UANI

Technical Talking Points

Number of Centrifuges

As of May 2011, Iran was in possession of approximately 8,000 P1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. 5,860 of these centrifuges are in operation in 35 cascades. Additional centrifuges are located in the advanced Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, which uses two centrifuge cascades (328 centrifuges) to enrich 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to almost 20 percent LEU.[1]

How much enriched uranium can Iran produce per year?

As of May 2011, the average monthly rate of low-enriched uranium production is 156 kg per month of LEU hexafluoride (UF₆).[2] Based on this figure, Iran could potentially produce 1,872 kg of LEU per year. Approximately 1000 kgs of LEU is needed to construct a nuclear device.[3]

How much enriched uranium does Iran currently possess?

As of May 13, 2011, Iran has produced 4,105 kilograms of LEU hexafluoride (UF₆); 499 kg is estimated to have been produced since February 5, 2010 alone.[4] Iran currently has enough LEU to produce at least two nuclear bombs after further enrichment.[5] In a breakout scenario, Iran’s facilities could potentially convert low-enriched uranium to weapons grade within three to six months.[6]

At the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is part of the Natanz facility, Iran has begun to further enrich its LEU stockpile to 20 percent purity, bringing the regime closer to weapons-grade level material. As of May 2011, Iran has produced 56.7 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium.[7]

What are Iran’s main nuclear facilities?

Bushehr:  The power plant at Bushehr was originally built with the help of Germany’s Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens AG) in the 1970s. Work resumed in the late 1990s under Russia’s Atomstroyexport.  The US opposed the construction of Bushehr in 1998 for the following reasons: “First was that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the reactor allowing the Iranians to construct nuclear weapons. Secondly, the US was concerned that the knowledge gained by Iranian scientists working at Bushehr could further Iran’s nuclear weapons program.”[8] Though Iran claims Bushehr is for civilian purposes only, it is still a cause for concern. The spent fuel in Bushehr, a light water reactor, can be reprocessed to HEU and used for weapons purposes.[9] The plutonium produced by the fuel rods could also be used to create a plutonium bomb. Iran began loading fuel into the Bushehr on October 26, 2010.[10] The February 2011 IAEA report also revealed that Bushehr is facing serious technical setbacks and that the 163 fuel rods in reactor's core will have to be removed. It is unclear whether these difficulties arise from sabotage or startup problems.[11]

Arak:  The heavy water production facility at Arak was revealed to the public in 2002 by the National Council of Resistance in Iran, an opposition group against the regime. As of fall 2008, satellite imagery showed that significant progress had been made on the construction of the facility. The reactor at Arak is called the IR-40. Construction may be completed by 2011, with the facility being fully operational in 2013. Arak would produce approximately 9 kg of plutonium a year (enough for two nuclear bombs annually).[12]  Heavy-water reactors use natural uranium as fuel in order to produce plutonium.  Iran can therefore acquire natural uranium for non-weapons purposes (research, power production, etc) and use it to produce weapons-grade (“fissile” or “fissionable”) material. Even if the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency provided Iran with uranium for civil purposes under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran would be able to use the low-enriched uranium to create fissile plutonium for a nuclear weapon.  Only several kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium is necessary for an implosion bomb, making plutonium extremely dangerous in the hands of rogue nations and terrorists.

Natanz: The enrichment facility at Natanz was revealed to the public in 2002 by the National Council of Resistance in Iran. Natanz enables Iran to produce large amounts of low-enriched uranium that can be enriched to weapons-grade within a short period of time. The facility has two components: a fuel enrichment plant (FEP) with two cascade halls, and a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) with one cascade hall comprised of six cascades. The PFEP is also broken into two parts, with one part designed to enrich LEU up to 20% U-235, and the other designated as an R&D area.

Esfahan: Esfahan is believed to be the center of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the country’s largest nuclear research center. It is believed to have housed missile and chemical weapons programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, receiving assistance from North Korea and China. Esfahan has a uranium conversion facility (it received technology from China in the 1990s)—for conversion to gas prior to enrichment--and a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (to produce fuel for a nuclear reactor), among others.[13]

Qom: In September 2009, it was revealed during a meting of the G-20 that Iran was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near Qom.  In violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguard Agreement, Iran did not initially declare the facility to the IAEA. Iran has claimed that the plant is being constructed as “a contingency enrichment plant, so that enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack.”[14] This facility is being built to contain sixteen cascades with approximately 3,000 of Iran’s “third generation” centrifuges, which are built to spin at speeds far greater than its other centrifuges.  There is extensive evidence alleging that design and construction of FFEP began as early as 2006, but Iran has continually refused to answer any questions about the facility.[15]

Tehran: The Tehran Research Reactor is a 5 megawatt-thermal light water research center that the United States supplied to Iran in 1967.  In 1987 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) paid Argentina to convert the reactor’s fuel from 93% enriched uranium to 20% enriched uranium.  The reactor has been operating with the LEU fuel since 1993.[16]

What kind of nuclear-capable missiles does Iran possess?

Iran’s missile program mainly consists of the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, Shahab-4 and Ghadr-1 Kavoshgar (Shahab-3M) missiles. The Shahab variants are believed to have some of the same parts as North Korean SCUD missiles—missile-collusion between the two countries is highly apparent.[17]  Plans for several other Shahab variants are rumored to be in existence. Reports suggest that Iran may also have short-range ballistic missiles like the Fateh A-110 and the Chinese-imported CSS-8 (Tondar-69).

Iran’s Sajjil-2, tested in 2008 and operational in 2012, is a solid-fuel missile, “which means it has a short preparation time and can’t be as easily deterred by a pre-emptive strike.” A 2010 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) found that “Iran is the only country to have developed a missile of this reach without first having developed nuclear weapons.”[18]

February 2010 cables released by WikiLeaks in November 2010 revealed that North Korea had provided Iran with BM-25 missiles. This advanced missile is based on the Russian R-27, which was “once used by Soviet submarines to carry nuclear warheads.”[19]

How many missiles does Iran have?

Iran is believed to possess 50-300 Shahab-1 missiles, 50-150 Shahab-2 missiles, 25-100 Shahab-3, 16-35 Shahab-4 missiles, 50-90 of the Sajjil variant, and 19 BM-25.[20] Its official inventory is unknown.

What are the ranges of these missiles?

The Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, and Shahab-4 missiles have ranges of 300 km, 500 km, 1,300 km, and 3218-4000 km, respectively. [21] The other Shahab variants may have ranges of 1,500-2,500 km, making them capable of striking targets in the Middle East, Turkey, and southeastern Europe. The Shahab-3 and its higher-range variants are believed to be adequate delivery methods for nuclear warheads.[22] The Sajjil-2 has a range of 1,400 miles, making it capable of reaching parts of Europe.[23] The BM-25 missile, provided by North Korea, is believed to have a range of 2,000 miles.