and fired on one managed by U.S. oil company Chevron.

Third, U.S. officials appear quite concerned about releasing assets to Iran without any strings attached. The JCPOA included billions of dollars-worth of sanctions relief without controls on how those funds could be spent. These provisions were subject to immense bipartisan criticism, which ultimately led to the JCPOA’s unraveling. The 2023 diplomacy is attempting to install some safeguards. That should be welcome news. But money is fungible, and the relief provided to the Islamic Republic for humanitarian transactions may free up other assets for furthering its defense and repressive security apparatus. U.S. policymakers should be made to explain the U.S. strategy and how the protections built into this arrangement will ensure that any released assets will not be diverted to the IRGC or other problematic actors.

Fourth, reports about Iran’s demands in these negotiations have been vague. There are suggestions that Iran expects the U.S. to refrain from tightening sanctions but it is not clear if this refers to nuclear or non-nuclear sanctions. Clarity on these points is essential, especially given current efforts to counter Iran’s ongoing human rights abuses and the use of economic sanctions to further the goals of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. There is also the risk that if the United States does not aggressively enforce sanctions, then the understanding being developed will quickly become a permanent, rather than an interim, step. The Iranians have already grown complacent due to lax American sanctions enforcement. Tehran may calculate that it can keep its nuclear infrastructure and advancements, while benefitting from U.S. risk-aversion and self-deterrence in this case. Further advancements in its nuclear program and the hardening of its nuclear infrastructure will also make a credible military option more challenging, especially for Israel if Russia transfers the S-400 air defense system to Iran as compensation for Iranian assistance in Ukraine.

Likewise, an American agreement not to pursue resolutions against Tehran at the United Nations and the IAEA are problematic if true. This is an urgent issue, as arms restrictions on Iran are shrinking quickly. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, included an arms embargo on Iran that expired in October 2020. Restrictions on the regime’s missile program will lapse next in October 2023. The United States and especially Europe are attempting to ensure their respective national authorities are primed for the expiration of these provisions, but China and Russia will likely interpret it as providing legal cover to assist Iran in developing its missile program. While press reports suggest Tehran may not send missiles to Russia as a part of this pending agreement, that does not necessarily stop Russia from helping Iran advance its missile program—including via materials, equipment, technology, and training that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems—which would have been barred under international law if Resolution 2231’s limitations remained in place.

U.S. Domestic Politics

One of the reasons the JCPOA was not long for this world was its lack of bipartisan support. This underscores the need for Washington to engage in the hard work of alleviating the concerns of U.S. lawmakers and its allies and partners—in addition to its Iranian negotiating counterparts.

The need for congressional buy-in is why the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015 was signed into law. The Biden Administration has been too clever by half in public by denying an “agreement” or “deal” with Iran is in the offing to avoid INARA review. However, INARA defines “agreement” quite broadly. The text specifies that it applies to one “regardless of the form it takes.” The Act can capture “understandings”—whether informal or formal—as well as ones that may not be written, although it would be hard to believe that diplomacy of this nature would not be in writing.

The Biden administration risks inflaming an already deeply partisan conversation over Iran policy by not engaging with legislators. Lawmakers have appeared blindsided in public, despite an all-Senators briefing by the U.S. deputy secretary of state in May. Other questions surround the White House decision to task the National Security Council—as opposed to the U.S. State Department—with the nuts and bolts of diplomacy with Iran. Perhaps it is because oversight of the NSC is more difficult for legislators than the U.S. State Department. This could be an attempt to insulate whatever understanding is being developed from scrutiny, which would be a mistake. If the Biden Administration is confident in its negotiating product, it should not be afraid to sell it to key constituencies.

Congress has a role to play as well. Oversight of the executive branch has been severely lacking as it relates to Iran. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has not held a single public oversight committee hearing specifically focused on Iran policy since 2020. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has a slightly better record, having held one in 2022. Significant developments have occurred inside Iran, and there should be commensurate public conversations on the policy responses and ramifications.

This is especially true given that U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley’s security clearance has been suspended over an investigation into his mishandling of classified information. Malley’s appointment was controversial from the beginning and multiple members of the U.S. negotiating team resigned during his tenure. Now he has been placed on unpaid leave. Congress and the American public deserve explanations.

But to date, there has been more silence than substance coming from the administration on its Iran policy. It refuses to declare the JCPOA of 2015 officially dead despite negotiations to revive it having effectively ended; it denies reports of “agreements” or “deals,” which belie regular press reports about ongoing indirect diplomacy; and most recently, it dodges questions about the U.S. special envoy’s status. The president himself has a visible discomfort when speaking about Iran and is rarely asked about it by the media. Nevertheless, avoiding confronting Iran to concentrate on China and Ukraine—what the U.S. government considers its more pressing priorities—should not be the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar in the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.

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Iranian Politics

The China-brokered Agreement Between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Jason Brodsky — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 20:27:43 +0000

On March 10, 2023, China brokered a deal to normalize relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia after Riyadh severed ties following an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016. The three countries announced, “that an agreement has been reached…to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months, and the agreement includes their affirmation of the respect for the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.”

Win-Win-Win

China can showcase its prowess as not only an economic actor but also a diplomatic one in the Middle East. Iran can boast of a victory on the world stage after months of mounting international isolation over its nuclear program, the protests enveloping its country, and its supply of arms to Russia for use against Ukraine. It also reinforces the supreme leader’s vision of a resistance economy neutralizing sanctions and broadly fits into his strategic pivot to the East, deepening partnerships with Moscow and Beijing. Iranian officials may calculate they have also slowed down expansion of the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia at the same time can remind Washington that it has other options in the region after a years-long perception that the United States is disengaging from the Middle East. It also is interested in ensuring a stable investment environment as it implements Vision 2030.

The Problems of U.S. Policy

Perceptions of U.S. disengagement harken back to the Obama administration, when the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) was concluded and traditional U.S. partners in the region felt the deal compromised their security interests by infusing Tehran with sanctions relief while leaving its missile and drone programs and support for terror proxies unaddressed. U.S. messaging over a pivot to Asia heightened such concerns. The lack of a U.S. response during the Trump administration to the attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure at Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019 increased the urgency for Gulf Arab states to rebuild channels of communication with Tehran to deescalate. President Biden also undermined the confidence of U.S. partners when he pledged to make the Saudi government a pariah during his campaign, delisted the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, and prioritized a return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA above all else early on in his administration.

Problems Ahead

But the soaring rhetoric portraying China as a peacemaker willing to wield its considerable leverage over Tehran through its purchases of oil in defiance of U.S. sanctions belies its record. The Chinese Communist Party has in practice underwritten support for Tehran’s terror proxies through these energy transfers and provided a permissive environment for Tehran to procure parts to advance its missile and drone programs. Beijing has also repeatedly voted against censure resolutions of Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors—which has not been helpful in increasing pressure on Tehran.

Likewise, the existence of full diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia historically has not automatically resulted in meaningful rapprochement. While both countries had diplomatic relations in 2011, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force plotted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States at a Georgetown restaurant. That is not to mention that the war in Yemen began in 2014 while embassies were still open.

This warming of ties between Riyadh undercuts U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. American and Gulf Cooperation Council officials have repeatedly warned that regional diplomatic efforts “will not succeed if Iran continues to provoke a nuclear crisis.” Thus, this initiative risks reinforcing to Iranian decision-makers that they can advance their nuclear program without paying any meaningful costs. In fact, they are already being rewarded through the reopening of embassies with U.S. partners without even reining in their nuclear program.

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U.K. Iran Policy Recommendations

Jason Brodsky — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:17:30 +0000

The Anglo-American bond is based on common interests and values. This should enable the two nations to develop a shared, robust strategy to thwart Iran’s malign activities at home and abroad.

In light of Iran’s supply of lethal weaponry to Russia for use against an EU candidate country Ukraine, its sponsorship of terrorism, and its human rights abuses, the U.K. government should pursue new effective policies, including: designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a proscribed terrorist organization; leading an effort in the U.N. Security Council to snapback sanctions on Iran under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231; downgrading diplomatic relations with Tehran; and sanctioning Iran’s top leadership.

A Shared History

Iran’s leadership has consistently labeled the U.K. as the “Old Fox” while America has been known as the “Great Satan” in regime lore. Relations over the past four decades have been peppered by malicious Iranian activities targeting British interests. At its founding in 1979, militants assaulted the British as well as the American embassies in Tehran. In 1987, during the height of the Iran-Iraq War, when Tehran accused London of supporting Saddam Hussein’s war effort, Iranian agents kidnapped and beat Edward Chaplin, the first secretary of the British interests section at the Swedish embassy in Tehran. In 2007, the IRGC detained Royal Navy sailors patrolling the Persian Gulf. In 2011, Iranian protesters stormed the United Kingdom’s embassy in Tehran—an incident which the British ambassador claimed was “with the acquiescence and the support of the state.”

In recent years, the United Kingdom has arrested Iranian proxies for attempted assassinations and other terrorist threats on British soil, including the stockpiling of bomb-making materials on the outskirts of London in 2015. Relations have worsened markedly since 2019, which saw Iran detain a British-flagged tanker in response to marines detaining an Iranian tanker destined to illegally export oil to Syria’s Assad regime. Iran continues to jail American and British dual-nationals who have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges without due process, including Morad Tahbaz. In January 2020, Iran went as far as arresting the British ambassador for his attendance at a vigil for the victims of the IRGC’s downing of a Ukrainian jetliner.

That is not to mention the serious threats against Iranian diaspora media networks like Iran International TV in London over 2022 and 2023, where IRGC-linked hostile surveillance teams and other threats have prompted the need for police protection for its senior executives and staff. As the director-general of MI5 recently revealed, the U.K. government has “seen at least ten” potential kidnapping or assassination threats against British or U.K.-based individuals perceived as enemies of the regime since January 2022 alone. There was a significant escalation in January 2023, when Tehran executed Alireza Akbari, a British-Iranian dual-national who was a former regime official. Akbari was reportedly lured back to Tehran by his old friend the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani and later detained. British officials assess this is the first time since the 1980s when the Iranian government has executed a dual-national.

It is therefore in Britain’s interests to take a tougher approach on Iran, especially given that negotiations over reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 appear dead. As the chair of the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Alicia Kearns recently said, “no more can Iran set the parameters for our relationship.”

Recommendations:

Designation of the IRGC as a Proscribed Terrorist Organization

In an unprecedented move, the U.S. government designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in April 2019. Adding the IRGC to this hall of infamy was the first time Washington styled a state organ as an FTO—and despite the many doomsday predictions which followed, it did not produce a war. The United States had previously sanctioned the IRGC as a terrorist organization under existing authorities like Executive Order 13224. But the FTO decision represented a force multiplier in the existing U.S. sanctions architecture against Iran by criminalizing the knowing provision of material support to the IRGC with extraterritorial reach.

The United Kingdom maintains a similar list of proscribed terrorist organizations. Pursuant to the Terrorism Act of 2000, the home secretary is charged with proscribing such organizations if he/she “believes it is concerned in terrorism, and it is proportionate to do.” Accordingly, this means the organization “commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”

The IRGC clearly meets these criteria, given its record in threatening British nationals dating back to the 1980s. News accounts indicate that elements of the IRGC were responsible for the abduction and assault on U.K. diplomat Edward Chaplin in 1987. In 2007, Shiite militants, under the direction of the IRGC, kidnapped British computer expert Peter Moore and murdered four British security guards in Iraq. In 2016, 40 Iranian state media outlets contributed $600,000 as a bounty for the death of British-American author Salman Rushdie on the anniversary of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Rushdie for his publication of The Satanic Verses. One of the outlets, Fars News Agency, is affiliated with the IRGC and committed $30,000 alone to the bounty, and Iran’s supreme leader’s own website has affirmed the 1989 Khomeini fatwa. In the summer of 2022, this incitement likely led to the stabbing of Rushdie in New York, where he lost sight in one eye and use of a hand. The culprit in the case sympathized with IRGC leadership—including the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and its proxy Hezbollah—and may even have had contact with the IRGC. This incident caused the U.S. government to sanction the 15 Khordad Foundation, subordinate to Khamenei’s office, which maintains a multi-million dollar bounty on Rushdie to this day. That’s not to mention the IRGC’s seizure of the Stena Impero and the attempted impoundment of the British Heritage in 2019 or the IRGC’s Aerospace Force’s droning of the Mercer Street in July 2021, which resulted in the death of a U.K. national.

Any of these incidents would fall under the United Kingdom’s definition of terrorism.[1] The Chaplin abduction involved “serious violence against a person” given his severe beating. It was also “designed to influence the government” for the purpose of “advancing a political cause” given Iran’s accusations of British complicity in Saddam Hussein’s onslaught during the Iran-Iraq War. Ditto for the seizure of Peter Moore, which endangered his life, and was likely committed to intimidate U.K. forces stabilizing Iraq. Salman Rushdie’s experience is also terrorism since the Khomeini fatwa and Khamenei’s affirmation were threats of action which endangered his life; they were intended to intimidate the public’s free expression; and were undertaken “for the purpose of advancing a religious cause.” IRGC satellites—including a member of Hezbollah—have attempted to kill Rushdie in the past, including Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh, a Hezbollah member, who died when a book bomb he wanted to use to target Rushdie exploded in a London hotel in 1989. Hezbollah had vowed to carry out the Khomeini fatwa.

The capture of the Stena Impero and attempted apprehension of the British Heritage is also terrorism—it involved the use and threat of action which involves serious damage to property—the vessels—and created a serious risk to the health or safety of a section of the public. This piracy was also designed to influence the government—specifically its lawful seizure of the Grace 1—and was undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political cause—namely the Islamic Republic’s desire for political retribution and intimidation of the government of the United Kingdom to provide Tehran with the sanctions relief it is desperately seeking. The IRGC’s attack on the Mercer Street likewise meets the definition of terrorism as the launch of a lethal drone at the Mercer Street merchant vessel resulted in the death of two European nationals and was a “deliberate and targeted attack,” according to G7 foreign ministers. It was designed to influence the public given the ship’s perceived connection to Israel.

The last consideration is whether the proscription would be proportionate.[2] Such a designation would be entirely proportionate. The U.K. government has already led the way in joining the United States in proscribing Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organization in March 2019. Hezbollah is a satellite of the IRGC. Some estimates indicate Iran in recent years has supplied Hezbollah with over $800 million annually—accounting for over three-quarters of the organization’s budget. The same goes for Bahrain’s al-Ashtar Brigades, an Iranian proxy, which is proscribed by both the U.S. and U.K. governments. Indeed, in the past, the United Kingdom has sanctioned the IRGC’s top brass in their individual capacities—Hossein Salami, the IRGC’s commander-in-chief, and Qassem Soleimani, the former head of its Quds Force, have both appeared on its financial sanctions target list. If the home secretary has found Hezbollah and the al-Ashtar Brigades to be threats to the United Kingdom, their patron, the IRGC, surely shares that status. Likewise, if Britain has a history of sanctioning senior IRGC commanders, the militia’s characterization as a terrorist organization is appropriate.

Lastly, one of the factors the U.K. government is required to consider is “the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.” Supporting the U.S. government’s groundbreaking decision to name the IRGC as an FTO—and in the process thwarting the IRGC’s enduring threat to the United Kingdom and transnational repression—is in Britain’s national interests. Indeed, there’s growing support for such a move—in 2023 the U.K. House of Commons unanimously passed a resolution calling for its proscription.

SnapBack Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 enshrined and endorsed the JCPOA. Despite the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Resolution 2231 remains in effect. The international arms embargo imposed on Iran under Resolution 2231 expired on October 18, 2020. This means that the supply, sale, or transfer of any guns, howitzers, mortars, battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems to or from Iran no longer requires U.N. Security Council approval. U.N. member-states are also no longer obligated to prevent such arms-transfers from Iran. The expiration of this arms embargo is already having immediate destabilizing effects, providing Iran and Russia legal cover to transfer lethal drones and potentially soon surface-to-surface missiles for use against civilians and critical infrastructure in Ukraine. According to press reports, Russia may in turn be poised to send Iran Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, which would have been prohibited had the U.N. arms embargo on Iran remained in effect. Likewise, by October 18, 2023, Resolution 2231’s restrictions on Iran’s missile program expire. It is this very provision which London and its allies are relying on to hold Iran accountable for its proliferation of drones to Russia as models like the Shahed-136 that are being sent to Moscow are embargoed under the resolution.

UANI has been warning of these JCPOA sunsets for years. Such expirations directly threaten U.K. security. Hossein Salami, the IRGC’s commander-in-chief, warned in 2017 that Iran is prepared to increase the range of its missiles to greater than 2,000 kilometers, threatening Britain and potentially the United States. Salami said, “[i]f we have kept the range of our missiles to 2,000 kilometers, it’s not due to lack of technology… We are following a strategic doctrine…So far we have felt that Europe is not a threat, so we did not increase the range of our missiles. But if Europe wants to turn into a threat, we will increase the range of our missiles.” Resolution 2231’s sunsets only enable such blackmail.

Given the deep freeze in the negotiations over reviving the JCPOA and the urgency of the war in Ukraine, the U.K. government should support snapback sanctions which would restore the pre-JCPOA international arms restrictions architecture, like U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929.[3] The JCPOA, in its current form, should be declared dead.

Diplomatic Isolation

The U.K. government currently maintains full diplomatic relations with Iran. London’s ambassador to Iran is Simon Shercliff, while Iran maintains representation at the chargé d'affaires level. There are reportedly around 10-15 Iranian diplomats in the United Kingdom. In addition, the U.K. government allows the Islamic Center of England to operate, despite serving as effectively a representative office of Iran’s supreme leader on British soil. Its director, Seyed Hashem Moosavi, was appointed directly by Khamenei. British media exposed how the Islamic Center of England was given £100,000 from a Covid-19 aid program sponsored by the U.K. government.

This is not to mention the troubling reports that schoolchildren were given special classes honoring the late Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, who had the blood of British troops on his hands. The Jewish Chronicle reported mosques in London, Luton, Birmingham, and Manchester, which all have charitable status and are entitled to U.K. tax breaks, “organized the events including at least two where children were encouraged to learn about Soleimani’s life.” There are additional concerning indications, reported by The Jewish Chronicle, that The Islamic College (ICL), affiliated with Middlesex University, may be linked to Al-Mustafa International University. Al-Mustafa International University is a recruiting ground for the IRGC’s Quds Force, and the U.S. government has levied terrorism sanctions on the university. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, “the IRGC’s Quds Force uses Al-Mustafa University to develop student exchanges with foreign universities for the purposes of indoctrinating and recruiting foreign sources. Al-Mustafa has facilitated unwitting tourists from western countries to come to Iran, from whom IRGC Quds Force members sought to collect intelligence.” This is all the more concerning given the active Iranian terror threats on U.K. soil.

The U.K. Charity Commission, in turn, has opened a statutory inquiry into the Islamic Center of England over serious governance concerns. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom clearly has allowed Iran’s regime a permissive environment for influence operations. Downgrading diplomatic relations and shuttering Khamenei’s representative office should be a first step in reducing the Iranian regime’s European footprint. The U.K. government has a long history of engaging in such moves. In 1989, after Khomeini’s fatwa was issued calling for the killing of Salman Rushdie, Britain broke diplomatic relations. In 1990, after partial diplomatic relations were restored, the U.K. government accused Iran of engaging with the outlawed Irish Republican Army (IRA), which resulted in the expulsion of diplomats. Given the assassination and kidnapping plots hatched by the Iranian state targeting individuals residing in the United Kingdom over the last year, that should provide enough impetus to declare discrete Iranian diplomats personae non-grata and to withdraw the British ambassador from Tehran. The incidents in 1989 and 1994 provide the precedents.

Sanctioning the Khamenei Family and President Ebrahim Raisi

The U.K. government should also personally sanction Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his son Mojtaba Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi for human rights abuses. The U.S. government has already sanctioned all three of these men under Executive Order 13876, which targets the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader and his appointees. The U.K. government has in the past sanctioned Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. There is no reason why Iran’s supreme leader should be treated any differently given his singular role in the four decades of the Islamic Republic’s bloodstained rule. Additionally, the U.K. government has even sanctioned the wife of Bashar al-Assad—Asma al-Assad, who holds U.K. citizenship. Mojtaba Khamenei, who wields great influence in his father’s office and holds no U.K. citizenship, should be similarly sanctioned. There have been allegations that Mojtaba was linked to a $1.6 billion bank account that the U.K. government seized in 2009.

Conclusion

Along with the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom comes a special responsibility to jointly combat global threats such as Iran. With likely greater foreign policy latitude, Brexit provides the United Kingdom with an opportunity for a reset on Iran policy. The Islamic Republic, rather than acting like a normal country, remains a radical cause. These recommendations will go a long way in recognizing that truth and dealing with it effectively.

Endnotes

Terrorism, according to the Terrorism Act of 2000, “means the use or threat of action which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and must be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”
According to the U.K. criteria, “In considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Secretary of State will take into account other factors, including: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the UK; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.”
Instead of “calls upon” standard adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Resolution 1929 stated, “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take… necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.”

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What Could the Top Contenders for Prime Minister Mean for UK Iran Policy?

Daniel Roth — Mon, 18 Jul 2022 21:33:39 +0000

The three leading candidates to take over as Britain’s new Prime Minister are Rishi Sunak, Liz Truss, and Penny Mordaunt. What do we know about their positions on Iran, and could anything change depending on the winner?

Rishi Sunak

Sunak’s foreign policy positions beyond support for Brexit are not in evidence. Before becoming an MP in 2014, Sunak carved out a career in finance, while his ministerial portfolios have been understandably limited to big Treasury jobs including his current post as Chancellor.

Sunak’s voting record offers few clues either. He voted in favor of British military strikes against ISIS in 2015 and for updating Britain’s Trident nuclear deterrent program - but so did almost every other Conservative MP.

If Sunak has considered the future of the Anglo-Iranian relationship at all, his domestic emphasis on Britain’s finances might sway him toward a pro-trade rationale and attendant support for the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal). This would echo the confused thinking of the UK’s former Iran Trade Envoy Lord Lamont – another Tory Chancellor – who told UANI in 2016 that “greater trade with Iran…[will] strengthen moderate…elements” and later described the U.S. pullout as “catastrophic.”

So the Chancellor does not seem to have strong foreign policy convictions, or they are at least not a matter of public record. Coupled with his recent appreciative comments about Johnson, another big JCPOA supporter who begged President Trump not to pull out of the nuclear deal, a Sunak government would suggest a continuation of his former boss’ Iran policy: ongoing support for the JCPOA as a ‘least bad’ option to restrain and possibly moderate Iran in the long-term.

Liz Truss

While we can only speculate on Sunak, we have clearer indications about the views of Liz Truss.

As Foreign Secretary from 2021, she has had two priorities on Iran.

First was getting British hostages out of the country. He efforts ultimately led to the release of Nazarin Zaghari-Radcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori. This week, she used this as proof of her leadership credentials.

This is not exactly the big win as framed.

While obviously a happy outcome for the victims and their families, there is no doubt that Britain was forced to pay handsomely. Truss ignored the appeal, “Don’t give in to Iran’s blackmail by paying £400 million to free Nazanin.” Under her watch, Britain paid £400m in ransom money (or as the UK Government described it, “historical debt”) in a “carefully choreographed set of diplomatic manoeuvres” – but clearly breaking the “do not negotiate with terrorists” mantra.

Her other priority has been the revival of the JCPOA. Her repeated references to getting “Iran back to the [negotiating] table” suggests she is a true believer in the value of the deal.

Her tenure as Foreign Secretary contrasts with her predecessor, Dominic Raab, who warned in January 2020 that Iran was “marching toward pariah status.” He cheered the U.S. decision to kill IRGC major-general Soleimani, slammed Iran’s arrest of the UK ambassador in Tehran, and sanctioned the naval seizure of Iranian oil off Gibraltar.

Despite her reputation as a “human hand grenade,” which she admits to enjoy, Truss has not demonstrated similar resolve on Iran.

On the other side of the ledger, however, she has stoutly defended Britain’s ties to Arab states and floated the notion of a “Liberty Network” of like-minded countries. With a “conviction politician” as Prime Minister – who has been resolute against Russia – Truss could connect the dots and realize that Britain should likewise adopt much tougher policies against Tehran.

Penny Mordaunt

Although behind Sunak in the official tally, Mordaunt was until recently the bookmakers’ favorite owing to her popularity among Tory party members, who have the ultimate say in the final paired run-off.

There are plenty of clues regarding her views on Iran.

Mordaunt served a short but eventful stint as Defense Minister from May to July in 2019 before being ousted by incoming Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Through this period Iran was upping threats against commercial shipping including against British vessels in the Persian Gulf. Mordaunt, herself a Royal Navy reservist, noted that it was “vital that we send a very clear message to Iran that we want them to step back from this situation, that we want them to de-escalate, but we have always and we will continue to protect shipping and the free flow of goods in that area.”

Mordaunt also strongly condemned Iran for its downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020, among whose 176 victims were three Britons.

And back in 2013, Mordaunt highlighted the ongoing threat of Iran (as well as Russia) during a House of Commons debate on Britain’s nuclear force:

Of the three candidates, Mordaunt has shown most awareness of the threat that Iran poses, and has been most outspoken in condemning its malign behavior, and not just during her 85-day spell as Defense Minister. Like Tom Tugendhat – another candidate with military experience who is unusually hawkish on Iran in the British context – her experience with the Royal Navy (she was named after HMS Penelope) appears to have sharpened her appreciation of Iran’s destabilizing actions across the region.

Conclusion

For almost ten years since the initial negotiations that led to the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, Britain has been a consistent advocate for the deal. A unilateral withdrawal like the United States has never really been on the cards, despite the chance to carve an independent foreign policy unshackled from the EU. It would be surprising if any of the three top contenders would push for the exit.

But there are voices inside Parliament doing just that. On June 30, 2022, Conservative MP Robert Jenrick opened up the idea of an exit:

Whatever one’s thoughts about the JCPOA, the fundamentally different circumstances we face today must be confronted. It is always easy to stick with what one has been involved in for a long time; of course there is pride among those who have negotiated relentlessly on this issue, both here in the UK, in the Foreign Office, and particularly in the Biden Administration, among those officials who were previously in the Obama Administration. However, it is time to appreciate what has happened in the seven years since the deal was signed.

Wise words that the new Prime Minister should heed. But even if the eventual winner decides to stick with the deal, the choice of Prime Minister could make a difference to other important Iran items outside of the JCPOA: the shuttering of London’s Iranian terror banks, the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group in its entirety, and tougher pushback against Iran-sponsored terrorism. The 2021 parliamentary committee report, “No Prosperity Without Justice: the UK’s Relationship With Iran,” also presents a far more realistic blueprint than Britain’s current policy.

Sunak’s priorities are likely to be heavily domestic and suggest the continuation of the status quo. As Foreign Secretary, Truss has not proved as robust as her reputation might have indicated, but her “Liberty Network” ideas and defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council might lead to stronger action. From the available evidence, Mordaunt appears best-placed to move the needle on these items – if she decides to follow words with action.

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Iranian Politics

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Intelligence Organization in Transition

Jason Brodsky — Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:07:31 +0000

L to R: Mohammad Kazemi, the new head of the IRGC-IO and Hossein Taeb, his predecessor

There is one man in the Iranian system who had a great deal to lose amid the multiple mysterious assassinations and explosions gripping the country. The now former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) Hossein Taeb has operated in the shadows. A longtime favored disciple of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Taeb has been a fearsome player in the security establishment. The fact that the Israeli government publicly implicated Taeb as frantically plotting against its tourists in Turkey as the Iranian leadership considered whether to replace him signaled more than just the growing foreign threat that the IRGC-IO poses. It was a hint of trouble in the ranks in Tehran.

Who is Hossein Taeb?

Early Years and Path to Power

Taeb was born in 1963 in Tehran. He received his clerical education in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, having been Khamenei’s student at the dawn of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Taeb thereafter joined the IRGC in 1982 as the Iran-Iraq War raged. One of his brothers, Hossein, was killed in battle. It was during this time that Taeb developed important relationships as he served in the Habib Battalion alongside Khamenei’s son Mojtaba. These contacts would power his rise in later years.

Taeb soon found himself as the head of counter-intelligence at the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). During the presidential administration of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Taeb was pushed out of MOIS for machinations triggering internal strife among officials as well as reportedly falsifying cases against Rafsanjani’s children. Nevertheless, Khamenei protected Taeb, and found a landing spot for him in the Office of the Supreme Leader as a deputy coordinator. This shows how Taeb capitalized on Khamenei being his teacher and Mojtaba being an associate as an insurance policy for a controversial career. He was also operating at the center of a very politically fraught and sensitive inter-personal dynamic between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, as Khamenei sought to secure his position in the early years of his supreme leadership despite owing his career, in part, to Rafsanjani, who vouched for him at the Assembly of Experts, which anointed Khamenei as Ruhollah Khomeini’s successor.

Taeb held his position in the Office of the Supreme Leader during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, where he was at the forefront of a crackdown spearheaded by Iran’s deep state, embodied by Khamenei’s network, on Khatami’s reformist allies. During this time period, Taeb was implicated in the case of a Helmut Hofer, a German businessman, who was reportedly taken hostage with his girlfriend while on a trip to Tehran in September 1997. The tale became more sordid when, according to an audio tape that later surfaced which was transcribed by Iran Wire, Reza Golpour, the former editor of Ammarion, who was arrested in 2016 and sentenced to prison, alleged that Taeb’s father-in-law Ali Akbar Mousavi Hosseini was framed by German authorities in a compromising situation with a woman in Germany in response to the Hofer case to put pressure on Tehran to release him.

During the Khatami presidency, Taeb also tended to his roots as a guardsman and became the head of the cultural department of the IRGC’s Imam Hossein University. In the 2005 presidential election, Taeb was involved in Mojtaba Khamenei’s early support for the candidacy of future Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf before switching to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who eventually won.

The Basij and the 2009 Election Unrest

Later, Taeb occupied roles as cultural deputy of the IRGC’s Joint Staff, deputy commander of the Basij, and eventually commander of the Basij. Taeb was elevated as commander in July 2008 to thwart cultural infiltration. But he was soon tested during the unrest after the disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2009. The U.S. Treasury Department, along with the European Union, sanctioned Taeb for his role at the time, saying, “forces under Taeb’s command participated in beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful protestors.” Some inside the regime were cognizant of this brutality as then Intelligence Minister Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei allegedly reported to Iran’s supreme leader, without Ahmadinejad’s knowledge, that Taeb was a security risk because of unspecified crimes he committed against prisoners following the election. Soon after the election, Mohseni-Ejei left his post. Ahmadinejad, after he left office, accused Taeb of being “psychologically imbalanced.” He also said he opposed his appointment as head of the IRGC-IO because he would foment conflict between the government and other state institutions.

Following the electoral unrest, in October 2009, Iran’s supreme leader instituted structural reforms to the IRGC—with the Basij being officially absorbed in the IRGC and more integrated into its Ground Forces. As scholar Ali Alfoneh noted at the time, the Basij encountered difficulties in thwarting the protests after Ahmadinejad’s disputed reelection, particularly in urban areas, but had greater success in the provincial areas. Perhaps in a sign of disaffection, Taeb, despite only serving a short stint as Basij commander, was replaced with Mohammad Reza Naghdi. Taeb’s relatively brief tenure contrasted with his predecessor, Mohammad Hejazi, who served for around nine years in the role, but other commanders of the Basij served abbreviated periods as well. Taeb differed from Hejazi in that the latter came to the Basij with a more significant military background, whereas Taeb was steeped in the intelligence services. Taeb overlapped in some qualities with Naghdi in that the latter headed the Iranian police’s counter-intelligence service prior to his elevation as commander of the Basij. But Naghdi, unlike Taeb, also had more significant military experience as a commander of the Badr Brigade and fighting in Bosnia.

Center: Hossein Taeb

The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization

Taeb, despite the problems the Basij encountered during the electoral unrest, still managed to land a coveted slot as head of the IRGC’s newly formed Intelligence Organization—likely once again owing to his personal connection to Iran’s supreme leader and his son Mojtaba. This is a familiar theme in Taeb’s career—notwithstanding controversy and setbacks—Khamenei always managed to take care of him and ensure he remained a part of the Iranian system.

The IRGC’s intelligence branch was given a more formal and powerful structure and refashioned into a standing Intelligence Organization, and Khamenei placed Taeb at the helm in a move to solidify his control over the Iranian intelligence community after a period that shook the foundations of the Islamic Republic. Unlike the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), whose minister also nominally reports to the president, the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization would be under the direct and sole control of the Office of the Supreme Leader. Taeb, having experience at MOIS and Khamenei’s office, would therefore bring considerable authority to his new role. One Iranian news outlet, the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) speculated that Taeb had been selected as the inaugural head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization due to his skills “in light of the enemy’s focus on the soft warfare and the promotion of the IRGC’s intelligence division to an Intelligence Organization led by Taeb, who is familiar with various kinds of intelligence and soft warfare…will bestow new responsibilities on the new organization.”

During Taeb’s tenure at the IRGC-IO, he focused much of his work on thwarting Western infiltration all while Hassan Rouhani, when he assumed the presidency in 2013, was seen as trying to curb the excesses of the IRGC. He warned ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections that “the enemy is doing networking within the country’s political sphere in an attempt to infiltrate the political system.” In this regard, Taeb’s IRGC-IO targeted Rouhani’s administration. For example, Rouhani’s then Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Shahindokht Molaverdi invited Lebanese citizen and U.S. permanent resident Nizar Zakka to a conference in September 2015. But despite his invitation from the government, Zakka was arrested by the IRGC-IO and was held hostage for around four years. The IRGC-IO later, in January 2022, also targeted Rouhani’s own brother Hossein Fereydoun, alleging a bribery scheme. Fereydoun had played a role as Rouhani’s special representative during the original Iran nuclear negotiations in 2013-2015, and these charges can be seen as evidence of the IRGC-IO’s paranoia over Rouhani and his associates, with Western connections, as they negotiated with world powers, fearing “infiltration.”

Taeb has been at the center of protecting allies and manipulating adversaries in the Islamic Republic. The former head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) Mohammad Sarafraz accused Taeb and Khamenei’s son Mojtaba of colluding to thwart reforms he wanted to institute by issuing fraudulent tenders for different projects, like a data center. Taeb’s close relationship with Mojtaba manifested itself in this episode when Sarafraz eventually left his post and recounted that he said to Taeb, “I thank you, and since I may not be able to see the gentleman for himself, on my behalf, please thank Mr. Haj Agha Mojtaba, because you prepared the ground for me to leave the IRIB, to my relief.” Taeb did not deny the charge, according to Sarafraz, but then asked him “Well, what do you want to do next?”

L: R: Son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei shaking hands with Hossein Taeb

In a leaked audio conversation between the former commander-in-chief of the IRGC Mohammad Ali Jafari and one of his deputies which surfaced this year, they implicate Taeb in helping to cover up embezzlement of around $3 billion during Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s tenure as mayor of Tehran between the municipality and Yas Holdings, which was controlled by the IRGC. Ghalibaf had proposed generating false invoices to mask the corruption—Iran’s supreme leader had ordered a certain percentage of profits from Yas Holdings be directed to the Quds Force—but despite this proposed financial crime, Taeb and Mojtaba Khamenei allegedly supported Ghalibaf.

The IRGC-IO has become an entity over which Mojtaba Khamenei wields great influence. This can be seen in not only Taeb’s alliance with Mojtaba dating back years to their service in the Habib Battalion, but also with Taeb’s deputies being alumni of that brigade. Hossein Nejat was installed as Taeb’s deputy in 2016. Nejat, who also served in the Habib Battalion during the Iran-Iraq War, previously commanded the IRGC’s Vali Amr Unit, which provides personal security to the supreme leader. Nejat eventually left the role in 2019 to become the IRGC’s deputy commander for cultural and social affairs and eventually decamped to the Sarallah Headquarters. Hassan Mohaghegh replaced Nejat as Taeb’s deputy. Like Mojtaba, Taeb, and Nejat, Mohaghegh also hailed from the Habib Battalion. He was injured, and uses two canes to this day. Before ascending to the deputyship of the IRGC-IO, Mohaghegh was chief of staff of the IRGC’s 27th Division and then later became the head of the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division. In May 2019, the IRGC-IO received another boost in stature when it merged with the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division, with Mohaghegh becoming Taeb’s deputy.

L to R: Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC Hossein Salami and IRGC-IO Deputy Hassan Mohaghegh

While Taeb has become notorious for his domestic repression and political gamesmanship, the IRGC-IO’s foreign footprint had been less prominent until recently. But when Taeb was sanctioned by the European Union in 2011, it was for involvement “in providing equipment and support to help the Syrian regime suppress protests in Syria.” After Hossein Salami became the commander-in-chief of the IRGC in May 2019, he signaled a desire for the IRGC-IO to become involved in the entirety of the threat geography that the Islamic Republic faces—which was interpreted to mean an expansion of its mission set beyond Iran’s borders. This ambition can be seen in the complex operation which resulted in the luring of dissident journalist Ruhollah Zam from exile in Paris to Iraq, where he was kidnapped and taken back to Iran and later killed. In July 2021, Taeb thereafter made a rare trip to Iraq—undertaking an assignment that was usually reserved for the Quds Force commander—where he liaised with Iraqi militias and encouraged them to increase attacks on U.S. forces. Later, Taeb was implicated as spearheading the drive to retaliate against Israel for its reported assassinations of Iranian IRGC officers and defense sector specialists, involved in the regime’s missile and drone programs. Israeli media reports depicted him as being under intense pressure to do so. This is likely because of multiple counter-intelligence failures, particularly the deaths of the former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, the father of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the late Deputy Commander of the Quds Force’s Unit 840 Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, and several sabotage attacks against Iranian nuclear, missile, and drone facilities. It also may have been personal for Taeb, as audio tapes, summarized by Iran Wire, alleged that the son of Ahmad Motevaselian, whom Iran accuses Israel of capturing in the 1980s, is married to Taeb’s daughter Zeinab.

Replaced

The longevity of Taeb’s career at the IRGC-IO, coupled with these setbacks, likely precipitated the decision to replace him in June 2022 with Mohammad Kazemi, who was previously the longtime commander of the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization, which was founded in 1983 and focuses on counter-intelligence and security within the ranks of the IRGC. Nevertheless, Kazemi, who has kept a very low profile through the years, represents a change as he is not a cleric, in contrast with Taeb, and comes from outside the Intelligence Organization as the Intelligence Protection Organization has been a separate, standing subunit within the IRGC hierarchy. This likely indicates an attempt to tighten the operations of the IRGC-IO through a player, Kazemi, who has had an inward IRGC-centric focus at the Intelligence Protection Organization. But this still raises questions as to Kazemi’s own personal effectiveness as he too was at the helm of the Intelligence Protection Organization alongside Taeb at IRGC-IO all while Soleimani, Fakhrizadeh, Khodaei, and others were killed. The IRGC’s Ansar Al-Mahdi Protection Unit, which provides bodyguards to senior Iranian officials like Fakhrizadeh, still experienced great breaches all while Kazemi was in his post focusing on security among guardsmen. Also unclear is the future leadership of the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization and its structural relationship with the IRGC-IO moving forward given Kazemi’s time there. The IRGC-IO has undergone mergers before—for example with the strategic intelligence division—with other IRGC entities. But Khamenei may still prefer to keep it as a separate organization.

Mohammad Kazemi, the new head of the IRGC-IO

Mojtaba Khamenei himself, who is considered by some observers to be a potential candidate for the supreme leadership, will still retain significant institutional sway in the IRGC-IO. After all, he and Mohaghegh, who is still deputy head of the IRGC-IO, served in the Habib Battalion as well.

Hassan Mohaghegh, the deputy head of the IRGC-IO

Taeb’s future remains in question as he was merely named as an advisor to the commander-in-chief of the IRGC. This appears at first glance like a comedown, at least in the short-term, for him given his central role manipulating, meddling, and repressing Iranian officials and society, not to mention his powerful relationships with Iran’s supreme leader and his son Mojtaba.

Onetime commanders of IRGC subunits have also gone on to become advisors to the commander-in-chief of the IRGC. Saeed Mohammad, the former head of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, after a short tenure there where he was seen as harboring presidential ambitions, was removed from his position—with rumors about unspecified violations—and became an advisor to Salami, like Taeb. Later, Mohammad became the secretary of the Free and Special Economic Zones, a decidedly less powerful post.

But it is still too early to write the regime obituary for Taeb given his relationship with the Khamenei family and how they have managed to promote him through the ranks despite his repeated controversies and fearsome reputation. He may be too valuable for the Khameneis to completely cast aside. Already, there is speculation in the Iranian media of a significant new strategic and special post for Taeb, citing his recent foreign travel. Taeb’s rare trip to Iraq last year could be a sign of an expanded mission set for him.

In the end, Taeb has survived and thrived in Tehran for such a long period of time given his ruthlessness and relationships. His departure from the IRGC-IO represents an earthquake in the Iranian intelligence community given the longevity of his career there—being the inaugural head of the IRGC-IO, and presiding over it under three presidents—Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raisi—and in the aftermath of the 2009 Green Movement protests; through the Iran nuclear deal; and in the first year of Raisi’s presidency. But what this means for Taeb’s personal stock in Tehran’s corridors of powers will be decided in the weeks and months ahead.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focuses on Iranian leadership dynamics, the IRGC, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.

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Iranian Politics

Who was Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei?

Jason Brodsky — Mon, 23 May 2022 20:22:22 +0000

On Sunday, May 22, Iranian media reported the assassination of Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, who was a senior officer of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force. Khodaei was shot five times by men on a motorcycle in an unarmored Kia Pride, in what was thought to be a secure area near the Iranian parliament. Khodaei’s death was reminiscent of previous operations targeting individuals associated with Tehran’s nuclear program. But his death represents an evolution in Israel’s modus operandi, signaling the implementation of the Octopus Doctrine.

Photo of Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei

Who was Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei?

Before his assassination on Monday, there was little available in open source on the life of Khodaei. But as has been the case after the deaths of other senior officers, Iranian and Israeli media soon began to detail who he was and why he was significant. Masaf News indicated Khodaei was born around 1972, before the Islamic Revolution, and joined the IRGC at a young age in 1987, which was when the Iran-Iraq War was still raging. He was originally from Mianeh in East Azerbaijan Province.

Not a great deal is known about his career after this point. Iranian reports described him as a “defender of the shrine,” which usually means service in Quds Force theaters like Syria. Apart from these brief descriptors, a series of narratives have emerged in Israeli media about Khodaei’s activities. According to some accounts, Khodaei was complicit in plots against Israelis in Africa, Cyprus, Turkey, and other locations. In fact, Israel’s Channel 13 reported that IRGC operative Mansour Rasouli was under the command of Khodaei, when Rasouli targeted Israelis in Europe, a French journalist, and an American general in Germany. Reports even suggested Khodaei may have been behind the recent Iranian attempts to kidnap or harm Israelis by luring them to fake conferences and encouraging them to travel abroad. Other narratives suggested Khodaei was involved in the smuggling of weaponry from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria. Such a disclosure would come on the heels of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) revealing last Friday that Reza Hashem Safieddine, the son of senior Hezbollah official Hashem Safieddine and the son-in-law of the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, was a lynchpin in this network. An Israeli strike near Damascus took place shortly thereafter. Separate versions of Khodaei’s life depict him as also being close with Soleimani and playing an “important” role in Iran’s defense industries, particularly relating to drones.

Photos of Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei

It is plausible that Khodaei was involved in any or all of the above. Indeed, he was likely a senior officer in the Quds Force’s Unit 840. According to Israeli assessments, Unit 840 is an operational unit which constructs terrorist infrastructure beyond the borders of Iran against Western interests and Iranian opposition groups. Unit 840 has also been active in Syria, responsible for the planting of improvised explosive devices in the Golan Heights on the border between Israel and Syria in August and November 2020. Thus, service with Unit 840 connects Khodaei’s career in Syria to his alleged involvement in terrorist plots against Israeli interests, particularly Unit 840’s role in the foiled plots against Israeli and U.S. targets outside the Middle East. In fact, some reports position Khodaei as deputy commander of Unit 840, which was reportedly headed at one point by Yazdan Mir, also known as Sardar Bagheri, according to VSQuds. But the secretive nature of Unit 840 makes it difficult to confirm with confidence the current leadership structure.

The Octopus Doctrine and Security Problems

The death of Khodaei represented a change from Israel’s modus operandi in targeted killings concerning Iran. In the past, these operations have targeted persons affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program, specifically scientists, between 2010-12, and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who headed the Organization for Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) and was killed in 2020. Other episodes involved the assassination of senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Muhammad al-Masri on the streets of Tehran. Another category of incidents involves mysterious explosions, like the 2011 blast near Bidganeh which killed the IRGC’s Aerospace Force’s Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, who was a senior officer spearheading Iran’s missile program.

But what makes Khodaei’s death different is that it represents an escalation in Israel’s war-between-the wars campaign (MABAM). Members of Iran’s Resistance Axis—including IRGC officers—have been killed after Israeli strikes on battlefields like Syria. However, in the case of Khodaei, a senior Quds Force operative has been killed on the streets of Tehran. This is a signal that the Octopus Doctrine, long championed by Israel’s Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, is in effect. Even before Bennett became prime minister, he urged Israel to focus on targeting Iran proper—the head of the Octopus—and not just its tentacles in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere. As Bennett once said, “while we’re shedding blood fighting their tentacles, the octopus’ head is lounging in its chair enjoying itself.” In 2020, Bennett expanded on this concept saying, “when the octopus tentacles hit you, you must fight back not just against the tentacles, but also to make sure to suffocate the head of the octopus, and the same applies to Iran…Now we are changing the paradigm, we are now engaged in a continued effort to weaken the Iranian octopus through economic, diplomatic, and intelligence measures, as well as with military means and various other approaches.”

Photo of Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei After His Death

Therefore, Khodaei’s assassination is very much a reflection of this approach. It’s not just his death but also the events leading up to it, including Mossad’s reported detention and questioning of Mansour Rasouli in Iran, and especially its disclosure. Many of these campaigns likely utilize foreign citizens, what Haaretz has called “Mossad’s international brigade.”

Khodaei’s killing lastly represents another embarrassment for Iranian security forces. It follows the deaths of Soleimani, Fakhrizadeh, al-Masri, and explosions at sensitive facilities. Soleimani and Fakhrizadeh were more senior targets than Khodaei—and were guarded by the IRGC. Khodaei did not appear to have a great deal of security, especially given his car was unarmored. But Khodaei’s assassination shows once again the recurring problems in IRGC protective details—or lack thereof—of its officers and Iranian officials as well as chronic counterintelligence failures. This is likely to cause yet another reassessment within Tehran on security, demonstrating that it continues to suffer from deep institutional penetration from foreign intelligence services. In a sign of how sensitive the IRGC is to this issue, right around the time of Khodaei’s death, it published information claiming it dismantled an Israeli intelligence network.

In the end, Khodaei, while not well known to the outside world, was certainly important to the Iranian system given his senior role in Unit 840 and the presence of significant regime figures at the mourning ceremony over his coffin on Monday, like First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, who has close ties to the Office of the Supreme Leader as a onetime head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order. Khodaei’s assassination is already causing Tehran to consider how it can reestablish its own deterrence, with Nour News, which is linked to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), saying the operation “is crossing a red line without calculation, that is going to change many equations.” The fallout is far from over.

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Terrorism

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