What is the Next Step in Israel and Hezbollah’s Strategic Chicken Game?

Another red line was crossed as Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, one of Hezbollah’s top military commanders, in a precise air strike on the organization's stronghold in Beirut. The unusual attack in terms of the target's seniority and the sensitivity of the location, was a retaliatory move after a rocket launched by Hezbollah killed 12 children in northern Israel a few days ago. 

The Israeli strike in Beirut was followed by another attack – this time the target was Hamas Political Leader Ismail Haniyeh who was killed in Tehran. The proximity of the two pinpoint attacks attributed to Israel put Hezbollah and its patrons in Tehran on the spot. Decision makers in both Tehran and Beirut must figure out a way to retaliate against Israel without risking an all-out regional war that could either threaten the existence of Hezbollah or lead Iran into a direct military confrontation with Israel.

By now the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has already declared Iran’s commitment to avenge Haniyeh’s death and reports are indicating that Tehran is getting prepared to retaliate directly. There is a chance Hezbollah will be left outside of these plans, and the organization will be responsible to carry out an independent and separate response as a retaliation to Shukr’s assassination.

Fuad Shukr was a member of Hezbollah’s top military decision body, the Jihad Council, and an adviser to Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah for planning and directing wartime operations. At the same time, he headed the organization’s strategic division which includes various types of advanced missiles and UAV capabilities and was the main person responsible for the years-long military power build-up in Lebanon sponsored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 

Being one of the “founder’s generation” of Hezbollah, Shukr was one of the top names on the United States’ most wanted terrorists list due to his involvement in suicide attacks against American forces in Lebanon during the 1980s.  

For the past nine months, the tit-for-tat exchange of blows between Israel and Hezbollah has become a well-established dynamic. As both sides emphasize their lack of will to engage in a full-scale war, their declarations and actions have fed a dangerous spiral of escalation in which every attack and counterattack raises the stakes of conflict.  

The targeted killing of Shukr in Beirut brings this spiral of escalation to a culminating point and puts Hassan Nasrallah’s combative rhetoric to the test, as the ball is now in his court. He now needs to come up with a response that will be harsh enough to deter Israel from further targeting the organization's senior leadership and its stronghold in Beirut, but at the same time one that will not give Israel the casus belli and the international legitimacy to retaliate with a full-scale attack on the terror organization.  

Past incidents in Hezbollah's retaliation to an unusual Israeli move openly challenging the organization's red lines, as the case is now, indicate that the organization goes through a calculated process. This could last up to a few days, before its leadership, headed by the risk-averse Hassan Nasrallah, approves the countermove. 

Israel has already demonstrated on a few occasions its ability to carry out a highly targeted military strike crossing its rival's red lines, but in a way that enables them to contain the strike. Such were the targeted assassinations of Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas's top leader in Lebanon, who was seeking refuge in Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut, and the pinpoint attack on the air-defense system protecting Iran’s nuclear facilities, after Tehran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack on Israel in April. 

Hezbollah does hold precision-guided stand-off munition capabilities, but so far Israel's air-defense systems have been able to intercept most of these attacks. Nevertheless, it should be expected that Hezbollah’s response to Shukr’s assassination will be in a form that has yet to be carried out. It is likely that Nasrallah, who sees importance in fighting according to “equations” and maintaining a certain level of control over the potential developments, will order his men to hit a target similar in its characteristics to the one hit by Israel – a possible target could be Israeli military bases deeper inside the Jewish state than those Hezbollah has targeted thus far.  

Other targets that might be considered by Hezbollah as an appropriate response could include civilian infrastructures in northern Israel, such as the Port of Haifa or the Karish gas rig in the Mediterranean Sea. By mounting a limited precision strike against civilian targets, Hezbollah could try to signal its readiness to challenge more of Israel’s red lines, but the risk for further escalation will be much greater. 

Similarly, Hezbollah’s leadership should recognize that targeting Tel Aviv, or any other target in central Israel, holds the potential of losing control over the situation. In that regard, the Israeli aggressive and disproportionate attack on the Port of Hodeidah as a retaliation to the Houthi attack on Tel Aviv a few weeks ago was a clear Israeli message meant also for Hezbollah. 

The next few days hold special importance as the spiral of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah just took a dramatic turn. Hezbollah’s killing of civilians in northern Israel and Israel's retaliatory strike in Beirut against top Hezbollah officials represent a clear crossing of red lines set by both sides. Hezbollah's anticipated response to the assassination of Fuad Shukr will be critical to understanding whether it will be possible to deescalate the current situation or whether the recent attacks should be seen as the opening moves that could lead to an all-out war that could ignite the entire region.

The fact that at the same time Iran will aspire to carry out its own retaliatory move against Israel after the Haniyeh assassination in Tehran, adds another element of complexity and raises the risk of all-out war.

Dror Doron is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) focusing on Hezbollah and Lebanon. He spent nearly two decades as a senior analyst in the Office of Israel’s Prime Minister. Dror is on Twitter @DrorDoron.